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involving as it does the cessation of all activity, final release, which consists in separation from all things, we lose much that is desirable,' 'how can any intelligent person have any longing for Final Release, in which there is neither pleasure nor pain, nor any sensation at all?'

From the above detailed account of Wrong Cognition, the *Vārtika* has deduced the definition that 'Wrong Cognition is the cognition of a thing as what it is not,—the apprehending of a thing in what is not that thing,'—*Atasmin tadīti jñānam*. And this is the definition that has been accepted by all later logicians. The ***Tattvachintāmaṇi*** also accepts the same definition, only expressing it in a form more in keeping with the precise terminology invented by itself. The definition as propounded by it is **तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानम्**—'when where there is non-existence of a certain thing, there is a cognition qualified or objectified by that thing, that cognition is *wrong*.' (*Tattvachintāmaṇi* p. 401) In the proper style of the Neo-logician, this definition is on p. 418 further improved into the elaborate form—**स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रकारानवच्छिन्नविषयताप्रतियोगि ज्ञानम**, which, translated literally, means—'the Cognition that has for its objective counterpart a thing that is not characterised by properties actually co-existent with itself;'—which comes to the same thing as 'the cognition of a thing as what it is not.'

The Naiyāyika view is given in clear great detail in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (pp. 180-83):—

It has been held by many philosophers that the Wrong Cognition 'this is silver' involves the direct apprehension of 'this' and the remembrance of 'silver;' and the mistake lies in these not being properly discriminated and being allowed to coalesce. This analysis of the cognition cannot be accepted; as, like Recognition, the cognition of silver is always known as one only; the cognition being in the form: 'This substance that is lying before me, possessed of whiteness

brightness and such other properties, is the particular thing called *silver*;' and in this cognition the silver appears as something that *is being known* at the time, and not as something that *has been known* in the past; and in remembrance, the object always appears as something that *has been known*. So the notion of silver in the case of the wrong cognition of silver cannot be regarded as remembrance. Then again, the Mīmāṁsaka regarding all cognitions as self-illumined,—how can he justify his regarding one part of the cognition (of the wrong cognition of silver) as 'direct apprehension,' and another as 'remembrance'? It has been held that the notion of 'this' in the cognition 'this is silver' is direct apprehension; now let us consider what is it that really appears in the cognition of 'this'? If the 'this' herein cognised is the piece of shell along with all its peculiarities, then how could its perception, in any way lead to the remembrance of silver? Even if such remembrance were possible through the similarity of the shell to the silver, this could not account for that non-discrimination, or identification, of the two which we find in the cognition 'this is silver;' when we see a man, and are reminded of another man resembling him, this does not lead us to identify the two men. The only rational explanation of the cognition 'this is silver' is to regard it as due to the remembrance of the particular thing silver,—this remembrance of the thing, not before the eyes, being brought about by the perception of properties common to the two things, as aided by the arousing of the impression of the other thing (silver) left on the mind; hence the 'this' refers not to the shell, but in a general way to the 'thing possessed of the properties of whiteness and the rest;' and through the aforesaid remembrance, this general thing, instead of being particularised as 'shell,' comes to be particularised as 'silver;' and it is because the observer knows that he is actually appre-

hending the silver that, being desirous of having silver, he stoops to pick it up; until he knows that what he is seeing is actually silver he cannot stoop to pick it up. Hence it must be admitted that in the Wrong Cognition, we have the direct apprehension of silver, and not only the obliteration of the fact of its being only remembered. And the direct apprehension of silver is brought about by the instrumentality of the sense-organ, so far vitiated by some defect that it is incapable of apprehending at the time those peculiar features of the object that distinguish it from other similar things, and apprehends only those properties that are common to both; and this apprehension is further assisted by the remembrance, through association, of the features peculiar to the other thing (silver). When we speak of the organ being defective in this case, it is only in reference to the true cognition; so far as the bringing about of the Wrong Cognition itself is concerned, the organ is fully efficient. Then again, we are all agreed as to the fact that the wrong cognition 'this is silver' is sublated by the subsequent apprehension 'this is not silver'; and on being analysed this sublating cognition comes to mean this—'what I had seen was not silver'; and this must mean that the silver had been *seen*, and not only *remembered*; as in the latter case the sublating cognition should have been 'what I had *remembered* is not silver'.

As regards the substratum of the wrong cognition of silver,—in the first place, the silver itself may be regarded as that substratum; though the silver is not present, yet there need be nothing objectionable in regarding the cognition as having its substrate in the silver recalled to the mind; what has come to the mind can be the substratum of cognition, which is a mental process. In case this be not acceptable, we can have as substratum the shell, which has its own form obscured, and has taken for the nonce the form of

Nyāya Lec. 67.

the other thing (silver). These two views are only tentatively put forward; the real view held by the Logician is that the substratum consists only of the entity that is vaguely known at the time as 'this object,' without its peculiarities being definitely ascertained.

According to the Vēdānta, (Viv. I. Th. I, p. 283) the object of the Wrong Cognition is the external *this*-element of the Shell.

The *Yogasūtra* accepts the Naiyāyika view of Wrong Cognition. It defines *Viparyaya*, or Wrong Cognition, as 'a notion which abide in a form which is not that of its object' (I—8); and the *Bhojavritti* adds —'it is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not,' '*atathābhūtevthē tatha utpadyamānam*,' —which comes to the same thing as the '*atasmin taditi*,' of the *Nyāyavartika*.

It has been held that, the wrong cognition is sublated by a subsequent right cognition. What is the nature of of this 'sublation'? What is meant by a cognition being 'sublated'? This means that the cognition is bereft or deprived of its objective (Nyā. manj p. 186); that is to say, the object apprehended by the cognition becomes deprived of its *apprehendedness*; that is, it is made known that the *apprehendedness* was unreal. The sublating cognition appears in the form 'What I had, on the former occasion, apprehended as silver was not silver, but something else,'— which means that the *apprehendedness* of the silver was not true. Another explanation of 'sublation' suggested is the being deprived of its fruit; the fruit of the cognition of a thing consists in its being acquired or discarded; in the case of the wrong cognition of silver, when the resultant acquiring comes, it is found not to pertain to silver; so that the cognition of silver becomes deprived of its fruit.

As Dream is only one of the many kinds of Wrong Cognition, this is the best place for enquiring into the account given by Indian philosophers of the exact character of Dreams.

The Vēdānta view of Dreams, and of their difference from ordinary Wrong Cognition, is thus briefly explained by Vidyāraṇya (Viv. pra. saṅ., I. Th. I, p. 283 &c.):—

'In the waking state the contact of the sense-organ with the external object produces a modification of the internal organ which has for its object the external *this*-element of the shell and the like; for the internal organ has no independent energy outside the body. In dreams on the other hand, the internal organ,—which, within the body, is independent—may function on its own account and is not, therefore, dependent on contact with external objects The third cause—*viz.* the modification of the internal organ—is thus present in dreams no less than in the waking state. The substrate also is in both cases the same,—*viz.* Consciousness circumscribed by the modification of the internal organ. The difference however is that in the case of the ordinary waking Wrong Cognition, the shell and the *this*-aspect are what bring about the contact of the sense-organ......The two cases therefore stand as follows:—In the waking state, that Nescience—which has for its substrate Consciousness, as manifested by that modification of the internal organ which is due to the contact of the sense-organ and object, and as defined by the *this*-element of the shell,—illusorily projects itself in the form of silver; analogously, in the state of dream, there is concerned that Nescience, which has for its substrate Consciousness as defined or circumscribed by a certain modification of the internal organ—which modification originates within the body (independently of external objects) and is influenced by the defect of drowsiness and the like;—this Nescience, being at the same time assisted by the mental

impressions left behind by previous perceptions—which, at the time are revived by the Unseen Principle—, illusorily projects itself in the form of the world of things that are seen by the dreaming person.

The Mīmāmsaka view of Dreams has already been explained above.

The Vaishēṣika Prashastapāḍa-Bhāṣya provides the following account of Dreams.

The mind having retired within the trans-organic regions of the Soul, and thereby the functioning of the sense-organs having ceased, by reason of drowsiness, which is brought about by the contact of the Soul with the Mind, and by reason also of the impressions of previous perceptions, there appear cognitions in the form of Perception; and it is this pseudo-perception during sleep that is known as 'Dream'. Dreams have been divided into three classes—(1) those caused by the force of the extra-vivid impressions left by previous perceptions; when, for instance, a banker dreams of his money;—(2) those due to the derangement of the bodily humours; as, when, on account of the wind-humour being excessive, one dreams of flying in the sky;—(3) those due entirely to the Unseen Agency of the person's merit and demerit; *e.g.* when one dreams of riding an elephant and such other things as are regarded to be indicative of good or evil to come.

We have dealt with the first two kinds of Direct Apprehension—Right Cognition and Wrong Cognition. We now take up the third kind, Doubtful Cognition. Doubt, as forming the basis of all Discussion, is the third item in Gauṭama's scheme; and as such its treatment should, in the ordinary course, have come after the Objects of Cognition had been dealt with; but we may deal with it here; as after all, Doubt is only a form of Cognition.

The Nyāya-Sūṭra (1-1-23) defines *Doubt* as 'that wavering judgment in which definite cognition of the specific character of any one object is wanting, and which arises—(a) either from the cognition of properties common to the objects concerned, (b) or from the cognition of properties that serve to distinguish an object from diverse homogeneous and heterogeneous objects; and (c) from the presence of contradictory opinions; and the appearing of such wavering judgments is due to the uncertainty attaching to perceptions and non-perceptions'.

The Bhāṣya supplies the following explanation:—(a) The first kind of Doubt is that which arises from the cognition of properties common to two things—*e. g.* when, in a certain object seen by us we are cognisant of only such properties as are common to two things—as for instance, of the quality of *tallness* only—and we do not perceive any qualities that would help us in determining if what we see is a man or a pillar,—there arises in our mind the wavering judgment—'May this be a man or a pillar?'. (b) The second kind is that which arises from the cognition of properties that serve to distinguish an object from diverse (homogeneous and heterogeneous) objects. *E. g.* in the case of many objects we find that their special properties distinguish them from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous objects; for instance,

the earth is distinguished by the property of odorousness; and this distinguishes it from Water, Fire, &c., which are homogeneous to it, as being 'Substance',—as also from such heterogeneous things as *Action* and the rest; hence even when we perceive only odorousness in a clod of earth,—and do not perceive those other wider qualities which mark it as *Substance*—we are in doubt as to whether it is a *Substance* or an *Action*. (c) The third kind of Doubt arises from the presence of contradiction; *i. e.* from the presence of opposite statements about an object; *e. g.* one philosophy asserts that Soul exists, while another holds that there is no such thing as Soul; so long as we do not find any reasons helping us to determine in favour of either of the two alternatives, we have a doubt on the point. Doubt is due to the uncertainty of perception, as when we know that there has been perception of water where water was actually present; as in the lake; and there has been perception of water also where water was not present; as in the mirage; so, whenever we have perception of water, there is always an uncertainty as to whether there is water or something else appearing like water. Doubt is also due to the uncertainty attaching to non-perception: Seeing that the water in the roots and branches of trees, though present, is not perceived,—even when we do not see water in a certain place, we are in doubt as to whether water is actually absent or not.

(VĀ. BHĀ., pp. 34—35.)

The above statement of the Bhāṣya has been taken to mean that there are five kinds of doubt. For instance, the Nyāyamañjarī (p. 562) says इति पञ्चविधः प्रपञ्चितो मुनिना दर्शित एवसंशयः But the Vārtika and the Tātparya both hold to the three-fold division of Doubt, as detailed under (a), (b) and (c), the first three explained above; and the subsequent phrase is regarded as affording an explanation applicable to all Doubts; and the Tātparya says that the five-fold division should be discarded. Nor

is there anything definite in the Bhāṣya itself to justify the five-fold division; though such a division appears to be implied by the way in which the Bhāṣya has explained the Sūtra.

The above Explanation of Doubt has been accepted by the modern Naiyāyika. Says the *Tarkabhāṣā* (pp. 63-64, Indian Thought II, pp. 103-104)—

'When with reference to one and the same object there arise ideas of two mutually contradictory things, it is what is called 'Doubt'. It is of three kinds—(1) Arising from the non-perception of the difference between two things, and the perception of only their similarities; (2) arising from difference of opinions; and (3) arising from the perception of a property that is peculiar to the thing concerned. (1) As an instance of Doubt arising from the perception of similarities, and non-perception of differences, we have the doubt as to the object seen being 'a man or a post'; in this case, with reference to the object seen, when the observer fails to perceive either the presence of crooked crevices, which would lead to its being definitely recognised as the post, or the presence of hands, head and other limbs, which would indicate it definitely to be a *man*,—and he perceives only the tallness and such other properties common to the man and the post—he has the doubt in the form 'is this a post or a man?' (2) The second kind of doubt is that which is due to there being differences of opinion, and the distinctive features not being perceived; *e. g.* the doubt as to words being eternal or non-eternal. Some philosophers hold that words are eternal, while others regard it as not-eternal; and the impartial man who becomes apprised of this difference of opinion, and does not himself notice any such features in Words as would point definitely one way or the other, has the doubt—'is Word eternal or non-eternal?' (3) The third form of Doubt is

that which is due to the perception of a property that is peculiar to the thing in question only ; *e. g.* when one perceives the presence of odour in a clod of earth,—which is a property peculiar to earth only, which does not indicate either its eternality nor non-eternality—and he does not notice any other property favouring either eternality or non-eternality, there arises in his mind a doubt as to earth being eternal or non-eternal ; the doubt appearing in the form—'Is the Earth eternal, because possessed of the quality of odour which is not present in many non-eternal substances, like a piece of ice and such other aqueous products ? Or is it non-eternal, because possessed of the quality of odour which is present in many non-eternal substances, like the jar and other things ?'

The Nyāyamañjarī, p. 556, notices another explanation of the Sūtra by which Doubt is defined simply as 'wavering judgment', or as 'wavering judgment due to the perception of similarities'; and the rest of the Sūtra is regarded as purely explanatory.

The Vaishēṣikas divide Cognition into two classes—Knowledge and Ignorance. Under Ignorance they have,—(1) Doubt, (in the form 'is the thing I perceive this or that?'),—(2) Wrong Cognition (when a thing is known as what it is not),—(3) Uncertain Cognition (in the form 'what may this be?'),—(4) and Dream. Under *Knowledge* they have Perception, Inference, Remembrance and Intuition. (Prashastapāḍa, under 'Buḍḍhi.')

'The Mīmāmsaka view is as follows—

'As regards Doubtful Cognitions—*e. g.*' is this a pillar or a man ?'—what is actually perceived is some object endowed with the quality of *tallness* ; and this is quite valid so far. This perception of tallness then brings to the mind of the observer a number of *tall* things, the pillar, the man, the tree, and so forth ; then it is that there comes the doubt as to whether the object before the eyes is this or that partic-

ular *tall thing*. Thus in all doubtful cognitions there are two remembrances involved; there is not only one act of apprehension'. (Prābhā. Mīmā. p. 32.)

CHAPTER V.

REMEMBRANCE.

We have dealt with Right Cognition, Wrong Cognition and Doubtful Cognition, which are the three kinds of Direct Apprehension or *Anubhava*, the first kind of Cognition. We now proceed to deal with the second kind of Cognition, *Smaraṇa*, as distinguished from Direct Apprehension.

In the course of argument in favour of the view that all cognitions belong to the Soul, the Bhāṣya (pp. 177-78) says—

'Remembrance is the cognizance by a man of what has been cognised before by the same man; the cognitive agent being the same in both cases; which shows that one to whom cognitions—Direct Apprehension as well as Remembrance—belong must be a lasting entity, and not anything ephemeral or transient. The entity to whom Remembrance belongs must be the same to whom the original cognition of the thing belonged.'

The earliest definition of Remembrance that we have found is that supplied by Patañjali in his Yogasūtra, where under Sūtra 1-11, we find Remembrance defined as—'the non-relinquishment of an object that has been cognised';—'non-relinquishment' being explained as 'not allowing to escape from our mind an object which has once been cognised through the proper means of knowledge' (Bhojavṛitti); and the psychology of Remembrance is thus explained by Vyāsa in his Bhāṣya on this Sūtra—'The cognition, coloured by the cognised object, and as such manifesting or illuminating the forms of both (the object as well as the

cognition), produces an impression of the same character; and this impression, being of the same form as its cause, brings about a recollection, a re-cognizance, which also partakes of the same character.' On this the Vāchaspatya notes—'The definition of Remembrance thus comes to be this, that, it is that function (of the Mind) which has for its object something that has already been the object of a previous function; and this is the *non-relinquishment* of the object spoken of in the Sūtra.' The *Bhāṣya* proceeds—'This Remembrance is two-fold:—one in which the object remembered is purely imaginary, and the other in which the object is not imaginary; the former we have during dreams, and the latter in the ordinary waking state'.

In the *Tarkabhāṣā* (p. 61) we read that Remembrance is of two kinds, Right and Wrong; according as it is, or it is not, in consonance with the real character of the object remembered; both these kinds appear during the waking state; and during Dreams the element of Remembrance present is always of the wrong kind, not necessarily because the object dreamt of does not exist in reality (as very often the things we dream of really exist), but because, not being actually in contact with any means of direct cognition, the object, during a dream, should be known as 'that', something not before the eyes; while, as a matter of fact, it is known as 'this'; and it is in this that the *wrongness* of the Remembrance lies.

Gautama's Sūtra 3. 2. 43-44, affords material for an interesting study of the psychology of Memory and of the association of ideas in general. In this Sutra Gautama enumerates the various causes that lead to the Remembrance of things, and form the basis of Memory:—

(1) Attentiveness—fixing the mind on what is to be remembered;—(2) Association—fixing some connection among diverse things, whereby they may help the remembrance of

one another; or fixing of them in the mind;—(3) the Faculty of Memory acquired by frequent repetition;— (4) Correlated Indicatives—things related either by contact, as smoke indicates fire, or by inherence in a common substratum; as the hands or the feet; or by contradiction; as what exists brings to mind what does not exist;—(5) Characteristic features,—*e. g.* the features of the animal brings to mind the entire species to which the animal belongs;—(6) Similarity,—*e. g.* the picture reminds us of the original;—(7) Possession—as where the possessor of a horse reminds us of the horse;—(8) Supporting—as when the master reminds us of the servant;—(9) Being supported—as when the servant reminds us of the master;—(10) Relationship—as when the pupil reminds us of the teacher;—(11) Sequence—when in the details of a performance, the performance of one item reminds us of the item that follows it;—(12) Separation—when two separated lovers are reminded of each other;—(13) Identity of work or function—when one bricklayer reminds us of another of the same trade;—(14) Enmity—when of two competitors the sight of one brings the other to the mind;—(15) Excess—reminds us of what brings about the excess;—(16) Attainment—one often remembers what he has to acquire;—(17) Concealment—when the case of a cocoon reminds us of the insect that has gone out of it;—18) Pleasure and Pain,—bring to mind what causes them;—(19) Desire and Aversion—remind us of their objects;—(20) Fear—brings to mind the source of fear;—(21) Longing—is the cause of the remembrance of what is desired;—(22) Action or Profession—as the sight of the chariot reminds us of the carpenter who made it;—(23) Love—reminds us of the beloved;—(24) Merit—brings the memory of past lives, and also that keenness of memory which helps in study, &c.;—(25) Demerit—puts us in mind of unthought of sources of pain and suffering. This list is not meant to be exhaustive; it is purely suggestive. In

short, what brings about Remembrance is that faculty which is brought into existence by cognitions; and Remembrance is not the direct result of cognitions.

The *Tarkabhāṣā* also says that the Faculty of *Bhāvanā* is produced by Direct Apprehension, and, in its turn, produces Remembrance; but only when it is energised by the presence of accessory aids in the shape of the Perception of similar things Unseen Agency, Constant Thought (and the rest, enumerated in the aforesaid Sūṭra).

According to Vaishēṣika-Suṭra 9-2-6. Remembrance is brought about by the contact of the Soul with the Mind and by impression. On which the Upaskāra remarks—' In remembrance the particular Mind-Soul contact is the non-material (indirect) cause; the impression is the efficient (direct) cause; and the Soul the material cause;' and the Prashastapāḍa-Bhāṣya—" Remembrance of past things is brought about by a particular kind of Mind-Soul contact due to the perception of indicative signs, or to desire, or to subsidiary remembrance; also by impression or faculty caused by impressive cognitions, or by repeated cognitions or by attentive cognitions;—and this Remembrance appears with regard to things perceived, or heard of, or otherwise directly apprehended."

The Mīmāmsakas, agreeing with the above view, have held that Remembrance is produced only by the impressions left by a previous cognition. (Prābhā. Mīmā. p. 19).

' The modern Naiyāyika also lays stress upon the *only*; as they hold that without this qualification, the definition would apply to Recognition, which also is produced by impressions left by previous cognitions. The older Naiyāyikas do not insist on this qualification; for they hold that Recognition is not brought about *by impression*, but by the *remem-*

brance of the character of the thing perceived. The moderns regard Recognition as brought about by the eye that perceives the thing, as aided by the impression left of its previous cognition.

The Māḍhvas hold that Remembrance is brought about directly by the *Mind*, and not by impressions; and the Impression or Faculty is nothing apart from the contact of the Mind with the object.

The very fact of Remembrance forming a class apart from Direct Apprehension or *Anubhava* (of which latter Right Cognition is a sub-class) shows that the former is not Right Cognition or *Pramā*. Says the *Prābhākara* :—

'Remembrance is not valid, inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous cognition, being, as it is, a cognition produced only by the impressions left by a previous cognition.'

That is to say, Remembrance cannot be regarded as valid, because it bears upon its object, not *directly*, but only indirectly, through the agency of previous cognitions; (Prābhā. Mīmā. pp. 19-20)—and Valid Cognition is always *direct*.

The Vaishēṣikas make Remembrance as valid as Perception and Inference; distinguishing it entirely from Ignorance of all kinds.

The Vedantic idea of Remembrance is thus put forth in the *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (Text, p. 253).

'Remembrance is that conception which is dependent entirely on the energising of the impressions of the thing; and it never departs from the thing previously perceived; and it never affects any changes in the character of the thing. It is entirely independent of the man's will; often appearing in spite of his desire not to remember the thing, and not appearing when he seeks for it eagerly.'

Nyāya Lec. 79.

So by this explanation there is nothing inherently invalid in Remembrance.

We have seen above that in defining Remembrance the Logician, ancient as as well as modern, has drawn a distinction between Remembrance and Recognition :—

The definition of Recognition given by Uḍayanāchārya in his Lakṣaṇāvalī is that it is that knowledge which is brought about by Impressions as aided by the sense-organs.

Before proceeding to explain in detail what Recognition is, we shall pause a little over the argument that the Bauḍḍha Idealist puts forward against the whole idea of Recognition. These arguments will also serve the purpose of showing the different views that have been held with regard to Recognition.

The Bauḍḍha insists on demolishing Recognition, as Recognition strikes at the root of the pet theory of the Bauḍḍha that everything has only a momentary existence. The Bauḍḍha position has been put forward in the *Nyāyamañjarī* (*Text*, pp. 443-50). It may be summed up as follows :—

Recognition is said to be in the form 'this is that same jar'; now, does this involve one cognition, or a combination of two cognitions, or a direct apprehension and another a remembrance? If it is one, then it becomes necessary to examine the nature of the instrumentality that leads to it. The sense-organ can not bring about such a cognition; as no organ is in contact with the 'that'-element of the cognition; nor could it be due to impressions alone, as no impression can operate upon the 'this'-element; nor can the cognition be said to be brought about conjointly by the sense-organ and the impression; as in all cases, these two are found to operate separately, and never jointly; impression always leads to remembrance, and the sense-organ to direct apprehension; and there is no single

III.

Perception Defined.

BHĀṢYA (p. 11, l. 10).

Of the Instruments of Right Cognition enumerated above the author proceeds to supply definitions—

Sūtra (4)

Sense-perception is that cognition—(a) which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ,—(b) which is not expressible (by words)—(c) which is not erroneous,—(d) and which is well-defined.

BHĀṢYA (*p.* 11, *l.* 13 *to p.* 16, *l.* 10.)

(*a*) That cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object cognised is *Sense-perception.*

An objection is raised against this:—" If such is the definition of Sense-perception, then it is not right to hold (as the Logician does) that (in all Perceptions) the Soul is in contact with the Mind, the Mind with the sense-organ, and the sense-organ with the cognised object; [because the *Sutra* lays down only the contact of the sense-organ with the object as the necessary condition of Perception]."

Our answer is that the declaration in this Sūtra is not meant to be an exhaustive enumeration of all the factors that enter into the cause of Sense-perception; it does not mean that what is here mentioned is the only cause of Sense-perception; all that it does is to indicate that factor which pertains to Sense-perception exclusively, and which distinguishes it from all other forms of cognition; and it omits to mention the other factors (*e. g.* the contact of the Soul with the Mind, and so on), not because these agencies are not present in Sense-perception, but because they are common to Inference and other forms of cognition also.

" Even so, it should be necessary to mention the contact of the mind with the sense-organ [which is a factor that is present in Sense-perception only, and in no other form of cognition]."

*The *contact of the mind with the sense-organ* is not mentioned in the ***Sūtra*** because when Perceptional Cognition

*The *Vārtika* supplies two explanations of this sentence —(1) The Mind organ contact is as good a distinctive feature of Perception as the organ-object contact —this is what is meant by '*samānatvāt*', but the Sūtra does not make it its busi

is distinguished from other forms of cognition, that contact is as good a distinctive feature of it as the *contact of the sense-organ with the cognised object* [consequently when one has been mentioned, there is no need for the mention of other conditions, as the Sūtra is not meant to contain an exhaustive enumeration of all the distinctive features of Perception].

(*b*) *[Some people have held the view that there is no such perception as is entirely free from verbal representation ; this view may be briefly put as follows] :—" As many things there are, so many also are the names or words expressive of them ; and through these names, the things come

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ness to point out all its distinctive features ; one is quite enough to differentiate it from all other forms of cognition. The meaning of the sentence would, in this case, be as presented in the translation.

(2) The second explanation is that the Sūṭra mentions only the organ-object contact because this forms the distinctive feature of every individual perception ; *when one perception differs from another, this difference does not consist in mind-organ contact ; i.e.* individual perceptions are never spoken of in terms of mind-organ contact. In this latter case it is difficult to explain the word '*samānaṭvāṭ*', the explanation given by the *Vārṭika* (see below) being forced The *Vārṭika* does not pronounce itself in favour of any one of the two interpretations ; in the concluding statement (see below) it mentions both.

It is remarkable that the *Ṭāṭparya* notices the latter interpretation only.

*" Every object has a name , there is nothing that is devoid of name , this establishes the identity of the thing with its name , whenever a thing is cognised, it is cognised, as bearing its name ; the name is not the means by which the object is known ; as the object—cow—when perceived is perceived as 'this is cow', where there is a distinct co-ordination between the *this* and the *cow*, both of which are in the same case ; thus things being identical with their names, the perception of things must involve the perception of the name also , hence there can be no perception devoid of verbal expression"—*Ṭaṭparya.*

The translation has followed the interpretation of the *Ṭāṭparya.* This interpretation of the *Bhāṣya* however appears to be a little forced , the *Ṭāṭparya* found it necessary to have recourse to it, and explain the word '*Shabda*' not as 'verbal' (its ordinary signification), but as '*accompanied by the word or name*', as it could not accept the view that cognition of the thing as bearing a name—*i. e.* the *Savikalpaka* cognition—is not included under 'Sense-perception'. The reader is referred to its remarks in connection with the word '*vyavasāyāṭmakam*', below.

It appears much simpler to take the *Bhāṣya* as meaning that whenever the cognition of a thing 'involves its name, it cannot be regarded as *Sensuous*, being as it is *verbal* ; and it is with a view to exclude such verbal cognition (which includes *Savikalpaka* cognition also) that the Sūṭra has added the epithet—'which is not expressible

to be cognised as identical with, inseparable from, the words; and it is on such cognition that all usage is based; that is to say, every cognition of objects that is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object is in the form of 'colour,' or 'taste', and so forth; and all these words—'colour' 'taste' and the rest—are names of objects;—by which names the cognition is expressed in such words as—'such and such a person cognises the thing as colour', 'such and such cognises it as taste', and so on; and that which is thus expressed by means of names, must be inseparable from, always accompanied by, words; [whence it follows that there is no Sense-cognition that is free from verbal representation.]"

It is in view of the above position that the author has added the qualification that the cognition should be '*not expressible by words*.' In a case where the relation of the object with a word is not known [*i. e.* when we do not know the name of the object that we perceive], the apprehension of the object that there is is certainly never spoken of by means of any name *; and even when the relation is known, it is known in the form that 'such is the name of the thing I perceive' (where the two are entirely distinct, and not identical). † Even when the fact that 'such is the name of the thing' is known, what happens is that this (notion of the name) is an additional factor superadded on to the apprehension, of the thing,—this apprehension, by itself, remaining as before (entirely independent of the idea of the name). | Where the use of the name comes in, is in the communicating of the

by words'. It has to be admitted however that this explanation would militate against the accepted Logician's view that Sense-perception is of two kinds *Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka*. It is for this reason that we have adopted in the translation the interpretation of the *Tātparya*, which also appears to have the support of the *Vārtika*, which latter however is not quite explicit on the point.

*The reading in the text gives no sense, an additional 'na' being necessary. Such is the reading adopted by the *Tātparya* and translated here.

†The translation follows the reading of the printed text. But the *Tātparya* reads '*narishyatē*', which reading is better; the meaning of the sentence in that case would be that——'Even where its name is known, the cognition of the thing itself does not differ from that cognition of it which we have where its name is not known'. The reading of the 'Pandit' edition is '*arthajñānanna vishyatē*.'

apprehension to others]. *So long as there is no name or appellation or verbal expression for the cognition of the object it cannot be comprehended by others, and thereby put to any practical use, because what is not comprehended cannot serve any practical purpose (such, for instance, as being communicated to others, and otherwise made use of).

†It is for these reasons [i.e. because the thing cognised is something different from its name] that whenever the cognition of things is spoken of by means of names, these names are always accompanied by the word 'as' ('*iti*'),—the form in which the cognition is expressed being 'the thing is cognised *as* colour', 'it is cognised *as* taste', and so forth.

For these reasons we conclude that the name is not (necessarily present and) operative at the time that the apprehension of the thing takes place; it becomes operative (and useful) only at the time of its being spoken of, or communicated to other persons. The upshot of all this is that the apprehension of things, produced by the contact of the sense-organ with them, is *not verbal*—*i. e.* it is entirely free from all verbal representation.

‡(c) During the summer it often happens that the sun's rays become mixed up with the heat-rays radiated from the earth's surface; and the two together, flickering at a distance, come into contact with the eye of the observer, who apprehends them as water; now if the definition of *Sense-perception* consisted of only two terms—'that which is produced by the sense-object contact' and 'that which is not representable by words'—then the apprehension of water under the above circumstances would have to be regarded as 'Sense-perception'. With a view to guard against this contingency, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be *not erroneous*. That cognition is erroneous, in which the thing is apprehended as what it is not; while when a thing is perceived as what it is, the Perception is *not erroneous*.

* The sentence given in the foot-note reading is absolutely necessary; as without it that the sentence in the text, standing by itself, gives no sense. The *Tātparya* also accepts the reading of the foot note, and so does the 'Pandit' edition.

† Here also the reading is defective; that noted in the footnote being the correct reading, accepted also by the *Tātparya*

‡ The qualification '*avyabhichāri*' is necessary in the case of Perception only; as in the case of other forms of knowledge, the *erroneousness* lies in the Perception upon which every one of them is, in one way or the other, based;—says the *Tātparya*

(*d*) When the man observes from a distance, and sees (something rising from the earth), the cognition that he has is in the (doubtful) form—'this is smoke, or this is dust'; inasmuch as this doubtful cognition is also *produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object*, it would have to be regarded as *Sense-perception*, if this were defined simply as 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object.' With a view to guard against this, the author has added the further qualification that the cognition should be *well-defined*.*

It will not be right to urge that—"all *doubtful cognition* is are produced by the contact of the Soul with the Mind [and *not* by the contact of the sense-organ with the object]; so that the doubtful cognition would be precluded by the first word of the definition; and for the exclusion of such cognition it would not be necessary to have a further qualification";—because as a matter of fact, it is when one sees the object with his eyes [when there is contact of the object with the eye] that he has a doubtful cognition with regard to it [in the form—'this object that *I see* is this smoke or dust]; † then again, just as in all cases of Perception, when a man apprehends the object with his sense-organ, he perceives it also with his mind, so also when he has the doubtful cognition of a thing through his sense-organ, he has the same cognition through his mind also [which shows that in such cases the doubtful cognition, though brought about by the mind, is de-

* The *Tātparya*, anxious to include the *savikalpaka* Perception under the definition contained in the Sūtra, remarks that doubtful cognition is already excluded by the qualification 'not erroneous', as that cognition also is erroneous; consequently we must take the qualification 'well defined' as meant to include the *Savikalpaka* cognition; so that the phrase 'not expressible by words' applies to the *Nirvikalpaka* or non determinate or abstract cognition, and the word 'well-defined' applies to the *Savikalpaka*, determinate or concrete cognition. The *Tātparya* justifies its interpretation by the remark that the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* have omitted to make mention of this Determinate Perception because it is too plain to need any explanation; and that it has put forward its interpretation, according to the view taken by Trilochana Guru. According to the *Bhāṣya* and *Vārtika* the Determinate Cognition would not be Perception, the entire definition being applicable to Non-determinate Perception only. It would seem that the Bauddha definition of Perception as *Kalpanāpoḍham*—abhrāntam—were a true rendering of Vātsyāyana's view. The Vārtika also, when refuting the Bauddha definition, directs its attack only to the presence of the word 'Kalpanā'.

† Which shows that *all* doubtful cognitions are not independent of sense-operation, even though there are some that are due to the operation of the Mind alone

pendent upon a sense-operation]; and it is this latter kind of cognition which is brought about by the mind through the agency of the organ,—and which has this additional qualification [over the doubtful cognition, produced by the mind alone by its contact with the Soul]—which is meant to be referred to here by the name 'doubtful'; and not the former kind of doubtful cognition [mentioned by the opponent, as that which is brought about by the contact of the Soul with the mind independently of the operation of the senses].* Thus then in reality, in all cases of Sense-perception, the sense-organ of the perceiver is invariably operative; and the operation of the Mind comes in only subsequently, for purposes of the representative cognition (which recalls the third cognition previously got at through the senses); that this is so is proved by the fact that there is no representative cognition for those whose Sense-organs have perished. [And just as in the case of representative cognitions which are directly due to the Mind-operation, sense-operation is necessary, so in the case of doubtful cognitions also, which are due directly to Mind-operations, the operation of the sense-organ is necessary].

The Opponent raises another objection against the definition :—" It is necessary ", he urges, " to supply a definition of Perception that should be applicable to the † (cognition of) the Soul and (that of) pleasure, &c; because the cognition of these is not *produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object*; [and hence the definition given in the *Sūṭra* cannot apply to it]". Our reply is that the *Mind* [by whose contact the cognition of the Soul, pleasure, &c., is produced] is as good a 'sense-organ' as the Eye, &c., and the reason why the *Mind* is mentioned in the Sutra, apart from the 'Sense-organs' enumerated (in Sū. 1. 1. 12,) lies in the fact that there are certain marked differences in the character of the *Mind* and the other sense-organs [and not because the Mind is *not* a sense-organ; these differences are the following: all the other 'sense-organs'] (*a*) are composed of material or elemental substances,—(*b*)

* Thus there being many doubtful cognitions brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object, a further qualification was necessary for the exclusion of those.

† '*Āṭman*' and '*sukhādi*' must be taken as equivalent to '*āṭmajñāna*' and '*sukhādijñāna*' according to what the *Vārṭika* says. Pleasure may be produced by sense-object contact, but it cannot be called 'Perception', it is only the cognition of the pleasure that can be called 'Perception'.

are effective upon only a few specific objects; and (*c*) *are capable of acting as *organs* only as endowed with certain specific qualities (which they apprehend);—whereas the Mind is (*a*) immaterial,—(*b*) effective on all objects,—and (*c*) capable of acting as an organ, without being endowed with any quality.† And further, we shall show, under Sū. 1-1-16, that even when the contact of more than one sense-organ with their respective objects is present, there is no simultaneous perception of all these objects,—which is due to the fact that while there is proximity or contact of the *Mind* (with one object), there is no such contact of it (with the other objects); [which shows that the operation of the Mind is necessary in every act of perception];—and all this goes to prove that the Mind is a 'sense-organ'; and this obviates the necessity of providing another definition (of Perception, for including the perception of the Soul, &c.). Then again [even though the *Sūṭra* does not mention the *Mind* among the 'sense-organs', the fact that the *Mind* is a 'sense-organ' can be learnt from another philosophical system (the *Vaishēṣika*, for instance); and it is a rule with all systems that those theories of other systems which are not directly negatived are meant to be accepted as true.‡

Thus has Sense-perception been defined.

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* The Eye is an organ of perception, because it is endowed with the quality of Colour which it apprehends; and so on with the Nose, the Ear, the Hand, and the Tongue.

† The *Vārṭika* accepts only one of those three points of difference—viz; that the other sense-organs operate only upon certain specific objects, whereas the Mind operates on all objects.

‡ Diṅnāga, the Buddhist Logician, has objected to this declaration, in his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya*, remarking 'if silence was proof of assent, why did the Nyāya-Sūṭra not remain silent regarding the other five Sense-organs also?' (See S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa. *Indian Logic*—pp. 86-87, *footnote*).

Vārṭika.

[P. 32, L. 8 to P. 45, L. 17]

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 11, l. 10) has said—*Of the Instruments of Right Cognition enumerated above, the author proceeds to supply definitions.* Of these definitions, that of Perception is given in Sū. 4. This Sūṭra serves the purpose of differentiating Perception from all other things, homogeneous as well as heterogeneous.*

The question is raised—"What is the meaning of the Sūṭra?"

[In answer to this question; the *Bhāṣya* proceeds to explain each of the words separately].

(*a*) '*That which is produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ.*' The sense of this is that—'that cognition is *Perception* which proceeds from, or is brought about by, the contact of the object perceived with the sense-organs (spoken of in the Sūṭra) pointed out later on (in Sū. 1-1-12); and the 'objects' also will be pointed ut in Sū. 1-1-14. As for 'contact,' this is of six different kinds:—*viz.* (1) *conjunction,* (2) *inherence in that which is in conjunction,* (3) *inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction,* (4) *inherence,* (5) *inherence in that which inheres,* and (6) *the relation of qualification.* To exemplify these—When a certain thing—the jar, for instance,—is seen, the jar which is endowed with colour is the 'object', and the eye the 'sense-organ'; and in this case, the 'contact' of those two is of the form of *conjunction;* because both are *substance* (and as such capable of mutual conjunction) (1)—in the perception of the colour (of the jar) the 'contact' of the eye with the colour, which latter is not a *substance,* is of the nature of *inherence in that which is in conjunction*; because the colour

* Perception is distinguished from Inference, &c., which, as Right Cognitions are 'homogeneous;' and it is also distinguished from Erroneous Cognition, which is 'hetrogeneous', as not belonging to the same class of 'Right Cognition'.

(which is *in contact*) subsists in the jar which is in conjunction with the eye,—this 'subsistence' being of the nature of *inherence* (2).—In the perception of the genus subsisting in the colour, the 'contact' is of the form of *inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction* [the genus *inhering* in the colour, which *inheres* in the jar, which is in conjunction with the Eye] ; similarly in the case of Perception by means of the Olfactory organ, there is *conjunction* with the odorous substance,—in the odour, there is inherence of that (substance) which is in conjunction (with the organ),—in the genus subsisting in the odour, there is inherence of that (odour) which inheres in that (substance) which is in conjunction (with the organ) (3). In the case of the perception of Sound, the 'contact' is in the form of *inherence* (4) [Sound inhering in the Ākāsha of the auditory organ, by which it is apprehended]. In the case of Sound, the first * sound that is produced has its source in conjunction and disjunction.

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On this point, there arises the question——" (a) Which Sound has its origin in conjunction ? (b) and which in disjunction ? "

(a) [The *Sound having its origin in conjunction* we find in the case of the beating of the drum; in this case] Sound being the distinctive quality of *ākāsha*, its cause must be a conjunction subsisting in *ākāsha* ;—and it is a well-known law that in the producing of qualities and actions, Conjunction cannot operate independently ; it must depend on something else.—Now what is that upon which it depends ? Well, as a matter of fact, Sound

* 'First.'—The Logician's view is that whenever sound is produced, it is produced in the first instance, in the source from which it proceeds ; this sound reproduces itself in the point of Ākāsha nearest to that source, and so on, it continues to be reproduced until it reaches the auditory organ, where it is perceived ; of this series, it is the *first* one that is produced by conjunctions and disjunctions——of the air with the vocal cords for instance,—the subsequent ones owing their origin to the sound immediately preceding it in the series.

is produced (in the case of the sound of the drum, for instance) by the conjunction of the *ākāsha* with the drum; and this conjunction is aided by (and hence is dependent upon) the conjunction of the drum with the stick (with which it is beaten); and this latter conjunction is also dependent upon the force with which the stick is struck. ; [From this it does not follow that Sound is produced by the conjunction of the drum with the stick; because] if the cause of Sound consisted in the conjunction of the drum and the stick (and not in that of the drum and *ākāsha*), then the cause of Sound would not be co-substrate with it, [the Sound inhering in *ākāsha*, and the conjunction causing it subsisting in the drum and stick] and if such causal operation were admitted, then it would be possible for sound to be produced anywhere and everywhere; [because the only condition that restricts the effectiveness of causal agencies to particular effects lies in the necessity of their subsisting in the same substrate with the effect to be produced; and hence if this sole restriction were removed, any effect could be produced by any cause anywhere].

(*b*) *Sound produced by disjunction* we find in the case of the splitting of the bamboo; in which case the Sound is produced by the disjunction or separation of the bamboo-fibres from *ākāsha*,—this disjunction being aided by the disjunction among the bamboo-fibres themselves.

Sound thus produced produces other sounds all round—one sound on each side of itself; each of these again sets up another sound;—and so on, till there is produced a sound in that part of *ākāsha* which is enclosed within the ear-drum; and that sound, which inheres, is produced, in the part of *ākāsha* therein enclosed, is perceived through the relation of *inherence* (because the sound inheres in the ear or auditory organ, and this organ is only a form of *ākāsha*).

Nyāya 120.

In the case of the perception of the genus or class-character belonging to these sounds, the 'contact' is in the form of 'inherence' of the inherent (the genus inhering in Sound which inheres in the *ākāsha* of the Auditory Organ). (5)

In the perception of Inherence and Non-existence, the contact bringing about that perception is in the form of the relation of the qualification (Inherence being the qualification of that which is inherent, and Non-existence the qualification of the spot on Earth which is perceived). (6)

Thus then, we find that the Sūtra has made use of the word '*sannikarṣa*', 'contact', because it includes all those conditions that give rise to Perception—viz., conjunction, inherence and qualification-qualified relationship. And this contact is regarded as the distinguishing feature of Perception, because it is what brings about the Perception.

An objection is raised :—

"If the 'contact of the object and sense-organ' is mentioned in the definition, simply because it is what brings about Perception, then what is mentioned is only a small portion of what should be mentioned: there are many other factors that bring about Perception ; and all these also should be mentioned ; for instance, the contact of the Mind and Soul, the contact of the Sense-organ with the Mind, the contact of the object with light, the colour of the object, the colour of that which is in contact with the object (i. e. the Eye and the Light which, by means of their own colour, render the object perceptible), the large dimension of the object, the multiplicity of the component particles of the object (which, if consisting of only one particle, would be merely atomic and hence imperceptible,) and the faculty (in the Self)* conducive to the perception. 'Why should these be regarded as the cause of Perception ?' For the simple reason

*All cognitions are due to the faculty in the Self caused by past *Dharma* and *Adharma*.

that Perception appears when these are present, and does not appear when they are absent. Thus then, if the 'Contact of the Sense-organ with the Object' is mentioned because it is the cause of Perception, all the rest just enumerated should also be mentioned for the same reason."

It is not necessary to mention these other factors. The *Sūtra* is not intended to enumerate all the causes of Perception; it is meant to indicate only those characteristics which serve to differentiate it from other things, homogeneous and heterogeneous; hence the *Sūtra* mentions only that factor which is the cause peculiar to Perception, and not those that are common to other kinds of cognition. *

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†"In that case", says the Opponent, "it is necessary to mention the *contact of the sense-organ with the mind*,—as this is a factor that is peculiar to Perception."

(A) That is not at all necessary, we reply; as it is already implied by the words of the Sūtra; that is to say, the purpose that would be served by the mention of *the contact of the sense-organ with the mind* is already accomplished by the mention of that between the Sense-organ and the Object. "How so?" For the simple reason that both of these *contacts* are peculiar to Perception; and it is not intended by the *Sūtra* to supply an exhaustive enumeration of all the distinctive factors that bring about Perception; the *Sūtra* mentions only one such factor, as the mention of any one distinctive factor suffices to differentiate Perception from the other forms of knowledge.

(B) Another reason for mentioning only the contact of the Sense-organ with the Object may be that it is this contact that forms the distinctive feature of every individual perception;

*The text reads *nivartyatē*', the sense apparently points to '*varṇyatē*' as the correct word.

†See Bhāṣya p. 12, l. 2.

in every individual perception, born as it is of the contact of the sense-organ with the object, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived; as every perception is named after one or the other of these two; whenever there is a perception, it is called either after the organ, or after the object; for instance, when we perceive colour, the perception is called either '*visual*-perception' or '*colour*-perception';—and no perception is similarly named after the *contact of the sense-organ with the mind*; for instance, * the perception of colour is never called '*mental* perception'. † "But there are *mental* perceptions arising from the contact of the Mind and the Soul,—and all these *are* called after the Soul, as well as after the Mind". Our answer to this is that everything is named after that which is peculiar to itself; for instance, when a seed sprouts, it is due to a number of factors; such as the particular time of the year, the seed, and so forth; and yet the plant is named, not indeed after the time of the year and such other factors, but only after the *seed*, which is the one factor peculiar to itself, which distinguishes it from all other sprouts: it is called 'the *barley*-sprout';—so also in the case in question, [it is the contact of the *sense-organ* that forms the distinctive feature of Perception, and not that of the *mind*, which is common to all forms of knowledge]. Thus then, there is nothing objectionable in the definition provided by the *Sūṭra*.

(C) Another explanation proposed by one section of Naiyāyikas is that *the contact of the sense-organ with the mind* is not

* The reading *ṭūpālambanē* is a misprint for *rūpālambanē*

† The Yogin has the perception of his Soul; and this perception is independent of the contact of sense-organs; this perception is called the 'perception of the soul', just like 'the perception of colour'; and it is also called 'mental perception', just like 'visual perception'. Hence the Mind-soul contact is just as distinctive of individual perceptions as the sense-object contact; hence both these contacts should be mentioned.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

mentioned, because it is a factor that is common to Perceptions that are otherwise different; that is to say, the *sense-mind* contact does not differ, it remains the same, in different perceptions (with each of which the *sense-object* contact varies).* "If the mind-sense contact is not mentioned simply because it is the same in all Perceptions, then, for the same reason, the sense-object contact also should not be mentioned; as this also is the same in all Perceptions obtained through any one sense-organ; for instance, when we have the perception of the *white moving bull,* in the form 'the white bull is moving' (even though we have two distinct perceptions, that of the *cow* and that of the *movement,* yet the contact of the sense-organ remains the same)". It is not right to urge this objection; as it has already been answered; we have already given the answer to this objection, when we have said that the *Sūṭra* is not meant to contain an exhaustive enumeration of all that brings about Perception; this answer is quite sufficient so far as our own view is concerned; as regards the view of some Naiyāyikas, against which the present objection has been urged, we simply do not accept that view (and so are not bound to find an answer to it). †

(D) There is yet another explanation for not mentioning the contact of the mind and the sense-organ: It is not mentioned, we say, because it is similar. "It should be pointed out to what it is similar." Well, it is similar to the contact of the Mind and Soul. "What is that *similarity*?" It is this, that the perception is not named after them ‡;—or the similarity may be regarded as consisting in the fact that both subsist in a

* *E. G.* When we see a crowd of men, elephants, horses, &c., the factor of mind-contact is one and the same for all; but the sense-object contact is different with the perception of each of the things perceived.

† This is the *Vārṭika's* own interpretation of *Bhāṣya* passage, p. 12, l. 2.

‡ Just as the Perception is not named after the Mind.

substratum which is imperceptible by the senses : just as the Mind-soul contact has an imperceptible substratum, so also has the Sense-mind contact ;—or the similarity may lie in the fact that neither of the two belongs to the object perceived : just as the Mind-soul contact does not pertain to the perceived object, so the Sense-mind contact also ;—or lastly, the similarity may lie in the fact of both belonging the Mind : just as the Mind-soul contact subsists in the mind, so the Sense-mind contact also.

* Thus then, because the Sense-mind contact is similar to the Mind-soul contact,—or because all that is necessary is accomplished by the mention of any one of these two,—the Sūṭra does not mention both.

†The Opponent now raises an objection to the definition as a whole—" It is not right to define Perception as produced by the *contact* of the sense-organ and the object; as the sense-organs operate upon things without actually getting at them (hence no *contact* of these is possible). For instance, according to some philosophers both the *Eye* and the *Ear* are operative without getting at the object; and in support of this view they put forward two reasons :—The Eye is operative without getting at the object, (*a*) because it apprehends things at a distance from it, and (*b*) because it apprehends things very much larger than itself (and of varying sizes). (*a*) It is a matter of common experience that we see, with our eye, a thing which is lying on a spot at some distance from ourselves; and certainly, in this case the Eye does not get at the thing seen; specially as the organ is only a particular kind of material substance (and as such incapable, by itself, to move up to a thing at a distance) ;

* The *Tāṭparya* notes that the first reason is the one that is given in the Bhāṣya; and the second that which the Vārṭika itself propounds.

†This is a fresh objection raised in the *Vārṭika*, and is not mentioned in the *Bhāṣya*.

that which is called the 'Eye' is only the * material substance in the shape of the dark spot (the *pupil*), which is aided (in its operation) by another material substance (*light*) outside itself, and further depends upon the *desire to see* (on the part of the person to whose body the dark spot belongs) and also upon the past *karman* (of that person, conducive to the particular experience of visual perception);—this fact has been explained in the following words—'The Eye becomes the means of perceiving colour, because it is brought into existence by the *karman* that is conducive to the experiencing of colour as preceded by a desire for that experience'. Similarly with the other sense-organs also. Thus then, the Eye-ball (which, by the above definition, is the visual organ), aided by another material substance (light), cannot possibly *get at* the object (apprehended by its means). Hence we conclude that the Eye is operative without getting at the object, because it apprehends things at a distance. Some people explain the reason '*sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ*' in a slightly different manner: in the case of the Nose and the other organs that operate by getting at objects, things are not perceived as 'this is at a distance from us'; while in the case of the Eye, things *are* so perceived. (*b*) Another reason for regarding the Eye as operative without getting at the object lies in the fact that it apprehends things of larger and varying dimensions; for instance, we see such large things as the city, the forest and the like; while the Eye is never found to be of such large sizes. (*c*) †A further reason for the same view lies in the fact that in the case of perception by the eye, there is mention of the particular direction in which the thing is perceived; (in the form 'the thing that

* The sense of this is that a particular material substance, when making known colour, with the help of the past Karman of the perceiver, is called the *Eye*. —*Ṭāṭparya*.

† If it were necessary for the Eye to get at its object, we could see only those things that would be exactly of the same size as the Eye; as only such things could be *got at* by the Eye; the Eye can never *get at* the entire forest that is seen.

I see is to the east of me'); if the eye were operative by getting at the object, there could be no such mention of the direction; as we find no such mention in the case of perceptions by means of the Nose and such other organs as operate by getting at their objects. (*d*) A fourth reason in support of the same view is that at one and the same time the Eye apprehends near as well as remote things: anything that has motion, when it continues to move, it gets at the nearer object sooner than it does at the remoter one; whereas in the case of the Eye, we find that we see the branch of the tree (which is near us) at the same time that we see the moon (far off from us); all which goes to prove that the Eye has no motion; and hence cannot be operative by getting at the object."

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To the above, the author offers the following reply:—

(*a*) The first reason given is '*sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ*— '*because we see with our Eye, a thing which is lying on a spot at some distance from the Eye;*'—this reasoning is not sound; as it does not stand an examination of the several alternative explanations of which the expression is capable: What, we ask, is the meaning of the expression *sānṭaragrahaṇa?* (1) Does it mean *the perception of the sānṭara*—of that which, being at a distance, is not got at? (2) Or the perception of the thing *along with distance* (anṭara)? We shall take the former first. We grant that the expression '*sānṭaragrahaṇa*' means the perception *of that which is not got at*:—but in this case we find that this is exactly what is meant by the proposition that you are seeking to prove; and as such cannot be regarded as a reason in proof of that proposition. "Why so?" Simply because what is meant to be the reason or proof is already implied by the proposition sought to be proved; that is to say, your reasoning turns out to be—'The Eye cannot operate by *getting at the object*, because it apprehends things without *getting at them*'; in

which it is clear that what is put forward as the reason does not differ from what it is meant to prove. If then, you accept the second of the two alternative meanings mentioned above and explain '*sānṭaragrahaṇa*' as 'perception along with the distance',—we ask, in that case, what is that 'distance' which is perceived, by the Eye, along with the object? Is it *ākāsha*? or mere negation? or some other substance? If it is *ākāsha*, then, it could never be an 'object of the Eye'; *ākāsha* is never perceived by means of the Eye; being, like Air and the rest, without colour. If the word 'anṭara' (distance) means some substance that has colour, then, as no coloured substance can be transparent, such an intervening substance would act as an obstacle to the perception of the other object; and hence there could be no perception of this object *along with that other coloured substance.* If lastly, the word '*anṭara*' means *negation* * then, it is a well-recognised fact that negation, independently by itself, can never be perceived by means of the Eye; if then, the negation that is meant is that which is perceived (not by itself, but) as pertaining to the coloured object seen by the Eye†,—then in that case the reason '*sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ*' becomes *inconclusive* (incapable of proving that the Eye does not get at its object).

As pointed out above, some people, regarding themselves very wise, seek to explain the expression '*sānṭaragrahaṇa*' to mean the perception of a thing in the form 'this is remote from me.' But this explanation also cannot be

* Whenever a *negation* is perceived, it is perceived only as related to something; and never independently by itself.

† If the negation perceived is as pertaining to the colour that is seen,—*i. e.* the negation is perceived along with what is seen—then, such a negation is found to be perceived in the case of Touch also; when *f. i.* we feel the cool touch of water, and along with it, perceive the negation of heat: Hence inasmuch as such *sānṭara* perception (*i. e.* perception of negation along with the perceived thing) is found in the case of Touch also, the organ of which does actually get at its object,—the reason *sānṭaragrahaṇāṭ* cannot conclusively prove that the Eye does *not* get at its object.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

accepted; as the idea that 'the thing is remote from me' is due to other causes (and not to the sense-organ getting or not getting at its object); it is on account of entirely different causes that we perceive things as remote from ourselves; it is with reference to our body that we regard a thing as remote from us; a thing is regarded as near or remote to ourselves only with reference to our body; and this idea is not due the thing being got at or not got at by the senso-organs. In a case where the body and the sense-organ are both in touch with the object, we regard it as near; and when the object is related only to the organ, (and not in touch with the body), it is regarded as remote. Thus then, the perception of the thing as *remote* being due to other causes, such a perception cannot be accepted as a proof of the Eye not getting at its object.

(*b*) The second reason propounded above, in support of the view that the Eye does not get at its object is—*prithuṭaragrahaṇāṭ* '—' *because it apprehends things larger than itself*'. This also is not right; as mere* connection with the thing is enough to bring about its perception (and it is not necessary for the *entire* thing to be in contact with the Eye); as a matter of fact, all our perceptions of things of varying dimensions, of the large as well as the small thing, proceed from mere connection (of the sense-organ).

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(*c*) The third reason propounded above is '*ḍigḍēshavyapaḍēshāṭ*'—'*because there is mention of the particular di-*

* The *connection* meant here is that of the sense-organ with the object; *i. e.*, of the object with some parts of the organ, of the organ with parts of the object; of parts of the object with parts of the organ; this connection is possible only if the light emanating from the eye goes on expanding outwards, spreading wider and wider as it proceeds farther and farther; the passage of the text therefore shows that the author accepts this view of wider expansion. The light from the lamp, though originally centred round the wick, moves out of it in gradually expanding circles; and it is only thus that the light illumines objects of varying sizes;—so, in the case of the eye, the light, centred in it, moves out of the eye, and moves out in gradually expanding circles, and thereby renders perceptible things of varying sizes. —*Ṭāṭparya*.

rection in which the thing is perceived.' This reason has already been refuted (*Text*, p. 36, *l*. 20, by pointing out that this mention is with reference to the body, and not to the sense-organ). As a matter of fact, we find that in cases where the sense-organ and the body of the perceiver are both in contact with the object perceived, there is neither a mention of the direction (as that 'the object is to the east of me'), nor any idea of the thing being near or remote (to the perceiver); when, however, the object is in contact with the sense-organ only (and is not in touch with the body), then alone we have such notions as those of direction, of proximity or remoteness;—all these notions being relative to the body and dependent upon the largeness or smallness of the number of conjunctions or connections of the sense-organ, which is in contact with the object, with points of space intervening between the object and the body. *

(*d*) The fourth reason given above is—'*because we see the branch of the tree* (*which is near us*) *at the same time that we see the* (*distant*) *moon*'. This also cannot be accepted; as the fact cited is not admitted: What sane-minded man is there who admits that the perception of the tree-branch is simultaneous with that of the moon? This idea of simultaneity is purely erroneous, due to our non-apprehension, of the difference in the time of the two perceptions; just as in the case of the piercing with a needle of the hundred petals of the lotus (where the piercing of all the petals is felt to be simultaneous, only because the difference in the time of the different petals being pierced is not apprehended by the observer). "How do you know that the idea of simultaneity is due to the non-apprehension of the difference in time, and not to real simultaneity?" What leads us to that conclusion is the inference based upon the impossibility of obstruction.

* When I see a cow, I regard it as *near*, when the points of space between the cow and my body are few; and 'remote' when these points are many.

* That is to say, if the Eye were operative without getting at its object, there could be no power in walls or screens to obstruct the vision; and thus there would be an impossibility of obstruction ; as a matter of fact however, there is no perception of things hidden behind the wall and such other things ; hence the conclusion is that the Eye can not operate without getting at its object. And further, if the Eye were to operate without getting at the object, we could not explain the well-recognised fact that we see things near us, and do not see those far away from us ; † if it were true that the Eye apprehends its object without getting at it, then it could not be that it would apprehend things near it, and not those away from it ; while that it is so is a well-recognised fact ; this also leads to the conclusion that the Eye does not operate without getting at the object. In answer to the above the Opponent puts forward the following explanation :—" Because a thing becomes an object of perception (only when it is capable of being perceived, and not when it is not so capable) [this is the reason why the thing behind the wall is not perceived]." This is not right, we reply ; nothing can become an object of perception without some sort of connection [there is nothing intrinsic in the thing which makes it capable of being perceived; this capability must consist in its having some relation with something. ‡ What the argument of the Opponent means is as follows :—" As a matter of fact, that thing which

* 'If it were not necessary for the Eye to go up to the object for apprehending it, what obstruction could the wall put to it ? In case it has to get at its object, what moves forward is the light proceeding from the eye ; and the movement of light would naturally be obstructed by the wall and other opaque things ; and thus the light not getting at the object, there would be no perception of the thing in this case, —*Tāṭparya.*

†' The only explanation for this fact is that the Eye—or the light from the Eye—can go up to a certain distance, and not beyond it ; so that it falls upon the near object, which is seen, and not upon the remote object, which, therefore, is not seen.—*Tāṭparya.*

‡If there were any thing in the object itself which makes it perceptible, then, what is perceptible would always be perceptible ; which is absurd.

becomes an object of perception by the eyes is perceived, and that which does not become such an object is not perceived ; and things hidden behind obstacles, or placed at a distance, do

Var. p. 38.

not become objects of perception by the eye ; and it is for this reason that these things are not perceived, [and not because the eyes do not get at them]." Our answer to this is that the reasoning is not correct; as we do not admit that a thing can become an object of perception, without some sort of connection (with something else). Apart from such connection, what could this *becoming an object* be ? Hence what you differ in from us is only in the matter of names, and not in reality : What we call 'connection' you call 'becoming an object' ; and there is no real difference at all, as to facts.

The Opponent puts a further question :—" What is the proof for the Eye getting at its object ? " The proof, we reply, lies in the fact of the Eye being a sense-organ; the reasoning being—' the Eye operates by getting at the object, because it is a sense-organ, like the Nose ;—we have found that the Nose and other sense-organs operate by getting at objects,—and the Eye also is a sense-organ,—therefore the Eye must operate by getting at the object.' In case no sense-organ is admitted to be operative by getting at objects, we can make *all sense-organs* the 'subject' of our reasoning ; and in that case our 'reason' would be 'because they are instruments'; the reasoning being put forward in the following form :—' We have found that the axe and such other instruments operate on their object only by getting at them,—and the Sense-organs are instruments,—therefore the sense-organs must be operative by getting at their object.'

*" In case, through extreme obstinacy, it be held that all things in the world are operative without getting at their ob-

* The view represented here is that it is through its intrinsic potency that the cause produces its effect, irrespective of its getting or not getting at the latter.

jects,—how then would you prove your case?" Well, this obstinate man should be met with the argument that even potent causes do not bring about their effects in the way that they should do, [if their effectiveness depends solely upon their own intrinsic potency, and is not aided by other auxiliary circumstances];—that is to say, if all these causes bring about their effects, by themselves, irrespective of getting at one another, without having any potency added to them (by extraneous circumstances),—then, how is it that effects are not produced in all places and at all times (as there is no time at which the cause may not be present somewhere or the other, and its mere presence should bring forth the effect)? This is what will have to be explained. Thus then, we conclude that there is no cause that is operative without getting at the object; and of this we have many instances in ordinary life,—*e.g.* the potter's stick, his wheel, and so forth.

Thus then it is established that Perception is the cognition 'produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with the object.'

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* A fresh question is raised.—"For what purpose is the word '*cognition*' introduced into the definition?" It

* On p. 41 of the *Vārṭika*, we find 'the cognition of pleasure' mentioned as 'produced by sense-object contact' and in the present context 'Pleasure' is also spoken of as produced in the same manner;—the Bhāṣya on p. 16 includes '*Sukhādi*' under 'Perception.' What is the point then in excluding Pleasure from the definition of *Perception*? It is true that in the 'cognition of pleasure' being produced there enter some more factors than in ordinary perception; as the *Ṭāṭparya* remarks on p. 81, 1-6-8 and 27-28; but that cannot justify the exclusion of this cognition from 'Perception.' Taking the present passage with l. 15 on p. 41, we are led to believe that the *Varṭika* makes a distinction between 'Pleasure' and 'Cognition of pleasure.' But what is 'pleasure' apart from our *feeling* of it? and *feeling* is only a form of 'cognition.' It may be that in some cases pleasure, even though present, is not *felt*; but that is the case with all cognitions. The *Ṭat.* on p. 81 speaks of Pleasure, as amenable to Mental Perception. So the attempt to exclude *pleasure* from 'Perception' can be justified only on the distinction between 'Pleasure' and 'Cognition of pleasure'. Pleasure is the object, and not Perception itself; hence just as colour being distinct from colour-perception, cannot be included in perception, so also pleasure, being distinct from pleasure-cognition, must be excluded from Perception.

is introduced, we reply, for the purpose of excluding Pleasure and such other things ; Pleasure and Pain also are 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ with objects'; hence for the exclusion of them it is necessary to add the word 'Cognition' [Pleasure and Pain not being *cognition*].

With regard to this Perception 'produced by the contact of the Sense-organ with objects,' the *Bhāṣya** has represented an objector as putting forward the objection that 'every perception is called after the name of its object (which makes every Perception *verbal*).' And it is with a view to reject this view that the *Sūṭra* adds (to the definition) the qualification '*avyapaḍēshya*', *not expressible by words*; the meaning of which is that *perception* is that cognition † *which follows, and varies with, the variations in the object,* and appears in a person who has not made use of, and does not yet know, the (denotative) relation that the object may bear to any word or words;—in fact even for the person who knows this latter relation of the object to its name, at the precise moment when the cognition appears, it appears in a form which is entirely free from any idea of the said relation [the idea of this relation coming to the mind only subsequently].

Some commentators explain that the qualification '*avyapaḍēshya*' is added with a view to exclude Inferential Cognition. ‡ This is not right. Why? Because the de-

*The words of this sentence seem to imply that the *Vārṭika* is quoting the *Bhāṣya*. But no such sentence is found in the *Bhāṣya* ; and the *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that the present passage explains the purport of the *Bhāṣya* passage (pp. 12-13).

† This qualification is meant to show that the cognition in question is not *verbal*.

‡ How Inferential Cognition is excluded by the qualification is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*:—

When, from the contact of the sense-organ with objects we infer the motion of the senseorgan, the inferential cognition of this motion is also 'produced by sense-object contact' ; as it is from this contact that the inferential cognition proceeds. And it is with a view to exclude such inferential cognitions from the *category* of 'perception' that the qualification '*avyapaḍēshya*' has been added

finition already mentions the qualification 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object'; as a matter of fact, inferential cognition does not proceed from the contact of the cognised object with the sense-organ; hence (even without the qualification '*avyapaḍēshya*') the definition could not apply to Inferential Cognition.

(*c*) Says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 14, l. 6) :—'*During the summer it often happens that the Sun's rays become mixed up with heat-rays radiated from the earth's surface; and the two together flickering at a distance come into contact with the eye of the observer, who apprehends them as water*'. It is with a view to exclude such wrong apprehensions that the Sūṭra adds the qualification '*avyabhichāri*', *which is not erroneous.*

"What do you mean by a cognition being *Erroneous*?"

It means that it is the cognition of a thing as what it it not.

"What is it that is *erroneous*? Does the *error* lie in the *Object* or in the *Cognition*?"

*Some Naiyāyikas offer the following explanation :—The '*Error*' lies in the *object*: it is the object that appears as what it is not; and it is on account of this wrong appearance of the *object* that the *Cognition* is called 'erroneous."

This explanation however it not right. "Why?" Because the object all the while remains as what it actually is. In regard to the flickering rays of the sun, when there arises the cognition of water, there is no error in the object; it is not that the *rays* are *not rays*, nor that the *flickering* is *not flickering*; what the error lies in is the *Cognition*; as it is

'*Apaḍēsha*' is the statement of the reason or premise;—'*vyapaḍēsha* (*vi*—*apaḍēsha*) is the correct statement of the premise; '*vyapaḍēshya*' is that cognition which is obtained from the said *vyapaḍēsha* or statement of premiss; and '*avyapaḍēshya*' is that cognition which does *not* follow from the statement of the premiss; thus then '*avyapaḍēshya*' is equivalent to 'not inferential.'

* '*Ēkadēshimaṭam*'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

the *Cognition* which, instead of appearing as the 'cognition of the flickering rays,' appears as 'the cognition of water,'—*i.e.* the Cognition of a thing as something which it is not; there being no water there (and yet the Cognition is 'of water');—what happens in this case is that the Cognition* after having apprehended the rays with the Eye, falls into an Error, by reason of some defect in the perceiving organ; hence it is in the *Cognition*, and not in the *object*, that the 'error' lies.

(*d*) Says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 15, l. 1)—'*When the man observes from a distance and sees something rising from the earth, the Cognition that he has is in the doubtful form &c., &c., &c.*' It is for the purpose of excluding such *doubtful* cognitions that the *Sūṭra* adds the qualification '*vyavavasāyaṭmākam*,' '*which is well-defined.*'

An objection is raised—"The qualification is not necessary for the excluding of *doubtful* Cognitions; as doubtful Cognitions are not *produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ*; as a matter of fact, doubtful cognition is not produced by sense-object contact; it is a cognition due to Mind (and not to the sense-organs); specially as the word '*samshaya*' is synonymous with '*samshīṭi*, [*i. e.* the root '*shi*' with the prefix '*sam*', which signifies 'cogitation based upon some particular character'; and this 'cogitation' consists in the attributing of two mutually contradictory characters, recalled to the mind, to a single substratum: hence all that the Sense-organ does is to present to the mind that one *substratum*; and all the rest of the process of the

*The translation follows the interpretation of the Ṭaṭparya; which construes the passage as *inḍriyēṇa marīchīnālochya*, *inḍriyopaghāṭadoṣāṭ viparyēṭi*' and explains that the first *ālochya*, refers 'to the *nirvikalpaka* cognition, which is never 'erroneous'; the error comes into only the subsequent *Savikalpaka* cognition.

It appears simpler however to construe the sentence to mean that 'it is by reason of apprehending the thing with a deranged organ that the Cognition falls into the Error &c'

cogitation,—the recalling of the contradictory characters, and the attributing of these to the perceived substratum—is the work of the Mind; hence Doubtful Cognition must be regarded as a purely *mental* product.]"

This is not right, we reply. Because a doubt is caused by both: both are the cause of doubt,—the contact of the Soul with the Mind, as well as that of the Object with the Sense-organ; and what is meant to be excluded by the qualification '*vyavasāyāṭmakam*' in the present instance is that Doubt, consisting of non-ascertainment by the Mind, which is preceded by the non-ascertainment by means of the sense-object contact; as of this Doubt the sense-object contact is the cause; and the qualification is not meant to exclude that other kind of Doubt which proceeds merely from the contact of the Soul with the sense-organ. Thus then, we conclude that there is something to be excluded by the qualification, and hence it is quite right for the Sūṭra to add the qualification '*vyavasāyāṭmakam*.'

Another objection is raised against the definition :—"The definition 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object and so forth' does not apply to the (cognition of the) Soul or Pleasure &c., because the Mind (which is the instrument of these cognitions) is not a 'sense-organ'; and thus the proposed definition of Perception becomes too narrow. 'How is it that the Mind is not a sense-organ?' For the simple reason that it is not mentioned in the *Sūṭra* which enumerates the 'sense-organs'; as a matter of fact, we find that the Nose and the other 'sense-organs' are all mentioned in the *Sūṭra* (1-1-12), and the Mind is not mentioned among these; hence the conclusion is that the Mind is not a sense-organ. Nor is the Mind mentioned as a sense-organ in any other *Sūṭra*; hence there is no authority for regarding the Mind as a

Vār. P. 40.

sense-organ. Thus then, the Mind not being a sense-organ, Pleasure &c., (as brought about by the instrumentality of the mind) would not be amenable to Perception. As a matter of fact however, all these are amenable to Perception, and not to Inference; for the simple reason that there is no probans or inferential indicative available; and in the absence of the probans, there can be no cognition of a thing that is amenable to Inference. Nor is there any other means of cognition capable of providing the cognition of Pleasure, *etc.*; and they are not amenable to Inference; thus then there is no alternative left; it is absolutely necessary that the cognition of these should be included in 'Perception' [and yet under the proposed definition, this is found impossible]."

To the above we make the following reply; Who says that Pleasure and the rest are not amenable to Perception? "Well, that they are not so has been said by the philosopher who defines Perception as *produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.*" Certainly there is nothing wrong in the definition: the Mind *is* a sense-organ; and hence the cognition of Pleasure is a cognition *produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.* Then, as for the Mind not being mentioned in the *Sūtra* enumerating the Sense-organs,—this is due to the Mind being different in character from the other Sense-organs. "What is this difference in character?" The difference lies in this that while the Mind operates upon all (perceptible) things, every one of the other organs operates upon only a limited number of things; as a matter of fact, the Mind is effective on all objects,—while the others are not effective on all objects. That the Mind is effective on all objects is proved by the following reasonings:—(*a*) 'The Mind is effective on all objects—because it is the substratum of that contact which is the cause of remembrance,—like the Soul;—(*b*) because it is the substratum of that contact which brings about the cognition

of pleasure—like the Soul ;—(o) and because it supervises over all Sense-organs—like the Soul.

The *Bhāṣya* (p-16, ll. 5-6) itself has mentioned another point of difference between the Mind and the other sense-organs :—*viz.*, that the other sense-organs are all *material*, while the Mind is *immaterial*. But this is not right ; and such a statement is contrary to facts : in reality the Mind is neither material nor immaterial ; *materiality* and *immateriality* are properties belonging to products* ; [hence to say that the mind is *immaterial* would mean that it is the *product* of something other than *matter*] ; while as a Matter of fact the Mind is not a product at all ; and as such it cannot be either *material* or *immaterial*. Then again, the character of *materiality* cannot possibly belong to the Ear (which being *ākāsha* itself, cannot be regarded as a material *product*) ; consequently, if the non-mention of the Mind in the *Sūṭra* be explained as being due to the fact of its being different from the other sense-organs in that it is immaterial while those are material,—then, in that case, for that same reason the Ear also should not be mentioned in the *Sūṭrā* ; as the Ear also is neither material nor immaterial (product). " In the word '*bhaūṭika*', the affix has a reflexive force (so that the word means *matter itself*, and not *product of matter*.) [And the Ear, as *ākāsha*, is certainly *matter*]. " This explanation is not right ; as in that case, the affix would become absolutely useless : what you mean is that the word '*bhauṭika*' is synonymous with '*bhūṭa*' ; but if it is so, then the affix (in the word '*bhaūṭika*') has absolutely no meaning ; no additional meaning being afforded by the affix (over and above what is signified by the word '*bhūṭa*' itself) ; and the addition of the affix therefore becomes totally meaningless and futile.

Var. P. 41.

* That which is produced out of matter is 'material; that which is produced not out of matter, but out of something else' is immaterial.

It has been urged by the Opponent (in the *Bhāṣya* that there is no mention of the Mind as an organ (of cognition). But this is not true; the Mind is actually mentioned as an organ (of cognition) in Sūṭra 1-1-15 which speaks of 'the impossibility of simultaneous cognitions as indicative of the presence of the Mind'; and from this it is clear that the Mind is an instrument or organ of cognition.

Another point of difference between Mind and the Sense-organs, mentioned in the *Bhāṣya* (p. 16, ll. 5-6) is that the Eye and the rest are organs 'only as endowed with certain specific qualities' (while the Mind is an organ without being endowed with any specific quality). But this also is not right; as if this were true, then also it would follow that there should be no mention of the Ear [which does not, through its own quality of sound, make perceptible Sound exterior to itself, as the other senses do: for instance, the Nose makes perceptible the Odour outside itself, through the odour inherent in itself; while the Sound that is apprehended by the Ear is actually that which is produced within the Ear itself].

For these reasons we conclude that the only point of difference between the Mind and the other sense-organs is that while the latter are effective on only certain particular objects, the Mind is effective on all objects. [And this affords the reason for Mind not being mentioned in the *Sūṭra* along with the other sense-organs.]

The *Bhāṣya* (P. 16, l. 9) supplies another reason for Mind not being mentioned in the *Sūṭra*—'*because the fact that the Mind is a sense-organ can be learnt from another philosophical system.*' As a matter of fact, we find the Mind mentioned as a sense-organ in the Sūṭra of another (*Vaishēṣika*) philosophical system; and as this mention has not been controverted in the *Nyāya-sūṭra*, it follows, from this non-controverting, that the fact is accepted.

*An objection is raised :—" This is not right; as in that case, the mention of the other Sense-organs would be futile; the other sense-organs also have been mentioned by the other philosophical systems; and hence these also should not be mentioned, if the mere absence of denial mean acceptance."

This objection is not well taken ;—the objector is ignorant of the ways of philosophical writers : The fact of the matter is that you are not conversant with the ways of philosophers : *it is a rule with all systems that those theories of other systems which are not directly negatived are meant to be accepted as true.* (*Bhā*. P. 16, ll. 9-10). And then, unless a philosophical work lays down certain positive propositions, there can be no distinction, for that philosophy, of 'one's own theory' and 'another's theory;' that is to say, [by arguing that Gauṭama should not mention any sense-organs as all of them are found mentioned in other works] you would set aside entirely the statement of one's own philosophical views, simply on the ground that other people may have propounded them; but if this were so, then there could be no distinction of 'one's own theory' and 'another's theory '†.

For these reasons it follows that there is such a thing as the *Mind*, and that it is an organ (of perception). And thus it follows that the cognition of pleasure is 'produced by the contact of the sense-organ and object', and thus becomes included in the definition.

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*This refers to the objection urged by Diṅnāga. 'If the Mind is accepted as an organ because the Sūṭra has not controverted that statement, then the mention of the other organs is also futile.'

†Every theory is mentioned in some system or the other, being propounded in some philosophical work, or current among the common people. And what the view held by a certain person is cannot be known unless he expresses it by words ; and it cannot be known if the man confines himself to denying the views he does not hold, and does not propound any positive views —*Ṭāṭparya*.

A fresh question is raised as to whether the definition is to be taken piece-meal, or as one complete whole:—There is a doubt as to the definition of Perception that has been propounded: that is, are the qualifications to be taken as *individually* affording the necessary definition of Perception? or are they to be taken as *collectively* affording that definition? The ground for this doubt lies in the fact that we meet with both kinds of definitions; in some the qualifications are meant to be taken collectively, while in others severally. For instance, in Sūṭra I. 1. 10. we read—'Desire, Effort, Aversion, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the characteristics of the Self'; wherein each factor constitutes by itself a definition of the Self;—so also in Sūṭra 1-1-23, we have a definition of Doubt, wherein the qualifications are meant to be taken individually; while Sūṭra 1-2-10 provides us with a definition of Casuistry as the subverting of another's declaration by means of suppositions,—in which the whole collectively forms the necessary definition; so also in Sūṭra 1-1-6, we have the definition of Analogy as 'that which accomplishes the desired end by means of similarity to something that is well-known',—where the whole forms one complete definition. And as what the present *Sūṭra* propounds is also a 'definition', there naturally arises the doubt as to whether it is to be taken collectively or in parts.

The answer to the above is that the words of the Sūṭra are to be taken collectively, as affording one complete definition of Perception; for the simple reason that each of the qualifications serves to excluded Inferential Cognition, Pleasure, Verbal Cognition, Wrong Cognition and Doubtful Cognition. If every one of the five words of the *Sūṭra* were to constitute a distinct definition of Perception; then, by turns, Inferential Cognition and the rest would come to be regarded as 'Perception';* similarly if only any

Vāi. P. 42.

* For instance, if we took out the first word of the Sūṭra and accepted the rest of it as the definition of Perception, such a definition would apply to Inferential Cognition; and so on.

two of the words constituted the definition of Perception, it would include all to which those two qualifications would apply; so also if the definition were made to consist of three words only, all to which these qualifications would apply would have to be regarded as Perception; and lastly, in case four words only were to form the definition, we would have to regard as Perception all in which those four qualifications would be present. Thus then, we have to reject the alternatives of accepting one or two or three or four words as constituting the definitions of Perception; and thus we set aside all the thirty contingencies (caused by the permutations and combinations of the four epithets), and take the entire *Sūtra* (with its five epithets) as forming a single definition. If each epithet is taken as forming a complete definition, then we have *five* definitions provided by the Sūtra; if the definition consist of any two epithets, we have *ten*; if it consist of any three epithets, we have *ten*; if it consist of four epithets, we have five, (these are the *thirty* contingencies rejected); and what we accept is the *thirty-first* alternative—in which all the five epithets are taken collectively as forming a single definition.

"How do you make out that the Sūtra accepts the *thirty-first* alternative and rejects the other thirty?"

"It is a well recognised principle that the affirmation of one particular thing out of a number of things implies the denial of the rest, and the denial of a particular thing implies the affirmation of the rest. That is to say, whenever we have the affirmation of one particular alternative (out of a number of possible alternatives), it implies the denial of the rest; as it is in the case of the affirmation 'he sees with the right eye,' which implies the denial of seeing with the left eye; and when there is denial of a particular alternative, it implies the affirmation of the rest; *e. g.* the denial 'he does not see with the left eye' implies the affirmation of seeing with the other

eye. Thus then, in the case of the definition under consideration the acceptance of the one alternative (out of the possible 31) implies the rejection of the other 30.

Thus is the nature of Perception duly defined.

Some people [*e.g.*, Vasubandhu, the Bauḍḍha logician who wrote his *Ṭarkashāsṭra* about A. D. 480] have defined Perception as 'Cognition proceeding from that same object'; but this is not right. The definition has been explained as follows:—" When the cognition proceeds from that same object after which it is named, and from no other object, that cognition is called *Perception*; this definition serves to exclude the inferential and other forms of cognition, as all these do not proceed only from the object cognised, proceeding, as they do, from that and many other things." Our objections against this definition are the following:—In the first place, it is not necessary to have the words '*arṭha*,' 'object,' in the definition; if we said merely 'cognition proceeding *from that*,' it would mean '*from that object*.' "But the word *arṭha* is added with a view to emphasise it; that is to say, the addition of the word '*arṭha*' serves to lay stress upon the fact: so that the sense that would be got at by the phrase 'from that

Vār P 43. *only*' is got at by the words 'from that *object*.'*"

This is not right, we reply. As the purposes of emphasis are already found to be served by the single word '*taṭaḥ*,' 'from that;' just as in the case of the word '*abbhakṣaḥ*' ('feeding upon water'), the purpose of the emphasis that the man lives upon *water only*) is served by the word 'water' itself (and it is not necessary to add any other word for that purpose). † Thus then, the word '*arṭhāṭ*'

*The mere adjectival pronoun '*taṭaḥ*' is meaningless unless some noun is added as qualified by it; hence also the addition of the word '*arṭhāṭ*' becomes necessary.—*Taṭparya*

† In answer to what has been said above, Vasubanḍhu might reply that if we had only the word *taṭaḥ*, 'from that', then, the definition would apply to the other forms of cognition also; as these also proceed from something; and this

being found to be superfluous, we have to reject also the view that the definition serves to exclude the inferential and other kinds of cognition.

It has been held (by the propounder of the definition under discussion) that it serves to exclude the Objective * Cognition. But we do not quite understand how the Objective Cognition becomes excluded by the definition. You will perhaps offer the following explanation :—" The cognition in reality proceeds from the qualities of colour and the rest, but is called after the jar, as 'the cognition *of the jar*'; and hence it does *not* proceed from that after which it is named ; and thus becomes excluded by the definition." This however is not right ; because as a matter of fact, the cognition that proceeds from colour and the rest is never called 'the cognition *of the jar*' ; the cognition proceeding from colour is always named after the

something, be it an object (as in the case of Perception) or a cognition (as in the case of Inferential Cogniton which proceeds from the Cognition of the probans), could be spoken of as 'that'; hence *all cognitions* could be spoken of as 'proceeding *from that*;' with a view to avoid this contingency, it is necessary to add the word 'arṭhāṭ.' In answer to this we have the text 'we have also to reject the view etc. etc.' 'From that' having been explained as 'from that after which it is named', the definition would not exclude the inferential cognition ; as the latter also is named after its object 'the inferential Cognition of fire,' for instance. Nor would this be excluded by making 'arṭhāṭ' serve the purposes of emphasis ; as such emphasis could exclude only that which is contradictory to, and incompatible with, what is mentioned ; and certainly in inferential Cognition there is nothing incongruous, or contradictory, in its being named after its object, even though it may have other names also, as declared by the propounder of the definition (p. 42 l. 19). There is nothing in those other things, from which the inferential cognitions proceed, which could be contradictory to or incompatible with, the 'that object' after which the Cognition is named. Thus then, the phrase *taṭaḥ arṭhāṭ*' cannot exclude these other causes of inferential Cognition; hence this latter Cognition fails to be excluded by the definition.

* When we see 'an object, what we see are only the atoms of *colour* or such other distinctive qualities, and not any single composite object. But this cognition of the atoms is followed by the cognition of the object as one composite whole—e.g. 'This is a jar'; as the Bauḍḍha does not admit of composite wholes, he regards this latter objective cognition as wrong, and hence calls it by the name of '*samvṛṭi-jñāna*.

colour, and that proceeding from the jar is named after the jar; and hence there is no possibility of any such contingency arising (as you would exclude from the definition). Perhaps you are under the impression that the jar and such other objects are nothing apart from the qualities of Colour and the rest. But, in basing your theory upon this impression, you are building castles in the air. How the jar etc., are something apart from their qualities, we shall explain later on. As a matter of fact, every cognition proceeds from its own object; hence the introduction of the word '*taṭaḥ*', 'from that', in the definition is absolutely futile. (As it does not serve to exclude any cognition at all).

'But certainly, the Wrong Cognition proceeds from an 'object which is not '*that*' (after which it is named). [and hence the phrase 'from that' would serve to exclude the Wrong Cognition]." Certainly not, we reply. It is not that the Wrong Cognition *proceeds from* an object which is not 'that,' * it only appears in a form which does not belong to the real object (in contact with the sense-organ). So it seems you have not yet been able to understand what a Wrong Cognition is!

Thus then we find that of the three words of the definition—'*taṭaḥ arthāt vijñānam*'—the first two are found to be futile; and what is left is the single word '*vijñānam*', 'cognition'; and this would be no definition at all (*of Perception*; which is a particular form of Cognition);—or if mere 'cognition' were the definition of Perception, then all cognitions would be *Perception*!

* When the shell is wrongly cognised as silver, this wrong cognition is not produced by what is *not-shell*; there is no doubt that the object whose contact gives rise to the cognition is the *shell* itself; what happens then is that the cognition is in the form of something (*silver*) which the actual object (*shell*) is not. Hence the wrong cognition, not *proceeding from* that which is not *not-that*, cannot be excluded from the definition.

* Even accepting the definition to mean what it is held to mean,—it is not possible for (*a*) the *apprehended object* (that from which the cognition proceeds, and which therefore is the *cause* of the cognition), and (b) the *apprehending cognition* (which is the *effect* of the former) to be present at one and the same time, [as the *cause* must always precede *its effect*]; so that the cognition, in this case, could not be perception.' "But the destruction or disappearance of the cause (Object) may be simultaneous with the appearance of the effect (Cognition) [so that even if the cause precedes the effect, the effect can appear at the moment of its disappearance]." This explanation cannot be accepted; because there is no instance available of such simultaneity; as a matter of fact, there is no instance of destruction and appearance being simultaneous. In any case there is no avoiding the absurdity that the object, which will have disappeared and hence become *past*, would under the definition, be cognised as *perceived* (in the *present*). "The objection applies equally forcibly to the original definition also [as in that also the object is a *cause* of the Cognition, and should therefore have gone before the Cognition]; and in this case also what instances of simultaneity (which is necessary) are available for you?" The objection does not apply to our original definition, we reply; as we have already answered this; and we have explained the simultaneity under *Sūṭra* 3, 2. 9.

Others (e. g. Diṅnāga) have offered another definition of *Perception*:—

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* As the cause and the effect cannot be present at the same time, 'antecedence' forming a necessary factor in the conception of the 'Cause'—the object (the cause) will have ceased to exist at the moment that the cognition will appear. So that the cognition *as present* ('the jar *is*') appearing with regard to the object that is *past*, would be clearly a *wrong* cognition; and hence the cognition would not be the *valid* Perception that is intended to be covered by the definition.

"Perception is that which is *free from determination.* 'What do you mean by *determination*?' It * means *connection with name and class*; the meaning of the definition thus being—that is *Perception* which is not spoken of by a name or specified (designated) by *class* and the rest†, which is in keeping with the form of the object‡, which is definite § and self-cognisable ||."

To these people the following questions should be put:—*Firstly* (as to the word expressing what is defined) what is it that is denoted by the word 'Perception'? If it is the perceptional *cognition* that is denoted by the word, then how can it be regarded as 'not spoken of by a name'?¶ (and yet this forms the first differentium in your definition). If, on the other hand, perceptional cognition is not denoted by the word 'Perception,' this word becomes meaningless (and yet your definition contains this word.), If then, it is held that what is denoted by the word 'Perception' is some sort of generic (unspecified) thing, then we ask—Is this generic thing something other than Perceptional cognition? or the same as Perceptional cognition? If the former, then Perceptional cognition remains undefined (and yet it is this very cognition that the definition is meant to define). And if the latter, then, in that case, how could you hold Perceptional cognition

* There are five Kalpanās or determinations to which cognitions are subject:—(1) name, 'the thing I see is Dēvadatta',—(2) the class—'it is a man I see',—(3) quality, 'he is dark',—(4) action, 'he is walking',—(5) connection with other things,' he is carrying a stick'. That cognition in which none of these determinations enters is Perception.

† Action, 'quality,' connection.

‡ This qualification precludes *wrong* cognitions.

§ This implies validity.

|| If it were not so, it would not be *cognition*; and it is because it is self-cognised that it is 'free from determinations.'

¶ The Tātparya says this would be contrary to the Bauddha tenet that words express only unqualified cognitions.

to be one that is 'not spoken of by a name'? *Secondly* (as regards the definition itself), if the expression 'free from determination' is meant to denote the Perceptional cognition, then the definition involves a self-contradiction. [Perceptional cognition has been defined as that which cannot be spoken of by a name, and yet it is spoken by the name *free from determinations.*] And if Perceptional cognition is not denoted by the expression, 'free from determination,' then the expression itself becomes absolutely futile (as a definition of Perception). *Thirdly* (as regards the entire statement of the definition), the statement, 'Perception is that which is free from determinations,' is in the form of a sentence. Now, what is it that is denoted by the sentence? If it is Perception that is denoted by it, then there is the same self-contradiction. "How so?" Because Perception is actually denoted, *ex-hypothesi*, by the sentence 'it is free from determinations', and yet it is called 'undenotable,' 'not spoken of by a name';——and who else except the Bauḍḍha can make such a self-contradictory assertion? If, on the other hand, the sentence does not denote Perception, then the assertion, 'Perception is that which is free from determinations', becomes a meaningless jargon of words.

Then again, Perception being actually spoken of by such words as 'non-eternal' and the rest, it cannot be absolutely incapable of being spoken of by a name (or word). That is to say, we find the Bauḍḍha scriptures themselves speaking of Perception in the following words—'Perception is non-eternal,' 'Perception is free from pain, and also selfless; if then 'perception' can be spoken of by such words, how, can it be 'incapable of being spoken of by words'? If it cannot be spoken of by these words, this would mean that Perception is *not* non-eternal; and so, it will not have been (rightly) declared by Ṭaṭhāgaṭa

(Buddha) that 'all that is *sanskrita* (amended or purified) is non-eternal?*

The Opponent offers the following explanation:—" What is meant by the expression 'free from determinations' is that the 'specific individuality' † of the thing cannot be determined and spoken of."

In that case all things ‡ would become 'perception.' "How so?" Because no person, however well-instructed he may be (as a Bauddha) can determine and speak of the 'specific individuality' of things; for the simple reason that this would be opposed to all philosophic conception, (*specially* of the Bauddha, according to whom the 'specific individuality' of things is undeterminable, something that cannot be definitely grasped and spoken of). As a matter of fact every object has two forms, general and specific; and whenever any object is spoken of, it is only in its *general* form. Nor does this give rise to the absurdity of the object being not spoken of at all;—because the object is not particularly spoken of in its specific form, it does not follow that it is not spoken of at all; for example, it is not that the Brāhmaṇa is not spoken of by the word 'Man'; even though the word 'man' does not signify the specific features of the Brāhmaṇa—those that distinguish him from other men,—yet simply because the word does not signify the Brāhmaṇa *along with his specific characteristics*, it does not follow that the

Vār. P. 45.

Brāhmaṇa is not spoken of by the word 'Man,' at all. In the same manner, Cognitions also have the two forms —general and specific; and even though their specific form

*As perception is also included in 'all' and if it is not non-eternal, *all* cannot be not-eternal.

†This is a Bauddha technicality: Every object has a distinctive form of its own but this is nothing positive, it is purely negative; the 'specific individuality' of the Cow consists in the *negation-of-the not-cow*; this is also called '*Apoha*'.

‡Diṇnāga has not put forward his definition in connection with 'Right Knowledge'—as Ḍharmakīrṭi has done; hence the definition cannot be restricted to *Cognition* only. *Tāṭparya*.

can never be spoken of by means of words, the general form can always be so spoken of [Hence the explanation of the definition becomes absurd].

If, in order to escape from this absurdity, the definition of Perception be explained to mean 'that which is not spoken of *in its specific form*,'——then it would apply, not to Perception only, but to the entire Universe. [As no object is ever spoken of *in its specific form.*]

With a view to avoid these difficulties, the word '*kalpanāpodha*' ('free from determination') may be regarded as a conventional name for the specific form of 'Perception' (without having any literal meaning of its own). But even thus the contradiction does not cease; for as already pointed out above, the specific form of anything cannot be spoken of by means of any word; and yet, the specific form of Perception would be sought, in the definition, to be spoken of by means of the word '*kalpanāpodha*.' If (with a view to escape from this, it be held that) the word expresses nothing,—then what is the use of introducing the word at all in the definition—'*Kalpanāpodham pratyakṣam*'? Not expressing anything at all, it is exactly like the dream of a dumb person.

Thus then, it is found that the more we examine the definition proposed by Dinnāga, the more incapable it is found of bearing the scrutiny of reason.

Jaimini has proposed another Definition of Perception: "The cognition that is produced when there is contact of the man's sense-organs." Mīm-sū. 1-1-5. This definition also is not right; because the said contact is the cause of the production of Doubt (and Wrong Cognition) also; this has been pointed out by the commentators upon this *Sūṭra* of Jaimini (*e.g.* in the *Shabhara-Bhāṣya* and the *Shloka-vārṭika*).

This same argument also sets aside the definition of Perception as 'that cognition which appears when there is contact of the object with the sense-organs, and the mind is calm and clear*'.

Similarly the definition supplied by Vārṣagaṇya cannot be accepted. He defines Perception as 'the functioning of the Ear and other sense-organs.' This definition cannot be accepted as it introduces the names of all the five sense-organs; hence any cognition in which even one of the five organs is not in operation would not be a true Perception'!

The method of reasoning employed in the refutation of these definitions will serve to show that all those definitions that are similar to those already refuted, cannot be accepted as true definitions.

Thus ends the explanation of the Definition of Perception.

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* This also applies to Doubt and Wrong Cognitions.

CHAPTER II.

SECTION (1).

Ineffectiveness of the Naiyāyika's Nigrahasṭhānas or 'Clinchers' as against the Vedānta.

A—[Having found that it is not possible to propound suitable definitions of the *Pramāṇas*, Perception, Inference and the rest, or of the *Pramāṇābhāsas*, the *Hēṭvābhāsa*, &c., whereby the validity of the Vedānṭa view could be vitiated,—the Logician now falls back upon his 'clinchers' or *Nigrahasṭhānas*, which afford to him the means of silencing his opponents in discussions. And he takes up *Praṭijñāhāni*, which is the *first* to be mentioned among 'clinchers'.]

[PAGE 511] (1) Says the Logician—"If we cannot define the *hēṭvābhāsas*, then we have the 'clinchers'—'Recantation' and the rest (described in *Nyāyā-Sūṭra* 5. 2. 1.)—which would invalidate the philosophy of *non-duality*." This cannot be, we reply. For what is '*pratijñāhāni*', or 'Recantation' (which is the first of the twenty-two Clinchers mentioned by Gauṭama)? It will not be right to define it as the retracting or denying of what has been admitted and asserted; as this definition will apply to that case in which one makes a certain assertion and (himself finding it wrong) quickly retracts it; while as a matter of fact, this is not (according, to the Logician himself) a case of 'clincher'. And in order to avoid this difficulty it will be necessary for you to add the further qualification that the *retracting* be done after the assertion has been found fault with *by the opponent*. [And in thus propounding, at the outset, an unqualified definition, and subsequently, adding a qualification, the Logician himself becomes open to the fifth 'clincher', called '*hēṭvanṭara*'.]

(2) In the above definition, what do you mean by the something being '*svīkriṭa*', *admitted*? Does it mean only that the thing is *simply accepted*? or that it is *accepted as existing*, as a real entity? If the former, then, as a matter of fact, you will find that in every case, you have the *denial* of something, in one form, which is *desired* or *accepted* in

another form [even in the case of the perfectly true denial 'sound is not eternal', you have the *denial* of *sound*, which is desired or accepted,—though it is true that sound is accepted, in the form of *quality*, as being a quality, and it is denied, as eternal; yet the *denial of the accepted* is there all the same]; thus the definition would, in this case, become too wide. "What is meant by the word '*tyāga*' 'retraction' in the definition is that denying which comes after acceptance; and in the case you have cited the acceptance is not *in the form* in which the denial follows; and hence there being no real 'retraction' in this case, the definition, does not apply to this case". This will not be right, we reply; as by your explanation, the idea of *acceptance*, being implied by the word 'retract', the word '*svīkṛiṭa*' 'accepted', 'admitted', in the definition would be superfluous. If in view of this superfluity, you omit the word '*svīkṛiṭa*' from the definition,—even then, neither of the two alternatives put forward above (in connection with the meaning of the word '*svīkṛiṭa*') would be admissible. As [the first alternative has already been shown to be inadmissible; and as regards the second alternative, that the word means *being accepted as a real entity*] with regard to *what is accepted as a real entity*, it is always possible to regard it is *not accepted*, in some other form. And [even if you urge that both the *acceptance* and the *denial* should pertain to one and the same form of the thing, and not to different forms of it], we shall urge against you the case of the Logician's own theory that Conjunction and such qualities exist only in parts of their substratum, by which theory, (in the case of the conjunction of the jar and the all-pervading *ākāsha*) the Logician both *accepts* and *denies* the presence of Conjunction in *ākāsha* [in which case the acceptance and denial both pertain to the same conjunction and the same *ākāsha*]. Similarly also with the case of many things whose existence is both accepted

and denied with reference to different points of time and place—the same thing being accepted as existent at one place and time, and denied to exist at another place and time. "But what we mean is that the thing that is denied in a certain form at a certain time and place by a certain man should be the same thing that has been accepted in the same form by the same man at the same time and at the same place." In that case there would be no 'recantation' when a man admits the existence of Time and then denies it; as with regard to Time the qualification 'at the same time' would be impossible; as any one point of time cannot subsist either in itself or in any other point of time [hence no 'time' can be predicated of any point of time, in the form 'the time at the same time.'] If (in order to avoid this difficulty) you omit the qualification 'at the same time' in the definition as pertaining to *Time*, and insert it in the same as pertaining to other things, then you fail to provide a single definition for all kinds of 'Recantation'. If, in view of this difficulty, 'Recantation' be not regarded as reprehensible, so far as assertions with reference to Time are concerned, then its reprehensibility could similarly be denied in all other cases also. Nor again is it ever possible for the *denial* to come exactly *at the same time* as the *acceptance*. "What is meant by *at the same time* is at the time of, during, that discussion (and not precisely at the same moment of time)." This is not right; if by 'that discussion' is meant any particular discussion, then the definition would not be a comprehensive one (each definition applying to only a single discussion); if, on the other hand, all forms of all three kinds of discussion be meant, then this would lead to the absurd contingency that if a person once admits something [for the sake of mere disputation, in the course of a Wrangling discussion] he will be prevented (on pain of becoming open to the charge of *Recantation*) from ever making any

Kh. II. 3.

assertions to the contrary (in the course of any discussion that he may enter into, in the course of his life). Similar objections could be taken against the qualifications of the same form 'of the same thing' and so forth.

(3) The definition is open to yet another objection :—The word 'asserted' has been added for the purpose of differentiating 'Recantation' from '*Apasiddhānta*' or 'absence of any definite view' (which is another kind of 'clincher'). But even without being asserted, if a certain fact is merely admitted, and then denied, this should be enough to vitiate the man's position; consequently the addition of any further qualification would be entirely superfluous; and the definition containing such a qualification would be open to the charge of 'superfluity'; just as in the case of the Contradictory Probans, the mere fact of its being related to 'that where the Probandum never subsists, being sufficient to mark it as 'fallacious', it has been considered (by the Logician himself) entirely superfluous to further qualify its definition by the specification that it should be present only in that where the Probandum never subsists.

B.—[The first Clincher '*Pratijñāhāni*' having been disposed of, the author takes up the second, *Pratijñāntara* or 'Shifting of Ground.'

[Page 511] (4) In describing the 'Clinchers,' you speak of 'Recantation and the rest'; now what is it that is included in the phrase 'and the rest'? You cannot answer that it includes '*Pratijñāntara*' or 'Shifting of Ground' and the other Clinchers. For you cannot provide an adequate explanation of this 'Shifting of Ground.' For instance, one definition that has been proposed by you is as follows :—"In course of a discussion, on finding the statement of his case assailed and criticised by the opponent, if one states his case in another form, adding qualifications not mentioned before,—he becomes open to the charge of having *shifted his ground.*" This definition

cannot be accepted. As it would be too wide, being applicable in the following case of correct rejoinder :—the man states his case in a qualified form,—the Opponent not minding the qualification, assails the statement in its unqualified form, —the former party thereupon re-iterates his statement with the qualified form, adding the statement 'this is the form in which I had stated my case, and not in the unqualified form criticised by you; thus you become subject to the *clincher* of assailing what should not be assailed.' "How can our definition apply to this case of correct rejoinder, when there is no addition by the first party of any *qualification* not already present in the first statement?" This will not help you; as the *prāgabhāva*, 'prior negation,' of the qualification was certainly there before the qualification was re-iterated.* "But precisely *at the time* that there was 'prior negation' of the qualification, the statement with the qualification was also not there [so that there is no mention of what is not mentioned]."

True; but in what way does it meet the undesirable extension of the definition due to there being 'non-mention to the qualification'?† "What is meant by the definition is that there should be non-mention of the qualification *at the time* that the qualified statement is made [so that it does not matter if there is non-mention before this latter statement.]"

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* All that the definition makes necessary is that there should be subsequent mention of a qualification of which there was *no mention* before · *non-mention* means *absence or negation of mention;* according to the Logician there are three kinds of absence or negation, one of which is the *prāgabhāva* or prior negation; by which is meant the absence of a thing before it comes into existence; now in the case in question, where the qualification is reiterated, there is the *prior negation* of the qualification; that is, there is the absence of mention of the qualification; thus the non-mention of the qualification being there, its subsequent mention involves the 'mentioning of a qualification not-mentioned before'; and this satisfies the conditions of the definition

† It is enough for the application of the definition to the case in question that there was 'non-mention,' of some sort, of the qualification, which is mentioned subsequently; it makes no difference if this mention comes only subsequently, and is not present at the time of the non-mention.

This also will not help you; as it being absolutely impossible for any two statements by one and the same person to be present at the same time,—in the case cited by us, as in all similar cases, this condition will always be present [as the mention of the qualification will never be present at the same time that the qualified statement is made].

"What is meant is, not that the non-mention of the qualification should be there precisely at the same moment as the qualified statement is there; what is meant is that the non-mention should be there *after* the qualified statement." This is not right, we reply; as in that case, the definition will apply to the case of such compounds as 'blue-lotus', where the qualification 'blue' comes before the qualified 'lotus' [so that *after* the utterance of 'blue lotus' there is 'non-mention of the qualification' *blue*]. "What we mean is that it should come immediately *before* the qualified statement." Then the definition will apply to the case of the expression '*utpalam nīlam*', 'the lotus blue' (where the qualification comes *after* the qualified). "It need not be specified whether the non-mention should be *before* or *after*; we say simply that it should be in *immediate proximity* to it." But this will apply to that case where there are more than one qualification [in which case *immediate* proximity is impossible]. "Well, we shall say that the non-mention of the qualification shall be there *at the time when the qualification could be mentioned.*" This also will not help you; for in a case where there are more than one qualification to a thing, when this qualified thing comes to be spoken of,—as the mention of a number of things must be in some order of sequence,—it is inevitable that the qualifications be mentioned one after the other; now the time at which the *first* qualification is mentioned will be also *the time when the second qualification could be mentioned* (there being no hard and fast rule as to the exact order in which the qualifications of a certain thing should be mentioned); and thus in this case also there being non-mention of all those other qualifica-

tions at the time when they *could be mentioned*, the definition becomes applicable. "Well, in order to avoid all these difficulties, we shall say that it is necessary that the qualification be not mentioned *at any time which is proper for its mention.*" This will not be right; as if you regard the time after the statement of the criticism by the opponent to be the 'proper time', then the definition fails to apply to the real cases of 'ground-shifting'; [as in all these the qualification being mentioned *after* the criticism, there is no 'non-mention' at the time.] If, on the other hand, you regard the time *before* the criticism as the 'proper time',—then the definition will, as already shown before, become applicable to the case where the first statement is made with the qualification, but the opponent, not noticing the qualification, offers his criticism of the unqualified statement, whereupon the first party reiterates the qualification; as in this case the second mention of the qualification, which comes *after* the criticism, is not there *before the criticism* [so that there is 'non-mention' of the qualification *before the criticism*]. "What is meant is the 'non-mention of the qualification' as a class (and not any particular kind of 'non-mention') [So that in the last case cited, even though the 'non-mention of qualification' comes *after* the criticism, yet it is of the same *class* as the 'non-mention of qualification *before* the criticism']." This is not right, we reply; for as a matter of fact, it is absolutely impossible for persons of ordinary powers of cognition like ourselves, to form any conception, by any means of cognition, of all those endless individual 'mentions of qualification' which constitute the *class* whose absence is held to be meant by the 'non-mention'; and thus the absence of these also being incapable of being grasped, the definition (of which this absence of mention forms an integral part) becomes incomprehensible, and hence *impossible*. As for the Logician's theory that all individuals of a class appear to our mind by the 'contact of generalities', this has been already refuted by us in the section on *Inference*. *Kh. II.* 7.

(5) These same arguments also serve to set aside the view that to the definition given at the opening of para. 4, we should add a further qualification 'that which has been stated at first in an unqualified form'; even with this qualification, the definition will apply to the case of such qualified statements as 'the lotus blue' [as we have shown how it is possible for a qualified object whose qualification is mentioned after itself, to be regarded as 'stated at first in the unqualified form'. Further, having at first stated your definition in one form, and then subsequently added to it further qualifications, you would yourself become subject to the clincher of '*hētvanṭara*'. [This clincher being defined in Gauṭama Sūṭra 5. 2. 7 as that which 'a person incurs when, finding his unqualified statement refuted he adds to it further qualifications']. And if even in face of, this the clincher of '*hēṭvanṭara*' does not attach to you because you find the subsequent addition of the further qualification necessary), then for me, your adversary, also against whom you would urge the clincher of '*praṭijñanṭara*' solely on the ground of the subsequent mention of qualifications) how could there be any *praṭijñānṭāra*'?

(6) If, then, in order to escape from the clincher of '*heṭvanṭara*', you state your definition of '*praṭijñānṭara*', at the very outset, (not in the form in which you have stated it in the beginning of para. 4. but) along with the further qualification (mentioned at the beginning of para. 5),—then, firstly the definition will become too narrow: as it will not apply to the following case (which should be one of real *Praṭijñānṭara*) :— The man makes a qualified statement at the outset,—then feeling that the qualification may be superfluous, he withdraws the qualification,—and on this unqualified statement being criticised by his opponent, he again puts forward the statement in the qualified form. [The definition would fail to apply to this, as in this case the first statement would not be in the unqualified form, a condition necessary

by the qualified definition now put forward]. Secondly [there is yet another objection to which your definition as stated now with a qualification, as well as in the unqualified form in which it was stated first is open] your definition becomes too narrow in another sense also: the definition contains the words '*sva*' ('oneself'), '*para*' ('opponent') '*sādhya*' ('case') and '*pūrva*' ('before'); and when we come to ponder over the signification of these words, we find that they must refer to individuals ('*sva*' referring to a particular individual person, and so on); and thus the definition containing these words will not apply to any other case of '*Pratijñāntara*' save the one in which those particular individuals would be concerned. *Thirdly*, the definition would apply to the following case of correct reasoning also: The first party makes a certain statement, omitting those qualifications that are already indicated by the context, the particular occasion &c. (and whose explicit mention, on that account, is thought uncalled for);—the Opponent, not understanding the reason of the omission, criticises the bare statement (on the absence of the qualifications);—the first party thereupon explains his position, supplementing his former statement by the direct mention of those qualifications that are indicated by the context &c. (and had on that account been omitted). [This case will fall within the definition, as the former statement is in the unqualified form, and qualifications, not mentioned before, are subsequently added.] Lastly, with a view to escape from this last difficulty, you may substitute, in your definition, the word '*apratipādita*', 'not indicated or made known,' in place of the word '*anukta*' 'not mentioned' [So that what is indicated by context &c. would not be '*apratipādita*', and hence the case cited would not fall within the definition];——but in that case, the definition will be open to the objection that, inasmuch as the other party does not comprehend the qualification as indicated by the context, it

cannot be regarded as 'indicated' or 'made known' to him; [and from the fact that he criticises the statement on the ground of its being *unqualified*, it is clear that he does not comprehend the qualification]. And so on, many other objections could be multiplied.

C.—[The definition of the *third Clincher*, *Pratijñāvirodha*, 'Contradiction of one's own statement' is next taken up.]

(7.) What again do you mean by 'Pratijñāntara *and the rest*?' "We refer to the Contradictory Statement, *Pratijñāvirodha* and the other Clinchers." This is not right; as *Pratijñāvirodha*, has been defined as that contingency which arises when there is a contradiction between any two statements made by a person in the course of his observations during discussion,—this contradiction not necessarily involving the putting forward of any thing contravening the proposition that that person has undertaken to prove (as is found to be the case with the Fallacious Reason, called 'Contradictory');———and this definition cannot be accepted as a correct one; as it would apply to such assertions as '*iha bhūtalē ghato nāsti*,' 'there is no jar in this place'; for two statements are said to be 'contradictory' when what one of them expresses is directly contrary to what the other expresses; and such a contradiction we find in the case of the statement *iha bhūtalē ghataḥ na asti*; where the words '*ghataḥ asti*' expresses *affirmation*, the existence of the jar, while the word '*na*' expresses the denial of the same existence (and certainly the affirmation of one thing is contrary to its denial). "Your reasoning is most improper; the words of the sentence *ghataḥ nāsti* do not in reality express the affirmation and denial of the jar's existence; and it would be only if such were the case that there would be a contradiction; as a matter of fact, it is the jar that is denied; it is only the *denial* (or non-existence) *of the jar* that is expressed; how then can there be any contradiction in this?"

Kh. II. 10.

This argument is not sound, we reply. You must admit that the word '*ghaṭaḥ*' of the sentence expresses the affirmation or presence of the jar, and the phrase '*na asti*' expresses its denial or absence. If you do not admit this, then, by your admission, there would be no contradiction (and consequent incongruity) between the meaning of '*ghaṭaḥ*' and '*na asti;*' and the result of this would be that the sentence '*iha bhūtalē ghaṭaḥ na asti*' would have to be regarded as expressing the affirmation of the presence of both the jar and its relation at the same place (*bhūtala*)! As this would be absurd, it must be admitted that the word '*ghaṭaḥ*' affirms the presence of the jar, while '*na*' denies it. Under the circumstances, the statement '*iha bhūtalē ghaṭaḥ nāsti*' fulfils every one of the conditions of your definition. For instance, firstly are not the two words ('*ghaṭaḥ*' and '*na*') parts of the observation made by one and the same person? Secondly, do not they express meanings contrary to each other? How can your definition then not apply to this case? " Two statements are regarded as mutually 'contradictory', not simply when they express meanings contrary to each other, but only when one of them affirms the presence of something with regard to a certain time and place, and the other affirms with regard to that same time and place the presence of that which is contrary to the former thing; and in the case in question, the words '*na*' and '*asti*' do not affirm the presence and absence (of the jar) with regard to the same time and place ". This will not help you, we reply; as we have already answered this [that is, what we have already said above meets this last argument of yours]; for all that you and I have been saying on this point presupposes that it is with regard to the same time and place; otherwise—unless two contradictory statements pertain to the same time and place—there can be no contradiction at all.

Kh. II. 11.

(8) Then again, we ask—You speak of the presence, at one and the same time and place, of mutually contradictory things ; now is this co-existence real, *rightly cognised* or not ? If you hold it to be real, *rightly cognised*, then your use of the word 'contradictory' must be in some extraordinary technical sense (and not in the sense that is attached to it in ordinary language)* ; as from the very fact of the two things co-existing at the same time and place being true or rightly cognised, all idea of 'contradiction' between them must cease forthwith.

If, on the other hand, you do not hold the co-existence to be real, *rightly* cognised,—then as a matter of fact, such 'incongruity of co-existence as is *not rightly cognised*, i. e., unreal, would be present everywhere (as in the case of true co-existence also, there would be an unreal or false contradiction) ; and thus your definition (speaking of a contradiction that could be present everywhere) would become too wide.

" What the contradiction or incongruity lies between are the two things as they are spoken of by the Opponent (and not as they actually exist) ; and certainly there are valid means of rightly cognising the contradiction between these." †

This is not right ; it may be possible to show that the fact is somehow subject to the operation of some valid means of right cognition (verbal for instance) ; but even so, with the explanation that you provide of the 'contradiction' urged by you remains a mere conventional technicality [and has no meaning] ; for even the assertion that—' the matter (of co-existence) as stated by the Opponent involves a contradiction '—cannot be made until one has

*The right cognition of the companionship or co-existence of two things implies that it is possible for them to co-exist and, on the ordinary notions of 'contradiction', the fact of two things being contradictories means that they can never co-exist.

†That is to say, 'contradiction ' lies in the fact of the opponent speaking of two things as co-existent at the same time and place, when they are not so co-existent; and this fact can certainly be true, and rightly cognised, by means of the word used by the opponent ; so long as the words actually express what is in the mind of the speaker the cognition of what is thus expressed by ourselves, can be regarded as valid.

already got the right cognition of the contradiction [and if the 'contradiction' is rightly cognised it ceases to be a *contradiction* in the proper sense of the word; and under the circumstances, when you proceed to prove the conclusion 'the Opponent's assertion is one that involves contradiction', you make use of a meaningless epithet, and this makes your argument fallacious]. "But what we do is not to prove, or state an argument for, the presence of contradiction; all that we mean is to subject the Opponent to a hypothetical confutation by showing that by his own admission he is open to the charge of 'contradiction' ".* But this also will not help you; as without having had some sort of a right cognition of 'contradiction,' you could not indicate it even by way of hypothetical confutation.†

(9) "There may be no *right* cognition of the co-existence involving contradiction; we could certainly speak of it (without having a right cognition of it) through the wrong cognition that we may have of it (as in cases where we deny wrong conceptions)". This will not be right, we reply; for what case is there against which one can not put forward a 'contradiction' which is more apparent than real, and of which he has only a wrong idea? And as this could be urged against all cases, the definition (containing the word 'contradiction') becomes as improperly wide as we have pointed out above. "The two things between which contradiction is pointed out are certainly such as have

*The difference between sādhana, *proving* and 'prasañjana' 'hypothetical confutation,' lies in this that in *proving* one has to have recourse to all the details of correct and accurate argumentation; which has been shown to be difficult in the case in question;—in the case of hypothetical confutation however much accuracy is not necessary; all that is necessary is to point out to the other party that in case he admits a certain thing he will make himself open to serious undesirable consequences.

†Even in this some sort of notion of invariable concomitance is necessary between the contradiction and what the opponent admits; and no concomitance can be cognised until we have right notions of the members concomitant.

been rightly cognised; but they have been rightly cognised apart from one another, each by itself; and what the contradiction is urged against is the bringing together of the two by forming a conception of them as co-existing at the same time and place. [That is, in urging the contradiction, it is not necessary to have the right cognition of the two factors *as co-existent*]." This also will not be right, we reply; as it is not the two things taken individually that involves anything undesirable for the Opponent; but only the two taken together, as co-existent; and the urging of this co-existence (in course of hypothetical confutation) depends upon that character (*f. i.* 'being mutually contradictory') which is concomitant with such co-existence; thus if this character of the co-existence is definitely rightly cognised (as formerly declared by you) then there can be no incongruity in the co-existence; and if the character (that is, the contradiction) is not rightly cognised (as you have held subsequently), then it is not possible for it to be urged (by way of hypothetical confutation). "It will be possible to urge the two things (that are concomitant with the contradiction), not collectively, but individually,—pointing out that one (which has been rightly cognised by itself) is contradictory to the other (which also has been rightly cognised by itself) (so that no right cognition of the two together is necessary)." This will not be right; as there is no contradiction between the two taken individually by themselves (the contradiction lying only in their co-existence at one time and place). "But even when we take the two individually, this would imply the two collectively (and the consequent contradiction, which is the concomitant of both collectively)". This cannot be, we reply; as this implication would mean that the co-existence of the two is rightly cognised by the valid instrumentality of Presumption; and the fact of the co-existence being rightly cognised would remove all possibility of any idea of contradiction bet-

Kh. II. 14.

ween them being entertained. It will not be right to urge against this that implication is not proof, so that when the co-existence is merely *implied*, it does not mean that it is *proved*;—and this will not be right; for, in the first place, the two things being mutually contradictory, if one were to urge a confutation on the basis of this contradiction, which could only be brought home by taking the two things collectively, and which contradiction, as such, would not be regarded as *proved*, such a confutation (being based upon something that is not proved, and being not based upon the man's own convictions) would not be a correct or true confutation;—and secondly [if, in order to avoid this, the contradiction were sought to be brought home by taking each of the two things individually, there would be no contradiction at all, as it is only the co-existence of the two that involves contradiction; and] this indirect indication of absence of contradiction would be quite acceptable to the Opponent (and the confutation would thus be a failure). "How can it be so (acceptable) when there is a distinct contradiction between the two things?" But the fact is that the contradiction is attendant upon the co-existence of the two things; and hence exists upon, and belongs to, both; consequently, the contradiction would cease to be nugatory; as it would be necessary to have right cognitions of the two things (as co-existent); and when there is right cognition of this, the contradiction cannot be regarded as a true contradiction, and it must fail to have any nugatory force in a confutation.

Kh. II. 15.

SECTION (2).

[The Opponent, being unable to answer the objections urged by the Vedantin, makes a last attempt to turn the tables on the latter, and seeks to silence him by arguing that in course of his reasonings against his antagonist, the Vedantin, with a view to obtain victory, has recourse to those same fallacies and clinchers that the Logician has adopted. Hence the objections that he urges against these as employed by the Logician are equally applicable to their employment by himself. The answer of the Vedantin is that he uses against the Logician the implements that the latter himself has forged ; and whose effectiveness he cannot deny, ; but as for the Vedantin himself, in so far he does not admit their effectiveness, they can have no force against him.]

(10) The Opponent retorts—" All these objections that you bring forward (against our use of such words as 'Contradiction' and the like) can be easily turned against yourself, when you put them forward in course of your 'refutation' [wherein also you make use of many such words and phrases, explanations whereof will be open to all these objections that you have urged against our use of them]." Not so, we reply. For when you thus have recourse to the argument of retaliation, that you would urge the same arguments against me (that I have urged against you), what is your meaning? Do you mean simply to indicate the weakness in your opponent's reasoning? or do you do so with the ulterior motive that, in case I attempt to put forward an answer to the objections as urged against me, you would put forward that same answer to them as urged by me against you? In case the former is your meaning, that cannot be; as such finding fault with another before having met the arguments against oneself is highly objectionable and unreasonable; specially as by the rules of debate, if one party fails to answer the objections that have been urged against him by the other party, this either puts an end to the whole debate, which cannot proceed any further, in case the debate is in the form of *Wrangling*, where it is enough for one party to indicate blemishes in his Opponent's view, in order to obtain victory),—or puts an end to

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Kh. II. 16.

one half of the debate [in case it is in the form of Controversy or Discusson, in which case the criticism of the Opponent's theory is only half of the debate, the other half consisting of establishing one's own view of the case]; as *Wrangling* has its end in the silencing of one party and Controversy and Discussion come to an end if either party fails to answer the objections urged against himself. [In any case there can be no further opportunity of speaking for the person who has failed to answer objections].

(11) If then, you accept the second alternative [*i.e.* you put forward the retaliatory argument in the hope that you will employ in support of yourself the answer that I may give to your retaliatory argument];—then, we put forward that same answer; what harm could that do me (who am prepared to carry my refutation further, as I have not exhausted my armour in putting forward the objections I have urged). "You please just mention how you will answer the objection as urged against you; after that I shall make my answer." But, as a matter of fact, the present occasion is not the right time for me to put forward an explanation or answer; we did not begin the present discussion on the understanding that I was to establish my position and you were to demolish it by urging objections against it; in fact we began on the understanding that you were to establish your position and I was to find objections against it; and in course of a discussion started on this understanding, what right have you to urge me to offer arguments in support of my own position?

(12) The Opponent explains—"If you ask what special purpose I have in view in ascertaining what your answer to the objections will be, my reply is that any answer that there may be to the objections as urged against your view will certainly be accepted as valid and true, specially in reference to your own position (and it will then be easy for

me to retort and put forward the same answer with reference to my position)." This also is not right, we reply; for from the mere fact that there is an answer to the objections as urged against my view, it does not follow that the same answer will be available in favour of your view also. "The same answer will apply to both of us, for the simple reason that the objections are the same in both cases."

Certainly not; some difference in the objections urged against the two views is absolutely certain (for the simple reason that the two views are mutually contradictory, and as such cannot be open to the same set of objections). For instance, if a certain answer were available, in reference to my view,—either on the basis of a certain unique feature in that view, or on the basis of a certain theory which is accepted by a philosophical system allied to my particular philosophy, and which is not denied by us;—how could one be sure that such an answer would be available for your view also, simply on the ground of the similarity of the objections?—when the two factors, on the basis of which the answer has been propounded, cannot apply to your view [the 'unique feature' of my view not being present in your view, and the philosophical system allied to my system not being necessarily allied to yours also]. "What is that *unique feature* (in your view)?" I have already told you that the present is not the occasion for me to make any statement as to my views.

(13) "Inasmuch as the objections are the same in both cases, the answer also will be on similar lines (even though it may not be the same exactly)." This also will not be possible; there is every chance of there being differences in the answer in the two cases, in view of the exact form of the answer being dependent upon the presence or absence of certain peculiarities in the view against which are urged the objections sought to be met by the answer; and also upon other circumstances. As for example, what necessitates the

Kh. II. 18.

postulating of the genus 'Being' is the idea that we have, in ordinary experience, of things *being existent*; so far all are agreed; but when it comes to the asserting of the presence of this genus in certain substrates, one may hold that it subsists in a particular 'Being' itself (which also is something existing), while another may hold that it subsists only in Substance, Quality and Action (and not in *Being*); now in this case, if an objection is raised against the subsistence of 'Being' in Being as well as in Substance and the rest,—though the objection will be the same in both cases, yet the person who holds it to subsist in Substance &c., will be able to offer in answer the explanation that the postulating of 'Being' in Substance can be accepted as it does not involve any illogical contingency; while the upholder of the view that 'Being' subsists in *Being* will be unable to offer the same answer; as in his case the postulating of *Being* as the substrate of 'Being' will involve the illogical contingency of having to postulate an endless series of Beings. Similarly in many cases we find that even when the objections are similar the answer cannot be similar.

(14) Further, without answering these objections of your Opponent which urge against you the fallacies of 'Uncertainty' and the like, you rise against him with a retaliatory argument;—now what do you mean by this? (*a*) Do you mean by this that the objection that your opponent has urged is no objection at all, as it applies also to the view that is not objectionable (*i.e.* the Opponent's own view, which, for him, must be unobjectionable)? (*b*) Or that even though the objection is real, yet it should not have been urged by the Opponent, as the objection affects equally the views of both,—in accordance with the law that—when an objection is equally present in the views of both disputants,—and and when an explanation, if possible, is also available for both,—such an objection is not to be urged by either party against the other, in course of a discussion?

Kh. II. 19.

[PAGE 528] (15) (*a*) The former cannot be your meaning; for if the discrepancy that has been urged fulfils the conditions of the fallacy of 'uncertainty,' or any other fallacy that may have been urged,—then it is impossible either to deny that it is a serious discrepancy that vitiates the view, or to find an answer to it; and if a suitable answer is found possible, then the conditions laid down for the discrepancy or fallacy (which conditions are, *ex hypothesi*, fulfilled by the case in question) are not the true conditions of that fallacy. "If what is urged by the Opponent is a real discrepancy, then, how is it that it is found applicable to the view which my Opponent accepts as free from discrepancies and unobjectionable? And that the objection *is* applicable to this latter view is shown by our retaliatory argument."* But do please also pay your attention to this question—If it is not a real objection, how is it that it fulfils the conditions of the fallacy on which the objection is based? "Well, as there is nothing to decide which of these two views of the objection is the true one, this gives rise to an uncertainty as to the reality of the objection." Let there be a mere uncertainty; even the slightest doubt as to the presence of objectionable fallacies in your argument vitiates the efficiency of that argument; as in the case of that particular kind of 'fallacious reason' which has been called '*sanḍigḍhāsiḍḍha*,' 'whose validity is doubtful.' And further, the fallacy that the Logician seeks to make doubtful in the present connection fulfils certain conditions; if even so it is doubtful, then in all other cases when it is found to fulfil exactly those conditions, the Logician will have to reject the invalidative efficiency of that fallacy;—and in so doing he will deny the efficacy

* The meaning is that if the objection is applicable to the disputant's own faultless view, then it cannot be a true objection; as for its fulfilling the conditions laid down for the fallacy that is urged,—well, if it is found to be so widely and improperly applicable, we should simply find out some other definition for that fallacy.

of the fallacy postulated and defined by himself! This retaliatory argument is difficult to be answered by the Logician who is himself over-fond of putting forward retaliatory arguments!

(16) Nor can the latter alternative (mentioned in para. 14) represent your meaning. For as a matter of fact, [one cannot desist from urging an objection simply for fear of its being urged against himself; *e.g.*] even though both disputants recognise the validity and unobjectionability of such inferences as that of fire from smoke and the like, yet if one party should urge objections against that valid inference, the other party could not, even with reference to other details of his opponent's view, bring forward, against his arguments, the fallacies of 'uncertainty' &c., for fear lest the same fallacies be applicable also to his own arguments;—such for instance, as his inference of fire from smoke.* This is a retaliatory argument that I can bring forward against my Opponent; and in this connection also I may quote in support of my own view, the law quoted above by my opponent—'When an objection is equally resent &c. &c.'†

"We do not mean that no objections at all shall be put forward; what we mean is that one should not put forward only those particular phases of the objection on the presence whereof in his own views his opponent may bring forward the retaliatory argument against him." This also will not be right; for the presence of this retaliatory argument itself would prove that the particular objectionable phase put forward by me is not really objectionable; and being thus deprived of its objectionable character, if the definition of 'objection' or 'fallacious reason' applies to

*One can never be sure that the objections he is putting forward may not be urged against himself also. And so, if one were to desist from bringing forward objections for fear of his own view being assailed by the same, then, no objections would ever be urged by anyone.

† That is, just as my opponent brings up a retaliatory argument against me, in the same manner I also bring up a retaliatory argument against him.

it, such a definition cannot be regarded as correct; and if, in order escape from this difficulty, you were to restate your definition of the 'fallacious reason', with qualifications which would serve to exclude those objections that are deprived of their objectionable character by retaliatory arguments, then, in that case, it would be much more reasonable for you to show that the definition of 'fallacious reason' is not applicable to what has been urged against you, rather than go about propounding retaliatory arguments, which would be absolutely futile.

"When the other party bases his retaliatory argument upon something which is held to be flawless or unobjectionable according to my view of things, then he could very well retaliate by saying —'You should not put forward any objections against this; if you do, then, by the same reasoning, what has been accepted by you (as true) will be demolished'. [And herein lies the use of the retaliatory argument]." This explanation of yours is not right; for it is quite possible for the retaliatory argument to be stated in a form inviting the statement of objections, in the following form :—'You should state your objections to this; as in the case of your not stating them, the undesirable contingency, which your adversaries intend to bring home to you, will become established.'

"Well, be it so; so much the better for us; as this only shows that in both cases, whether an objection is stated or not stated, the possibility of the retaliatory argument cannot be denied by you." Not so, we reply. A confutation that admits of two mutually contradictory retaliatory arguments (one inviting and another preventing the statement of objections) cannot be regarded as a true confutation; as contradiction vitiates all confutation,—the two retaliatory arguments stultifying, each other; just as we found in the case of two 'neutralising inferences.'

(17) [As regards the dictum quoted by you that one party should not put forward such objections as are equally applicable to both parties, I have to point out that] Under

Kh. II. 22.

Nyāyasūtra 2. 1. 16—the Opponent having put forward an objection that the support of corroborative instances is equally wanting in both views (the Pūrvapakṣa as well as the Siddhānta), the Āchārya Udyoṭakara has met the objection in the following words :—'That the objection is equally applicable to both views is no answer; as such an answer involves the confession of one's weakness : by this answer you have confessed that there is no corroborative instance in support of your view.' (*Nyāyavārtika*, p. 197, ll. 15-19) ;—and your own Teacher, making this assertion, should be set up against Bhatta Kumārila, who has declared that an objection common to both parties should not be put forward by either.

SECTION (3).

[In not accepting the utility of the Retaliatory Argument the Vedantin incurs the charge of 'Apasiddhānṭa,' 'Contradicting an admitted Fact', which is the *twenty-first* 'Clincher' enumerated by Gauṭama in his Sūṭra. And he proceeds to show the impossibility of an adequate explanation being provided of this Clincher also.]

[PAGE 532] (18) "Do you mean to say", asks the Logician, "that Retaliatory Argument and such other reasonings do not serve the purpose of vitiating or refuting a statement? If you really mean this, then you make yourself open to the charge of *contradicting an admitted fact.*" Well, our reply is, in the first place please explain to us, in the present connection, what is it that constitutes 'Apasiddhānṭa,' 'contradiction of an admitted fact.' If your mere assertion that there is such contradiction were sufficient, then what would prevent our making a similar assertion that you are open to the same charge?

(19) The Logician proceeds to explain how, in the present discussion, the Vedāntin has incurred the charge of contradicting an established fact :——"When one makes an assertion contrary to an admitted fact, he incurs *Apasid-*

Kh. II. 23.

ḍhānṭa; now, as a matter of fact you have, in course of the present discussion, admitted the fact of the Retaliatory Argument constituting a means of refutation (which fact you are now denying); we say you have admitted this fact, because at the very outset of our discussion you declared your intention of arguing in accordance with the tenets of a particular philosophical system, the *Nyāya*,—whereby you have accepted the tenets of that system: and as a philosophical system is nothing more than the acceptance of certain facts and things, and as the 'Retaliatory Argument' and such other Clinchers are things that are accepted by the Nyāya system, you are certainly contradicting an admitted fact when you deny the existence of any such thing as the Retaliatory Argument." Our answer to this is that the very definition of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' that you have put forward is an impossible one; for if you define it merely as 'contradicting' an admitted fact, then you yourself become open to the charge, on the ground of your denying facts that are 'admitted' in our philosophy.

(20) "What we mean is the contradicting of facts admitted by oneself." This is not right; for you cannot extract this meaning from the definition as you have stated it, unless you add to it the further qualification (of 'one's own'). If it were permissible to make a definition mean what is not actually expressed by the words constituting it, then there would be no need for adding any qualification [anything that is desired may be taken as implied by the definition]. And if you hold that no qualifications are to be added to definitions, then the charge of 'contradicting an admitted fact' would rebound on yourself! As in the first place, qualifications by the hundred are found to be added to the statements of reasonings and conclusions made in your own philosophy; and secondly in your philosophy, you have often found fault with the reasonings propounded by

others, simply on the ground that they do not contain certain necessary qualifications and are hence rejected by you as inconclusive.

(21) Then again, in the present context also, you have stated your definition without the qualifying phrase 'one's own',—and subsequently, for fear of objection being raised against it, if you add that qualification, you render yourself open to the 'Clincher' of '*Hēṭvanṭara*'; as according to your own philosophy, 'one is said to fall within the Clincher of *Hēṭvantara* if, having originally stated his conclusion in the unqualified form, he re-states it subsequently, with the addition of fresh qualifications.'

(22) Further, you have stated your definition in the form—'when one makes an assertion contrary to an admitted fact, he incurs what has been called *Apasiḍḍhānṭa*';—that is, you state the definition first, and the object to be defined last; and in this you incur the Clincher of 'Inopportune Statement' (the fifteenth Clincher mentioned in Gauṭama's *Sūṭra*, 5-2-1),—which has been defined as consisting in the 'reversal of the natural order of constituent factors' (*Nyāya-Sūṭra*, 5. 2. 11); and 'the natural order of constituent factors' of a definition is that the object defined is mentioned first, and then comes the statement of the definition; and this natural order you have reversed (by stating the definition first, and then the object to be defined). If, in order to escape from this difficulty, you insist upon this reversal of the natural order, then you become subject to '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*.' [As your own philosophy lays down that the several factors of a statement, for instance, of the statement of an inferential argument, should be mentioned in their natural order].

[PAGE 534] (23) He who introduces the qualification '*sva*', 'one's own', at the very outset, should be met with that same objection which we have urged above against the

Kh. II. 25.

definition as without the qualification; the facts admitted by me are certainly my *own* admitted facts [and thus by stating a view that is opposed to facts admitted by me you will be contradicting *one's own* admitted fact]*. "But our definition contains the word '*abhyupagama*', 'admitted fact'; this implies the person by whom the fact is admitted; thus that fact alone which is admitted by the person himself could be *his* '*own* admitted fact' (and not what may be admitted by other persons)". This will not help you. I also am 'a person by whom facts are admitted', as certainly there are certain facts that are admitted by me. "What we mean is the person who admits facts to the contrary." But this also will apply equally to both parties (both being contrary to each other). "That person who admits facts contrary to well-established conclusions is one who is regarded as *admiting facts to the contrary*". Even so the name will apply to both parties equally; as I also admit facts contrary to your well-established conclusions (just as you admit facts contrary to my established conclusions). "What is meant is the person who admits facts contrary to his own well-established conclusions." You are certainly extremely clever: you began with qualifying the word '*sva*,' 'one's own' by the 'person by whom facts are admitted',—and you end with qualifying the 'person by whom facts are admitted' by the word '*sva*, 'one's own'! And in doing this you do not even fight shy of the vicious circle of interdependence into which you land yourself! And lastly you do not observe that the fact that the word '*sva*' (as a pronoun) is applicable to all (parties),—a fact that has been pointed out to you by your opponent—still remains in force!

* The word '*sva*' is a pronoun, it does not apply to the Logician alone; hence the *siddhānta* of the Vedāntin is as much entitled to the name '*svasiddhānta*' as the *siddhānta* of the Logician, until some other qualification is introduced. So that when making a statement against the tenets of the Vedānta, the Logician will be open to the charge of '*svasiddhāntavirodha*'. Hence the definition proposed being applicable to a case where it should not apply, must be rejected as 'too wide.'

Kh. II. 26.

(24) Another definition of '*Apasiddhānta*' is put forward :—"When a person accepts a fact as a well-established conclusion, and then (in course of discussion) renounces or denies that conclusion,—this constitutes an '*Apasiddhānta*' for that person." This definition also cannot be accepted; as if the clause 'well-established conclusion accepted by a person' refers to a particular individual person, and to a particular conclusion, then the definition becomes singular (pertaining to one single case), and fails to be comprehensive (of all *Apasiddhāntas*). If again by 'the person accepting the conclusion' is meant the person connected with a well-established conclusion, and by the person 'renouncing the conclusion' is also meant the person connected with a conclusion,—then you yourself become open to the charge of *Apasiddhānta*; for I (the Vedāntin) am a person connected with a certain well-established conclusion, and you also are a person connected with a conclusion,—so when you renounce the conclusion accepted by us (as you often do), there is denial, by a person connected with a conclusion (*i. e.* by yourself) of a well-established conclusion accepted by a person connected with a conclusion (that is myself). "But in this case there is no *renouncing*; as one can renounce only that which he has accepted (and we have never accepted your conclusions; so that when we deny them, we do not *renounce* them)." This will not help you; as if what is meant by 'renouncing' is only *non-acceptance*, then it is not necessary for what is 'renounced' to have been previously accepted. "The 'renouncing' consists in the non-acceptance of what has been accepted." In that case, (in your case also) there is *non-acceptance*, by you, *of what has been accepted*, by me; and thus the explanation makes no difference as regards the objection urged by us. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you hold that the non-acceptance should be by the same person by whom there has been acceptance,—this also will not avail you; as if by 'the same

Kh. II. 27.

person' you mean the man accepting a conclusion, then I also am a man accepting a conclusion; you, by not accepting what has been accepted by me, 'incur *Apasiddhānta*. "It is '*Apasiddhānta*' only when there is non-acceptance by one individual person of that conclusion which has been accepted by that individual person." This will not be right; as what do you mean by '*one* individual person'? If it means a person who is qualified by the number '*one*', then, I am as good 'a person qualified by number *one* as yourself; and so the charge of '*Apasiddhānta*' urged' against you remains in force as before. "What is meant by *one individual person* is the *person who is not different*". Even so, if this 'non-difference' be non-difference from one's own self, then this also applies equally to you and myself; while if it be 'non-difference from others,' this cannot apply either to you or to myself (as no person can ever be non-different from another person); and so *Apasiddhānta* as thus defined would be something impossible. "What is meant is that in a case of *Apasiddhānta* there is no difference between the person accepting and the person not-accepting (renouncing) a certain conclusion." Well in that case your definition would come to this—'*Apasiddhānta* is the non-acceptance, of what has been accepted by one person, by one who is not different from the acceptor'; and thus you still remain open to the same '*Apasiddhānta*'; as what is accepted by me is not accepted by you, who are 'not-different from the acceptor', inasmuch as you also accept something.

(25) The above reasoning also serves to reject the definition of '*Apasiddhānta*' as the acceptance and non-acceptance, by one person, of the opinion of one person; as, with this definition, between yourself and myself, there would be a distinct *Apasiddhānta* [each of us being 'one person']. "But what is meant by 'one person' is the non-difference of the person accepting, from the person not-accepting, that

conclusion; [and this condition is not fulfilled when what is accepted by the Veḍānṭin is not accepted by the Logician].' If by 'that conclusion' you mean to imply the non-difference of what is 'not-accepted' from what is 'accepted',—then you cannot escape from the charge of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'; inasmuch as you renounce what is accepted by me; so that there is non-acceptance by you—who also accept something, and as such, are non-different from the accepting person—of what is accepted by another person; and thus there is 'non-difference of what is not-accepted from what is accepted.' "But what is meant is that the *acceptance* and *non-acceptance* should be by one and the same, and not by different, agents.'" This also will not help you, we reply; for when you come to examine what is meant by the 'one and the same agent', you again introduce the same qualification 'one', which has been already found to be faulty; and thus, not succeeding to escape from the objections that have been urged against you, tell me if you do not experience the same tribulation as those of the tuft of grass which is whirled round and round in the widening whirlpools of a turbulent stream, in which there is an inrush of water at the outburst of the rainy season!

(26) "It is *Apasiḍḍhānṭa* when there is non-acceptance after having accepted (a certain conclusion)." This also cannot be accepted; for when you come to examine the import of the affix '*kṭvā*' in '*svīkriṭya*', 'having accepted', —you will find that this definition is open to the same objections as those urged above*. And further, by this definition, one could not incur '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' if, in course of discussion, he were to accept a conclusion which he did not

* The affix '*kṭvā*' denotes *samānakarṭṛikaṭva*, *i.e.* the fact of the participle ending in that affix having the *same nominative agent* as the principal verb of the sentence; so that you again introduce the same qualification of 'the same agent' against which objections have been raised.

accept at the outset. [While such a contingency does, according to the Logician, involve a real *Apasiḍḍhānṭa*.]†

(27.) Then again, when you urge the Clincher of *Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' against one who renounces an admitted fact, is it against a disputant who accepts that philosophical system in which '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' is regarded as a defect? or against one who does not accept such a system? If the former, then such a person is as capable of rebelling against the tenet of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' as against the philosophical conclusion [by reason of renouncing which you charge him with the Clincher of *Apasiḍḍhanṭa*]; and under the circumstances, what can you say to such a person? It will not be right for you to reply to this that you will have nothing more to say to such a person—fully humbled as he will have already become by the Clincher of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' due to his renouncing his previously accepted conclusions. For, inasmuch as he has rejected the tenet of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*,' this 'clincher,' when urged against him, will be one whose vitiating efficacy is not accepted by both parties [and which on that account ceases to be an efficient 'clincher']. If a 'clincher' which is not accepted by both parties were to be efficacious in closing the mouth of disputants, then any person putting forward a refutation from his own stand-point (irrespective of the other party admitting or not admitting the force of the refutation) could claim to have put an end to the disputation, and to have obtained victory over his opponent; and he would not wait to listen to the Opponent's answer to his refutation. And the result of this would be that even on urging a futile refutation, though there would be no refutation at all, he would have conquered his opponent, and would, without the slightest

† *E.g.* during the discussion between the Logician and the Veḍānṭin, the former does not, in the beginning, accept the conclusion that Word is unreal; but in course of argumentation, if he comes to accept it, he certainly incurs '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*; but by the present definition, this would not be *Apasiḍḍhānṭa*, as there is no 'having accepted' in this case.

obstacle, go back home fully satisfied! "When a man has been defeated, even if he may have something to say, we can certainly pay no regard to what he might say." This will not be right, when what he has to say is the answer to precisely the same Clincher by means of which you regard him as defeated,—this answer being in the form that the efficacy of the Clincher is not admitted by one of the two parties concerned (which circumstance weakens the efficacy of the Clincher). If, on this, you still insist on paying no regard to what he says, then, as we have already pointed out above, you yourself would be defeated; inasmuch as you will have put forward a refutation which is not a true refutation, and will have refused to listen to the Opponent's answer to that refutation! "But it would be for the Umpire to determine if a refutation has been put forward that is not not a true refutation, or if the Clincher of '*Apasiddhānta*' has been urged when there is no true '*Apasiddhānta*'; and having determined this he would apportion victory or defeat; in fact it is for this purpose that the Umpire is appointed." If this be the correct procedure, then, when one party has put forward his reasonings, his opponent might simply say 'your reasoning is fallacious', and retire from further discussion; and it would be for the Umpire to determine if the reasoning is really fallacious or not, and thereby apportion victory and defeat; and by this stupid reasoning of yours the poor Umpire will undergo all this (to himself fruitless) trouble, in the same way as the crow undergoes all the trouble to feed the offspring left by the pair of Kokila birds, who are fully content after having brought forth the young ones [the two disputants, satisfied with putting forth one argument each, ressembling the *kokila* pair, and the Umpire, having to perform all the sifting and examining of the reasonings, ressembling the crow].

Kh. II. 31

[Page 541] (28) The Logician argues—"It may be that at the time of the discussion our disputant may for the occasion, not accept our opinion in regard to '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'; but what does that matter? As a matter of fact he has already previously signified his adherence to that philosophical system which accepts the vitiating efficacy of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'; and it will be quite right to urge '*Apāsiḍḍhanta*' against him, on the basis of that previous adherence of his." Not so, we reply; if no regard is paid to his non-adherence to the philosophy at the time of the discussion,—and if even on his declaration of this non-adherence, the refutation is to be addressed to him on the basis of his previous adherence,—then, how could there be any room for the charge of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' against him? For the *Apasiḍḍhānṭa* is urged against him only on the basis of the fact that he has expressed non-adherence to, or non-acceptance of, something to which he had previously signified adherence or acceptance; and on no other basis could the charge of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' be urged against him. Thus then, in the case of the disputant who has previously accepted the vitiating efficacy of the clincher of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*',—it is incumbent on you to prove this efficacy as against him, even when he chooses to repudiate his former adherence; and the proving of this cannot be the business of any second person (in the shape of the Umpire). [This with reference to the man who has previously signified his adherence to your philosophy]. On the other hand, as for the *Bauḍḍha* and the other philosophers who have never accepted the vitiating efficacy of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*', it becomes doubly necessary for you to prove this efficacy.

(29) "The man who would raise objections against the well-established conclusions (of the philosophy that he has accepted) will be open to the charge of 'self-contradiction' [so that so far as his case is concerned, it is not necessary to

provide an explanation of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'] : he has at the outset, signified his adherence to a particular philosophy, and hence to all that is included in that philosophy in the form of counter-arguments, fallacies and so forth; so when subsequently he comes to signify his non-acceptance of these, we find him accepting and not-accepting the same thing; and this certainly involves 'Self-contradiction.'" If this 'Self-contradiction' is of the same nature as '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*', then it can not be urged against the man who objects to the vitiating efficacy of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*', until his objections have been set aside. If, on the other hand, 'Self-contradiction' be a defect entirely distinct from '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' and capable of being urged independently of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*,'—then all those cases that are cited as examples of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' may be regarded as cases of 'Self-contradiction what is the use of accepting a distinct defect in the shape of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'? In fact the procedure adopted by you ——wherein you first urge the Clincher of '*Apasiḍḍhānta*,' and then objections having been raised against it, you give up the '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' and put forward an entirely distinct Clincher in the shape of 'Self-contradiction'——makes you open to the Clincher of 'Recantation'; 'Recantation' having been defined as the 'retracting of what has been admitted and asserted.' And if this procedure—in which one propounds a Clincher, and then retracting it, propounds another—does not involve 'Recantation', then there is an end to all such 'clinchers' as 'Recantation' and the like!

(30) "When we propound another Clincher (in the shape of 'Self-contradiction'), it is only for the purpose of lending support to that other Clincher ('*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*) which had been urged before; and [as this does not mean a denial of this latter] this procedure is not open to the objection that you have urged." Not so, we reply; so long as you have not justified the putting forward of the former

Kh. II, 33.

Clincher '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' (by showing that it is a real defect), you must be regarded as 'defeated'; and it is highly improper for one so 'defeated' to put forward another Clincher in the shape of 'Self-contradiction'. Nor will it be right for you to assert that for fear of these difficulties you will, at the very outset, urge the Clincher of 'Self-contradiction', and not that of '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*';—as in that case the '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' will become entirely useless and futile; for in every case of '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' you will find it more necessary to urge 'Self-contradiction' rather than '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*;' as in no case will you be able to feel quite sure as to the other party not raising objections against the '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' that you might urge.

(31) The Logician says—"All right; we shall, then prove the vitiating efficacy of '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' against the person who accepts our philosophy but denies the efficacy of '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*, [not indeed by urging the Clincher of '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' against this apostacy, but exactly in the same manner as we prove it as against our out-and-out opponents, the Bauḍḍhas and the rest]." This also will not be possible, we reply. For you can make him accept the efficacy of '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' only by showing to him that without accepting it he will incur the penalty of other clinchers (such as 'self-contradiction' and the like); and it will be quite open to him to deny the efficacy of those other Clinchers also (which therefore will have no dread for him). The Bauḍḍhas have declared as follows:—'Disputations are never carried on in strict accordance with any shāsṭra [they are carried on in accordance with what comes to the mind of the disputants; so that no amount of systematic treatment of the *Clinchers* will close the mouth of a recalcitrant disputant]. Thus the conclusion is that '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' is not a *Clincher* at all.

Kh. II. 34.

'Specially as when a man is born' he is born entirely free, untrammelled by any established conclusions; nor does he at the time of his birth, perceive the good and bad point of the several philosophical tenets); how then can anyone be said to have acquired a proprietary right over any established conclusion (the denying of which might constitute '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' for him)?'

(32) [In answer to the above assertion of the Bauḍḍha that 'Disputations are never carried on in strict accordance with any shāsṭra'] Some people* argue as follows:—It is not possible to carry on discussion except on the basis of shāsṭra. For instance, when the Bauḍḍha, who upholds of the momentariness of all things, puts forward a reasoning ['all that exists is momentary,—as for instance, the clouds floating in the sky'], and is met by a dull-headed logician, upholding the permanence of things, who is dull enough not to be able to perceive flaws in the reasoning and therefore simply says that the reasoning involves the fallacy of '*Siḍḍhasāḍhana*', 'Redundancy', 'Proving what is already well known',—what can the Bauḍḍha do [except to show that in urging this fallacy, the Logician accepts the momentariness of things, and thereby renders himself open to the charge of *apasiḍḍhanṭa*']? "He will simply show that the Logician contradicts the opinion (that things are permanent) that he had previously put forward against the Bauḍḍha's conclusion." If this procedure were admissible, then the Bauḍḍha might as well urge against him the contradiction of any other opinion that may be in keeping with the Logician's former opinion; or else [if this were not considered right, then] he would ignore (and not urge) the contradiction of the

* This refers to Uḍayanāchārya, who makes the observation in his *Nyāyaparishiṣṭa* (according to the *Shānkarī*), or in his *Ṭaṭparya-parishuḍḍhi* (according to the *Viḍyāsagari*). The *Chiṭshuki* says '*Uḍayanokṭam arṭhaṭaḥ upanyasyaṭi ḍūṣayiṭum*; by which it is implied that the text does not actually quote from Uḍayana.

former opinion either; for certainly there is no difference between contradicting a certain opinion and contradicting that which is in keeping with that opinion. [Thus we find that it is necessary to base a discussion on *shāstra*; for] '*shāstra*' is nothing more or less than what propounds facts and opinions—some of which are subordinate, and in keeping with others—that are conducive to the fulfilment of a certain purpose of man. So that if one admits the momentariness of things, this implies the admission of all those tenets that are in keeping with 'and favourable to' the theory of momentary existence,——such tenets, for instance, as that of 'Apoha' 'the exclusion of contraries', and such others held by the Bauḍḍha; and conversely, if even one of those correlated tenets is rejected, it implies the rejection of all that is in keeping with that rejected tenet. Even God himself cannot annul this palpable fact. Nor is it possible for one to describe, in his own words, all that may be in keeping with his philosophical tenet; for in the first place, this would mean the composing of a fresh philosophi cal treatise then and there; and secondly because the audience will not be interested in any such detailed statement. And for the purpose of urging against him the fact of his contradicting this philosophical tenet, one could not make a guess of all that may be in keeping with and implied by, the tenets of each of the *shāsṭras* concerned. And lastly, philosophical tenets and all that is implied by them continue to be contradicted; and if such contradiction is allowed to pass unnoticed, then there is no chance for either party getting at either the knowledge of truth or victory over his opponent. For these reasons, even though he may not wish it, one cannot but have recourse to the *Shāsṭras* bearing upon the matter under discussion.

(33) The above reasoning of Uḍayana is not very sound; what may the 'other tenet in keeping with the philosophical conclusion' be—on the non-acceptance of which, it is said, that one should urge 'contradiction'? There are two

***Kh. II.* 36·**

things that can be accepted: (1) that, without the acceptance of which the discussion itself could not proceed; *e.g.* the proofs admitted by all disputants;—and (2) those tenets that are held by particular philosophical systems only; *e. g.* the momentariness of things, the existence of God, and so forth. Now as one can enter into a discussion only after having accepted the former—*i.e.* the proofs—if he accepts them at the start, and then subsequently rejects them,—if this be regarded as '*Apasiddhānta*' for him,——then this cannot be; for the simple reason that this procedure involves 'Self-contradiction'; and 'Self-contradiction' has been regarded by you, the Logician, yourself as a 'futile rejoinder' (and not as a 'Clincher'); and you describe the 'futile rejoinder' as 'the urging of what should not be urged.' Nor can the '*apasiddhānta*' refer to the second set of tenets (which are peculiar to the individual philosophical systems). If it be held that for the starting of a discussion it is necessary to accept the 'momentariness of things,' or some such doctrine as is peculiar to a particular philosophy,—we ask: is the acceptance of that particular doctrine, 'momentariness' for example, the *upāya* or means of the subject of discussion, for example the doctrine of '*apoha*' and such other tenets of the Bauddha? Or are the two invariably concomitant with each other [so that the one implies the other]?

(34) It cannot be the former; for in that case, when the Bauddha proceeds to prove the momentariness of things, if he renounces the doctrine of 'Apoha' and such other doctrines peculiar to the Bauddha philosophy,—then this would not involve, '*apasiddhānta*' for him; as the acceptance of 'apoha' and the other doctrines is not the means of 'momentariness' [as, it is the 'momentariness' whose acceptance, *ex hypothesi*, is the means of 'Apoha']. And if, in order to avoid this difficulty, the two (acceptance of momentariness

Kh. II. 37.

and 'Apoha') were held to be the means of one another, then no discussion or consideration of the two would be possible; for it would involve a vicious circle: while on the one hand, only after discussion could the tenet be regarded as valid and consequently accepted, on the other hand, the discussion could proceed only on the acceptance of the doctrines. "The '*apasiḍḍhānṭa*' would lie only in the renouncing of the particular 'means' (viz: the momentariness of things) that had been previously admitted, and in nothing else." This is not right, we reply; for whence do you get at the law that whenever one thing is the 'means' of another, an *acceptance* of the former is necessary for the starting of any discussion in regard to the latter? All that appears to be right to concede is that the discussion proceeds in regard to the latter as having the former for its means; and as for the *acceptance* of the means, this acceptance need not form the said 'means'; for, in the first place, no proofs can be adduced in support of the view that both what is regarded as the 'means' (*i. e.*, the momentariness of things) and the acceptance of this 'means' have the causal efficiency necessary to be regarded as the 'means' (of 'Apoha' and such other doctrines); and secondly, even if such proofs could be adduced, why should it be necessary for the *acceptance* to be in avowed terms that 'such and such I accept'? [the 'acceptance' that may be the 'means' to the other doctrines could be only the *acceptance* by the original founder of the philosophy];—any such avowal of acceptance by every individual would be absolutely superfluous; as the mere fact of the 'acceptance' (by the original founder) being the 'means' would be sufficient to make the parties cognisant of the fact. [And thus the individual entering into the discussion not having avowed his own acceptance of any doctrine, any subsequent disavowal of the same by him could not constitute '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*'].

"But when one proceeds to prove the effect (*e. g.*, the

Kh. II. 38.

doctrine of 'Apoha') by means of its cause (*e. g.*, the doctrine of the 'momentariness of things') it is necessary that he should accept the existence of the latter; as that which is not accepted as really existing cannot be regarded as a cause; —such being the case, if there be any subsequent disavowal of the same, that would be a fit opportunity for the clincher of '*Apasiḍḍahānṭa*' being urged against him." Well, if such be the case, the fact of the man putting forward the doctrine as the 'means' would lead to the presumption of his 'acceptance' of the same; and even though this acceptance is not directly avowed, yet it would be presumed on the strength of the fact that that which is regarded as non-existing can never be regarded and put forward as a 'means'; and on the basis of the contradiction of this *presumed* 'acceptance' by the subsequent *direct* disavowal you would urge the clincher of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' against the man;—under the circumstances, it will be infinitely simpler for you to urge against him the objection that in case he does not *accept* the existence of what he has put forward as the 'means', this latter could never be a 'means' at all; firstly because it is this objectionable feature upon which the '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*' rests; and secondly because until you have put forward this objectionable feature, you cannot prove that he actually *accepts* that whose acceptance he has not directly avowed; and this objectionable feature being sufficient for the demolishing of his position, there would be no necessity for the urging of the '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*', which after all, is entirely dependent upon, and comes after, the said objectionable feature.

(35) For the same reasons the second alternative (noted at the end of para. 33)—that is to say, the doctrines of 'momentariness' and of 'apoha' are invariable concomitants—cannot be accepted. The necessity of the acceptance of one invariable concomitant can be proved only by the

Kh. II. 39.

argument that if its existence were not accepted, the other concomitant—which the man seeks to establish—would be an impossibility; and under the circumstances, it would be better to urge this same circumstance as an objection against the man's non-acceptance, rather than presume his acceptance, and then urge the clincher of '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*', on the basis of this presumed acceptance being contradicted by his subsequent non-acceptance.

(36) From the above refutation of the clincher of *Praṭijñānṭara*; '*Praṭijñāhāni*' and '*Apasiḍḍhānṭa*', we can deduce the arguments against the other Clinchers also.

End of Chapter II.

CHAPTER III.

CRITICISMS AGAINST THE USE OF PRONOUNS.

[With a view to remove all chance of any reasonable objection being taken against the Vedānta Philosophy, the author has shown that it is impossible for the Logician to provide any adequate explanation either of 'Pramanā', the incompatibility whereof might be urged against the Vedānta, of 'fallacies', which might be detected against the Vedanta view of things, or of the 'clinchers' and such other details of disputation which might have been put forward to shut the mouth of the Vedāntin disputant. He now proceeds to show that it is not possible for the Logician to put any question—in a reasonable form—to the Vedāntin, in the course of any discussion; and in this connection he begins with showing that no adequate explanation can be given of the 'pronouns'—'what', 'who' and the like—with which all questioning begins].

(1) [Page 553]. Now, how are you going to explain the meaning of Pronouns, on whose basis most discussions proceed? For instance, take the question—'*what* is the proof of the existence of God?' A person who puts the question should be thus answered:—This word, 'what' with which you introduce your question—what does it mean? The word could mean either—(*a*) *ākṣēpa*, denial, or (*b*) *kuṭsā* censure, or (*c*) *viṭarka*, doubt, or (*d*) *prashna*, question. (*a*) Now if it be taken to mean *denial*, the question would mean—'there is *no proof* of the existence of God'; and as this would be the mere statement of a proposition, which cannot establish anything, it should be necessary, for you, the questioner, to state certain reasons etc., in support of the proposition; and inasmuch as you have not stated any such reasons, you become open to the charge of 'deficiency.' (b) For the same reason, the word cannot mean *censure*; for in the first place in that case also the question would mean that 'the proof for God's existence is censurable'; and this also will be a bold statement without any reason;—and secondly, do you *censure* the proof because it does not prove what it is meant to prove? or because of some other reason? If the latter, then there is no need for your pointing it out to us; as, in that case, there is

Kh. II. 41.

no harm done to tho proving of what the proof is meant to provo (and this is all that the propounder of the proof cares for). If it be the former—*i. e.*, if you censure the proof becauso it does not prove God's existence,—then this also can not bo maintained; as to call it a 'proof', and then to say that it does *not prove,* would involve a self-contradiction. "But the word 'proof' is hero used in its metaphorical or figurative sense (and not in the strictly original sense of *that which proves*) [so that there is no self-contradiction)." This is not right; if tho word 'proof' is used here with reference to what is actually possessed of tho character of proof, *pramāṇatva,* then it cannot be regardod as usod in a figurative sense, for the simple reason that the word is found, *ex hypothesi,* to be used in its strictly original sense. If, on the other hand, the word 'proof' is used with reference to what is not really possessed of the character of proof, but only appears to be so,—then there is no need of mentioning that it is 'censurable' [as, proof is censurable as unsound only when being not a proof, it is applied to what *is* proof; so when it is applied to what *ex hypothesi,* is *not proof,* thero nood bo no censuro of it]; for your statement, in this case would simply mean—'the false proof that there may be for God's existence is censurable'; and this be admitted by all parties, including your opponent. Further, in that case even the special mention of the word '*īshvarasadbhāvē*' 'of God's existence' would be superfluons; as what is 'false proof' is censurable in other cases also,—being in its very nature, incapable of proving what it is meant to prove. (c) For similar reasons the third alternative cannot be accepted—that is, the word 'what' cannot mean 'doubt'. As, every case of doubt requires two alternative factors,—always appearing in the form 'this or that'; and thus in the proposition 'what is the proof' &c.

if it is to be a statement of doubt, it will be necessary to, state the other alternative factor also; and the proposition will have to be stated in the form—'for God's existence is this a proof or is it something else? And as you have not made your statement in this form, you are open to the charge of 'deficiency'. (d) Nor, lastly can the fourth alternative be accepted,—that is, the word 'what' cannot be regarded as denoting *question*; for if the 'what' denoted question, this would imply that there is something with regard to which there is a desire to know, an inquisitiveness; and owing to the presence of the word 'proof', this 'desire to know' would appear to be with regard to proofs; and the rule is that the person answering the question must point out or indicate that with regard to which the question is put. Now, with regard to the question under consideration, we ask—Does the question refer to proof in general for God's existence (meaning if there is any proof of God's existence)? Or does it refer to a particular proof (the meaning being, are there particular proofs for God's existence)? If it is the former, then the mere statement that 'there *is* proof of God's existence' would suffice for the answer; for all that is required of the answerer is to provide what the question requires; and as the question requires the statement as to whether or not there is any proof for God's existence, this statement is provided by the answerer stating that 'there is *proof*'. If the second alternative be meant—*i. e.*, if the question means 'What particular proofs are there for God's existence?—even then, the statement 'there is proof for God's existence' would be sufficient answer; the word 'proof' in this answer signifying *particular proofs* in the same manner as the same word does in the question. [So that 'there are particular proofs for God's existence' would be a fitting answer to the question, 'are there particular proofs for God's

Kh. III. 43.

existence ? ']. " What the question means is—' what is that particular proof which proves God's existence ? ".
This also does not help the matter; as this form of the question also would be met by the same answer as before: the subject of this question also is *particular proof*; the word ' what' being coordinate with the expression ' particular proof ', the answer also would consist of the phrase ' there is particular proof.' " The expression ' particular proof ' is not used in the vague sense of an undefined and unspecified particular proof; but in the sense of a specific individual well-defined proof; and it is in this sense that the expression ' particular proof ' has been used; so the meaning of the question is—' what is that particular specific proof which proves God's existence?.''—And the proper answer to this should consist of the indicating of such a specific proof, and not in the making of such senseless assertions as you have been making."
What you say is not quite right; for even with your interpretation of the question, the answer to it would again be in the form ' there is particular proof ' ;—and if in the question, the expression 'particular proof' signifies a specific individual proof, it does the same in the answer also; so that whatever meaning you may assign to the expression as appearing in the question, that same meaning would be expressed by the expression as occurring in the answer [and hence whatever your question may mean, the statement ' there is particular proof ' would be a suitable answer in all cases].

(2) " When one puts the question—' what is the proof of this or that ? '—what he wishes to know is if the particular thing is proved by Inference or by something else." To this also our answer is—It is proved by Inference. " What is that *inference* ?" With regard to this question also, we ask—does this question refer to Inference in general, or to any particular inference ?

Kh. III. 44.

And having put those questions, we shall offer to you the same answers that we did to your question 'What is the proof? And the following two verses depict the true state of things in this connection:—

'When the questioner explains his question as pertaining to a particular subject,—the same should be stated by the answerer, the same subject and in the same words.'

'It is a well-known rule that the answerer should state exactly that which forms the subject of the question; as the subject is best explained by those same words; in fact, this method of explaining by means of the same words has been adopted by you in the explanations that you have been putting forward of your question; [why then should not I, the answerer, adopt the same method?].'

[P. 558] (3) Then again, the fact of the word 'what' denoting *question* implies that the subject questioned about is an object of curiosity; and 'curiosity' is only the *desire* to know; and as a matter of fact, there can be no desire with regard to anything that is absolutely unknown; as if such desire were possible, then there would be the absurdity of desire arising with regard to everything in the world, known and unknown alike. Thus then, when you *desire* to know, the proof with regard to God, you will have to point to the knowledge that you may have of God,—the knowledge whereupon your desire would be based. And with regard to this, your knowledge, we ask—is this knowledge that you have of God, true—*i. e.* in full accord with the object as it really exists? or is it false—*i. e.* not in accord with the object? If it is true, then that knowledge itself makes its object amenable to valid proof; as unless an object is amenable to valid proof, it is not possible to speak of its knowledge as 'true'; and this valid proof brings up or indicates the *existence* of God, which forms its objective; and thus, our desire to prove the existence of God becomes accomplished without any effort

on our part. If, on the other hand, your knowledge of the thing (God) is not true,—then, if it be your desire, when you put the question, that in regard to that object of your Wrong Knowledge, we should produce another Wrong Knowledge, then why should you seek this at the hands of another person when it is entirely within your own power? You are yourself an expert in producing Wrong Knowledge; and just as you you have produced one Wrong Knowledge with regard to the thing, in the same manner you can produce another also As for ourselves we, are the producers of only *true* knowledge and are entirely inexperienced in the production of wrong ones; why then should you employ us in this work? "What we ask you to do is to make that which is an object of my *Wrong* Knowledge, an object of my *True* Knowledge." I that is what you desire, then our reply is that your very attempt at this is absurd, involving as it does a self-contradiction on your part: How can any intelligent person ever make an attempt at making *the shell that he perceives as silver* an object of his right cognition? For as a matter of fact, if the form in which an object is *wrongly* known were said to be the same in which it is *rightly* known,—this would be a clear case of self-contradiction. "What you have to produce is what may be right knowledge in accordance with *your* philosophical tenets (even though it may be wrong according to mine); that is why we are asking you to do so. This also will not be right: It is *not* a philosophical tenet of mine —I do not hold the view—that it is my duty to show that the invalid proof of God's existence, which you have wrongly come to regard as valid proof, is really valid; on the contrary my duty should be to show that the valid proof of God's existence, which you have wrongly come to regard as invalid is really valid.

(4) "When we ask you—what is the proof of God's existence?—what we wish you to do is merely to make

Kh. III. 46.

known to us the proof that there may be for God's existence, and we do not wish anything further, as to whether this knowledge that you may produce in us be true or false." This is not right, we reply; as the mere *making known* would be possible also if the knowledge produced were entirely wrong; and we have already said that the producing of such knowledge is entirely in your own power; why should you seek, in this, the help of any other person? "The fact is that there has appeared in us a certain knowledge of the proof for God's existence; and with regard to this there arises a doubt in our mind as to whether this knowledge of ours is wrong or right;— thus there is no room for the objections that you have urged, which is based on the supposition that we definitely accept one of the two views as to the rightness or wrongness of the knowledge [while, as a matter of fact, we are entirely in doubt and do not accept the one or the other]". * It is not so, we reply; for if you are only in doubt as to the truth or falsity of your knowledge, then this would mean that you are in doubt also as to the proof, of which you have the knowledge, and also as to God's existence, which is the object of that proof; and under the circumstances, your question would be one that comes from one who is in doubt on the point; and not that which comes from a decided opponent (who denies the point entirely). Such being the case, please accept the position of a disciple, and propitiate us with a long course of attendance and service; and then we shall remove this doubt of yours!

(5) "We are certainly your decided Opponents; [as we deny the existence of God]; and the doubt that we have spoken of is one that has been purposely conjured up (for purposes of discussion)." This means that you have fully accepted one of the two alternatives of the doubt; and you

* The objections have been in the form—'*if you regard your knowledge as true*, then God's existence is proved; if the knowledge is false, it is for you to produce wrong knowledge' and so forth.

have set up the doubt only for a special purpose. Well, in that case, we put to you the question—is this definite cognition of the one alternative true or false?,—and thereby make you subject to the objections that we have already urged above [from which you sought to extricate yourself, in para. 4, by urging that you were entirely doubtful, and had not accepted any one of the two alternatives]. And further this uncertainty will also serve to reject any such assertion of yours as 'this is accepted by us';—as this assertion also will be open to the objections based upon the question as to whether this acceptance is true or false; specially in view of the law that 'when there is contradiction between two things, one or the other must be *true*, no third alternative is possible' [by which an acceptance must be either true or false; 'true' and 'false' being contradictory terms].

(6) All that we have urged in the *Ishvarābhisandhi* and other works against the use of pronouns is applicable in the present connection also.

END OF CHAPTER III.

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NO. IV.

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OF

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effect that is ever found to have been brought about jointly by those ; in no case is a mixed effect found to be produced by the joint action of the two different causes; for instance, no such thing as the *cloth-jar* is ever found to be produced by the joint action of yarn and clay. No sense-organ by itself is ever found capable of producing any such effect as appears in the Recognition. For these reasons Recognition must be regarded as involving two distinct cognitions—*a direct apprehension*, so far as the cognition of 'this' is concerned, and a *remembrance* so far as concerns the cognition of 'that' ; nor can there be any single cognition of any kind that partakes of the nature of both Direct Apprehension and Remembrance ; for the simple reason that Remembrance pertains to what is remembered and Direct Apprehension to what it apprehended ; in fact the cognitions of 'this' and 'that' involved in Recognition must be regarded to be as distinct as the Direct Apprehension of the jar and the remembrance of the cloth. Even if, for the sake of argument, we admit that Recognition represents a single cognition, we have to examine the character of the object of such a cognition. If the cognition apprehends a thing of the past, it is mere Remembrance ; if it apprehends a thing of the future, it must be mere Imagination ; if lastly, it apprehends only what exists at the present moment, then it does not prove that permanence of things which it is meant by the Logician to prove. Nor can it be held to apprehend a thing qualified by its previous cognition ; as the previous cognition is not present at the time ; and what is not present cannot serve as a qualification.

In answer to the above, the *Nyāyamañjarī*. (pp. 458-461,) puts forward the *Nyāya* view of Recognition, which may be thus summed up :—

As a matter of fact, there is a single idea or cognition involved in Recognition ; and what brings about this cognition is the sense-organ assisted by impressions ; it is true that

sense-organs do not bring about such mixed cognitions; but because such is generally the case, it is not necessary that it should be always so; it is perfectly legitimate for a cause to produce an effect different from its usual effect, when it has extraneous forces bearing upon it; and in the case in question, we have the force of impressions bearing upon the sense-organ, which, on that account, produces on effect in the shape of the mixed cognition involved in Recognition. As to the character of the object apprehended by Recognition, what is apprehended is an object that belongs to the present, but is qualified by the past time also; and when such is the actual fact it is idle to deny the possibility of such mixed character of the object. Nor need there be any incongruity in this; the past is cognised as 'past,' as 'that', and the present is cognised as 'present', as 'this'; and the idea of the object pervades over both; and is cognised as one and the same, related to both points of time. As to what is past, and hence not present at the time of the cognition, qualifying the object which is present, there is nothing incongruous in this either; *e. g.* when we are eating a number of fruits,—one hundred, for instance,—when we come to the hundredth fruit, we have the cognition of having eaten hundred fruits; this cognition being brought about, and qualified, by the fruits which had existed in the past, many seconds before the hundreth fruit is eaten and the number *hundred* recognised; and in reality, even though what is past is not present at the time, yet the relation that the object had with the past time is certainly present in the object; and qualification by this relation is all that is necessary for Recognition being coloured by the idea of the 'past'. Lastly, the Bauḍḍha has taken exception to the fact that Recognition, though partaking of the notion of what is past, is yet produced by the sense-object contact; but what incongruity is there in this? The object is there before

the eyes; and there is thus present the sense-object contact which is the precursor of the Recognition; and when the object is seen, it is true that it is seen as qualified by the present time; but there is nothing to present its being, at the same time, known as qualified by the *past* time; this latter will be one among the many qualifications whose idea may quite reasonably come to the mind whenever the object is seen. Thus then, we come to the conclusion that Recognition apprehends objects that are present before the senses and which are qualified by the 'past' time; and they are brought about by the contact of the sense-organ with the object, and such other means of cognition; —or they may be held to have for their object, things qualified by the previous cognitions of themselves. Recognition thus is a form of qualified Perception.

The Vēḍānta view of Recognition is thus expounded in the *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṅgraha* (Trans. p.p. 177—181, I. Th. I, pp. 405-9).

The Vedantins seeking to prove the permanence of Cognitions on the strength of Recognition, which according to those is an independent Means of true Knowledge, is met by the following arguments of the Bauḍḍha :—

" Recognition cannot be regarded as immediate perceptive knowledge having for its object the relation of one thing to two points of time, a past one and the present one;—for perceptive knowledge apprehends present things only. It may be argued that Recognition must be of the nature of Perception, for it is originated by what is the cause of the valid cognition of a present thing—such cause being conjoined with the impression left by a previous perception (This view, it may be noted, is what has been put forward in the *Nyāya-mañjarī*]. But this does not satisfy us. As it does not meet the case of the Recognition of the Self which expresses itself in the form ' I *now* am the same person I was

then.' For the Vedāntin's Self is eternal and self-illumined, and hence there can neither be an impression of it, nor can knowledge be originated in it. Nor again can Recognition be defined as neither more nor less than the cognition of a thing's essential nature; for such cognition, like the light of a lamp, illumines only what is present here and now, and hence does not imply reflexion on what is earlier and later —reflection of which kind is involved in Recognition. On the view of the Bauḍḍha Idealist the judgment 'I am the same person I formerly was' consists of two cognitions, each of which has its own specific character and is not a 'recognition'. As Recognition thus does not admit of a satisfactory definition you may not use it to prove the oneness and permanence of cognitions."

To the above the Vēḍāntin offers the following reply :—

Although Knowledge cannot indeed be originated in the pure Self, and there can be no impression of it, yet both those things are possible with regard to the Self qualified by the internal organ; and of this Self, therefore, there can be Recognition. This fact of the Self being the object of Recognition and at the same time the recognising subject, which means that one and the same thing is the object of an action and its agent, does not involve any incongruity in the case of the Self; for all philosophical schools are agreed that the Self is agent and object of action, in so far as it is the object of certain inferential reasonings as to its difference from the body and similar things, and is of course the agent in all acts of cognising. And in the case of Recognition of the Self, the recognising agent is the Self in so far as qualified by the internal organ, and the object recognised is the Self in so far as qualified by earlier and later time; and it is the difference of conditioning adjuncts which renders it possible for the Self to be at the same time agent and object of action. It will be entirely unphilosophical to deny the

actuality of Recognition. For Recognition, expressing itself in the form 'I now am the same person I formerly was', is vouched for by our immediate consciousness; and as all men are agreed as to this, it cannot be treated as Error. The contention of the *Bauḍḍhas*—that in the judgment 'I am that,' we have to do with two separate cognitions, each of which has its own specific character,—cannot be upheld; for were this so, we should have to conclude that also in the judgment 'cognition is momentary' (which is a proposition propounded by the Bauḍḍha), we have to do with two cognitions—viz: (1) that 'Cognition *is*', and (2) that 'Cognition is momentary'; and in that case the theory of the momentariness of cognitions, which is the Bauḍḍha's great mainstay, could not be established. The upshot of all this is that Recognition may validly be conceived as Perceptive Cognition, with which there combines an impression left behind by a previous Perception; and on such Recognition also rests the incontestable consciousness of personal identity; for of, the Self, inasmuch as determined by self-conciousness, there may be a mental impression, and hence Remembrance and Recognition.

Prabhākara's view of Recognition does not differ from the above; but in his opinion, this permanent Self is established, not by the fact of its being the object of its own cognition, but by the fact of its being the substrate of the recognitive cognitions of other things. The consideration of Prabhākara's views of Self we must leave for a future occasion; but it is interesting to note in the present connexion the explanation that Prabhākara has provided of the view of the Self being both the object and agent of the act of cognition. It is true, says the Prābhākara, that the Self is cognised by the same means of valid cognition as the objects themselves; but even so the Self is not the *objective* but the *subjective* agent of the operation of cognition; just as even though the person

who walks has the operation of walking bearing upon himself he is regarded only as the nominative agent of the walking, and not as its object; specially as a true object is that upon which bears the operation of something other than itself; and this is not the case with the Self, upon which its own action of cognition bears. (Prābhākara Mīmāmsā p. 78).

CHAPTER VI—CAUSE.

We have seen what Cognition is, and what are its principal sub-divisions. We revert now to the definition of Pramāṇa, the first topic of the Nyāyā-Sūṭra, for explaining the real character of which we found it necessary to explain Pramā or Right Cognition.

Pramāṇa has been defined as the 'instrument of right cognition'; we have explained what is 'right cognition'. We shall now proceed to consider what is meant of 'instrument,' '*karaṇa*.' 'Instrument is the name given'—says the *Ṭarkabhāṣa* (Trans. p. 42)—' to that particular cause which is the most effective in bringing about a certain result; *i. e.*, it is the most efficient cause; for instance in the action of *cutting*, though the operation of many things is necessary, such as the hand, the axe and so forth,—every one of which, on that account, is a 'cause' of the cutting,—it is the axe which is the *principal cause*, its operation bearing directly and immediately on the cutting; and on this account the axe is called the *karaṇa* or 'instrument' of the cutting.

Instrument thus being only a particular kind of cause, it becomes necessary for us to provide an account of 'Cause'. Though Gauṭama and Vāṭsyāyana have not dealt with this subject,—depending it would seem for an account of it, upon the sister system of the *Vaishēṣikas*,—yet, an account of the philosophy of Nyāya will remain incomplete in an important point, if we ignored the 'cause' altogether. Nor are we entirely at sea as to the Logician's standpoint in this con-

nection. The later manuals provide us with an adequate account; and from these latter we learn the following details [*Tarkabhāṣā*. Trans. pp. 43-48].

That which must exist before the effect, and which is not taken up in the bringing about of something else, is to be regarded as the 'cause' of that effect; *e. g.* the yarn, the loom and such other things are the 'cause' of cloth; even though in some cases of the making of cloth, an ass may by chance come to the place, immediately before the making,—yet this mere *antecedence* does not make the ass a 'cause' of the cloth; because the previous presence of the ass is not *necessary* in the making of the cloth. Then again, even though the presence of the particular colour of the yarn is necessary, previous to the making of the cloth, yet that colour cannot be regarded as its 'cause', as the colour is taken up in the bringing about of an entirely different effect, in the shape of the colour of the cloth woven out of those yarns. Thus then the cause of an effect may be defined as that *necessary antecedent which is not taken up in the bringing about of something else.* Similarly the effect of a cause is that *necessary consequent which is not brought about by any other cause.*

This Cause is of three kinds—(1) the *Samavāyi*, the material or constituent cause; (2) the *Asamanāyi*, the non-constituent cause; and (3) the *Nimitta*, the efficient cause or cause in general. The first of these is that which forms the material out of which, and inherent in which, the effect is produced; *e.g.* the yarns are the material cause of the cloth; as it is out of the yarns, never apart from these, that the cloth is produced; so that the relation between these is what has been called 'intimate' or 'inherent'. The non-material cause is that which is in close proximity to—*i.e.* inherent in—the material cause of an effect, and which has its causal efficiency towards a certain effect duly ascertained; *e. g.* the

combination of the yarns is the non-material cause of the cloth ; the combination, being a quality of the yarns, inheres in those yarns, which are the material cause of the cloth ; and that the combination has its causal efficiency ascertained towards the cloth is shown by the fact that it is a *necessary antecedent* of the cloth, and 'is not taken up in the bringing about of any other effect'; these two being the only conditions necessary for causal efficiency. The Efficient Cause or Cause in General, is that which, while being neither the material, nor the non-material, cause, is yet 'a necessary antecedent not taken up in the bringing about of anything else'; *e. g.* the loom is such a cause of the cloth.

It is only things positive that have all three kinds of cause ; of negative entities, there is only one kind of cause, the *Efficient* ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that a negative entity cannot 'inhere' in, or have intimate relation with, anything.

From among these three kinds of causes, that which happens to be endowed with some sort of a special aptitude or efficiency is called the 'Instrument'.

As regards Right Cognition,—the Soul is its *material or constituent* cause ; the contact of the Soul with the Mind is its *non-material* cause ; and the thing known, and also the contact of the mind with the sense-organ, form its '*efficient* cause.

According to the Nyāya the former two kinds of Cause are never regarded as 'instrument'; it is always the last kind that is so regarded ; this is shown by the Bhāṣya declaring in regard to Perception, that if the cognition is the effect then the sense-organ is the 'instrument', and if the acquiring or discarding of the perceived object are the effect, then the cognition is the 'instrument'; so that in neither case is either the Soul or the soul's contact with mind spoken of as the 'instrument.'

With reference to the Pramāṇas, the Bhāṣya. (p. 10) raises a further question :—'Have the Pramāṇas their objectives in common? Or the scope of the Pramāṇas is restricted within mutually exclusive limits?' The answer given is that both of these are true: For instance, in the case of the Soul we find—(a) that it is by means of Word that we come to know that the Soul exists, (b) we find Inference operating upon it when it is asserted that 'the indicative marks of the Soul are desire, aversion &c.' (Sū. 1. 1. 10), which means that it is from the presence of these that the existence of the Soul is inferred; (c) and the Soul is also *perceived* by the peculiar contact of the Soul with the mind, this perception being the result of *yogic* trance, and as such possible only for the *yogin*. Thus it is found that the Soul forms an objective for all the four *pramāṇas*. Similarly in the case of fire, it is found that—(a) when a trustworthy person tells us that there is fire at such and such a place, our cognition of fire is *verbal*; (b) drawing nearer to the place, if we happen to see smoke issuing from the place, we *infer* from this the presence of fire; (c) actually getting at the place, we directly *see* the fire. On the other hand, in the case of certain things we find that one thing is amenable to only one *particular pramāṇa*; *e. g.* that the Agnihoṭra should be performed by one who desires heaven we can know only from the *words* of the Veda; the ordinary man has no other means available for knowing this; similarly when we hear the sound of thundering, from this, we *infer* the source of the sound; and in regard to this we can have no Perception; nor any verbal cognition; lastly of our own hand we have only direct perceptive knowledge, and neither Inference nor Word is operative in this case.

Among the four kinds of Pramāṇas, Perception has been held to be the most predominant; for if a man seeks the knowledge of a certain thing, when he is told of it by a trust worthy person, and thereby has the verbal cognition of the

thing, there is still a lurking desire in his mind to ratify this information by means of Inference through particular indicative features; and even after he has got at the inferential knowledge of the thing,—he is still desirous of *seeing* the thing with his own eyes; but when he has once *perceived* the thing directly, he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge of that thing. The examples cited above of the soul and fire, make this point clear. When the man has to know fire, if several *pramāṇas* come to bear upon it, as shown above, he has a commingling of the *pramāṇas*, in which case all longing for knowledge does not cease until the appearance of direct Perception; whereas if there is a single *pramāṇa* bearing upon the thing, there is no commingling, but separate functioning; and in this case also, it is Perception only that fully satisfies the inquisitive mind.

A further interesting question bearing upon *Pramāṇas* in general is discussed in Sūtras 2. 1. 8 to 19. An objection is raised against the validity of Perception and the other *Pramāṇas*:—

"Perception and the rest," it is argued, "can have no validity, as it cannot be shown whether they come before or after their object, or simultaneously with it. For instance, the cognition of odour is a Perception; if this existed before the odour, and the odour comes only afterwards, then the Perception is not produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the odour; and yet this is an essential condition in all Perception; according to Su. 1. 1. 4.;—*secondly* if the Perception comes *after* the odour; then before the appearance of Perception, what would be there to prove the existence of the odour? It is only by means of *Pramāṇa* that the existence of *prameyas* can be proved;—lastly, if the Perception is simultaneous with the odour, both coming into existence at the same time,—then, as a matter of fact, we find that many objects of cognition come into existence at a single time; for

instance, when the jar is produced, there come into existence its odour, its colour, its size, and so forth,—all of which are objects of Perception; now all these cannot be the object of a single Perception; there are, in fact, as many perceptions as there are objects to be perceived; so that at the moment that odour and colour are produced, there will be produced, *ex-hypothesi*, also the perceptions of these; and thus we would have a simultaneity of cognitions; and this is against the Naiyāyika's tenet, as expressed in Sū. 1. 1. 16 and 3. 2. 59. Thus then, all possible alternatives of the existence of Pramāṇa and its object having failed, the existence or validity of the Pramāṇas cannot be maintained". (Sū. 2. 1. 8—11).

The answer to the above, as given by Vātsyāyana (Bhā. p. 65, l. 12 *et. seq.*), is as follows:—

As a matter of fact there can be no hard and fast rule as to the Pramāṇa coming before or after or simultaneously with its object. In some cases we find the means of cognition, the *pramāṇa*, appearing before the object;—*e. g.* in the case of the light of the sun: the sun's light is the means by which we perceive things; so that when we perceive the jar that has just been made, we have the 'means'—in the shape of the sun's light—already in existence before the perceived object comes into existence;—on the other hand, in the case of lamp light we find that the lamp being lighted, we see things that have been in existence already,; so that in this case, the 'means'—lamp-light—appears *after* the object;—and lastly, in some cases both appear simultaneously; e. g. the inferential cognition of fire appears along with the cognition of smoke—where the latter cognition is the 'means' of the former. From these special cases we come to the conclusion that between the *object* and *what brings about its cognition*, that is the *Pramēya* and the *Pramāṇa*, there is no hard and fast rule as to the exact order in which the two appear.

Nyāya Lec. 91.

Nor is there any such hard and fast rule as that what is once an 'instrument' is always an instrument; or that what is once an 'object' is always an object. For instance, the Self is an 'object' of cognition, as we are cognisant of it; but in regard to the cognition of other things, it is the 'cogniser'; similarly the axe is an *agent* when we say 'the axe stands here'; but it is an *object* when we say 'I see the axe'; and it is an *instrument* when we say 'I cut the tree with the axe'; it is the *dative* when we say 'I pour oil for the sake of the axe'; it is in the *ablative* when we say 'this piece of iron has fallen from the axe'; it is in the *locative* when we say 'the spot is on the axe.'

Under Sū. 2. 1. 17, the following further questions are raised:—"How do you cognise the *Pramāṇas* themselves? By means of *Pramāṇa*? or without the instrumentality of *Pramāṇas*? If the latter, then, just as for the cognition of *Pramāṇas*, the instrumentality of *Pramāṇas* will not be necessary, so for the cognition of *Prameyas* also; and there would thus be no need for postulating any *Pramāṇas* at all. If on the other hand, *Pramāṇas* are cognised by means of *Pramāṇas*, then, for the cognition of every single *Pramāṇa* you will have to postulate another *Pramāṇa*; for the cognition of this latter again, a third *Pramāṇa* would be needed and so and on, you would have to postulate *Pramāṇas adinfinitum*.

Then again, is one Perception cognised by means of Perception or by means of other *Pramāṇas*? If the latter, then, there would be more than four *Pramāṇas*? If the former, then is every Perception cognised by itself or by another Perception? If by another, then this another would be cognised by another, and so on and on, *ad infinitum*. If a Perception is cognised by itself, then this involves the absurdity of the Perception operating upon itself. As a matter of fact, we do not find the sword-blade cutting itself. Hence

the inevitable conclusion would appear to be that there is nothing by means of which *Pramāṇas* can be cognised.' (*Bhāṣya* and *Tātparya*, p. 255).

The answer to the above is supplied in Sū. 19.

In the case of lamp-light, which renders things visible, we find that the light itself is apprehended, made cognised, by a Perception other than that to which it itself gives rise. From this analogy we conclude that one Perception also is apprehended by means of another Perception. Among the several factors that enter into the perceptional process—(1) the sense-organs are *inferred* as the essential instruments of the process ; (2) the objects themselves are known by Perception ; (3) the contact of the sense-organ with the perceived object is *inferred* from the fact that there is no Perception whenever there is anything intervening between the two and obstructing the contact; finally (4) the cognition produced by the sense-object contact (which cognition is what is the 'Perception' commonly so called) is perceived, like pleasure and pain, by means of the mind-soul contact, through its inherence in the Soul. When the Perception brings about the cognition of something else it is called '*pramāṇa*' ; and when it is itself cognised, it is '*prameya*' ; just as the lamp-light is called the *means* of seeing when it illumines objects ; but it is known as the 'object perceived' when we look upon the light itself. Thus for the cognition of the *Pramāṇas* we do not require to postulate any additional *Pramāṇas* ; nor need we hold the view that this cognition is not brought about by any instrumentality at all. (*Bhāṣya* p. 71.) Nor is any Perception cognised by means of itself (*Tātparya* p. 255). What is meant is that one Perception is cognised by means of another Perception. According to the *Naiyāyika* the mind is as much a sense-organ as any other; and in the case of the perception of Perception, we have the same kind of sense-contact as we have in the case of the cogni-

tion of pleasure and pain; these latter, according to the *Naiyāyika* being perceived through their contact with the mind. Thus the cognition of Perception also, brought about by its contact with the mind-organ, becomes pure Perception. Then again, in the case of such conceptions as 'I am happy' we have the apprehension of 'I' by the apprehender himself;—and in the case of 'Mind' we find that we infer its existence by means of the mind itself, through the fact of the 'cognitions not being simultaneous.' Similarly there need be nothing incongruous in Perception being made known by itself.

It has been urged that if one Perception be held to be made known by another Perception, then for the knowledge, of this latter we would need another Perception; and so on *ad infinitum*. The answer to this is that we postulate things only in accordance with our requirements: we assume only such things as are absolutely necessary for the explaining of and the accounting for, well-known facts. Thus in the case in question, we find that when we perceive an object, we have one Perception; and this is invariably followed by a further conception 'I have perceived the object'; which means 'I know that the perceptional cognition of the object has appeared in my mind'; similarly when we infer something, we have the conception 'I know that an inferential cognition of the thing has appeared in my mind'; and so in every case, we find a cognition followed by a conception in the form of representative cognition or *anuvyavasāya*; now this representative cognition represents the former cognition as the object of a further cognition; and hence it becomes necessary for us to postulate a *Pramāṇa*, a means of knowing the former cognition. For the postulating of any further *Pramāṇas*, we have no such justification; as in our experience we never find any conception following after the aforesaid representative cognition; upon whose basis alone a further

Pramāṇa could be postulated. Thus there can be no justification for the postulating of *Pramāṇas ad infinitum.*

Another answer to this objection is given by the *Ṭātparya Ṭīkā* (p. 256)—There are some *means of cognition* that produce other cognitions only when they have themselves been cognised:—*e. g.* Smoke brings about the inference of fire only when it has itself been perceived; there are other means of cognition which, though producing other cognitions, themselves remain unknown:—*e. g.* the Eye itself is not perceived at the time that it produces visual perception. This shows that it is not necessary for every *Pramāṇa* itself to be known in its turn by another *Pramāṇa*; hence also there can be no justification for postulating a *Pramāṇa* for the cognition of the aforesaid representative cognition.

Another interesting question arising from the above is—Are Perceptions cognised by Perceptions, Inferences by Inferences, Analogical cognitions by Analogical cognitions, and Verbal cognitions by Verbal cognitions? Or are all *Pramāṇas* cognised by means of Perception alone? or by Inference alone? or by Analogy alone? or by Words alone?

This question is not found raised either in the *Bhāṣya* or in the *Vārṭika* or in the *Ṭātparya.* Not having raised the question, they do not provide any clear answer to it. All that the *Bhāṣya* says is—प्रत्यक्षादिभिरेव प्रत्यक्षादीनां यथादर्शन मुपलब्धि :—'It is by means of Perception and the rest that we have the apprehension of Perception and the rest,—just as we find in each individual case' (p. 71, line 10). The *Ṭātparya* also makes a similar assertion (pp. 255-56) प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयस्य प्रत्यक्षादिजातीयेन ग्रहणमातिष्ठामहे—'What we hold is that what belongs to the category of Perception and the rest is apprehended by what belongs to the category of Perception and the rest'.

Both these assertions are vague; but from the mention of 'Perception *and the rest*' we can infer that cognitions

are cognised not by means of any one *Pramāṇa*, but by various *Pramāṇas* : Sometimes a cognition may be directly *perceived* ; sometimes it may be *inferred* and so on. This is what is meant by what the Bhāṣya says (on p. 73) in regard to such assertions as 'my cognition is perceptional', 'my cognition is inferential,' &c. &c. In most cases cognitions are cognised by means of Perception,—the Perception being obtained through the instrumentality of the Mind ; as in the case of all cognitions the mind-soul contact is essential ; and Mind being a sense-organ, the cognition brought about by its contact is 'perceptional'. This is the case in almost all cognitions by ourselves ; but in some cases it happens, specially in regard to the cognition of other persons, that we can only *infer* the cognition ; e. g. when we find a person fanning himself vigorously, from this action of his we infer that he has been feeling the heat ; i. e. he has had the perceptional cognition of heat. Sometimes we find the man asserting 'I have seen an elephant', in which case our cognition of this Perception of his is purely verbal. Lastly, when we find a man declaring, 'I am feeling the same pleasure that you are feeling', our cognition of his perception of pleasure is analogical. There thus can be no hard and fast rule in regard to this matter. This is what the Bhāṣya (p. 71) means by the qualifying word '*yathādarshanan*,' 'just as we find in each individual case.' Roughly speaking, our own cognitions we cognise by means of Perception obtained through the contact of the Mind ; while the cognitions of other people we cognise by means of Inference, Analogy and Word. And it is only in very rare cases,—in cases of very vague perceptions—that we may be led to *infer* our own cognitions.

This same question has been dealt with somewhat differently by Gaṅgēsha Upāḍhyāya in the *Ṭaṭṭvachinṭāmaṇi Prāmāṇayavāḍa*, p. 276 :—

It has been held that the validity of a cognition is cognised by another cognition. Now, is the validity of this latter cognition already known or not? If it is known, it must be so by a further cognition; and so on and on, there would be an endless series of cognitions. Another view held by some people is that the validity of the latter cognition is not already known from beforehand; but it is being known at the same time at which it apprehends the validity of the preceding cognition. This view is not right; as in that case, if the latter cognition were not to have its validity cognised by means of another cognition, then its validity would be self-apprehended;—a view which though held by the Prābhākara, is rejected by the Naiyāyika. The inevitable conclusion therefore is that when the validity of one cognition is apprehended by means of another cognition, the validity of this latter cognition is not apprehended at all. When such is the case with the latter cognition, the same may be said with regard to the first cognition also; that is to say, every cognition may be held to apprehend its object, without having its own validity apprehended; and there is no need for the ascertaining of this validity, when the definite cognition of the object is obtained without its ascertainment. It might be argued that the first cognition is often found to be invalid; so that unless its validity were ascertained, there would be no certainty in regard to the nature of the thing apprehended by it. But this same argument will also stand against the view that the validity of the second cognition need not be ascertained; as the uncertainty in regard to the validity of the second cognition will naturally reflect upon the validity of the first; and thus affect also the nature of the thing cognised.

The answer given to the above is that according to the Naiyāyika, it is not always absolutely necessary, for the obtaining of certainty with regard to an object, to ascertain

the validity of the apprehending cognition. In the case of very clear cognitions,—e. g. when we see a fruit in our hand —there is no doubt in our mind as to the validity of our cognition; and in such cases the definitely certain knowledge of the object is obtained by means of the first cognition itself, without any further thought over the validity or invalidity of that cognition; and when we act up to this knowledge, this activity of ours is found to be quite correct, and we actually find the fruit to be exactly what we had thought it to be on our first cognition of it. In some cases however,—when, e. g. we see an object, not seen before, for the first time in our life,—there is always a doubt in our mind as to whether or not our cognition apprehends the real thing as it actually exists; and in this case our resultant activity towards the object will naturally stand in need of that certainty which can be got at only by ascertaining the validity of the cognition that we have had; and it is only in such cases that it will be necessary to seek the aid of a further cognition to ascertain the validity of the former cognition; and so long as there is no doubt as to the validity of the second cognition, there is no need to seek for the ascertaining of its validity. When there is such a doubt, the assumption of a further validating cognition would be necessary; but only so long as there is any doubt. So there need be no assumptions *ad infinitum*.

INFERENTIAL COGNITION.

Sūṭra 1-1-5.

* *After Perception comes Inferential Cognition,* † *which is led up to by Perception; it is of three kinds—(1)* ‡ *the Pūrvavaṭ,* (2) *the Shēṣavaṭ and* (3) *the Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa.* §

BHĀṢYA.

[*Page 18, line, 1 to Page 20, line 6.*]

Page 18. The expression 'led up to by Perception' refers to the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum,* as also to the perception of the *probans* itself; and the *perception of the relation between the probans of the probandum* also implies the remembrance of the *probans*; and thus it is by means of remembrance and perception of the *probans* that the non-perceptible thing is *inferred.*‖

I. [The first explanation of the three kinds of Inference] —(A) the *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause¶; *e. g.,* when we see clouds rising, we infer that there will be rain. (B) The *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference is that in which the cause is inferred from the effect; $ *e. g.,* when we see that the water of the river is not like what it used to be, and that the stream is full and the current swifter, we infer that there has been rain.
(C) The *Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa* Inference [is that in which the inference is based upon a general observation]; *e. g.,* we have observed in all cases that we see a thing in a place different from where we saw it before only when it has moved; and from this fact of general observation we infer that the sun must be moving, even though we cannot perceive it (because

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* This is how the *Ṭāṭparya* explains the word *atha.*

† The *Vārṭika* expands this into—'that which is preceded by other forms of valid cognition and by two perceptions'.

‡ These are technical names, of which the *Bhāṣya* supplies two different meanings. Hence the names are left here untranslated.

§ Another interpretation of the Sūṭra has been proposed by the *Vārṭika.* (See below).

‖ We *see* the fire and smoke together—this is one perception, that of the relation between fire and smoke;—after some time we see the *smoke*—this is the second perception;—on seeing the smoke we remember the relation that we had perceived; and this leads us to the inference of fire—the unperceived member of the relation.

¶ The cause is '*pūrva*' or *prior* to the effect; hence that in which the inference is based upon the cognition of the cause, has been called *Pūrvavaṭ or a priori.*

$ The effect being '*Shēṣa* or *posterior,* to the Cause.

we see the sun in the evening in a place different from where we saw it in the morning).

II. [Another explanation of the three kinds of Inference]. Or, we may explain the three names in the following manner :—(A) The *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference is that in which out of two things *as perceived on some former occasion*, the one that is not perceived (at the time of inference) is inferred from the perception of the other; *e. g.*, when fire is inferred from smoke.* (B) The word '*shēṣavaṭ*' means *remainder*; hence the *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference is that in which with regard to an object some of the likely properties being denied (and eliminated), and this elimination not applying to other likely properties, we have the cognition of those that *remain* (thus undenied); † *e. g.*, in regard to Sound we find that it is an entity and is transient; and as these two properties (*being an entity* and *being transient*) are found to be common to Substances, Qualities and Actions only, their presence in Sound distinguishes it from the remaining categories of Generality, Individuality and Inherence (all of which three are *entities*, but *eternal*) ;—, then there arising a doubt as to Sound being either a Substance, or a Quality, or an Action, we reason (by a process of elimination) in the following manner :—(*a*) Sound cannot be a Substance, because it inheres in a single substance (*Ākāsha*) [while there is no Substance which inheres in only one substance, all substances being either not inherent in any substance,—*e. g.*, the atoms,—or inherent in more than one substance,—*e.g.*, the jar, which inheres in more than one atom] ;—(*b*) Sound is not an Action, because it is the originator of another sound [it thus gives rise to something that is of its own kind; and this is never the case with any Action, which always brings about effects that are entirely unlike itself;—*e.g.*, *Action*, in most cases, produces some kind of conjunction or disjunction] ;—and by this eliminative reasoning we come to the conclusion that Sound must be a *Quality* (this being the only member of the three that is not eliminated) ‡ (C) The *Sāmānyaṭodṛiṣṭa* Inference is that in which, the relation between the *probans* and the

* The *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference would thus be *Inference by Prior Perception*.

† The *Shēṣavaṭ* inference would thus be *Inference by Elimination*.

‡ This example of *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference is not accepted by the *Ṭāṭparya—Parishēṣa* is only another name for the purely *negative* inference ; while the example cited by the *Bhāṣya* is one of the affirmative-negative kind. The example suggested is the inference of the fact of Desire' &c., being dependent upon the Self.

probandum being imperceptible, the imperceptible *probandum* is inferred from the similarity of the *probans* to something else; *e. g.*, when the *Self* is inferred from *Desire* ;—Desire is a Quality, and Qualities always inhere in Substances; and (from this similarity of Desire to other qualities we come to the conclusion that Desire must inhere in a Substance) this leads to the inference that that Substance in which Desire inheres is the Self.

It is true that the fact of there being three kinds of Inference is sufficiently indicated by the enunciation of the three kinds, and hence the additional word '*ṭriviḍham*,' 'it is of three kinds,' in the *Sūṭra* could well have been left out;—but this additional curtailment of the *Sūṭra* was not considered desirable by the author of the *Sūṭra*, as he thought that he had secured sufficient conciseness in expressing by means of the short *Sūṭra* the entire extent of the vast subject of Inference. This method of explanation—of being satisfied with one form of conciseness and not minding other possible forms—is often employed by the author of the *Sūṭra*; as we find in the case of his descriptions of the various kinds of '*Siḍdhānṭa*', '*Chhala*', '*Shabḍa*' and so forth.

[The difference between Perception and Inference is that] Perception pertains to things present, while Inference pertains to things present as well as not present (*i. e.* past and future) "How so?" As a matter of fact, Inference is applicable to all the three points of time: by means of Inference we apprehend things past, present and future: for instance, we infer (a) that 'such and such a thing *will happen*',—(b) that 'such and such a thing is present',—and also (c) that 'such and such a thing existed.' The past and the future are 'not present', [hence we speak of Inference as pertaining to the *present* as well as to the *not-present*].

VĀRṬIKA ON INFERENCE.

[*P.* 46, *line* 1, *to P.* 60, *line* 7.]

'*Aṭha ṭaṭpūrvakam ṭrividhamanumānam*'—says the *Sūṭra.* The word '*aṭha*' denotes *sequence*; and the word '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' is intended to be the definition of Inference; as it serves to distinguish Inference from what is like it (viz: the other forms of valid cognition) as well as what is unlike it (viz: invalid inference &c.).

The compound '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' is to be expounded as '*ṭāni—ṭē—ṭaṭ pūrvam yasya*'. * When we take the factor '*ṭāni pūrvamyasya*', the 'ṭāni' in the plural, standing for all forms of valid cognition, it signifies that Inference is preceded by—*i. e.* is based upon and proceeds from—all forms of valid cognition (so that the inference proceeding from Inference becomes included). [Nor does this go against the declaration of the *Bhāṣya* that Inference proceeds from Perception as, whatever form of valid cognition may be the immediate antecedent of Inference.] Even so as a matter of fact, indirectly every Inference has ultimately to rely upon a Perception; and it is in view of this fact that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of Inference as 'preceded by Perception.' With a view to distinguish Inference from the other forms of valid cognition the word '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' has to be taken as implying a further qualification,—being expounded as '*ṭē pūrvē yasya*'; *i. e.* 'that which is preceded by *two perceptions*';—† so that *Anumāna* or *Inference*, as the *means* of inferential cognition, comes to be defined as 'that Perception which is preceded by two perceptions.'‡ "Which are these *two percep-*

* And not as '*ṭaṭ pūrvam yasya*'; as this would mean 'that which is led up to, or preceded by, perception; and this would not apply to those Inferences that proceed from other inferences, ; and it would become applicable to verbal cognitions, remembrances, doubts &c. also ; as these are all 'preceded by perception.'

† The *Vārṭika* here makes, at the very outset, a distinction between Anumāna as a *form* of cognition, and Anumāna as a *means* of cognition. If this distinction is lost sight of, this and the following sentences of the *Vārṭika* become unintelligible. The Vārṭika refers all along to Anumāna as the *means* of inferential cognition.

‡ Though this is a *perception* in reference to its own object (smoke), it is the cause of the *inferential* cognition of another object (fire).

tions?" The perception of the relation (of concomitance) between the *probans* and the *probandum* is the *first*, and that of the *probans* is the *second*. What happens in the case of Inferences is as follows:—When the man, who is desirous of getting at inferential cognitions, perceives the *probans* a second time (*i. e.* after having had perceived it previously as concomitant with the *probandum*), this Perception arouses in his mind the impression left in his mind by the former perception, which leads him to remember (the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*); and after this remembrance, when he again perceives the *probans*, this last perception, led up to by the former two perceptions and the subsequent remembrance, becomes the '*Anumāna*', or *Means of Inferential Cognition*,—which is known by the name of '*Parāmarsha*' [a name that is given *to the perception of the probans as invariably concomitant with its probandum*].

"What is the meaning of the word 'Anumāna' (by which Perception can be called 'anumāna')?"

The word 'anumāna' means *anumīyaṭē anēna, that by which something is inferred*,—the affix having the force of the instrumental.

"What is the result that is brought about by its instrumentality?"

The result brought about is the cognition of the *probandum, fire* (for instance).

"How is it possible for the instrument (Perception), which pertains to one thing (the probans, *smoke*), to bring about the cognition of another thing (the probandum, *fire*)? How, for instance, can the instrument, pestle, which falls upon *paddy*, produce the thumping of the grains of *shyāmāka*"?

* This reasoning is not very sound; there is no such fixed rule as that the resultant action must bear upon the same object upon which the instrument operates; as we find that the cutting instrument operating upon the tree, produces the action (of falling) in the *parts* of the tree (and not in the tree itself)'; what is cut is the *tree*, while what falls (that on which the action of falling resulting from the *cutting* bears) is some part of the tree. In some cases it is true that the resulting action pertains to the same thing on which the instrument operates; for instance, the cooking pertains to the rice-grains, and the resultant action of *being cooked* (softened) also bears upon those same grains. In some cases again, the thing itself is the agent as well as the instrument, and the resulting action also bears upon the same; for instance, when we speak of the tree *as standing*; it is by itself that the tree stands. "What do you mean by the tree standing *by itself*?" What it means is that in the action of *standing* the tree does not employ any other instrument. In the same manner, in some

Vār. Page 47. cases the action bears upon an object entirely different from that upon which the Instrument operates. In some cases again it does happen that the action bears upon the same object as the Pramāṇa or Instrument of Cognition;—when, for instance, that same object is cognised (on which the Instrument operates). † "But, inasmuch as it is already cognised, what of it is there that could be further cognised (by means of the Instrument)?" What is meant by the object being further cognised is that it comes to be regarded as to be rejected or accepted or disregarded.

* This is the answer given by an *Ekaḍēshin*. This view is refuted later on, *Text* p. 47, line 4.

†This happens when the resultant cognition itself is regarded as the '*pramāṇa*'; and thus what is led upto by this *pramāṇa* is the acceptance or rejection of the object cognised. In this case the instrumental cognition and the resulting acceptance, etc., both bear upon the same object.

The above explanation given by the *Ēkaḍēshin* is not right; for as a matter of fact, we do not admit of any difference between the objects of the 'Instrument of Cognition' and that of the result led up to by that instrument. [And this leaves no ground for the raising of the objection, to which the *Ēkaḍēshin* has offered the above answer].

[Hitherto the *Vārṭika* has confined itself to that interpretation of the word '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*', in which '*ṭaṭ*' has been taken as standing for *ṭāni* (all forms of valid cognition) and *ṭ ē* (the two perceptions represented by the two premises); it now takes up the interpretation whereby '*ṭaṭ*' stands for *ṭāni*', as before, and '*ṭaṭ*' in the singular].

When we take '*ṭaṭpūrvakam*' as '*ṭaṭ pūrvam yasya*', 'that which is preceded by *one* perception',—then we have to disregard the distinction (that we have made above, between the *perception of the probans* on the one hand, and the *perception of the relation between the probans and the probandum on the other*); and then what happens is that the *Parāmarsha* of the *probans* (the recognition of its invariable concomitance with the *probandum*, which is *Anumāna*, the Means of Inferential Cognition) comes to represent and imply—(*a*) the perception of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*, (*b*) the subsequent perception of the *probans*, *and (*c*) the remembrance of the relation perceived before; as it is this that is really the '*ṭaṭpūrvaka*', 'preceded by perception of the *probans*.'†

"What is it that is inferentially cognised (inferred) by means of these (as implied by the *Parāmarsha*)?"

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* The *Ṭāṭparya* reads no *anusvāra* over *nṭara* in line 7; it takes the whole as one compound.

† The difference of this from the former interpretation lies in the fact that in this case there is only *one* perception of the *probans*; while in the former case there were *two*.

That which is over and above (what has been cognised by Perception) is what is cognised by Inference—[*i. e.* of the two members of the *Parāmarsha*, the *probans* and the *probandum*, the *probans* is *perceived*, and the *remaining member*, the *probandum*, is what is *inferred*].

"What is the force of the affix in the word '*Anumāna*,' 'Inference'?"

It may be taken as having either a *reflexive* or an *instrumental* signification [*i. e.* (*a*) the word 'Anumāna' may stand for '*anumiṭi*', or *inferential cognition* itself, in which case the *lyut* affix will have the sense of the reflexive ; (b) or it may stand for '*anumīyaṭē anēna*', *that by means of which the inferential cognition is got at*, in which case the affix has the force of the instrumental.] [The only difference would be that] in case the affix has the reflexive sense, the result of the *Anumāna* would be in the form of the rejection or acceptance of the object inferred ; while if it has the force of the instrumental, then the result lies in the cognition of the 'remaining factor' (*i. e.* the *probandum*).

*Now then there arises the question—What is '*anumāna*,' the *means* (the direct instrument) of Inferential Cognition ? Is it *the remembrance of the relation between the probans and the probandum ? or the perception of the probans ?*

Several answers have been given to this question :—(*a*) Some people explain that it is *the remembrance of the relation between the probans and probandum* that constitutes the *Means* of Inferential Cognition ;—(*b*) while others would take this *remembrance* as the *means*, but only in so far as it is aided by the *perception* of the relation of the *probans* and the *probandum* and such other factors ;—(*c*) a third party holds the *liṅga-parāmarsha* (the recognition of the *probans* as invariably concomitant with the *probandum*) to be the *means* of inferential cognition ;—(*d*)

* What gives rise to the question is the fact that both, the remembrance and the perception, are *ṭaṭpūrvaka* and the *cause of inferential cognition*.

but in our opinion all these factors (mentioned by others) constitute the *Anumāna*; as they are all equally necessary for Inferential Cognition; and when we come to consider the relative importance of the factors mentioned, it seems only reasonable to regard the *liṅga-parāmarsha* as the most important.

"What is the *reason* that makes this view 'reasonable'?"

The reason lies in the recognition of immediate sequence: As a matter of fact, we find that the Inferential Cognition of the *probandum* follows *immediately* after the *liṅga-parāmarsha*; and from this it naturally follows that this *parāmarsha* is what should be regarded as the *means*. The *remembrance* (of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*), on the other hand, cannot be regarded as the most predominant factor. "Why?" Simply because the *remembrance* is not *immediately* followed by Inferential Cognition;—for instance, when we infer the presence of fire from smoke, it is not right to say that the conclusion, embodying the cognition of the *probandum*,—'there is fire'—follows *immediately* after the observer's remembrance.—'where I perceived smoke I found fire'. Hence it is only right to hold that what brings about the required Inferential Cognition is the *liṅga-parāmarsha as aided by the said remembrance.*

It is only thus that the *Upanaya*, or 'Application of the Probans to the subject in question,'(*e. g.* 'this mountain contains smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire) becomes a necessary factor in the inferential process; that is to say, the *Upanaya* can be regarded as a necessary factor in the process only when the *liṅga-parāmarsha aided by the remembrance* (of the relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*) is regarded as the *means* of Inferential Cognition; and thus alone does the *Upanaya* come to be recognised as an essential part of the statement of the Inference.

Thus then it is established that *Anumāna* is '*ṭaṭpūrvaka*', as declared in the *Sūṭra.*

An *objection* is raised :—

" If *Anumāna* is defined as *that which is preceded by Perception,* then the definition becomes applicable to *Faculty* (*Samskāra*) and Demonstrated Truth (*Nirṇaya*) also (and therefore it becomes too wide); for certainly that Faculty which brings about remembrance, and which has been called '*Bhāvanā*' or' Impression' is certainly *preceded by Perception* ; and so also Demonstrated Truth (which, in the case of perceptional cognition, would be *preceded by Perception*) ; and thus by the definition proposed, both of these would come under 'Inference'."

The definition is not open to this objection, we reply. Because what is meant to be defined is a form of *Cognition* ; that every one of those definitions (of Pramāṇas) pertains to a form of Cognition is clear from the definition of Perception, wherein it is distinctly stated that Perception is '*a cognition* produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the object'; and hence the definition cannot apply to *Impression* (as an Impression is not a *Cognition*). Then as regards Demonstrated Truth, it partakes of the nature of both : sometimes it is a *means of cognition,* and sometimes the *result* of cognition ; when it is in the form of the cognition of a thing—affording an idea of that thing—then it is only a result (led up to by a means of cognition ; and in this case, it is not a *Pramāṇa,* and as such, cannot be included in the definition of Inference) ; when however it leads to the further cognition of something else, it does become a Means of Cognition, a *Pramāṇa* [and in that case, there is nothing wrong in its being included in the definition].

Nyāya 162.

Inference is of three kinds—says the *Sūṭra.* That is to say, (1) *The Universal Affirmative*, (2) *The Universal Negative* and (3) *The Universal Affirmative-Negative.* Of these the last, (3) the *Universal Affirmative-Negative* is that in which the Probans, while subsisting in the Subject and other objects akin to it (wherein the Probandum resides), subsists in those where the Probandum is known to reside ; *e. g.* the Inference, 'Sound is transient,—because while belonging to a generality and being possessed of specified individuality, it is perceived by the external organ of ordinary human beings like ourselves,—like the ordinary jar.' * (1) The *Universal Affirmative* is that in which the Probans subsists in the Subject and other objects akin to it, and (is of such a universal character that) there is, in regard to it, no object in which the Probandum is known to be absent ;—*e. g.*, †when the philosopher (the Bauddha for instance), who holds all things to be transient, brings forward the reasoning —'Sound is transient,—because it is a product',—where there is no object in which the Probandum *transient character*, does not exist. (2) The *Universal Negative* is that in which the Probans Subsists in the Subject,—in whose case there is nothing (apart from the Subject) in which the Probandum is known to be present,—and which does not subsist in any object where the Probandum is known to be absent,—*e. g.*, ‡ 'the l'ving body is not soul-less,—as if it were were soulless, it would be lifeless'.

* In this, the character of Sound, on which the whole reasoning is based, is one that subsists in Sound, and things akin to it, like the Jar and other ordinary things ; and it is not present in any non-transient thing, in *ākāsha*, for instance.

† An example of this inference, from the author's own stand-point, would be—'the specific individuality of things is something that can be spoken of because it is knowable, like the generality of things'—*Tāṭparya.*

‡ In this case a 'sapakṣa'—'that where the probandum is known to be present'—is not possible ; as the probandum is ' negation of soullessness', and this cannot be present anywhere else except the *living body*, which is already the Subject.

We may explain the 'three kinds' of Inference in another manner:——'*Inference is of three kinds—(1) the Pūrvavaṭ, (2) the 'Shēṣavaṭ* and (3) *the Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa'*— says the *Sūṭra*. (1) In the word '*pūrvavaṭ*', the word '*pūrva*' refers to the Probandum; hence the '*pūrvavaṭ*', 'having the pūrva', is that which (invariably) has the Probandum for its substrate. (2) In the word '*shēṣavaṭ*' the word '*shēṣa*' stands for the Probandum and other things akin to it; and *that which has these* (the Probandum as well as other things akin to it) for its constant substrate is the '*Shēṣavaṭ.*' Thus the difference between the *Pūrvavaṭ* and the *Shēṣavaṭ* lies in this that, while the former is invariably concomitant with the Probandum only, the latter is invariably concomitant also with other things akin to the Probandum. (3) The '*Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa*' is that which is not seen in common (*i. e.* which is found nowhere except in the Subject); and the particle 'cha' (at the end of the *Sūṭra*) qualifying this last word '*Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭam*' signifies the fact that this inference should not be contrary either to the Scriptures or to any fact of ordinary perception. Of these, the first two kinds of Inference are distinguished by four characteristics, while the third is marked by five distinctive features.*

There is another explanation *of the 'three kinds' of Inference, the Pūrvavaṭ, the Shēṣavaṭ and the Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa,*— proposed by the *Bhāṣya* (p. 18, l. 3); *the Pūrvavaṭ is that in which the effect is inferred from the cause,* says the *Bhāṣya.*

* The three kinds of Inference herein indicated are thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*—The *Pūrvavaṭ* is that which is not sublated and which is not neutralised and which is concomitant with the probandum. These three features are common to all inferences,—which are classed under the following three heads.—(1) the *Shēṣavaṭ*, that which subsists in the probandum and things akin to it (this being the *fourth* feature of this kind of inference),—(2) the *Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa*, not seen anywhere else except in the Subject (this being the fourth feature in this second kind),—(3) the *Shēṣavaṭ-Sāmānyaṭodriṣṭa* which combines the features of the last two (and is thus possessed of two characters in addition to the aforesaid three common features).

An objection is raised against the *Bhāṣya*:—"What is meant by the assertion that *the effect is inferred from the cause*? (*a*) If it means that, on seeing the cause one cognises the presence of the effect,—then this is not true: No man in his senses is ever found to cognise the effect on seeing the cause; and thus the assertion becomes contrary to fact. (*b*) If it be meant that the inferential cognition is in the form—'*Where* the cause, *there* the effect is',—then this also is not true: because as a matter of fact the Cause and the Effect always occupy different points in space, inhering in different substrates; *e. g.* the yarns (the cause of cloth) inhere in the component fibres, while the cloth inheres in the yarns. Then again, by saying that 'the Effect is inferred from the perception of the Cause', you run counter to the very essence of Inference. 'What is this *essence of Inference*?' It consists in the fact that no reasoning ever operates in regard to either what is not known or what is fully known; and if the Effect were inferred from the perception of the Cause,—this inference (which is a process of reasoning) would operate upon what is not known [the effect being not known prior to the inference; and this would make the Inference invalid by reason of its *probans* being 'baseless', *āshrayāsiddha*]. And thus there would be a contradiction or annulment of the whole fabric of Inference."

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We cannot accept the force of the above reasoning; for the simple reason that we do not accept the assertions against which the reasoning is aimed. (*a*) In the first place, who says that 'the presence of the Effect is inferred from the perception of the Cause'? (b) Secondly, what person has ever asserted that 'the Effect is there where the Cause is'? What the Sūtra actually means is that, what is inferred *is the Effect as the qualifying adjunct of the Cause*; and in this there is no 'running counter to the essence of Inference'.*

* As the Cause is already known; and what is inferred is only an adjunct of the Cause; and thus the Cause affords the necessary substratum for the Probans.

The same explanation applies to the case of the *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference also: In the *Shēṣavaṭ* inference also what is inferred is *the Cause as the adjunct of the Effect.*

"How can the word '*Shēṣa*' in the word *Shēṣavaṭ*' mean Effect?"

The fact is that both Cause and Effect have been indicated as the instrument of inferential cognition;—and the instrumentality of the Cause has been already utilised in the *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference;—hence of the two, the *Effect* is the only factor that *remains* behind as the one whose instrumentality has not yet been utilised;—and it is thus that the Effect comes to be spoken of as '*shēṣa*' ('what remains behind').

As an example of the inference of the effect from the cause, the *Bhāṣya* cites the case where that 'there will be rain' is inferred from the sight of the rising clouds. "In what form would this inference be stated?" In the following form—'These clouds will bring rain,—because they are rising, being, as they are, accompanied by deep rumbling, having many lines of cranes flying through them, flashing with lightning—just like other rain-clouds perceived in the past.'

The case of the rise of water in the stream (leading to the inference of the rain that has caused it) is an example of the *Shēṣavaṭ* Inference. Against this an objection is raised:—"How can the rise of water, which is *in the stream,* bring about the inferential cognition of rain *in regions above the stream,*— the two being in totally different places?" The rise in the river is not the instrument leading to the inferential cognition of rain in regions above the river; what happens is that by means of the rise, which is a quality of the river, we infer the connection *of the river itself* with some place towards its source, where rain must have fallen; * the inference being stated in the following form:—'This river must be connected with some place towards its source, where rain has fallen,—because its flow

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* So that both pertain to the river itself.

is quick, pieces of wood are floating along by reason of the rise, and the river is full,—just like the river that is full when there is rain.'

* In stating the conclusion of this inference we might make use of any tense we like,—it being possible to speak of the rain as coming in the future, or as having been in the past (or as being present at the time).

† The third kind of Inference, the *Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa*, is that in which an object is cognised as qualified by a character which is an invariable concomitant of a well-known character of that object, the former character being independent of the notion of cause and effect; ‡ *e. g.* the presence of water is inferred from the presence of cranes. "In what manner do you get at the inferential cognition of water from the cranes?" In this case we take as the *pakṣa*, (the *Subject* of inference), the tree and other things along with

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*At the time that we notice the rise in the river, the rain that caused it may have ceased, in which case the past tense would be used; the rain may be still going on, when the present tense would be right; or it may be possible for the rain to continue for sometime longer, when the use of the future tense would not be wrong. Therefore, so far as the example is concerned, it does not matter what tense is used, it is enough that the perception of the effect leads to the inference of the cause. The *Bhaṣya* has made use of the past tense; as there is always a certainty as to the rain having gone *before* the river rises; and the present and future would, at best, be only doubtful.

† The example of Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa Inference given in the Bhāṣya is difficult to comprehend, hence, not satisfied by the explanation there given, the author of the *Vārtika* supplies another explanation and cites another example. *Tātparya.*

‡ The same object as qualified by the well-known character becomes, in this case the instrument of inference, and qualified by the other character, it becomes the *object* of inference. The principal point of difference between this and the other two kinds of inference is that in this case, the relation of cause and effect does not enter at all. The expression '*Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa*' is thus explained by the *Tātparya*:—'*Sāmānyēna*'—*avinābhāvena hētunā*—*lakṣitam*—'*dṛiṣṭam*'—*dharmirūpam*' *anumānam.* In the example, the place *known as with cranes* is the *means* of the inference of the *place as with water.*

the spot which is *well-known* as constantly inhabited by cranes and with regard to that spot we infer *the presence of water.**

† Some people take the *Bhāṣya* to mean that we have a case of *Sāmānyaṭoḍriṣṭa* Inference when we infer the movement of the Sun. But we do not understand this. In what manner is the movement inferred? If the inference is in the form 'the sun is mobile,'—the object inferred being the sun's movement,—then we ask: by what means is the movement cognised? There is no inferential indicative that has ever been perceived as concomitant with either the Sun or its motion (all cases of the concomitance of motion with change of position being noticed elsewhere than in the case of the Sun); and it is not possible to infer a thing that has not been found to be so concomitant; otherwise (if even non-concomitant things were to be inferred, then) anything could be inferred from anything (without any restriction). If it be urged that the *change of position* would form the requisite inferential indicative,—our answer is that this is not possible; as the change of the Sun's position is not actually perceived; no one ever sees with his eyes the Sun's going from one place to another; as the 'other place' to which the Sun goes must be either the *Ākāsha* or some *point in space*; and both of these—*Ākāsha* and *Space*—are imperceptible; and there is no other way of perceiving them; hence it is not right to assert that there is *the perception of Sun's going from one place to another*; specially as in all cases what is actually seen of the Sun is only the solar disc; and it is not right to draw an inference from the perception of a thing merely by itself. Even if the movement of the

* The reading '*balākāvaṭṭvēna*' appears to be a misprint; as the inference is of the place as *with water*; the presence of *cranes* being the means by which that inference is got at. '*Salilvaṭṭvena*' appears to be the correct reading.

† The *Vārṭika* now takes up the example cited in the *Bhāṣya*; criticises its apparent meaning; and then, on the top of page 51, points out in what sense the assertion of the *Bhāṣya* may be accepted as right.

Sun were somehow capable of being perceived,—being, as it is, something that has the capacity of being perceived, —yet the Sun's reaching of another point in space could never be perceptible; as Space is something that is eternal and super-sensuous, and, as a matter of fact, the conjunction of two things (Sun and Point in Space)—one of which (the Sun) is perceptible and the other (Space) imperceptible ——cannot be perceived [and the Sun's getting from one point to another is nothing more than its conjunction with a point in space]. If what you mean is that from seeing the getting to another place by Ḍēvaḍatta (only when he moves) you infer the movement of the Sun—and this inference is the *Sāmānyatodriṣta*, then, an inference of this kind would be of the movement, of not the Sun only, but of *all* things; and why, in that case, should it not be inferred that you also are moving?

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The answer to the above objection against the *Bhāṣya* is that, as a matter of fact, we do not infer the movement of the Sun directly; what happens is that in the first place we infer the fact of the Sun getting at another point in space; and then from this latter fact, we infer the movement of the Sun; and there is nothing incongruous in this. The form of the inference is as follows:—'The Sun gets at another point in space,—because, while being a substance, and never conceived of as undergoing decrease or increase, and found towards the East, it is yet perceived and conceived of as being in front of the observer, when he turns round, without moving a single step *,—just as is found to be the case with genus and other things;—genus and other things are found to satisfy all the said conditions, and they, as such, are found to have got from one place to another;—similarly the

* The observer has seen the sun in the East; after some time, he turns round, without moving away from the original place, and he finds the sun in his front again,—*i. e.* towards the West. This proves that the sun has changed its position.

Sun satisfies all those conditions:—so that the Sun must be regarded as having got from one place to another.' This getting from one place to another having been thus inferred, from that we infer the movement of the Sun. The inference of the Sun's getting from one place to another may be stated in another form, as follows:—'The Sun must be regarded as getting from one place to another,—because when the observer has seen the Sun in one place, if he does not move his eyes from that point, he fails, after some time, to see the Sun, even when there appears nothing to obstruct the range of his vision,—just as is found to be in the case of Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa (when he gets from one place to another).'

Some people meet the aforesaid objection against the *Bhāṣya* by arguing that Space *is* perceptible; and in support of this, they put forward the following inference:—'Space is perceptible,—because it is pointed at and indicated by means of the finger—like the Moon.' But it is not right to argue thus; as Space is without colour; and being colourless, how could it be perceived by any external sense-organ?

"How then is it found to be indicated by means of the finger?" What is actually indicated as 'Space' by the finger is (not the Space but) trees and such other things connected with the points in Space;—trees and other things are connected with definite points in space; and it is these that are figuratively spoken of and indicated as 'Space.' What really happens is this:—A certain point in space happening to be perceived along with the (rising) sun, the name 'East' comes to be applied to that point in space which is thus connected with the Sun; and then when any other thing, a tree for instance, is perceived along with the rising Sun, this other thing also comes to be spoken of as the 'East'; and when people indicate the 'East' with their finger, they do so with reference to the tree and such other things, to which the name is applied indirectly or figuratively.

Nyāya 170.

Or, when the *Suṭra* speaks of *Inference* as being 'of three kinds', what it refers to is the fact of the Inferential Indicative or Probans being—(*a*) well-known, (*b*) true, and (*c*) certain;—the 'well-known' Probans being that which is concomitant with the Subject; the 'true' that which subsists in other things of the same kind (*i. e.*, in which the Probandum is known to be present); and 'certain' that which is never found apart from things of the same kind.

Or, the mention of 'three kinds' may be taken as restricting the number of Inferences;—the sense being that all the various kinds of Inference are included under the three that are specified—*viz*; the '*Pūrvavaṭ*', the '*Shēṣavaṭ*' and the '*Sāmānyaṭoḍriṣṭa*'. "In what way can Inference be spoken of as being 'of various kinds'?" In the following manner, we reply:—(I) The Affirmative-Negative Inference is of two kinds—* (*a*) that of which the Probans is always present in things where the Probandum is known to be present, and that which is present as well as absent in such things;—(II) The Universal Affirmative Inference also is of the same two kinds;—(III) and the Universal Negative Inference is of one kind only; as in this case we cannot have any such thing in which the Probandum is known to be present;—then again, these *five* kinds of Inference come to be of *fifteen* kinds, according as each of them pertains to the past, the present or the future;—these fifteen again come to be sixty, according as they become addressed to the four kinds of persons (one who already accepts the conclusion, one who does not accept the conclusion, one who is doubtful on the point, and one who accepts the contrary of the conclusion);—of these again there are endless sub-divisions. Thus there being

Vār. page 52.

* (*a*) *E. g.* 'Sound is transient, because it is a product', where *the character of product* is one that is always present in all transient things. (*b*) 'Sound is transient because it is inseparable from our effort'—where of transient things, while some are inseparable from our effort, others are not so.

endless sub-divisions of Inference, all these become included in the 'three kinds'; hence it is with a view to this restriction that the *Sūṭra* speaks of the 'three kinds'.

The first kind of Inference has been called 'Pūrvavaṭ'; with regard to this name a question is raised—"What is it that is *Pūrvavaṭ*? The cause or the effect? If the word '*Pūrvavaṭ*' means *that which has a pūrva* or *antecedent*, then it is the effect that must be the '*Pūrvavaṭ*'; and in that case it becomes a contradiction in terms to assert that the *Pūrvavaṭ* Inference is the inference of the effect from the cause." We do hold that the word '*pūrvavaṭ*' means *that which has a pūrva or antecedent*; but we do not hold that it must be the *effect* that is so; we apply the name to the cognition; and the cognition is certainly 'that which has the antecedent', for its object; and thus what our meaning is is that from *the cognition of the antecedent*, *i. e.*, the cause, *follows the inference of the effect*. Similarly the name '*Shēṣavaṭ*' applies to *the cognition of that which comes after*, and so on.

Or (as the *Bhāṣya* points out on pp. 18-19) the affix in the word '*Pūrvavaṭ*' may be taken as '*vaṭi*', denoting similarity (and not as the possessive '*maṭup*')—; the meaning being that exactly as one has perceived the thing by means of Sense-perception, so also does he cognise the same thing by means of Inference; and thus by means of Inference the thing becomes cognised *as before*, *pūrvavaṭ*'.

Of the sentence '*yaṭhā ḍhūmnāgniḥ*' (*Bhāṣya*, p. 19, l. 2) several explanations have been given. The question that arises is—what is it that is cognised by means of the smoke? (*a*) Is it the fire? (*b*) Or the particular place where fire is? (*c*) Or the existence (of fire)? (*d*) * Or the particular place along with (containing) the fire? (*a*) It cannot be that the *fire* is cognised; as between fire and smoke, the relation of *ḍharma*

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* (*d*) Is the position adopted by Diṅnāga after rejecting the former three views.

(quality) and *ḍharmin* (qualified) is not *possible*; as neither the fire is the quality of the smoke, nor the smoke of the fire; and further, inasmuch the fire is something already known (in the premises, as concomitant with smoke), it does not stand in need of being inferred, and hence cannot rightly be regarded as an 'object of inference'. The same reasoning discards the view that what is inferred is *existence* (*c*) and also that it is the particular *place* that is inferred (*b*),— both *existence* and *place* being already known (before the inference). (*d*) If then, it be held that it is *the place along with the fire* that is inferred,—this also cannot be right, because *smoke* is not a *quality* of that place. What we mean is that it will not be right to accept the view (held by Diṅnāga) that what is inferred by means of smoke is *the place as containing the fire.* "Why not?" Because *smoke* is not a quality of the *place containing fire*; and then again, as for the relation of *fire* to *any place,* such relation is not unknown (and as such, it cannot be an object of Inference). "The inference is in the form, '*this* place contains fire',—wherein what is inferred is a particular place as containing fire, and not mere place in general." This also is not right; as the actual place is never perceived, under your theory; the man who puts forward the aforesaid contention (*viz.* the Bauḍḍha writer, Diṅnāga) never actually sees the place; and hence if he asserts the conclusion in the form 'this place contains fire', he makes an empty meaningless assertion; * specially because mere smoke (unperceived)

* The view here controverted here is Diṅnāga's. See *Medieval Logic*, p. 87. The question arises as to the exact nature of the Probandum: Is it *any* place in general containing fire? Or that particular place which contains smoke? In the former ase the *smoke*, which is the probans would not be a necessary quality or concomitant of any and every place that may have the fire; and further, some place or other that contains fire must be already known; hence the Probandum could not be in this unspecified form: as regards the second alternative, the objectionable feature is that the actual place from where the smoke is issuing is not seen by the observer; as according to the Bauḍḍha what is *seen* is not any perceptible

cannot bring about the cognition of fire, and the Bauḍḍha philosopher can never perceive the smoke (which, like everything else, is imperceptible);—for these reasons any *particular place* cannot be regarded as the object of Inference. "But as a matter of fact the smoke does bring about the cognition of fire, by reason of its invariable concomitance with it." Well, what you mean is simply this that there is an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, and on that account when one sees smoke he naturally apprehends the presence of fire;—if this is what you mean, we cannot accept it as true; as this assertion of yours will not bear the scrutiny of the several alternative interpretations of which it is capable: For instance, what do you mean by 'the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire'? (*a*) Does it mean that the two are related to each other as cause and effect? (*b*) Or that the two are related by the relation of 'inherence of the same object'? (*c*) Or by mere relationship in general? "We accept the first of these alternatives: the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire lies in the fact of the one being the cause of the other." This cannot be, we reply; as they do not inhere in each other *: the smoke does not inhere in the fire, nor the fire in the smoke; in fact each of them inheres in its own particular cause (which is neither fire nor smoke); thus the 'invariable concomitance' cannot consist of the relation of cause and effect. (*b*) Nor can it consist of 'inherence of

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gross substance,—mountain *e. g.*—but the mountain, like everything else, is only atoms, which are all imperceptible; and for the same reason, the smoke also cannot, according to the Bauḍḍha, be perceived. So much for the Bauḍḍha possibilities; but even for those who do admit of gross substances, when one sees the smoke moving in the sky, it is quite possible that he may not see the actual place from where it issues

* If 'invariable concomitance' is the relation of cause and effect then it must be the relation between the effect and its material cause, in which it

the same object'. * Because (1) there is no single object produced by both fire and smoke [*i. e.* of which both, are the *material cause*' and which, as such, would inhere in both, and would form the basis of Smoke and Fire being related to each other by the relation of 'inherence of the same object']; specially as no object is ever produced out of two entirely heterogeneous material causes. (2) Nor are Smoke and Fire ever found to subsist in any single object, as each of them subsists in its own particular material cause, as we have already pointed out. [And thus this second form of 'inherence of the same object' is not possible between smoke and fire]. (c) All then that we find thus is that there is some sort of relationship (in general) between smoke and fire;—but even this cannot be rightly inferred. "Why so?" Well, if the inference (premiss) were put forward in the form—'there is some (permanent) relation between smoke and fire',—this would not be true; as no such (permanent) relationship is really known (at the time of the inference); in fact the smoke is actually perceived even in the absence of fire (as when one sees smoke issuing from the hill-side and he does not see the fire). "Certainly there would be some sort companionship (or concomitance), as there is in the case of Colour and Touch." That also is not possible; as the two are not always found together; we have often seen smoke without fire, as well as fire without smoke; and as thus the two are seen

inheres i. e. subsists by *samavāyasambandha*; because there is no such concomitance of the effect with the non-material cause—the cloth being present also when the contact of the loom is not present; nor is there such concomitance of the effect with its Instrumental cause,—the cloth is not always accompanied by the Weaver. Thus the refutation emphasises the absence of the *relation by inherence, samavāyasambandha*, between smoke and fire.

* 'Inherence of the same object' may mean—(1) that some one object inheres in both; or (2) that both inhere in some one object. The first refutation meets (1)—the (2) being taken up a few lines below.

apart from each other, there can be no constant companionship between them. This same reasoning also serves to reject the inference in the form—'wherever there is smoke there is fire' [as this also postulates a form of companionship between smoke and fire]. Thus then, there being no other way in which this could be explained, the conclusion is that fire is *not* inferred by means of smoke. "But this would go directly against a fact accepted by all men: if there were no inference of fire by means of smoke, then a universally recognised fact would be contradicted." There is no such contradiction; * as what really happens (in the case of the universally recognised inference of fire) is that by seeing certain peculiarities of smoke we infer the presence of *smoke as qualified* (*accompanied*) *by fire.* "In what way does fire become a qualification of smoke?" Simply because the fire is subordinate to the smoke,—as what is inferred is 'this smoke *as accompanied by fire*'; and this is inferred by means of certain specific peculiarities of the smoke; at the time of inference we perceive both—the smoke as well as its pecularities, in the shape of the continuity of its upward rising volume and so forth; and what these peculiarities, as belonging to the smoke, lead us to infer is some such qualification of smoke as is not already known; as it is a fact noticed in the case of all inferences, that

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all those peculiar qualifications of the object inferred that are already known serve as the means of

* 'In a case where we see the smoke rising close to us, we certainly infer the *place* as characterised by smoke, (and from that, the fire) as the popular belief is But in a case where a large mass of smoke is seen issuing from a place that is too far to be perceived, we do not take the trouble of finding out the means of cognising the *place*; and what we infer, in this case, is the smoke itself which is seen *as accompanied by* fire; and this inference is led up to by the peculiarities that we perceive in the smoke,—*e. g.* its rising upwards in a continuous line, and so forth. '—*Tātparya*

bringing about the cognition of that thing; *e.g.* in the case of Sound, its two peculiarities—that it is an *entity* and a *product*—are well-known; and what is not known is its further peculiarity of *non-eternality*; hence when we infer the Sound, we infer it as qualified by its (hitherto unknown) *non-eternality*.

(B.) Says the *Bhāṣya—The word 'Shēṣavaṭ' means 'remainder'* (p. 19, l. 2);—and later on it adds—'*Sound' is not an action because it is the originator of another Sound* (p. 19, l. 9);—and against this last assertion, the following objection is raised:—"The Probans, in this inference, is *too exclusive*, being absent both in the Probandum and its contrary; that is to say, the character of *being the originator of another Sound* is one that is not found either in *Action* or in what is *not-action* [Hence the said character cannot prove the fact of sound being *not-action*]."

This objection is not sound; as the *Bhāṣya* means something entirely different (from what has been objected to): What is meant by the phrase 'it is the originator of another sound' is that 'it is the orginator of a homogeneous thing'; and thus (this latter character being present in what is *not-action*) the inference is not open to the objection that has been urged.

[C] In regard to the *Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa* Inference, the *Bhāṣya* (p. 19, l. 6) says—'The *Sāmānyatodṛiṣṭa Inference is that in which the relation between the Probans and the Probandum being imperceptible &c. &c.*' Against this the following objection is raised:—"What is meant by the relation of the Probans and the Probandum being imperceptible? Does it mean that it is not perceived *at the time that the inference is drawn*? or that it is *never* perceived? If the former, then, inasmuch as in all inferences the said relation is

not *perceived* at the time of the inference, the qualification becomes useless [as it does not distinguish the *Sāmānyatodṛiṣta* from the other kinds of Inference]. If then, it means that the relation is *never* perceived, then in the first place how can any Inference proceed in such a case (where the relation has never been perceived)? And secondly, the assertion would be directly opposed to what the *Bhāṣya* (p. 3, l. 8) has asserted as to impossibility of Inference applying to such things as have been never perceived or to those that are already well known."

This objection cannot be maintained; because what is inferred is not *fire by itself* (which of course is perceptible), but *fire as the qualification* (or accompaniment, of smoke); and certainly the fire as such is not perceived (at the time) and has got to be inferred.

Thus then, the *Sāmānyatodṛiṣta* Inference is that which, from the perception of a certain property of an object, leads to the cognition of that object; *e. g.* when Desire, Aversion, &c., are inferred as belonging to the Self, Desire &c., are the 'object' (inferred), and the Self as qualifying them becomes the secondary factor; and in this the 'property' of Desire &c. that is perceived is *their character of belonging to the Self*; and the perception of this character leads to the inference of those 'objects' (Desire &c.) as belonging to (qualified, or accompanied, by) the Self; and the inference is in the following form:—'Desire &c. are dependent upon (belong to) something else,—because they are qualities—like Colour.' "All that this Inference leads us to cognise is the fact that Desire &c., belong to *something else*;—whence do you get at the conclusion that they belong to *the Self*?" We get at this latter conclusion by means of elimination: That is to say, first of all we know that Desire &c., cannot belong to Earth and other similar substances, because they can be perceived only by the Self (*i.e.* the person that draws the infer-

ence), and are not perceived by means of any external sense-organ; in the case of qualities belonging to Earth and other similar substances, we find that they can be perceived by the person that draws the inference as well as other persons; and that they are perceived by means of external organs of perception; Desire and the rest, on the other hand, are such as are perceived only by the cognising Self, and that also only by means of the internal organ, of perception; and this proves that these cannot belong to Earth, or Water or Fire or Air or Ākāsha.—Secondly, we also know that they cannot belong to Space, Time and Mind, because like these three substances themselves, their qualities also are incapable of being perceived by the organs of perception.—Apart from these eight substances, there is no other substance except the Self;—and hence the only possible conclusion is that Desire and the rest must belong to the Self.

Vār. p. 55. '*Perception pertains to things present, while Inference pertains to things present as well as not-present*' —says the *Bhāṣya* [p. 20, ll. 3-2]. Against this the following objection is raised:—"Is this distinction based upon the difference of the qualifying adjuncts or that of the qualified objects? If the latter, then, the difficulty is that there can be no Inference with reference to *objects* that are *not-present*; for as it has already been explained, Inference never operates upon a thing which is not already * cognised in a general or vague manner,—and no such vague or general cognition is possible with regard (independently) to things that are *not-present*. If, on the other hand, you mean the distinction to the based upon the difference in the qualifying

* Inference applies to things that are known in a vague form, but of which there is no well-defined cognition; and never with regard to things absolutely unknown.

adjuncts,—then we urge the following points :—There are three kinds of qualifying adjuncts—(*a*) those that are affirmed, (*b*) those that are denied, and (*c*) those that are self-sufficient (or self-contained) ; as an example of (*a*) there is 'odorousness' which is asserted of the Earth ; of (*b*) the same 'odorousness' as denied of substances other than the Earth ; and of (*c*) there is the relation of 'inherence' subsisting between things thus inherently related.

"A question is raised in regard to the relation of Inherence :—How can 'Inherence' be regarded as 'self-sufficient'? The answer is—because there is no further 'inherence' (by which the former 'Inherence' should subsist in the inherent things) ; as whenever one thing subsists in another, it does so through some relation ; and as a matter of fact, for Inherence there is no further inherence that could be the relation (through which the former could subsist in the inherent things).—If there were such further Inherence of the former Inherence, there would be no end to the assumption of such Inherences ; and if there were to be a limit somewhere to these assumptions, it would be best to have the limit at the very first Inherence (and make it, at the very outset, self-sufficient, independent of further functions and relations). 'This assertion that Inherence is self-sufficient—is it to be accepted on trust? or is there any reasoning in support of it?' Undoubtedly, there is reasoning; the reasoning being as follows—(1) Inherence is *not-dependent* (is self-sufficient), being as it is, denoted by a word expressive of the relation that subsists in the five categories *,—just like the Atom (which is regarded as self-sufficient, because it is spoken of as subsisting in the five categories) †;—or again

* Substance, Quality, Action, Generality and Specific Individuality.

† The translation follows the interpretation of the *Tāṭparya*, which says that the compound '*panchapadārṭhavṛiṭṭi*' is to be taken as *Bahuvrīhi*, when applying to the

(2) because while being present everywhere, it gives rise to the conception of things being 'here, in this',—just like the Self. 'If Inherence were dependent on something else (and not self-sufficient), what would happen?' In that case Products would have no substratum at all. 'How so?' If Inherence were 'dependent', it could be dependent on the Product, and as such could not exist before the Product came into existence; so that at the time that the Product comes into existence, it would be without a substratum until the Inherence comes into it (by virtue of which Inherence it would have the Cause for its substratum);—it is well-known that Inherence subsists in the Cause and its Product [and hence if it is to be dependent upon, contained in, these, it cannot exist before the Product appears]; and it is necessary to determine the relation (or form) in which it subsists in them; as we find that whenever one thing subsists in another, it does so in some particular form or relation. 'Being a kind of *approach* or *contact*, Inherence subsists in the same form as Conjunction'. This cannot be, we reply; as it involves a contradiction. When you assert that 'the contact, or conjunction subsists', do you mean this (*subsistence*) to be a property of the Contact (in which the contact subsists)? or of the Product? We would say that it is a property of the Product, and not of the Contact; and it is only in that case that there being other Products also to which that contact belongs (those endless products, namely, into which every product goes on momentarily changing) [the Inherence could belong to *all* these momentarily varying phases of the

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Atom, and as 'Genitive *Tatpuruṣa* when applying to the Inherence; and goes on to point out that it is in view of this flaw in the reasoning that the second reasoning is given.

It however appears possible to take the clause to mean—'because it is spoken of as subsisting in the five categories'—a fact that would be true alike with regard to the Atom and the Inherence.

Product.] *. On the other hand, if the *subsistence* were a property of the Contact, then this contact would stand in need of a further contact (in order to establish the relation of Inherence with the further phase of the Product); and so on and on, there would be an endless series of assumptions; for the Contact also will have some sort of *subsistence* (form of existence); and this, on your supposition, is a property of the Contact; and this endless assumption would be highly objectionable; specially as no one can justify it, in view of the fact that there is no authority or valid proof for it. † [Thus then, it is proved that the subsistence of Inherence cannot be of the nature of *contact.*] If then, you were to assert that Inherence subsists through another Inherence, you would contradict the tenets of the *Shāsṭra*; which declares that *the nature of Inherence is explained by its mere esse or presence* (which denies more than one Inherence). 'There is no proof for the assertion that a relation (Inherence *e. g.*) continues to exist even when the *relative* (the Product in which Inherence subsists as a relation) has ceased to exist [and this is what the aforesaid tenet of a single Inherence would imply]. It is not true that there is no proof for this; a when the relative ceases to exist, all that cease (so far as the Inherence is concerned) are the circumstances that rendered the Inherence cognisable, and not the Inherence itself; for the

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* In conjunction, the *prāpṭi*, contact, is temporary; so if the subsistence of Inherence were of the nature of Contact, there would have to be an endless series of contacts to explain the permanent relation of Cause—Effect and such other cases of Inherence. While if the subsistence belonged to the Product itself, then, the Inherence would continue as the *permanent* relation throughout the several change that the product undergoes every moment.

† *Anavasṭhā*, Endless Assumption, is regarded as valid or permissible *pramāṇika*, only when the first step in the series cannot be ascertained; in the case of Contact, however, we can always lay our hands on the first contact; hence *Anavasṭhā* in this case cannot be permissible.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

Inherence is not a product (and hence cannot cease to exist);—that Inherence is not a product is inferred from the fact of every product having a substratum*; if it were a product, it could be produced only along with the product (which is related by that Inherence); and in that case, (as pointed out above) this latter Product would, at the moment that it is produced, be without a substratum [as it can subsist in its substratum only through Inherence, which, on your supposition, is not yet produced]. 'The Inherence is certainly produced *before* the Product.' Even so you will have to explain to what the Inherence belongs (at the time that it is produced; the Product not yet being in existence). If then, the Inherence be held to be produced *after* the Product, the objection remains in force that the Product, at the time of its production, would be without a substratum. For these reasons it has to be admitted that Inherence is 'self-sufficient."†

The answer to the above objection (started above, P. 179) is that when Inference is spoken of as pertaining to *things not-present*, what is meant is that Inference which pertains to qualifying adjuncts that are denied,‡ and not that which pertains to those that are *affirmed*, or to those that are *self-sufficient*§.

‖ "But we do find that *things not present* are sometimes actually affirmed;—e. g. when we make the affirmation '*ghato*

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* The reasoning is thus formulated by the *Tātparya*—'The Product is related to its cause by a permanent relationship (a relationship which is not a product), because it has a substratum'.

† The objection started on p. 55, l. 1 (*Trans. p.* 179, *l.* 18) ends here; the final upshot of the objection is thus summed up in the *Tātparya*—'There being so many as three kinds of qualifying adjuncts, we do not know with reference to what Inference has been held to pertain to *things not-present.*'

‡ As only things not-present—i. e., past and future things—can be denied at the time (the present) when the Inference is formulated.

§ The real classification of qualifying adjuncts is not exactly as the objector has put it.

In reality, in the first place, qualifying adjuncts are of two kinds—(a) affirmed and (b) denied; secondly those affirmed are of two kinds—(a) self-sufficient and (b) dependent.

‖ It is not true that only the *not-present* things are *denied*.

bhavaṭi' (' the Jar *is being produced*'), where '*bhavaṭi*' is synonymous with '*jāyaṭē*' [and that which *is being produced*, *i. e.* in course of production, is certainly *not present*]."

This is not true; as a thing that *is being produced* is not held to be (either *present* or *not present*); the word '*bhavaṭi*' (in the sentence '*ghato bhavaṭi.*') is synonymous with *viḍyaṭē* ' exists ', (and not with '*jāyaṭē*', ' is being produced ') [and when this ' existence ' is affirmed with regard to the jar in course of construction, the ' jar ' here stands for the several parts of the jar that have already been constructed, and which, being accomplished entities already, are sufficient for the purpose of the thing being recognised as ' jar ' and being spoken of as '*bhavaṭi, viḍyaṭē.*']

Thus we have established the proposition '*ṭaṭpūrvakam anumānam*'.

Other philosophers have defined Inference '*Anumāna*' as *the perception of the thing which is invariably concomitant*,—this being held to be '*Anumāna*' (Instrument of inferential cognition) for one who knows the said concomitance. This definition is thus explained :—When one thing is never present apart from another, it is said to be ' invariably concomitant ', '*nānṭarīyaka*', with it ;—the thing that is so concomitant is called the '*nānṭarīyaka-arṭha*'; and the '*ḍarshana*' 'perception', of that thing is '*Anumāna*', for the man who knows it,—*i. e.* who knows that the thing perceived is ' invariably concomitant.'

This definition however, cannot be accepted ; *firstly*, because the word '*arṭha*', 'thing', is superfluous ; as what is 'invariably concomitant ' can not but be a *thing* ;—*secondly*, '*nānṭarīyakārṭha*', is a compound word ; (A) now if this compound were treated as a Genitive *Ṭaṭpuruṣa*, being expounded as '*nānṭarīyakasya arṭhaḥ*', then, in the case of the Inference—

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'sound is transient, because it is a product'—*the character of being a product* is the '*nānṭarīyaka*'; and the '*arṭha*' of this would be either (*a*) its *ḍharma*, property, or (*b*) its *prayojana*, purpose or aim; (*a*) if the *property* of 'the character of being a product' were the '*arṭha*' *of the* '*nānṭarīyaka*' (meant by the definition), then it would be possible to infer 'transient character' even from such properties as 'being an entity', 'being an object of cognition', 'being nameable' and so forth (which is absurd); *—(*b*) if, on the other hand, the *purpose* or *aim* of the 'character of being a product' were meant to be the '*arṭha*' of the '*nānṭarīyaka*', then the 'cognition of transient character' would become the *Probans* of the Inference [*Transient character* being the 'aim' or 'end' of 'being a product'.] (B) If then, the compound '*nānṭarīkakārṭha*' were treated as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound,—being expounded as 'that to which the *nānṭarīyakārṭha* belongs'—then also

Vār. Page 57. 'the character of product' being the '*nānṭarīyaka*,' that to which this belongs would become the *Probans*;† and what is that to which *this character of being a product* belongs? (*a*) Does it belong to such things as the jar and the like? (*b*) or to Sound? (*c*) or to transient character. ? (*a*) If it belongs to the Jar &c., then these become the means of Inferential Cognition; the inference being in the form—'Sound is transient, because it is a jar'! (*b*) If it belongs to Sound, then Sound becomes the means, and the form of the inference becomes—'Sound is transient because it is sound'! (*c*) If lastly, it belongs to *transient character*,—belonging

* As the properties of 'being an entity' &c. are found in *Ākāsha* and such other *eternal* things also.

† That is, if we define '*Anumāna*'—which means, 'the source or means of inferential cognition'—as '*nānṭarīyakārṭhan ḍarshana*, the cognition of that to which the *nānṭarīyaka* belongs would be such an Anumāna or *means of inferential cognition*; so that the cognition of transient character, *e. g.*, instead of being the *result*, would be the *means* of the inferential cognition! And other similarly absurd results would follow from the theory.

to it as its cause, or that which proves it—then also the form of the inference becomes—'Sound is transient, because it is transient!'—as 'the character of being a product' is the '*artha*' of the 'transient character;'—in no case could the former be a reason for the latter [and this is what it is intended to be in the inference 'Sound is transient, because it is a product.'] (c) If the compound '*nānṭarīyakārṭha*' be treated as *Karmaḍhāraya*,—being expounded as 'that arṭha *which is nānṭarīyaka*,'—in that case, the compound would be impossible; as the exact conditions of the *Karmadhāraya* compound—compound between the qualifying adjunct and the qualified object—are not present: that is to say, the co-ordination, or *coextensiveness*, necessary for the *Karmaḍhāraya* compound is possible only when there is some difference* between the two words (the one denoting the qualifying adjunct and the other the qualified object); as we find to be the case in the well-known compound '*nīloṭpalam*', 'blue-lotus', where we know that the word 'blue' signifies a colour that is present in many things (besides the lotus) and that the word 'lotus' applies to many lotuses (besides the blue one); and hence we have the co-ordination between the two (in the compound '*nīloṭpalam*');—in the case of the words '*nānṭarīyaka*' and '*arṭha*', on the other hand, we find that when we mention the word '*nānṭarīyaka*', there is no such discrepancy or difference as that the character of being *nānṭarīyaka* subsists in what is *arṭha* as also in what is *not-arṭha*; † and under the circumstances the mention of the word '*arṭha*' (in addition to '*nānṭarīyaka*') cannot but be regarded as futile and superfluous. "But we find the necessary co-ordination even in a case where only one of the two words (and not both) are incompatible; *e.g.* in the expression '*priṭhivī ḍravyam*' (there is co-ordination between the 'Earth' and

* Otherwise—i.e. if the two are identical—both need not appear at all.

† As it is only an *arṭha* that can be *nānṭārīyaka*.

the 'Substance', even though it is only the word 'Substance' which applies to things other than Earth also; while the word 'Earth' does not denote things other than Substance)."*

In this case also, we reply, there is an incompatibility in both the words: when we take into consideration the diversity based upon the relation of subserviency (that subsists between the *class* as the qualifying adjunct, on the one hand, and the *individual*, as the qualified of the *class*, on the other),—that is to say, the word 'Substance' denotes the *individual* substance, as well as the *class* 'Substance'—the word 'Earth', while denoting the class 'substance' as forming its predominant qualifying adjunct, also denotes the individual earth as well as the class 'Earth' (which last cannot be identical with Substance) †; and thus there is a clear incompatibility between *both* words (the word 'Earth' also denoting something that is *not-substance*); which makes the proposition 'the Earth is a substance' possible. ‡The same conditions however do not hold regarding the co-ordination implied in the compound '*nānṭarīyakārṭha—ḍarshanam*'. "Why so?" Because people make use of words only for the purpose of making known things expressed by them; and as a matter of fact, we find that when the word '*nānṭarīyaka*' is mentioned, it provides the idea of the '*arṭha*' also (as it is only an *arṭha* that can be *nānṭarīyaka*); and hence it is no longer right and necessary to mention the word '*arṭha*.'

Lastly, the definition contains the phrase—'for one who knows the said concomitance'; and this is not right; being

* So also in the case of *nānṭarīyaka*' and '*arṭha*,' it is true that the word *nānṭarīyaka*' does not denote anything that is *not-arṭha*' but the word '*arṭha*' does denote things that are *not-nānṭariyaka*.

† *Jāṭi* according to the Logician being something distinct from *Ḍravya*.

‡ Though '*arṭha*' is incompatible with '*nānṭarīyaka*'—all *arṭha* not being *nānṭarīyaka*; yet '*nānṭarīyaka*' is not incompatible with '*arṭha*; '*nānṭarīyaka*' does not signify anything that is *not-arṭha*; hence the case of '*nānṭarīyakārṭha* is not analogous with '*pṛṭhivī—ḍravam*.'

entirely redundant; as there can be no idea of anything being *nānṭarīyaka* unless the person (using the word) knows it to be so: *e. g.* people who live in the *Nārikēlaḍvīpa* (where there is no fire?), if they happen to see smoke, cannot have the idea of its being '*nānṭarīyaka*' (with fire); hence it is unnecessary to add the phrase '*taḍviḍaḥ*,' 'for people who know the invariable concomitance.'

[Another definition is next taken up]

The above reasoning also serves to set aside another proposed definition: *viz*: 'The cognition of the *avinābhāvi-ḍharma* is the *hēṭu* (means of inferential cognition).' "What do you mean by applying to this definition the same objections (that have been urged against an entirely different definition, this last definition not containing the word '*taḍviḍaḥ*' of the former definition)?" What we mean is that, just as in the expression '*nānṭarīyakārṭha-ḍarshana*', the word '*arṭha*' is superfluous, so in the other definition is the word '*ḍharma*'. Then again, the example of Inference that the propounders of this definition cite is—'there is smoke, because there is fire'; and we have more than once shown that such an inference is impossible.

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* Other philosophers declare as follows:—"*Anumāna*, Means of Inferential Cognition, is that which is present where the subject of Inference and its like are present, and which is absent where the Subject is non-existent". This cannot be accepted as a correct definition; as it applies to that also which subsists in only a part of the subject of inference;—*e. g.* 'atoms are transient, because they have odour, like the

* 'The author has already refuted the definition proposed by Diṅnāga [which of the above two definitions is Diṅnāga's is not made clear]; he now proceeds to criticise a statement made by Diṅnāga in support of his own definition'.——*Ṭāṭparya*.

jar.' * "The definition cannot apply to such inferences, because what the definition states as a necessary condition is that the *heṭu* should be present where the Subject is present [and certainly *odourousness* is not present wherever atoms are present]". This does not save your definition from the said undue application; what subsists in a part of an object is also its *ḍharma*,—just as what subsists in a portion of the *vipakṣa* (*i. e.* where the Probandum is known to be absent) is regarded as the *ḍharma* of *vipakṣa*; when a certain thing is found to subsist in a part of the *vipakṣa*, we do not hold that it does not subsist *in the vipakṣa*; in the same manner, where a thing is present in a portion of the *pakṣa* (Subject of Inference) we cannot deny that it subsists *in the Subject*;—and thus it behoves you to make an effort to exclude that which subsists in only a part of the Subject. "No special effort is needed for that purpose; the necessary preclusion of what subsists only in a part of the Subject is secured by the restriction or emphasis implied (in the words '*anumēyē saḍbhāvaḥ*, which means '*anumēyē saḍbhāvaḥ ēva*']" [This is not right; as] the emphasised assertion '*anumēyē saḍbhāvaḥ ēva*' can mean only two things: (*a*) 'it subsists *only* in the subject of inference,'—or (b) 'it *must* subsist in the subject of inference.' † (*a*) Of those, as regards the former restriction, what does it do? Does it preclude impossibility? [That is, does it mean that it is not impossible for the *hēṭu* to subsist in the Subject of inference]? or does it only indicate the possibility (of the *hēṭu* subsisting in the Subject)? In either case there is no useful purpose served by the emphasis or restriction; the desired sense being got at even without the restriction; the idea that the *hēṭu*

* *Odorousness* is present in *certain* atoms (those of the Earth) and is not present where those atoms are absent;—hence the inference should be accepted as valid, under the definition.

† (*a*) Means that it cannot subsist anywhere else; and (*b*) that wherever the Subject is present the other must be present.

subsists in the Subject of inference, and that it is not impossible for it to subsist therein, is implied in the simple statement (*ānumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*') without the restriction; and yet *that this hēṭu subsists in a part of the Subject* does not become excluded by the emphasis; which, thus, fails in the very purpose for which it was brought in. * Then again, [the restriction implied in '*anumēyē ēva sadbhāvaḥ*' would mean that the *hēṭu* subsists in the *anumēya only*, that is, in nothing else, not even in the *ṭaṭ-ṭulya*; and thus] there would be a contradiction of the latter half of the definition [which consists of two halves—(1) '*anumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*, and 2) *ṭaṭ-ṭulyē sadbhāvaḥ*.] (*b*) Then as regards the second of the two meanings of the restriction [*i. e.* if the meaning is that the *hēṭū must subsist in the Subject*], this would imply that there is *vyāpṭi* or *invariable concomitance* between the two; but that particular Subject (*e. g.* fire) which is cognised by means of the inference has no connection with the invariable concomitance (upon which the inference would be based); as that (fire) wherein the instrument of inference (or Probans, *e. g.* smoke) subsists (at the time of inference) is entirely different from that wherein the invariable concomitance (of smoke with fire) has been observed.

['*Ānumēyē sadbhāvaḥ*' having been disposed of, the author takes up the next factor of the definition, '*ṭaṭ-ṭulyē sadbhāvaḥ*']—As a matter of fact where the Subject (fire) is observed, there is always a possibility of the presence of the Probans (smoke); and (on the occasion of the inference) what we do not know for certain is the possibility of the presence of the Probans; and so long as this uncertainty

* The *denial of absolute absence and disconnection* does not preclude ordinary or occasional or partial absence and disconnection; the mere assertion of the possiblity of existence also does not preclude the impossibility of existence;—thus on account of occasional or partial absence not being precluded, the emphasis fails to accomplish its purpose of excluding that invalid means of inferential cognition which subsists in only a part of the subject.——*Ṭāṭparya*.

continues, we feel that it may subsist (*a*) in the *Subject* (fire), (*b*) in that where the Subject is known to be present (the kitchen), and (*c*) in that where the Subject is known to be absent (the lake); thus then (apart from the Subject itself) there are two possible substrata where the Probans might subsist—viz: the *tat-tulya* or *Sapakṣa* (where the Subject is known to be present) and the *Vipakṣa* (where it is known to be absent); such being the case, it may be right to preclude the possibility of the real Probans in the *Vipakṣa* by means of the clause '*nāstitā asati*' 'where the subject is non-existent,' (the last clause in the definition);——but for what purpose should there be introduced the other clause '*tat-tulyē sadbhāvaḥ* ? It does not indicate anything that is not already indicated; all that is intended to be indicated is the mere possibility [of the presence of the Probans in the *Sapakṣa* (and not its *invariable concomitance* with it) *; and this mere possibility is got at even though there is an uncertainty as to whether or not it is *invariably concomitant* [Hence the clause in question cannot be taken as indicating the invariable concomitance of the *Probans* with the *sapakṣa*]. "The clause '*tattulyē sadbhāvaḥ*' is introduced for the purposes of emphasis". What is it that is meant to be emphasised by the clause? Does it mean—(*a*) the Probans subsists *in the Sapakṣa only* ?—(*b*) or that it *must* subsist in the *Sapakṣa* ? (*a*) If what is meant by the emphasis is that it subsists in the *Sapakṣa only* ;—then there is a clear contradiction between the first and second clauses of the definition: Just as one

Vār P. 59.

* If this invariable concomitance with the *sapakṣa* were meant, then the definition would not apply to the case of the valid inference 'this is transient because it is preceded by effort'; as in this case the probans—*being preceded by effort*—is not invariably concomitant with all transient things; for instance the jar, which is transient, is not *always* preceded by effort; it is only when it is produced that it is so preceded.

cannot say 'feed *only Dēvadatta*, and also *Yajñadatta*', so the statement in question—' it should subsist *only in the Sapakṣa* and also in the Subject of inference'— cannot but be regarded as the raving of a maniac. (*b*) If then the meaning of the emphasis be that the Probans *must* subsist in the *Sapakṣa*,—then that which subsists in a part of the *Sapakṣa*, [*i. e.* not in all *Sapakṣas*, but only in a few] would cease to be a true Probans; *e. g.* the character of *being preceded by effort*, and the like, which subsists only in a few, and not in all, things belonging to the same class as the Subject of inference (all *transient things*, in the case in question), would not be a true Probans.*

Lastly, the last clause of the definition——' *asati nāstitā*,' ' it should not be present where the Subject is not existent '——has been introduced without due consideration. That which is non-existent, is by itself a non-entity at the time; and a non-entity could never be the substratum (of the Probans ; and hence a denial of this impossible contingency of the *Non-existent* Subject being the subtratum of the Probans) is meaningless. " This clause also is introduced for the purpose of emphasis." What is the meaning of this emphasis ? Does it mean—(*a*) that the Probans *never subsists* ? or (*b*) that it does not subsist in the *non-existent Subject only* ? (*a*) If the former, then the addition of the word '*asati*', ' in the Non-existent Subject ' becomes superfluous ; as even without this word, the intended *Non-subsistence* would be got at ; *i. e.* when a thing is spoken of as ' not subsisting ' at all, it is implied that *it does not subsist in the Non-existent Subject also.* (*b*) If then, the meaning of the emphasis be that the Probans does not subsist *in the Non-existent Subject only*,——then the Probans in the inference ' this is a cow because it has horns ' would be a true

* The sense demands a '*nā*' here ; as the character in question, *is* regarded as a true probans.

Probans; as horns are absent only in the non-existent Subject [*i. e.* the *vipakṣas*; it is only animals other than the cow that are hornless], and they are not *entirely absent* in all *Vipakṣas* (as the buffalo, which is *not a cow*, has horns).

[Having criticised each of the three clauses of the definition separately, the author proceeds to criticise the definition as a whole.]

The upholder of the definition offers the following explanation of his definition:—"The definition contains three qualifications; by the omission of any one, in turn, of these qualifications we would have three forms of the definition; similarly by the omission of any two, in turn, of the qualifications, we would have other three forms of the definition; and by retaining all the three we get the seventh form; what then is meant to be done by the definition is to reject the first six forms,* and to accept the seventh form, with all the three qualifications." This explanation is not right, we reply; as, *firstly*, the two kinds of † affirmative Probans are covered by only the first two clauses of the definition; and *secondly* because the negative Probans is co vered by only the first and third clauses [and yet both these are accepted as *true* Probans]. For instance, (1) for one who does not accept Sound to be eternal, the two reasons or Probans —*because it is a product*, and *because it is preceded by effort*—serve as true *Probans*, and yet they fulfil only the condition indicated by the first two clauses of the definition—there being, in this case, no *vipakṣa* [and thereby the condition '*nāstitā asati*' being impossible];—(2) in the case of the negative Probans, as there is no *sapakṣa* or '*tattulya*', the qualification indicated by the second clause being im-

* The *Tatparya* explains the rejection of these; but it notices only five forms,—the sixth, in which the first clause only remains, is not mentioned; probably because it was too absurd to be noticed separately.

† 'Two kinds'—(1) that which is invariably concomitant with both *sādhya* and *sapakṣa*; and (2) that which is *invariably* concomitant with the *sādhya* only; its concomitance with the *sapakṣa* not being *invariable*.

possible, only two conditions—indicated by the first and the third—are fulfilled; and yet it is accepted as a true Probans; *e. g.* 'the living body is not soulless, as otherwise it would be without the life-breath'. Thus then, inasmuch as the definition fails to include the two kinds of Probans thus noted, it becomes 'defective ('too narrow').

The author next attacks the definition propounded by the *Sāṅkhyas*:—They have defined Inference as* '*sambandhādēkasmāt pratyakṣāchchhēṣasiddhiranumānan*' [which means either—(a) 'where there is a relationship (between two things), from the one perception (of the Probans), the cognition that arises of the other (thing, the Subject) is Inference'; or (b) 'out of one perceptible relationship the cognition that arises of the Subject is Inference']. This definition also is to be rejected on the same gronnds as the one propounded by the *Bauddhas*. Firstly, as a matter of fact, Inference does not proceed from a single perception (as the form er of the two interpretations of the definition implies) [there is one perception of the Probans at the time of the inference; but before that many more perceptions are necessary for the recognition of the invariable concomitance between the probans and the Probandum]. If it is the second interpretation of the definition that is intended—the meaning being, 'from one perceptible relationship',—this also will not be right; as at the time that the observer draws his inference what he actually perceives is not the relationship (but only the Probans). "But the relationship has been perceived beforehand." Even so, you would have to regard as 'inference' the cognition that the man may have at a time when he does not actually perceive the Probans, only if he may have perceived the relationship beforehand (which is absurd). And these are the only two interpretations that

*This sentence is in the same metre as that of the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Ishvara Kṛiṣna. Where does this definition occur?

are possible of the proposed definition. Further, the case of the inference of touch (coolness or warmth) from colour (which inference is quite possible, also under the definition in question),—would be a direct contravention of the tenets of the *Sāṅkhya*; as a matter of fact, the *Sāṅkhya* can never (under his theory) have a perception of the relationship beween colour and touch.* "There is certainly this relation between touch and colour (in the case cited) that both inhere in the same object." [Vār Page 60] But this also is not right, being incompatible with the tenets of the *Sāṅkhya* (who does not accept any such relation as *Inherence*), under whose theory, colour and touch do not subsist in the same object; it is not true, according to them, that the touch subsists in the same substance in which the colour subsists; as, by their philosophy, either touch or colour does not subsist in any object [all these qualities being only forms of Nature, Prakṛiti, they are one with this latter; hence they cannot be said to be contained in Prakṛiti either]. "There may be this relation (between Prakṛiti and its modifications) that they are themselves the substrates of each other." But even so,—even though there be the mutual relationship of being the container and the contained of each other—it would not be possible for touch to be contained in colour, or colour to be contained in touch [so that even the mutual relationship of the container and the contained could not be asserted in the case of touch and colour]. This also sets aside the view (held by the *Sāṅkhyas*) that there are *seven kinds* of relationship (between things; and some of these would be possible as between colour and touch); because as a matter of fact, from among these seven kinds of relationship—that of cause and effect and the like—there is not one that is found to hold between colour and touch.

* There can be no relationship between any two things, under the theory that everything is undergoing modification every moment.

And yet the inference of touch from colour is a perfectly valid one; hence the definition (which does not apply to this inference) is clearly too narrow; and hence defective.

Thus has Inference been explained.

ANALOGY.

Analogy is next considered—

SŪTRA (6)—* *Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object.*

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 21, l. 1 to P. 22, l. 3]

† That is, Analogy is that which makes known what is to be made known, through similarity to an object that is already well known; *e. g.* the assertion 'as the cow so the *gavaya*' [*i. e.* the animal called 'gavaya' is like the cow].

"What is it that is accomplished by this *analogy*?" When a person finds similarity to the cow, he actually perceives the object that had been referred to in the *analogy*; and thence he comes to cognise the connection of that object with the name mentioned in that Analogy; so that it is this latter cognition that is the purpose accomplished by the Analogy. For instance, when the Analogy, in the form 'the animal called *gavaya* is like the cow', has been put forward,—and the man who has heard this happens, subsequently, to perceive, through the contact of his sense-organs, an object similar to the cow,—he realises that 'the word *gavaya* is the name of this object', and comes to cognise the connection of the particular name with the particular object. Similarly in the case of such analogies as 'the *mudgaparṇī* is similar to the *mudga*', 'the *māṣaparṇī* is similar to the *māṣa*'—being put forward, the observer, by means of these analogies, comes to know the con-

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* The confused use of the word 'pramāṇa' continues. We have seen that *Pratyakṣa* has been defined as the *cognition* that is brought about by sense-contact &c; and here we find *Upamāna* being defined as that which accomplishes the purpose of making known,—*i. e.* a *means* of cognition.

† There is some difference between the *Bhāṣya* on the one hand and the *Vārtika* and the *Tātparya* on the other. As regards the object of analogical cognition and the exact *form* of that cognition, there is no difference; as according to both the object is the connection of the name with the object, the form of the

nection of the particular names with the particular objects, and thereby obtains the particular herb (*muḍyaparṇī* or *māṣaparṇi*) that he requires.

In the same manner we can explain other objects of Analogy met with in ordinary experience.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪ. 6.

[P. 60 L. 8 to P. 61, L. 3]

We proceed next to describe *Analogy*. The aphorism is to be interpreted as before, as providing a definition that differentiates Analogy from all homogeneous and heterogeneous things.

The compound '*prāsiḍḍhasāḍharmyāṭ*' in the Sūṭra means—either *that whose similarity is known*, or *that which has similarity to a known thing*; *—for instance, the *gavaya*

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cognition being 'this object is what is named *gavaya*'. There is however a marked difference of opinion as to the *means* of the cognition; that it is the similarity between the two objects that is the means, on this also all are agreed; but according to the *Bhāṣya*, it is this similarity as expressed in the assertion 'the gavaya is like the cow', —which assertion is remembered at the time that the man sees the animal ressembling the cow; while according to the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* it is the similarity that is actually *seen* when the animal is seen to ressemble the cow,—this perceived similarity being aided by the remembrance of the similarity expressed in the assertion 'the gavaya is like the cow.' Says the *Parishuḍḍhi*. [illegible]

The *Ṭāṭparya* interprets the *Bhāṣya* passage '*yaṭhā gauḥ ṭaṭhā gavayaḥ*' (ll. 1-2) to mean that the similarity should be one that is already known by means of such assertions. But we find (in l. 4) the *Bhāṣya* calling this assertion itself '*Upamāna*.'

There is no doubt that the view of the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* is more logical. The latter rightly remarks that for the cognition that 'this animal is what is called *gavaya*' 'it is necessary that the observer should know the assertion 'the gavaya is similar to the cow', and also that he should preceive the similarity to the cow in the animal concerned. If the analogical cognition had for its means only this remembered similarity, then its validity would be as doubtful as that of Remembrance itself.

* This is different from the interpretation given by the *Bhāṣya*. The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks—' The *Vārṭika* proposes to take the compound as a *Bahuvrīhi*; but it does not reject the Bhāṣya's interpretation of it as *an Instrumental Ṭāṭpuruṣa*'. The *Pārishuḍḍhi* adds that the similarity must also be well-known; so that there should be

[whose similarity to the cow is known, or which is similar to the well-known cow] ; and this analogy accomplishes the purpose through that thing (which is similar);—*i.e.* accomplishes (brings about) the cognition of the connection of the name; and *Analogy* is that which, through such a thing, accomplishes —*i. e.* makes known—what is to be accomplished or made known—*i. e.* the connection of the thing with its name.

"What does this mean ?" It means simply this, that the knowledge of similarity, as aided by the remembrance brought about by the impression left by a trustworthy assertion, is what is called 'Analogy.' That is to say, when the observer happens to have heard the assertion that 'the gavaya is like the cow',—and thus the similarity between the cow and the *gavaya* being well known to him,—and, on some future occasions, he sees the *gavaya* and perceives its similarity to the cow, —he comes to have the cognition 'this is gavaya'; a cognition in which he cognises the connection of the animal with the name '*gavaya*' [and this last cognition has been brought about by the perception of similarity as aided by the remembrance of that same similarity which is brought about by the impression left on the mind by the assertion that 'the gavaya is like the cow.']

[The Bauḍḍha * brings forward the following objection against *Analogy*, as an Instrument of Cognition]—" Analogy does not differ from Perception and Word. "How so?" When the observer actually sees the cow and the *gavaya*, it is by Perception that he cognises that *the one is similar to the other* ;—when too he hears the assertion that 'the *gavaya* is like the cow', the cognition that he has (of the similarity) proceeds from his hearing of the *words* (so that the cognition is purely verbal). Of the

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Karmaḍharaya compound also;but (it adds) both the *Tāṭpuruṣa* and the *Kamaḍhāraya* are implied in the two *Bahuvrihis* that the *Vārṭika* has put forward—*(a)* 'that whose *similarity is known* implies that the similarity should be known ; and *(2)* 'that which is similar *to a known thing*' implies what is meant by the *Tāṭpuruṣa*.

* In Chapter IV. (of his *Pramāṇasamuchkhaya*) Diṅnāga rejects Upamāna as a separate instrument of cognition ; he includes it under *Perception*.

many properties of the cow, a few are found to be present in the *gavaya*; while others are absent; if it were not so (and if all the properties were present in the *gavaya*), then there could be no such assertion as 'the gavaya is *like* the cow'; all that the observer cognises is that the *gavaya* bears much resemblance to the cow. Thus it is found that Analogy does not differ from Perception and Word."

The theory of the Bauḍḍha comes to this, that the same cognition apprehends the similarity of the cow in the *gavaya* and also the presence of the *gavaya* (as similar to the cow): and this shows a rare insight into the nature of Pramāṇas! [Apart from this however] What the *Sūṭra* means is that what follows from the cognition of the similarity of the *gavaya* to the cow is the cognition of the connection of that animal with the name [and it is thus this latter cognition, and not the cognition of similarity, that is brought about by means of Analogy]*. Thus it is found that it is without understanding the meaning of the *Sūṭra* that the Bauḍḍha has urged a frivolous objection.

Word.

BHĀṢYA.

[*Page* 22, *l.* 5 *to l.* 9.]

We now proceed to describe *Word* [as an Instrument of Right Cognition]—

SŪṬRA (7). ***The assertion† of a reliable person is 'Word'.***

That person is called '*āpṭa*', 'reliable', who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things, who is moved by

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* 'Thus Analogy must be regarded as different from Perception and Word,—because the cognition that it brings about is of an entirely different character from the cognition brought by the latter two',—*Ṭāṭparya*.

† 'The word Upaḍēsha, standing for words uttered for the benefit of others, here applies to the Sentence as well as to what is expressed by the sentence. When the sentence is regarded as the 'means' of the cognition, the result brought about by it is the knowledge of what is expressed by it; and when this latter is the 'means' the 'result' consists in the idea of acquiring or discarding the thing spoken of *Ṭāṭparya*.

a desire to make known (to others) the thing as he knows it, and who is fully capable of speaking of it. The word '*āpṭa*' is explained as denoting one who acts or proceeds, through '*āpṭi*', *i. e.* through the direct right knowledge of things. This definition applies to sages, * as well as to *Āryas* and *Mcēlhchhas* †; the activities of all these people are carried on through such 'Words.'

Thus we find that it is by means of the aforesaid four Instruments of Cognition,—and not by any other means—that the activities of Gods, Men and Animals are carried on.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 7.

[P. 61, line 4 to P. 63, line 20.]

We proceed next to describe Word (as the fourth Instrument of Cognition]. What the Sūṭra means is that the 'Word' that is the *Instrument of right cognition* is that which consists in the assertion of *reliable persons*, and not in *mere assertion* (which would include the assertion of unreliable persons also, which does not always lead to *right* cognition).

* 'One who has direct intuitive knowledge of things is a Sage. The name Ārya stands for the people of the Central Land (bounded by the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea, the Vindhya and the Himālaya). And the residents of the rest of the world are called Mlēchchha's!

† 'There are cases where the word of the worst man is true and reliable. For instance, after a robber has taken away all that a traveller possessed, if he is asked to point out the way to a certain place, what he indicates does turn out to be the right path. The word of such people is reliable only when they have no motive for giving incorrect information. Hence for being an 'apṭa', for purposes of the validity of his assertions, it is not necessary that he should be completely free from all defects, as has been asserted by some philosophers'.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

On this the *Parishuddhi* observes as follows:—There two kinds of persons—ommiscient and not-ommiscient; of these, the unreliabity of the former is set aside by the very proof that establishes his existence; as the persen who is proved to be ommiscient is also proved to be free from all defects of ignorance, love, hatred and the like. As for the not-omniscient person, his assertions only can bear testimony to his being reliable, by reason of his being possessed of—(a) due knowledge of the thing spoken of, (b) desire to convey true information, (c) efficient faculty of right articulation &c; and one can be sure of this only after having repeatedly found the man to be possessed of these qualities.

The *Bhāṣya* (p. 22, ll. 5-6) says—*That person is called 'reliable' who possesses the direct and right knowledge of things,..................The word 'āpta' is explained as denoting one who acts through 'āpti', i. e. through the direct and right knowledge of things.* Against this the following objection is raised (by * the *Mīmāmsaka*) :—"No *Assertion* is possible in regard to such things as Heaven, Apūrva, † Deity and the like; as all those are beyond the senses; that is to say, if by the 'āpti' of the thing (by reason of which the man is called 'āpta' 'reliable') is meant the *direct valid knowledge* of things, then,—inasmuch as no one ever perceives, or has the direct knowledge of, Heaven, Apūrva, Deity and other such imperceptible things,—there could be no activity of speech (assertion) bearing upon these things. Consequently it would be well to explain the compound '*āptopadēshaḥ*' as '*āptaḥ upadēshaḥ*', 'reliable assertion', ‡ and not as '*āptasya upadēshaḥ*' 'the assertion of a reliable person."

This objection does not affect our position; for we do not mean to say that Heaven &c., are *perceived* by us; what we mean is that those persons to whom they *are* perceptible (the Sages for instance),—the *assertion* of these persons would constitute the *Word* (as the valid means of cognising those things) §. "But what is your reason for believing that

* Who denies an author for the Veda; hence if Word were defined as 'the assertion of a reliable person', the Veda would be excluded.

† This is the name given to a certain invisible agency or force set going by every act that man does; this force being the immediate cause of the results, accruing to the man, from that act.

‡ 'The Veda, being without an author, is inherently free from all those defects that vitiate the reliability of assertions; hence with regard to all things, visible and invisible alike, it is *reliable*. As regards the words of persons of the world, these are *reliable* when they have the sanction of the other means of knowledge'.—*Tātparya*.

§ And as the Vedas are (according to us) the work of God;—and God can perceive Heaven &c.,—it is only natural that his 'assertion', in the form of the Vedas, should be the 'word' that provides the means of knowing these things.

Heaven &c., are perceptible to some persons?" * We explain our reasons as follows :—† Heaven, &c., are perceptible to some persons,—because they are possessed of certain definite generic and specific characters:—for instance, (a) because Heaven &c. are '*āshrita*', *i. e.* subsist in a certain substratum,—as a matter of fact, whatever is so subsistent must be perceptible to some one;——(b) because they are for the sake of others,—whatever is for the sake of others must be perceptible to some one;——(c) because they are things, and are capable of being spoken of,—whatever is a thing and is spoken of, must be perceptible to some one; as we find in the case of the jar and such other things;—and (d) because they are not eternal,—whatever is non-eternal must be perceptible to some one. "But as a matter of fact, *Apūrva* is not known to be non-eternal." This is not right; for in that case, there would be no possibility of death; that is to say, if Merit and Demerit (which constitute *Apūrva*) be eternal, to the destruction of what will man's death be due? If they are non-eternal, what happens is that the Merit and Demerit, that have begun to bear fruit, are destroyed by reason of their fruits having been experienced,—and there being left no more of such residuum of past deeds as has begun to bear fruit,—the Mind (Soul) of the man falls off from the body, and moves into another; and in this manner

* Our reason against such belief being—'The perception of the sages cannot pertain to Heaven and the rest,—because it is perception,—like our own perceptions.'

† In every reasoning that much alone of the Subject can be put forward as the 'Subject,' as much of it is known to contain the Probans. Hence, when the Mimāmsaka puts forward the reasoning 'The perception of the sages, &c.' wherein 'the perception of the sage' is put forward as the 'Subject', it follows that he accepts such perception as a reality. And when it is admitted, it must be admitted exactly as it is known to exist; so that there can be no reason for denying that they do pertain to Heaven &c. If, on the other hand, the said 'perception of sages' is not admitted, then the reasoning becomes open to the fallacy of the 'Unknown Subject.' So much for the untenability of the reasoning against the perceptibility of Heaven &c., by the sages. As for positive proofs for such perceptibility, we have many such; some of which are mentioned.

death and birth go on. For these reasons Merit and Dermerit (Apūrva) cannot be eternal.

Then again, if *Apūrva* be regarded as eternal, (a) is it one only, common to all persons? (b) and (c) or is it, different for each person, * [(b) one for each person, or (c) many for each person] ?

Vār. P. 62.

(A) If it were one only, common to all persons, then the good (resulting from it) would also be common to all persons! As there is nothing else that could determine which resulting good should go to what individual person; and thus (the good deed done by one person bringing the desired good to all) people would abandon the performing of meritorious deeds. "Even though Apūrva be eternal (and one only), as there would be many and diverse manifesting agencies, there would be neither of the two incongruities pointed out;—that is to say, even if the *Apūrva* be eternal and one only, common to all persons, neither the resulting good would belong to all persons, nor would there be a cessation of meritorious deeds. 'How so?' For the simple reason that the manifesting agencies are many and diverse; that is to say, the result proceeds (not from the *Apūrva* but) from that which manifests that eternal *Apūrva*; and it is for this manifesting of the eternal *Apūrva* that deeds have to be done; so that there is no possibility of the cessation of meritorious deeds; for it is a well-recognised fact that that which is manifested by a certain person brings its results to that person only [and thus when the *Apūrva* is manifested by the act of a particular person, the good resulting from it will belong to that person only]." This last statement that you make by no means represents a well-recognised fact; for instance, it is not a fact that the Jar that is manifested

* There are three possible alternatives implied in this, says the *Tātparya* :—(1) There is a single Apūrva common to all persons; (2) there are many Apūrvas one only for each person; (3) there are many *Apūrvas* for each person.

(rendered perceptible) by Ḍēvadaṭṭa is not seen by Yajña-ḍatta. Further, what do you mean by the 'manifestation' of the eternal *Apūrva*? Does it mean that it is *perceived*? or that it becomes capable of bringing about its results? or that its covering is removed? If you mean that it becomes perceived, then this is not a fact; as no ordinary person ever perceives the *Apūrva*, * which is beyond the reach of the senses. If secondly, you mean that the *Apūrva*, by being manifested, becomes capable of bringing about its results, then we ask—is this *capability of bringing about its result* the Apūrva itself? or is it a property belonging to the *Apūrva*? If it is the *Apūrva* itself, then in that case [as the *Apūrva* is eternal, and the said *capability* is nothing other than the *Apūrva*] there is nothing done by the man to the *Apūrva* [so that one man's *Apūrva* should bring results to all men]. If, on the other hand, the said *capability* is a property belonging to the *Apūrva*, then, what proof have you for the belief that the *Apūrva* is something entirely different from that *capability*? The view held is that the *Apūrva* is that from which the result follows. If, lastly, by the 'manifestation' of the *Apūrva* you mean that its covering is removed,—then you have to explain what this 'covering' of the *Apūrva* is; as a matter of fact however, we cannot conceive of the possiblity or impossibility of any covering for things that are beyond the senses.

(B) The above reasonings also serve to set aside the view that *Apūrva* is eternal and [one] for each person. "How?" For in this case also the incongruities pointed out in the previous case—*viz.* the cessation of meritorious deeds by men &c.—are present; and so also the incapability of manifesting agencies (for the *Apūrva*); and further, there would be no possibility of any activity for the purpose of adding to the *Apūrva* that has been once produced; as [this

* And as regards the Sage, he can perceive even an *unmanifested* Apūrva.

'addition' consists in the increasing of the component factors, and] no change of composition is possible in the case of an eternal thing (as the *Apūrva* is held to be). "The diversity in the composition would be due to the diversity in the manifesting agencies."* This is not right; as no such diversity is ever found in any single thing. All that you mean is that though the *Apūrva* is one only, yet it can appear as diverse, through the diversity of its manifesting agency, and this diversity would cause the said 'increase' and 'decrease'. But this, we say, is not possible; for the simple reason that no such diversity is ever found to appear in any single thing; that is to say, we have never found any single thing being affected by any diversity of its manifesting agency, whereby any such 'increase' or 'decrease' could be possible. "But, as a matter of fact, we have found such diversity (and increase and decrease) in the size of the face as reflected in diverse reflecting media, like the bright sword (the large mirror, the small mirror,) and so forth." No such diversity has ever been found, we reply. "Then what is it that is found (in the case cited by us)?" (In the case you have cited) the idea of diversity (that people have) is a wrong one; the face only *appears as if it were* diverse, and it does not actually become diverse; and this for the simple reason that one and the same thing can never have more than one form; there is no single thing that ever takes diverse forms. For these reasons, you must give up either the notion of the Apūrva being one only, or that of its being the cause of increase and decrease.

Vār Page 63.

(C) "We shall then regard *Apūrva* as eternal, and many and belonging to each person separately." If you take up the position that there are many eternal *Apūrvas* be-

* One and the same thing may be larger and smaller in accordance with the size of its manifesting agency; for instance, the same face appears large in a large mirror, and small in a small mirror.

longing to each person,—even then the incongruity does not cease; that is to say, even this last theory is not free from the incongruities that, there would be no possibility of death, and that there would be a cessation of meritorious deeds. "But what produces the result is the *manifestation* (of the *Apūrva*)." What do you mean by this? Do you mean that the *Apūrva* produces the result at the time that there is its manifestation? or that the result is produced after the action (producing the *Apūrva*) has ceased? As a matter of fact, it is never found to be the case that the *Apūrva* produces its result at the time that it is manifested; for instance, the attainment of heaven does not follow immediately after the *Ashvamēḍha* sacrifice [and the manifestation of the *Apūrva* must be at the same time as the action of sacrifice; as the action is the manifesting agent of the *Apūrva*, and in all cases the manifestation is found to be at the same time as the manifesting agency; *e. g.* the manifesting of the jar by the lamp is synchronous with the appearance of the lamp]. If then it be held that the result is produced after the action (of sacrifice, for instance) has ceased to exist,—then it comes to this that what manifests the *Apūrva* is the action that is non-existent, and yet it is as aided by this action that the *Apūrva* produces the result—a truly wonderful view of things! And [if a non-existent action were to manifest an *Apūrva*, then] there would be no *Apūrva* that would be not manifested at any time [as at any particular time we have any number of actions non-existent];—so that all *Apūrvas* would produce their results at all times! If, with a keen desire to support your view of the case, you hold every action also to be eternal [so that the action would not be non-existent at the time of the result],—even then you do not escape from the incongruities pointed out above;—*i. e.* the cessation of all meritorious deeds, and so forth [one meritorious action having been performed, as this would, *ex hypothesi*, continue to exist for all time, and to manifest its *Apūrva* and

bring about its results, there would be no need for the performance of any other act].

Thus then we find that in whatever manner the eternality of *Apūrva* is held, it fails to bear examination.

[Not admitting *Word* as a distinct Instrument of Cognition, the Bauḍḍha * philosopher raises the following objection] —" What is the meaning of ' assertion of a reliable person ' ? Does it mean that the person making the assertion is truthful ? or that the fact asserted is true (really as it is averred to be) ? If it means the former, then that idea (of the truthfulness of the speaker, and of the consequent truth of his assertion) is got at by Inference. † If, on the other hand, it means that the fact asserted is true,— then this also can be known by Perception ; for it is only when we actually *perceive* the state of things to be as it is asserted to be, that we conclude that the fact is really as it has been averred to be."

This objection cannot be maintained ; as it is based upon a misunderstanding of the meaning of the *Sūṭra*. The Sūṭra '*Āpṭopaḍēshaḥ shabḍaḥ*' does not mean what it has been taken to mean [*i. e.* it does not mean that ' the word, aided by the reliability of the speaker, makes the object known ', in which case alone would it be regarded as *inferential* ; nor that ' the truth of the fact averred is known by actually coming by the thing spoken of ', in which case alone could it be regarded as *perception*] ; ‡ what it does

* Diṅnāga in Chap. V of his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya*—vide Satish. Ch. Viyasbhusana', Mediaeval Logic' from which it appears that the objection as found in the *Vārṭika* is a quotation from Diṅnāga's work.

† That a certain person is truthful can be learnt only from inference ; and when we have come to the conclusion that he is a truthful man, from that we infer that what he says must be true.

‡ It is only after the Word has brought about the cognition of the fact expressed by it, that its reliability is inferred from the fact being actually found to be as averred by the Word. But because the reliability of the Word is inferred, it does not follow that the effect—the cognition-produced by the Word should also be inferred. Nor again is the relation between the Word and its meaning always that of invariable con-

mean is that, in regard to things connected with the senses, as well as those not connected with them, we have a cognition which we speak of in terms of the *word—i. e.* of which we speak of in the form ' I have the cognition of such and such a thing *by means of words*; '—and it is the cognition, thus expressed, that forms the result of the ' Word ' (as the instrument of cognition). Thus it is found that the objection urged by Diṅnāga is wholly irrelevant.

SŪTRA (8).

The said Word is of two kinds—the Dṛiṣṭārṭha, that of which the thing spoken of is perceived, and the Adṛiṣṭārṭha, that of which the thing is not perceived.

BHĀṢYA.

(Page 23, ll. 1—4.]

That ' Word ' of which the thing spoken of is perceived in this world is called ' *Dṛiṣṭārṭha* ' ; while that of which the thing spoken of is only believed to exist in the other world is ' *Adṛiṣṭāṛitha* '.* These are the two divisions under which are included all the assertions of sages and ordinary men. " For what purpose does the Sūṭra mention these two divisions ? " This mention is made so that the other party (either a pupil or a disputant) may not think that what is a *valid instrument of cognition* is only that *assertion of the reliable person* which speaks of things that

mitance, whereby every verbal cognition would be always inferential. What happens in the case of verbal cognition is that the words used are such whose conventional meanings, being well known, are recalled to the mind whenever they are heard; and the meanings of the individual words thus recalled,come to be connected together by reason of their proximity, capability and mutual need,——and thus related together, they give rise to the comprehension of the connected meaning of the Sentence as a whole. And this process is entirely different from the process of Inference.

* (1) That which speaks of things directly perceived by the Speaker, and (2) That which speaks of things only known to him indirectly, by means of Inference for instance.

are directly perceived, as it is only such things that can be duly ascertained. This idea had to be guarded against, as such assertions also as speak of things not seen are *valid Instruments of cognition*,; as such things also can be duly ascertained by means of Inference*.

Here ends the section of the *Bhāṣya* dealing with the Instruments of Cognition.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA (8).

[Page 63, l. 21 to page 64, l. 6.]

The declaration (in the Sūṭra) that '*Word is of two kinds*' is meant to restrict the application of the name; the sense being that, though a 'reliable assertion' may be of many kinds, yet, in the present context, it is meant to be restricted to such assertions only as speak of things that are amenable to Perception and Inference. † Or, the two kinds of Word may be said to be due to the difference in the character of the speakers; as words are found to have both 'ḍriṣṭārṭha' and 'aḍriṣṭārṭha' speakers; those who speak of things

* If only Words speaking of visible things were reliable, then the Veda would become excluded. Hence it is added that words speaking of invisible things also are reliable. Such invisible things as Heaven and the like can be known by means of Words whose validity can be ascertained only by means of an Inference based upon the fact of their being the Word of 'a reliable person', —i. e. God. And it is for this reason that these things are said to be inferred. This precludes the validity of mere Hearsay, or of the word of persons whose veracity cannot be correctly inferred; *e. g.* that of Buḍḍha and others. And it does not mean that the things spoken of in this case are those that cannot be cognised by means of Perception. As Heaven &c., are actually perceived by the sages. When the ordinary man speaks of Heaven &c., his words are 'aḍṛiṣṭārṭha' in a double sense—the thing is one cognisable only by means of words whose validity can be only inferred, and the man speaks of things that he has not seen, but knows by means of words whose reliability he knows from Inference. It is on the basis of this double sense of '*aḍṛiṣṭārṭha*' that we find the *Vārṭika* offering a second interpretation of the words '*ḍṛiṣṭārṭha*' and '*aḍṛiṣṭārṭha*'—*Ṭaṭparya*.

† 'The former explanation is in accordance with the *Bhāṣya*; the *Vārṭika* next adds another interpretation'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

they have seen are 'ḍriṣṭārṭha' speakers, and those who speak of things (not seen, but) known by them by means of Inference are 'aḍriṣṭārṭha' speakers.

The definition provided by the *Sūṭra* thus *applies to sages as well as to Āryas and Mlēchchhas* (*Bhāṣya*, p. 22, line 7-8). This common definition has been provided, and no distinction has been made, for this reason that the activities of all these men are carried on through 'reliable assertions.'

Thus we find that the four described above are the Instruments of Cognition, by means of which *the activities of gods, men and animals are caried on* (Bhāṣya, p. 22 l. 8-9).

Thus ends the section of the *Vārṭika* dealing with the Instruments of Cognition.

LECTURE (3).

The Prameyas.

The Objects of Cognition.

[*Sūṭras* 9—22.]

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 23, l. 5 to P. 24, l. 4.]

The *Sūṭrā* now proceeds to explain what is to be known by means of the above-described Instruments of Cognition.

Sūṭra (9).

*Soul, Body, Sense-organs, Things, Apprehension, Mind, Activity, Defect, Re-birth, Fruition, Pain and Release really * constitute the Objects of Cognition'.*

Of these—(1) the Soul is the perceiver (of all that brings about pain and pleasure),—the experiencer (of all pains and pleasures)—the knower of all (pains, pleasures and

* According to the *Parishuḍḍhi* there are two readings of the *Sūṭra*—one with '*ṭu*', and the other without it. We shall see later on (P. 216) how this particle is essential.

their causes)—who gets at all things.* (2) The Body is the receptacle of the Soul's experiences. (3) The Sense-organs are the instruments of the experiences. (4) The Things are the objects to be enjoyed and experienced. (5) Apprehension consists of the experience itself. (6) † The Mind is that internal organ which is capable of bringing about the apprehension of all things,—which the Sense-organs (being limited in their scope) cannot do. (7) Activity is the cause of the propagation of the body, the sense-organs, the things and the sensing of pleasure and pain; (8) So also are the Defects. (9) Rebirth—the body that belongs to the Soul in one life is not the first that the Soul has had; nor is it the last; in fact there can be no 'first' in the previous bodies that the Soul has had [as we cannot trace any beginning of the worldly process]; and as for its subsequent bodies, there can be an end to these only when Release is attained;—and it is this that constitutes *Rebirth*. (10) Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain along with the causes leading to those. (11) *Pain*—by the special mention of 'pain' (and the omission of 'pleasure') it is not meant that there is no pleasure at all,—which is what is actually felt as agreeable [just as much as Pain is felt as disagreeable]; what is meant is to lay stress upon the teaching that it is desirable that one should practise the thoughtful contemplation of the fact that Pleasure also is only a form of Pain,—being as it is, along with its causes, found to always end in pain, to be never also entirely free from pain, and to be inseparable from various difficulties; as when one is thoughtful and contemplates upon the said fact, he becomes disgusted;—this disgust makes him free from all attachment, and brings Dispassion;—and having become dispassionate, he attains Release. (12) Release consists in the cessation of the series of births and deaths, and the consequent disappearance of all pain.

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* If the Soul did not get at all things, it could not know 'all things'.

'The point in which the *Soul* differs from the other objects is that it is only as the experiencer of pleasures and pains that the Soul is something to be got rid of (*hēya* in its own positive form; it is never *hēya*, it is always *upādēya*, to be acquired and treasured; while all the rest—except Release—are always only fit to be got rid of; and *Release* is always to be acquired and treasured.'

† There is much uncertainty on the exact nature of *manas*. The later Logicians regard it as an '*indriya*'; while the *Bhāṣya* is not clear on this point. We shall deal with this subject later on, under Manas'.

Though apart from these enumerated, there are many other 'objects of cognition' also—such as Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Individuality and Inherence,—yet it would be impossible to enumerate all such objects severally; so what the Sūṭra has done is to make specific mention of only those 'objects' whose right knowledge brings Release, and wrong knowledge leads to Birth and Rebirth [and it does not mean that these are the only objects that can be cognised.]

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 64, l. 7 to P. 66, l. 10.]

The 'Object of Cognition' is next described—

*[The *Bhāṣya* puts the question—*What is to be known by means of the above described Instruments of Cognition*,—with a view to specify the 'objects of cognition', which have been only hinted at, in a general way, in the definition of the Pramāṇas; and the sense of the *Sūṭra* is that the 'objects of cognition' enumerated are precisely those whose true knowledge brings Release and whose wrong knowledge brings Birth and Rebirth. The compound in the *Sūṭrā* is *Ḍvanḍva*, of which every component is of equal importance.

An objection is raised—"What is the meaning of the *Sūṭra*? Does it mean that the Soul and the rest here mentioned are the only 'objects of cognition'? or that these are 'objects of cognition' only? If the former, then the statement becomes too narrow, as it omits to mention many objects of cognition; such, for instance, as Space, Time, Community, Individuality and Inherence.] If, on the other hand, the meaning is that they are 'objects of cognition' only, then there is a contradiction between this *Sūṭra*, and *Sūṭra* 2-1-16, where the *Bhāṣya* speaks of the Soul &c. as both 'instruments of cognition' and 'objects of cognition';

*The whole text of lines 10—17 is defective, there being no less than five lacunae. We give within square brackets, the purport of these eight lines, so far as it can be gleaned from the *Ṭāṭparya* and the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

and in support of this dual character it cites the instance of the weighing balance, in which when weighed, the gold becomes the *object* weighed; while when some other thing is weighed, and gold is used only as the medinm of measurement, it is the *instrument*; and thus the same gold comes to be spoken of as '*pramēya*' as well as '*pramāṇa*'. And further, such a statement by the *Sūṭra* would be contrary to facts of ordinary experience; in which it is found that one and the same thing is related to actions in more ways than one; for instance, in the case of the tree, we find it spoken of as the *agent* in the sentence 'the tree stands' [as an *objective* in 'I see the tree', as an *instrument* in 'he sees the moon by means of the tree,' and so on]; and just as in this case we find the names of several verbal-relations applied to the tree, on the basis of the presence, in it, of all the several characters,—so, in the same manner, the same thing (Soul for instance) could be '*pramēya*' as well as '*pramāṇa*' [so that it is not right to say that Soul and the rest are *pramēyas*' only]."

The above reasoning is not right; as it is based upon a misunderstanding of the meaning of the *Sūṭra*. What the *Sūṭra* means is that the 'object of cognition', consisting of the Soul and the rest, when duly known and differentiated tends to bring about the Release of the person; and it does not mean that there are no other 'objects of cognition'. Nor would there be any incongruity if the *Sūṭra* were taken to mean that Soul &c. are 'objects of cognition' only. "What do you mean *?" What we mean is that the *Sūṭra* states that for the man seeking Release, Soul and the rest must be the 'objects of cognition' only; *i.e.*, these must be *known* by him; and it is not meant to enjoin the knowability of these [*i.e.* the *Sūṭra* does not lay down that Soul &c. must be

* "The incongruity—in the shape of the contradiction of Sū. 2. 1. 16 is quite patent in this case—how then can you say that there is no incongruity in this view?"

known by all men *]; nor is it meant to deny the knowability of other things. All that is done by the *Sūṭra* is to reiterate † the truth that by one who seeks for Release, *these must be known*;—*i. e.* for him they must be '*objects* of cognition' only. Thus we find that the *Sūṭra is* meant to do both [to state that Soul &c. are the only 'objects of cognition', and also that Soul &c. are 'objects of cognition' only]; and neither of these statements is open to the objections that have been urged.

Even granting the contention of the Opponent against the *Sūṭra*, we offer the following explanation :—

Space and the other objects also are included in the Sūṭra, by the force of implication. "What is the *implication*?" It is this :—There are twenty forms of *Activity* (the *seventh* object mentioned in the *Sūṭra*); and these are affected,—*i.e.* found to be qualified and borne upon by—Space and Time; all which therefore are implied ‡ in the mention of 'Activity;' as for Community, Individuality and Inherence, these are only qualifications of the several Objects mentioned in the *Sūṭra*; that is, Soul and the other objects are already mentioned in the *Sūṭra*, and Community, Individuality and Inherence are only relations serving to differentiate the said objects from one another; and as such are included in the *Sūṭra* as the qualifications of those directly mentioned.

* 'But only by the pupil who is seeking for Release.'

† The use of the word 'reiterate' shows that the fact is vouched for by other pramāṇas also.

‡ The reading of the printed texts is defective; as it stands, the sense is that Space &c. are *not* included; which would be absurd; as from what follows, and from what the *Tāṭparya* says, it is clear that Space and Time &c. *are* meant to be included. Hence the proper reading should be [illegible]

Space affects activity, when the Veda lays down a sacrifice as to be performed on a plot of ground sloping eastwards; Time affects it when it lays down the Pūrṇamāsa sacrifice to be performed on the Purṇamāsī day.

* As a matter of fact however, the *Sūṭra* does not mean either to indicate all 'objects of cognition', or to indicate those that are 'objects of cognitions' only. If the author of the *Sūṭra* had simply meant to indicate the 'objects of cognition', he would thereby only prove his own inaptitude, by mentioning what has already been mentioned (as implied by the account given of the Instruments of Cognition); and further by mentioning again what has already been mentioned in the very first *Sūṭra* (and what is again already implied in the account subsequently given of the Pramāṇas) the author's statement (in the present *Sūṭra*) would partake of the character of the incoherent ravings of a maniac. It is with a view to all this that the author of the Sūṭra has inserted the qualifying particle 'ṭu'; the meaning of the *Sūṭra* thus is that 'though there are other *objects of cognition* also, yet those that are mentioned (Soul &c.) are those *objects of cognition* whose true knowledge brings the highest good; this is what is implied by the particle '*ṭu*'.

An objection is raised:—"How is it that Pleasure is not mentioned? Is it because there is no such thing as Pleasure? Or because it is already included in something else? It cannot be the former; as Pleasure is a thing that is known to every living Soul; inasmuch as Pleasure is found to be experienced by every living Soul, it cannot be said that there is no such thing as Pleasure. For the same reason [*i. e.* because Pleasure is actually known as something entirely different from Soul and the rest] Pleasure cannot be held to be included in any of the things mentioned in the *Sūṭra*."

Pleasure has been omitted with a view to indicate the absence of attachment. "How so?" The man who is seeking after Release should look upon everything as 'Pain;'

* The above explanation has been given by the author only to show his ingenuity; the real explanation is the one already given above; which he reiterates —*Ṭāṭparya*.

and it is for the purpose of laying stress upon the propriety of regarding everything as 'Pain' that the *Sūṭra* has omitted to mention 'Pleasure' separately. As a matter of fact, when a man regards everything as 'Pain', he acquires that Dispassion which consists of the *absence of attachment to* (or indifference for) the entire three worlds; and when the 'absence of attachment' is practised, his longing for all the three worlds ceases; the 'longing' for a certain thing consists in the desire for its return; and naturally no such desire is possible, when the man regards all things as 'pain'; for certainly no one desires Pain;—all longing having thus ceased, the man does not have recourse to those (activities) that tend to bring back the objects desired; as he does not have recourse to these activities; no further Merit or Demerit accrues to him; those that have already accrued to him in the past become exhausted through his experiences, and thus ultimately Merit and Demerit, which form the sole cause of birth and rebirth, entirely disappear from the man; and thereupon he becomes 'released'; that is, he is not born again. It is with a view to indicate all this that the *Sūṭra* has omitted to mention 'Pleasure'.

Soul—The first Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 24, l. 5 to p. 25, l. 9.]

* As a matter of fact, it is found that the Soul is not apprehended by Perception; the question then arises as to whether it is known only by means of 'reliable assertion'. The answer is that it is not so; as Soul is cognised by means of Inference also.

* 'That there is such a thing as Soul is known, in a general way, from Reliable Assertion (of the Veda, for instance), and this knowledge is ratified by Inference'—*Ṭaṭparya*. 'By being *ratified* is meant that the vague general cognition is specified'—says the *Parishuḍḍhi*. That is, the existence of particular souls in particular bodies becomes recognised.

In connection with the opening sentence of the *Bhāṣya*, the objection is raised as to why the perception of the Soul is denied, when as a matter of fact, the Soul is

SŪṬRA (10).

Desire, Aversion, Effort, Pleasure, Pain and Cognition are the indicatives of the Soul.

[A] The Soul having experienced pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of things, whenever, in the future, he happens to see a thing of that same kind, he wishes to acquire that thing; and this wish to acquire is possible only in one who, while remaining one and the same, perceives several things; as it arises from his remembrance of a previous perception; it is thus that Desire becomes an indicative (a sign or proof) of the Soul. * No such desire would be possible [if there were not one and the same agent to cognise and to recognise the thing, and] if there were only a series of distinct cognitions, each pertaining to its own distinct object; for the recognition of one cognition by another cognition would be as possible as the recognition by one body of the experiences of another body†.

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always an object of *mental perception*, being always perceived as 'I', a conception that appears along with every cognition. The answer to this is that it is true that we have the notion of 'I'; but this might be (and actually is) taken as referring to the body; and as such it could not afford a sufficient proof for the existence of the Soul apart from the body; so long as it is not strengthened and ratified by other means of cognition, Inference &c. This is the answer from the stand-point of one who does not regard the Soul as purely perceptible; the answer from the standpoint of one who regards Soul as perceptible is that the passage refers to the Soul of others, one's own Soul being always *perceptible*.—[as held by some Logicians, called by Jayanṭa Bhatta, '*svayūṭhyāḥ*']——*Parishuḍḍhi.*

* 'Having found a certain kind of thing to give pleasure, the man formulates the judgment 'this kind of thing gives pleasure', this is the major premiss; when he sees that kind of thing again, he has the idea 'this is that kind of thing'; this forms the minor premiss; from these two premisses he comes to the conclusion 'this will give pleasure'; and then *desires* to acquire that thing. Thus this *Desire* proves that the agent who has this desire must be the same who has the three cognitions represented by the two premisses and the resultant conclusion)—there being a common agent for all the four; if the agent were not the same there could be no such recollection or fusion of the several cognitions involved; and it is this common agent—who is the the seer of the thing, the experiencer of pleasure, the rememberer of the thing being the source of pleasure, and the desirer of the thing,—who is the *Soul*'—*Tāṭparya.*

† 'This anticipates the following argument :—' If in the absence of a *Soul*, the recollection and fusion of cognitions were possible under the hypothesis of every cognition setting up, and forming a factor in, a series of cognitions; then every cognition would recall and fuse into every other cognition of the same series. *Tāṭparya.*

The phrase '*ḍēhānṭaravaṭ*' is explained by the *Bhāṣya* itself later on—p. 25 lls. 4—6.

Nyāya 217.

[B] Similarly it is only when one and the same agent perceives several things, that, on recollecting a previous perception, he comes to have *Aversion* to the thing that has been the cause of pain to him.

[C] When a certain kind of thing has been found to be the cause of pleasure, on subsequently seeing a thing of that kind, the man makes an attempt to obtain that thing; and this *Effort* would not be possible if there were not *one* agent perceiving a number of things and recollecting his past perceptions; specially no such Effort would be possible if there were only a series of distinct cognitions, each pertaining to its own distinct object; for the Effort of one cognition on the basis of the experience of another cognition would be as impossible as the Effort of one body on the basis of the experiences of another body. This explanation also applies to the *Effort* that is put forth for the getting rid of what has been found to be a cause of pain.

[D and E] It is only by reason of his remembrance of his previous experience of pleasure and pain that when the man gets by the thing that had caused him pleasure he is pleased, and when he gets by what had caused him pain he feels unhappy; and thus it is that he experiences *Pleasure* and *Pain*. And in this also the reason is the same as before [that is to say, the said pleasure and pain is possible only when the person getting by the thing and remembering the previous experiences is the same who had had those experiences; and this proves the Soul as the experiencer of Pleasure and Pain in the past, their rememberer and their experiencer in the present].

[F] When a man is desirous of knowing or understanding (the real character of a certain thing), at first he ponders over it in the form—'what may this be?'; and pondering thus he comes to know it in the form—'this is so and so'. This *Knowing* of the thing is by the same agent as the previous *desire to know* and the consequent *pondering*;—so that this *Knowledge* becomes an indicative of the presence of the common agent in the shape of the 'Soul'. And here also the reason is the same as before.

Now we proceed to explain the phrase '*dēhāntaravat*' 'as in the case of another body', [that we have used twice before, p. 24, l. 11 and l. 14]:—The philosopher who does not admit the Soul readily admits that the diverse, Cognitions,

each pertaining to a distinct object, when appearing in different bodies, are never recognised [and never fuse together, the cognitions of one body not being recognised by another body]; and for the same reason the diverse cognitions, appearing in the same body also, could not be recollected; the two cases being for the said philosopher exactly alike, [so far as the absence of the common agent is concerned; there being no such agent in either case]. Thus then, with regard to a single agent we find that he recognises only what he has perceived, and not what he has not perceived * [or what has been perceived by another]; similarly with regard to diverse agents also, we find that one agent does not recognise what has been perceived by another; neither of the these two well-known facts can be adequately explained by the philosopher who does not admit a *Soul*.

Thus it is proved that there is such a thing as *Soul*.

VĀRTIKA ON SŪTRA 10.

[Page 66, line 11 to P. 71, l. 4|

Sūṭrā 10 is put forward—(*a*) with a view to differentiate the Soul from what is homogeneous to it (*i. e.* other *Pramēyas*, Body, Sense-organs &c.) as also from what is heterogeneous to it (*i. e.* the *Pramāṇas*) ;—(*b*) † also with a view to ratify (or specify) by means of Inference what is already known by means of Word (of the Scriptures) : *i. e.* with a view to strengthen the knowledge of [or to specify the cognition of] the Soul that has been known in a general way by means of Reliable Word ;—(*c*) and lastly also with a view to show an instance of the commixture of several Instruments of Cognition: We have said above (in the *Vārṭika*, Text, pp. 31-32) that in many cases several Instruments of Cognition commingle ; and the case of the Soul is one of those cases [where we find the commixture of Word and Inference].

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* The text reads नान्यदृष्टस्य नादृष्टस्येति ; and the foot-note remarks that नादृष्टस्येति is not found in three of the four manuscripts. But from the contex it is clear is that what is necessary is the clause नादृष्टस्येति, and it is the other clause नान्यदृष्टस्य, which is superfluous, in view of the next sentence ; where the perception and remembrance by different agents is spoken of.

† The particle 'cha' here means 'and'——says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

Says the *Bhāṣya* (P. 24, l. 8)—*The Soul having experienced pleasure by coming into contact with a certain kind of thing, whenever, in the future, it happens to see a thing &c. &c.* The sense of this is that what proves the existence of the Soul is the * 'recollecting' or 'blending' of Desire and the rest (the cognitions and recognitions leading up to it).

"In regard to this", says the Opponent, "we have to consider the following dificulty : [In every case of Inference the indicative proves the conclusion only when it is itself perceived] how, then, can Desire and the rest prove the Soul, when they are themselves not perceived ? †"

[They prove the existence of the Soul] because they pertain to the same object as the Recognition ; that is to say, because Desire and the rest have the same object as the Recognition, they prove that all the cognitions appearing in the Recognition have a common agent ; it is a well-known fact that no 'recognition' of cognitions is possible, (*a*) when these cognitions have different agents, or (*b*) when their objects are not the same, or (*c*) when they are brought about by different instruments. For instance—(*b*) in no case do we find a 'recognition' of the cognitions of colour, of taste, of odour, and of touch : as there is never any such recognition as 'this *touch* that I feel is the *colour* that I had seen' ;———(*c*) nor again is there any such recognition as 'that by means of which I see' colour now is that by means of which I had felt its touch ;—(*a*) nor lastly is there recognition by Yajñadaṭṭa of what had been seen by Ḍēvadaṭṭa : there is never any such recollection as 'this that I, Yajñadaṭṭa see, is the same

*The *Parishuḍḍhi* explains the word '*praṭisanḍhāna*' as the blending or fusion of (1) the previous cognition of the thing, (2) the remembrance of the pleasure, caused by it, (3) the subsequent cognition of the thing, (4) and the consequent Desire —into a single conception comprehending all the four ideas as belonging to one and the same agent.

† Desire, Aversion, and Effort are not perceptible.

thing that Dēvadatta had seen.' And what is the reason for all this? The simple reason lies in the fact that each cognition has a distinct object of its own. Thus then, for one who denies a Soul, every cognition must be *distinct, with a distinct object of its own; and no 'recognition' or 'recollection' would be ever possible. Hence the conclusion is that there is a single agent who *recognises*; and this is the *Soul.*

You will perhaps offer the following explanation :—"The fusion or recognition of the several cognitions (in a series) will be due to the fact of the preceeding cognition being the cause of the following cognition. That is to say, the 'recollection' or 'fusion' of the several cognitions is due, not to the fact of all of them having a common agent, but to the fact that, in any series of cognitions (to which every cognition gives rise), every individual cognition is the cause of the cognition that follows; as a matter of fact, every cognition is followed by another cognition, this latter proceeding from a certain potency in the preceeding cognition,—and is itself endowed with all the potency (that belonged to the previous cognitions); and thus even though the cognitions are diverse and many, there is a 'fusion' by reason of the relation of cause and effect subsisting among them; just as there is in the case of the seed: in the case of seeds, we find that the small grain of paddy is followed by the sprout; and the sprout, by reason of its having followed from the paddy-seed, is endowed with the potency of the paddy; and from this sprout by the aid of the several elemental substances, is produced only another grain of paddy, not a grain of barley: and the only reason for this lies in the fact that what has gone before is a paddy-grain, and not barley; [so that there is a *recognition* of the grain of paddy];—in the same manner, in the case in question also, there is a 'fusion' or 'recogni-

* The 'na' in the text is evidently wrong; as this sentence is meant to be explanatory of the preceding sentence; while with the 'na' it would be a direct contradiction of it.

tion' of several cognitions only when they appear in the same 'series of cognitions',—so that there is a causal relation among them, every one of them being the effect of that which precedes it; and there is no such 'fusion' when the cognitions belong to a different 'series'; as in this latter case, there is no necessary sequence (and consequent causal relation) among the cognitions. Thus the 'fusion' is due to the presence of causal relation, and not to the presence of a common agent; for the simple reason that we do not know of any instance where there is 'recognition' due to the presence of a common agent [while of 'recognition' due to causal relation we have an instance in the case of the Seed]; and thus the 'Recognition' (that has been urged as the reason for the existence of the Soul) having been found otherwise explicable, it cannot prove the existence of the Soul *."

† The above reasoning is not sound, we reply. As it does not remove the diversity: That is to say, when you declare that the 'recognition' is due to the causal relation, you do not set aside the diversity among the cognitions; and this for the simple reason that causal relation itself subsists on (*i. e.* presupposes) diversity; it is upon diversity that every causal relation depends;—and in cases where both parties admit diversity (among the things concerned) no 'recognition' is found possible. Why not?—you will ask. Well, in a case where the cogniser is not the same as the rememberer (in which case the diversity

Vār Page 68.

* The import of this objection is thus explained by the *Tatparya*—Between the cognitions of Dēvadatta on the one hand, and those of Yajñadatta on the other, we find two differences : they have different agents, and they are not the cause of each other. We also find that there is no 'recognition' of the one as the other. The question then arises—Is this absence of 'recognition' due to the first difference, or to the second; and as there is nothing to determine the exact answer to this question the inference drawn (as it is by the *Bhāṣya*) from 'recognition' can not be conclusive as to the difference or non-difference of the agents.

† The *Tatparya* remarks that the Siddhanti purposely keeps his real explanation hidden from the Opponent. The real explanation is clearly given in the *Vārtika*, Text, p. 68, l. 11.

of agents is admitted by both parties), no remembrance is possible; and when there is no remembrance, there can be no 'recognition.' [Hence so long as the causal relation does not do away with diversity, it cannot form a basis for 'recognition'].

"What we mean" the Bauḍḍha explains, "is that no 'recognition' is possible; and we do not say that 'recognition' is found where there is causal relation, all that we say is that where there is no casual relation, no recognition is found; and the reason that we have put forward for this absence of recognition is the fact that there is no necessary sequence (in cases where there is no causal relation). Thus your complaint against our reasoning is absolutely futile and meaningless".

This explanation is not right; as it does not really meet the question at issue. In explaining your position in the way you have done you do not meet the real point at issue: I have said 'where there is diversity', *recognition* is not found; and you say * 'when there is diversity, on account of the absence of causal relation, *recognition* is not found'; and your statement in this form is of such doubtful import that it does not at all set at rest the question at issue. "Well the same is the case with yourself: when you simply assert, that 'recognition is not found when there is diversity,' you do not meet the point in dispute." This answer of yours is no answer at all; when you say that my statement is similar to yours, you admit that your own statement *does not* meet the point in dispute.

"Not so", says the Opponent; "as what I have put forward is not meant to be a reason; that is to say, I do not mean that 'there is Recognition *because there is causal relation*'; all that I mean is that the Recognition, that you have

* The 'na' in the text is wrong: the opponent *does* say above ' [illegible]

put forward, can be explained otherwise (than on the basis of what you seek to deduce from it); and hence it cannot serve as a valid reason for deducing what you seek to deduce from it; and thus all that I mean is to point out the fallacy involved in your reasoning; and I do not mean to put forward another reasoning [in the form that '*there is recognition because there is causal relation*', or that '*there is no recognition because* there is no causal relation']."

* Even so your argument is not tenable. For you have failed to grasp the import of the reason (Recognition) put forward by us (in support of our conclusion). Evidently the true import of our reasoning has not been comprehended by you; you have been misled by the generalised form in which our reason has been asserted; that is why you find, with it the fault that it is explicable otherwise (than on the basis of our conclusion). The 'Recognition 'that we have put forward as our Reason is a *qualified* Recognition (and not mere Recognition in general); what we mean is that particular kind of Recognition which apprehends a certain thing as the common object of the previous cognition, of the present cognition and of the remembrance.† And no such remembrance or Recognition would be possible under your theory [where nothing is admitted except the 'series' of cognitions, and where everything having a momentary existence, any form of 'Recognition' is an impossibility.‡] "Why so?" Simply because—§(a) there

* The real answer of the Logician to the Bauddha objection begins here.

† The Recognition is in this form—'that source of pleasure in the shape of garlands, sandal paste and the like, which I remember, is the same that I am perceiving now'. The Recognition appearing in this qualified form differs materially from that Recognition which depends upon causal relation; as in this latter kind of Recognition there is no remembrance.—*Tātparya.*

‡ 'The proving of the momentary character of things means the disproving of all Recognition' says the *Pariśhuddhi.*

§ There is no recognition in any of the following forms—(a) 'I am touching this thing with the same organ of touch by which organ of vision I had seen it'; (b) 'This that I am seeing as the jar is the same as the cloth that I had seen'; or (c) 'I recognise this which had been perceived by my friend.'

is no recognition by one sense-organ of what has been previously apprehended by another;—(b) because there is no recognition in one form of what has been apprehended in another form;—and (c) because there is no recognition by one person of what has been previously apprehended by another person. [And under the Bauḍḍha's theory of momentary existence, each cognition being distinct, no form of Remembrance would be possible]. And yet in the case cited by us, Remembrance does take place; which proves that Recognition is possible only under that theory under which there is Remembrance [and not under that under which there is merely causal relation.]*

The Opponent makes the following rejoinder:—"You urge against us the *impossibility of Remembrance*; but as a matter of fact, it is not true that no Remembrance is possible under our theory. How so? Well, because on the basis of causal relation itself there is remembrance of a thing in that same 'series of bodily sensations' in which the previous apprehension of the thing had appeared; so that that 'series of bodily sensations' in which the apprehension and the remembrance appear is the *Rememberer* as well as the *Apprehender* [and there is no necessity for the postulating of a *Soul* apart from the body and the sensations]."

What you say is not possible, we reply; firstly because all cognitions are transient; and as a rule it is only something lasting for some time that can be impressed upon by an impressing agency†;—and secondly because of the absence of

* In the case of the cloth and the yarns composing it, where causal relation is distinctly comprehended, there is no Recognition; there is no such idea as that 'this cloth is the same as the yarns'.

'The conclusion thus is that for the proving of the existence of the common agent in the form of the Soul, we have a flawless Reason in the shape of the Recognition of an object as the same that was seen, is seen and is remembered.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The Opponent having failed to grasp the import of the former explanations, the Author proceeds to convince him of the existence of the Soul by means of another set of reasonings: 'Every cognition is momentary; when it disappears it disappears

connection : as a matter of fact, it is only when there is some connection between the two that one is impressed by the other ;* while (under your theory) the cog-

Var. Page 69. nitions (all appearing at different points of time and disappearing as soon as appearing) can have no connection with any impresser [so that, there being no impression, no Remembrance is possible].

† "The *impression* consists only in the production or appearance of a sensation endowed with a certain potency; that is to say, as a matter of fact, from a particular consciousness, which is produced along with a previous sensation, there follows another sensation, which is endowed with the potency of its predecessor ; and the appearance, with this potency of this latter sensation, in the Consciousness, is what is called 'impression' [and this is quite possible under the theory of 'momentary cognition.']."

We have already answered this by pointing out that no such thing is possible ; because Cognitions are transient, and because (as such) they can have no connection with any

entirely, leaving an impression of itself behind ; and it is through the agency of this impression that the subsequent remembrance appears ; it is absolutely essential for this process that the rememberer should continue to exist from the time of the cognition up to the time of the remembrance. According to the Bauḍḍha however no such lasting entity is possible ; as he admits of nothing else except a series of momentary cognitions'.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

* The reading should be '*sambaḍḍham*', not '*asambaḍḍham*' ; as the sense apparently is that as a rule the impresser is always connected with the impressed.

† The Bauḍḍha view is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya* :—

The 'previous sensation' is that cognition which sets up the 'series of cognitions' ; this is of six kinds—five related to the five organs of sensation, and the sixth the cognition of attributes. From the previous sensation there follows, coeval with it, that particular Consciousness or 'stream of cognitions', which is known as 'ālayavijñāna', or 'Basic Consciousness' ; from this comes the next sensation which is endorsed with the *potency of remembrance*, in the form of the 'I-idea.' Though this is nothing apart from the sensation itself, yet it is regarded as 'potency' only figuratively, for the purpose of explaining the phenomenon of remembrance.

impression. Then again, * that 'particular consciousness', which you hold to be coeval with the previous cognition, cannot afford any help either to the sensation appearing at any present moment, or to any that appears at some future time; because (according to you) the cognition that appear at the present moment appears in an immaculate form, and also disappears exactly in the same form in which it appears [so that it cannot be affected by the 'particular consciousness']; and as for any future cognition, no 'particular consciousness' could be regarded as having any connection with what is yet to come; and it cannot affect, or impress, that which is not connected with it. Thus we come to the conclusion that your assertion—that 'Remembrance proceeds on the basis of causal relation'—shows that you have not been taught the real meaning of *Impression*.

There is yet another reason why no Remembrance is possible under your theory [that there is no Soul, and every phenomenon depends upon causal relation among Cognitions]:—As a matter of fact, every *bhāva*, (lit. *becoming*, *i. e. condition* or *quality*), stands in need of a *bhavitṛi*, the *becomer*; *i. e.* the thing to whom the condition or quality belongs; every *becoming* must require a *becomer*, because it is of the nature of an *action*,—like the action of *being produced*. In accordance with this inference, Remembrance, being of the nature of a *becoming*, must require a *becomer*; and in the case of Remembrance this *becomer* may be either in the form of an objective (the object remembered), or in the form of an agent (the person remembering); that the *becomer* of an action has these two characters is shown by the fact that in the *action* of the 'cooking † of rice' the *becomer* is the rice, which is the

* This anticipates the following argument of the Bauḍḍha—"Even though the two cognitions are transient, yet, when they appear at the same point of time, there is some connection between them; and through this connection one cognition would be impressed by the other, and thereby bring about its remembrance."

† According to the *Tāṭparya*, the reading is '*pākaḥ*', not '*pāchakaḥ*'; and the sense also demands '*pākaḥ*.'

object cooked [as the condition *of being cooked* belongs to the rice, and not to the *cooker*]; while in the case of the action of '*walking*' *by Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa*, the *becomer* is Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa, who is the agent [as the condition of *walking* belongs to the man who walks]. Now so far as the action of Remembrance is concerned, the *becomer* cannot be of the nature of the objective, as there is remembrance of absent things also; if the *becomer* of Remembrance were its *object*, then at the time that one remembers an object that does not exist at the time, the Remembrance would be entirely baseless (its *becomer* being non-existent); it could certainly have the *agent* for its substratum; but this would be possible only under our theory, and never under yours; for the simple reason that you do not admit of any such thing as 'agent' (the 'stream of cognition' being all that you admit); as a matter of fact, you do not admit an 'agent' for the action of Remembrance; so that under your theory (when one remembers an absent thing) the Remembrance must be baseless. And if you admit this position [that Remembrance *is* baseless], then you are met by the following (inferential) reasoning: * 'Remembrance can never be baseless,—as no effect is ever found to be baseless; as a matter of fact we find that every effect—such for instance, as Colour—subsists in a substratum; and Remembrance is an effect;—hence Remembrance must have a substratum [and it can never be baseless]'.

"The names *becoming* and *becomer* may be applied to Effect and Cause respectively; *i. e.* the 'Effect-moment' (the moment at which the Effect appears) is the *becoming*, and the 'Cause-moment' the *becomer*. What then is the necessity of postulating a *becomer* (in the shape of the *Soul*) apar from these?"

This cannot be right; because of the difference in time; as a matter of fact, the Cause and the Effect

* This is the answer given by the Author on the basis of the momentary character of things; *i. e.* from the standpoint of the Bauḍḍha himself. The answer from his own standpoint he gives below, line 20 *et seq.*

exist at different points of time; so that neither of the two could ever be the substratum or container of the other; as in the case of the bowl and the jejube fruit, [we find that the bowl is the substratum of the fruit, only when the two are present at the same time, and when the bowl has a certain degree of continuity of existence, whereby it acts as an obstacle to the action of gravity which tends to the downward fall of the fruit, and thereby becomes its 'substratum'].

The Opponent may state his case as follows :—*" *Becoming* is nothing more than *being produced*, and the *Becomer* is *that which is produced*; that is to say, because Remembrance is something that is *produced*, its production would be its 'becoming'; and the Remembrance itself would be the 'becomer' [and as such not require a further 'becomer' in the shape of the *Soul*]".

Vār. P. 70.

This also cannot be; because it involves a self-contradiction, and implies a contingency which you do not admit. If you hold the *production* to be something different from the *Remembrance*, then you fall into self-contradiction; for you will have to point out the distinctive features of such 'production' [and this pointing out will land you in self-contradiction]; as you do not accept the *production* to be anything distinct from the *thing produced*. That is to say, if you hold the *production* to be different from *the thing produced*, it becomes necessary for you to describe the distinctive features of *Production*; and when you describe these features, you go against your philosophy. You will perhaps ask—why so? Well, the 'production' of a thing could be explained only, either as 'the connection of the thing with the existence

* Remembrance is not a *becoming*, a quality; in fact it is itself a *becomer*, a thing; and the *being produced* of Remembrance is its 'becoming'; so that being itself a *becomer*, Remembrance does not stand in need of another *becomer* in the shape of the *Soul*. The postulating of a *becomer* for what is itself a *becomer* would lead to a vicious regress.

of its cause,' or as 'the existence of the thing as qualified by the connection of its cause'; and both these are contingencies not * accepted by your philosophy [as both involve the more than momentary existence of the Cause and the Effect]; and this is the 'self-contradiction' (mentioned by us). If then, [with a view to escape from this self-contradiction] it be held that the *Production* is not different from the *Remembrance*,†——then, which (of the two) would subsist in which? In fact, in this case, your assertion—'the *production* is the *becoming* and the Remembrance is *that which is produced* (the becomer)'—becomes absolutely meaningless.‡ Such an assertion can have some sense only in case *production* is the 'becoming' or 'property' of Remembrance [and not when both are identical].§ And when Remembrance itself is a 'becoming,' it must have a 'becomer'; for the simple reason that every 'becoming' must have a 'becomer', as we have already pointed out.

Thus it is found that under the Bauḍḍha theory, there can be no Remembrance; and when there is no Remembrance, there can be no Recognition;—but Recognition is a fact;—hence the inevitable conclusion|| is that that which is the

*The reading demanded by the sense is 'तन्मते नाभ्युपगतम्"

† The reading demanded by the sense, and countenanced by the *Ṭāṭparya* should be—'अथ स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तोत्पत्तिः किम्

‡ As Remembrance and Production being *ex hypothesi* identical, how can one subsist in the other?

§ The *Ṭāṭparya* adds—Even so the assertion, 'Remembrance is the *becomer* and Production is the *becoming*', could have some sense; that is all. It could not, however, save the opponent from the necessity of admitting the permanent Soul; as even though the *production* is the 'becoming' of the Remembrance, yet it does not follow that Remembrance, in its own turn, can never be a 'becoming'; specially as every effect can be a 'becoming'; and Remembrance is certainly an effect. Nor does this mean an *infinite regress*; as the series ends in the *Soul*, which is a permanent entity, and not an *effect*. Thus of Remembrance, as a 'becoming', the eternal Soul is the 'becomer'.

||The Sūṭra thus comes to be interpreted as containing an 'Inference per negation' which may be thus formulated :—Remembrance has a common agent with the past and the present cognitions,—because it is actually *recognised* as having the same object with these two,—that which has not the same agent, is never thus :

agent of this Recognition is something quite distinct (from Cognitions and Series of Cognitions), and this is the single entity of the *Soul*.

*We may also explain the Sūṭra as containing a 'positive Inference', or 'Inference per affirmation':—Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa's cognition of colour, taste and touch must have one as well as many causes,†—because they are all *recognised*, as 'by me,' along with the remembrance of the same objects ;—exactly as it is found in the case of the single glance of the dancing girl, on looking at which several cognitions appear simultaneously in the minds of several experienced persons knowing [through their study of Bharaṭa's *Nāṭyashāsṭra*] the signification [of every gesticulation]. That is to say, in the case cited, as the *cause* is one only,—in the shape of the *glance* ; thus even though the cognitions are several and by several persons, yet they are all *recognised* as having been brought about by a common cause ; in the same manner, in the case under consideration, as the cause, in the shape of the agent, Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa, is one only, his cognitions (of colour, taste and touch), even though several, will be *recognised* as by a common cause ;—and this common cause is the *Soul*.

II.

[Having proved the existence of the *Soul* on the basis of the *Recognition* that is involved in Desire, Aversion &c., the *Vārṭika* proceeds to prove the same on the basis of the idea that, Desire and the rest being *qualities*, must have a *substance* in which they would subsist].

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recognised,—*e g*. the Remembrance by Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa is never recognised as having the same object as the Yajñaḍaṭṭa's cognitions,—the Remembrance in question however is *not* not-recognised,—hence it must have a common agent with the cognitions.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

* The 'negative inference' proving the existence of the Soul has been shown in the preceding note ; in accordance with the Bhāṣya. The Vārṭika next proceeds to show the 'Inference per affirmation,' in support of the same conclusion,—as deducible from the Sūṭra.

†In the present context it is the presence of *one* common cause—the common *agent*—that is wanted to be proved ; but in order to make the judgment perfectly correct, the author has added the 'many causes' also; these many causes consisting of the several distinct *objects* cognised.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

Some people have explained the *Sūtra*—' Desire......are indicatives of the Soul '—in a different manner. Desire and the rest are all *qualities*; and it is a well-known fact that qualities subsist in something different from themselves. That Desire and the rest are *qualities* is proved by an ' Inference per residue ', as follows :—(*a*) Desire &c., being non-eternal, can be neither Community, nor Individuality, nor Inherence (all which are eternal) ;—(*b*) nor can they be Substance, or Action, as they, like Sound, inhere in an all-pervading * substance [and Substance cannot inhere in Substance, and Actions do not *always* inhere in all-pervading substances] ; and so on there are many similar reasonings that could be deduced, which go to make up the ' Inference per residue ' [that proves that Desire &c. cannot be any thing else but *Qualities*]. All this goes to prove that Desire and the rest must subsist in something distinct from themselves, because they are non-eternal, and because they are effects, like Colour and other qualities. Then, inasmuch as it is a well-known fact that the qualities that belong to the Body continue as long as the Body remains in existence,—and as Desire and the rest are not found to so continue,—they can not be regarded as qualities belonging to the Body. And being precluded from belonging to the Body,

* The reasoning is put here in a condensed form ; it contains the sense of several reasonings (as mentioned towards the end of this passage). The full import of this reasoning has been thus explained by the *Tātparya* and the *Parishuddhi* : –

Because Desire &c. are non-eternal, they must inhere in a substance ;—where a mere ' substance ' is sufficient to form the substratum of Desire &c., there can be no justification for asserting that their substratum should be such as is made up of several component parts ;—hence we conclude that the substance in which Desire &c. inhere is one that is not made up of component parts ;—such impartite substances are of two kinds : some are all-pervading, while others are atomic ;—Desire &c. could never inhere in an atomic substance, because they are non-eternal, and they are perceived by us ; while no qualities of the atom can ever be perceptible to us ordinary human beings ,...hence the conclusion is that they inhere in an all-pervading substance. Why they cannot inhere in the non-pervading or limited substances, Earth, Water &c. is shown in the next Note.

they must subsist in the Soul. * Thus the existence of the Soul is proved by an 'Inference per residue.'

Body—the Second Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 25, l. 10 P. to 26, l. 2].

† The receptacle of the Soul's experiences is—

The Body, which is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects.‡ (Sūṭra 11).

(A) "How is the Body the *vehicle of actions*?" With regard to things that the Soul desires to obtain or to discard, there arises in the Soul the desire to obtain, or to discard it respectively; urged by this desire, the Soul puts forth exertion embodying the operation of the means for obtaining or discarding it; and that wherein this exertion appears is the *Body*.

(B) "How is the Body the *vehicle of sense-organs*?" That thing alone can be regarded as the *vehicle of the sense-organs* by whose benefit the sense-organs are benefited, and by whose injury they are injured,—and being according to this benefit or injury, they act upon their objects good and bad;——and such a thing is the *Body*.

"How is the Body the *vehicle of objects*?" That is to be regarded as the *vehicle of objects* in which receptacle

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* The other items in this 'Argument per residue' are thus supplied by the *Ṭāṭparya*.—'Desire &c. cannot be the qualities of the five elementary Substances, Earth, Water &c.; as, if they were so, they would be common to all men: the desire of one man would be the desire of all men; just as the odour of the earth is perceived by all men;——they cannot be the qualities of the Mind; as the Mind is found to be the instrument that produces them;—nor could they belong to Time and Space, as, if they belonged to these, then also, they would be common to all men. Hence the only substance to which Desire &c. can belong is the Soul.

[For further discussion on the Soul the reader is referred to Sūṭra 3-1-28].

† As the Body is the receptacle of the Soul's experiences of pleasure and pain, it lies at the root of the series of births and rebirths; hence its treatment comes next after the Soul.'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

‡ According to the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārṭika*, this Sūṭra contains three definitions of the Body—(1) it is the vehicle of the Soul's actions; (2) it is the vehicle of the Soul's sense-organs;—(3) it is the vehicle of the Soul's objects. Some philosophers have taken the Sūṭra as providing a single definition—' it is the vehicle of actions &c. &c.". This is rejected by the *Vārṭika*.

there appear the feelings *of pleasure and pain caused by the contact of the sense-organs with those objects ;—and such a receptacle is the *Body*.

VARṬIKA.

[P. 71, l. 6 to P. 72, l. 12.]

"*The Body is the vehicle of actions, of sense-organs and of objects*—says the *Sūṭra*. Now what is *Action* †?

By 'action' in the present connection is meant only a motion, an activity, *for the purpose of obtaining what is beneficial and discarding what is injurious*. That is to say, when one comes across something that has been the source of pleasure (in the past), he is moved by a desire for obtaining that thing ; and the movement that follows from this desire is what is meant by 'action' (in the Sūṭra) ; similarly when one comes across something that has been the source of pain, there is an activity in the shape of a movement towards the discarding of that thing ; and this movement constitutes what is meant by 'Action'.

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*The word प्रतिसंवेद्यं in the pointed text appears in the wrong place. The 'Pandit' edition places it after सुखदुःखयोः ; This gives a better sense and has been adopted in the translation. In the other reading it is not possible to find a reasonable construction for सुखदुःखयोः

†The Opponent puts this question, in view of the following difficulty:—The definition of Body as *the vehicle of action* is both too wide and too narrow ; the tree also is a vehicle of some action, while it is not a *body* ; similarly the frog embedded in stone has *body*, which is devoid of all action.

The answer is that the word 'action' does not stand here for any and every action ; but only for that action which is excited by a desire for the obtaining and discarding of the beneficial and the injurious thing respectively. ∴ that the definition cannot apply to the action of trees, which have no desires. As regards the body of the frog embedded in stone, though it has no action at that time, yet it has the capability of such action ; as no sooner does the frog come out on the stone being broken, its body acts in the same way as all other bodies do. Our bodies also are not always *acting* ; all that the Sūṭra can mean is that the Body is capable of action ; *i.e.* when such conscious action appears it does so only in a body.

The *Parishuḍḍhi* defines *cheṣṭā* as that activity which is brought about by the contact of the Soul that is moved by exertion.

"How can the Body be the *vehicle of sense-organs*—when as as a matter of fact, sense-organs either subsist in their own cause, or do not subsist in anything at all? That is to say, those sense-organs that are products subsist in their own cause; while those that are not products do not subsist in anything. For instance, the organs of smell, of taste, of vision and of touch are products, while the organs of hearing and Mind are not products; and not one of these organs —beginning from the organ of smell down to the Mind—subsists in the Body. Under the circumstances, it is not right to assert that *the Body is the vehicle of sense-organs*."*

What we mean by the Body being the *vehicle of sense-organs* is that the sense-organs follow the changes of the Body. We do not mean that the Sense-organs subsist in the Body in the sense that the Body is the *container* and the sense-organs the *contained*; all that we mean is that they subsist in the Body in the sense that they are affected by the benefit and injury of the Body; that is to say, the Sense-organs are benefited by the benefitting, and injured by the injury, of the Body;—this is all that is meant by the Body being the *vehicle of the sense-organs*. Thus the objection urged by the Opponent has no force.

This same explanation applies to the assertion that the Body is the *vehicle of objects*. How so? For the following reason:—What is meant is not that the 'objects'—smell and the rest—subsist in the Body (in the sense that the Body is the container of smell &c.); what is meant is that the 'purpose' or 'function' of smell &c.—which consists in their being the cause of the experiences of pleasure and pain—is not accomplished except when the Body is there; and it is in this sense that smell &c. are said to have the Body for their vehicle; just as the villagers are said to have the proprietor

*The *Tātparya* adds that if by 'subsistence' it be meant mere conjunction, and no inherence, then the jar also would be a body; as the jar is often in contact with sense-organs.

of the village for their '*āshraya*' [which means that they are the cause of bringing pleasure and pain only when the proprietor is there to experience them; and it does not mean that they are *contained* in the proprietor].

"As a matter of fact we find the *Sūtra* using the general terms 'action' ('Sense-organ' and 'object'); how then can they be interpreted in the restricted sense that you have given them [of 'action' *for the obtaining of the beneficial and the discarding of the injurious*, and so forth]?"

Our answer to this is that general terms are found to have their signification restricted by their *force*; this 'force' consisting in the peculiarity of the context and so forth. For instance, when the assertion is made 'feed the Brāhmaṇas' [where the general term '*Brāhmaṇas*' is used, which signifies *all* Brāhmaṇas]——as it is absolutely impossible for *all* Brāhmaṇas to be fed, the word is taken to mean a *particular* Brāhmaṇa, who happens to be in closer proximity (than other Brāhmaṇas) to the speaker, and who, on that account, is more nearly related to the context. In the same manner the words 'action' and the rest also, though used in their general forms, become restricted in their significations by the force of the attendant circumstances [which make the wider signification impossible]. The 'force' that thus alters the denotation of words is twofold—(1) popular usage bearing on the subject spoken of, and (2) certain inconsistencies, or incongruities. And in the case in question we find that in popular usage, the word 'action' is never used in the sense of *action in general*; whenever it is used, it is used always in the sense of some *particular* action; *e.g.* all such words as '*spandaṭē*', '*sarpaṭi*', '*ḍhāvaṭi*' and the like,—though denoting activity *in general*—are always used in the sense of some *particular* form of activity; exactly the same is the case with the word '*chēṣṭā*' used in the *Sūṭra*. Even if we accept*

* 'The particular '*api*' denotes—*even if we grant it*'——*Ṭāṭparya*.

the word '*chēṣṭā*' to be denotative of action in *general*, we shall have to regard it as denoting a *particular* action, in view of certain incongruities (arising from the word being taken in its general sense); and by reason of those incongruities, * it will not be right to take it in the sense of action in general; [the incongruity in the present instance consisting in the fact that] the vehicle of any and every action could not be entitled to the name 'Body;'—and that, it is only when we take the word '*chēṣṭā*' in the restricted sense, that we can avoid the absurdity of the definition of Body (as *the vehicle of action*) applying to the jar and such other things [everyone of which is the 'vehicle' of some sort of action in general].

† The explanation that we have provided serves to set aside the view that the definition applies to the jar and such other things,—if made to consist (severally) of the first word [or of the second word, or of the third word]. Further, those who admit the force of the contention that the definition (consisting of each of the words taken severally) becomes applicable to the jar &c., propose to take all the three expressions (*vehicle of action—vehicle of sense-organs—vehicle of objects*) as collectively forming a single definition of Body;—but even so they cannot prevent the definition from applying to atoms [which being the constituent cause of sense-organs and objects, and being the vehicle of many actions, are the 'vehicles' of all these].

* The *Tāṭparya* reads an additional 'न क्रियामात्रे' after वर्तते'

† Having given the sense of the Sūṭra from the standpoint of the *Bhāṣya* and of himself, the Author takes up the interpretation suggested by certain writers that the Sūṭra does not contain *three* definitions (as held by the Bhāṣya); but it constitutes a single definition. This view is thus explained:—(1) If the first word alone —'vehicle of action'—be taken as the definition of 'Body', it applies to the jar, which is the vehicle of some action;—(2) if the second word—'vehicle of sense-organs'—is taken as the definition of Body, the word 'vehicle' meaning that which is in contact, the jar would be a Body, as it is in contact with Sense-organs;—(3) lastly, if the third word—'vehicle of objects'—be taken as the definition, it will apply to the jar; as the jar is the vehicle of many such objects as colour and the like.

All this is set aside by the explanation that we have given as to how the jar &c. are excluded from the definition.

As for our own view of the definition, we have already shown how it does not apply to any thing except the Body.

The Sense-organs—Third Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 26, L. 3 to P. 26, L. 10].

* The instruments that bring about the experience (of pleasure and pain) are—

The Olfactory, the Gestatory, the Visual, the Cutaneous and the Auditory Organs, proceeding from material substances. (Sūṭra 12.)

That by whose instrumentality one smells things is the Olfactory Organ; so called because it apprehends odour. That by whose instrumentality one tastes things is the Gestatory Organ; so called because it apprehends taste. That by whose instrumentality one sees things is the Visual Organ; so called because it apprehends colour. That which is located in the skin is the Cutaneous Organ; so called indirectly because of its location. † That by whose instrumentality one hears things is the Auditory Organ; so called because it apprehends sound. Thus from the force of the literal signification of the names, we learn that the sense-organs are to be defined as the apprehenders of their respective objects.

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* 'The sense-organs being the *presenters* [as they serve to bring before the Soul through the body, definite objects, which become the source of pleasure and pain—*Parishuḍḍhi*], they differ, in this respect, from the objects that are *presented*; and as such they have to be defined before the Objects. As the Sūṭra only provides the definitions of the particular organs,—and as these particular definitions are not intelligible until we have the definition of 'Sense-organ' in general, the Bhāṣya in this introductory clause, supplies this general definition. The general definition should have been stated in the form that the sense-organs are the instruments by which direct cognitions are brought about; but it is with a view to excite disgust against the organs (along with every thing else), that the *Bhāṣya* speaks of them as the 'instruments of the experience of pleasure and pain.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The other organs are named after what is apprehended by them; the Cutaneous Organ apprehends the *touch* of things; hence the name 'Cutaneous Organ' applies to it, not directly in the sense in which the names of the other organs apply, but only indirectly, in the sense that the skin is the locus of that organ.

**Proceeding from material substances*—adds the Sūṭra. The meaning of this is that it is because the organs proceed from diverse sources (in the shape of the material substances) that they are restricted to particular objects; this would not be possible if they all proceeded from a single source [in the shape of the 'self-consciousness' of the Sāṅkhyas]; and it is only when each of them is restricted to a particular object that it can be defined as the apprehender of its object.

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 72, L. 14 to P. 74, L. 4].

This *Sūṭra* also is be interpreted in such a way as to show how the Sense-organs are to differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; as such is the sense of all Sūṭras that are put forward as definitions.

An objection is raised:—

"The Sūṭra merely mentions the Sense-organs by name; and as such having the form of simple *Enunciation*, it cannot † be taken as a *Definition*. *Enunciation* has been defined (by the *Bhāṣya* p. 9 l. 10) as the mention of things by mere names; and this is exactly what the present Sūṭra does; hence it cannot be accepted as a *Definition*."

This is not right; as the Sense-organs are of the nature of instruments, and hence their definition must rest upon the apprehension of their objects.‡ That is to say, being

* As a matter of fact, odour, which is the specific quality of Earth, is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ only; taste, the specific quality of Water, is apprehended only by the Gestatory Organ: and so forth. This is so because the Olfactory Organ proceeds from—is built of—Earth, and the Gestatory Organ of Water. If both proceeded from a single source, as held by the Sāṅkhya, then we could not account for the aforesaid facts.

† There is a 'न' wanting in the text. The meaning intended must be as translated above.

‡ The sense-organs being imperceptible, they can only be inferred from the perception of things; which perception is not possible without the instrumentality of a sense-organ; and hence a sense-organ can be defined only as the instrument by which its particular object is apprehended and its perception brought about. Thus then the word '*Ghrāṇa*' (Olfactory) in the Sūṭra is to be taken in its literal sense—*jighrați anēna*, that by the instrumentality of which odour is apprehended; and this is a perfect definition of the Olfactory Organ. Similarly with the other Sense-organs.

of the nature of instruments, and as such being themselves beyond the senses (and hence imperceptible), they can be described and defined only through the apprehension of their objects; so that the Sense-organs should be defined as the instruments of the apprehension of their respective objects; as it is this apprehending that forms their distinctive feature [and what the definition does is to point out the distinctive feature of the thing defined].

The word '*bhūṭēbhyaḥ*', 'proceeding from material substances', has been added with a view to show that the Sense-organs have, each of them, the Earth, Water &c., for their respective causes; and this is mentioned in order to show that they are restricted in their scope.

"What is the meaning of this *restriction*?"

What is meant is that each Sense-organ is the instrument by whose instrumentality the apprehension of the specific quality of a particular material substance is brought about; as a matter of fact, no Sense-organ apprehends the qualities of all material substances; in fact every Sense-organ proceeds from a particular material substance, and apprehends the distinctive* quality of that substance alone;—*i. e.* that quality which distinguishes that substance from all other substances. This is the *restriction* that is meant to be expressed by the word '*bhūṭēbhyaḥ*'. No such restriction would be possible if all the Sense-organs proceeded from a single cause; that is to say, if all the Sense-organs proceeded from a single cause, then, inasmuch as every effect follows the trend of its cause, all the organs would be of a uniform nature; so that, there could be no restriction or sharp line of demarcation in the scope of the organ; in fact either all the organs

* As a matter of fact what the Olfactory Organ apprehends is only odour, which is the distinctive specific quality of Earth. From this fact we infer, as follows, the fact of that Organ being of the Earth—'The Olfactory Organ is of the Earth, because from among the specific qualities of material substances, it apprehends odour only, which is the specific quality of the Earth.'

would apprehend all objects, or a single organ would apprehend all objects.

" But, in the case of colour and such other things, we find that, even though proceeding from a single cause, the effects differ in their nature. That is to say, in the case of the various shades of colour, produced in the jar, by the baking, there are distinct differences, even though they all proceed from a single cause. 'What is the one cause of these shade of colour etc ?' That single cause is the contact of fire."

This is not right, we reply ; as it shows that our position has not been understood. We do not hold that the various shades of colour proceed from a single fire-contact. What we hold is that they proceed from the fire-contact as aided by a certain peculiarity in the preceding shade of colour. That is to say, when a certain object is baked on fire, what happens is that each succeeding shade of colour is brought about by the fire-contact as helped by a peculiarity in the preceding shade of colour. * It is only thus that it is possible for varying grades of baking to appear in the same atom. From all this it follows that the several shades of colour &c., do not proceed from one cause. In fact we have never found any effect produced by a single cause; every effect is produced by three causes,—the 'constituent' cause, the 'non-constituent' cause and the 'efficient' cause. "But we find a single action (of moving f. i.) to be the cause of two such things as conjunction (with one point in space) and disjunction (from another point)." This reasoning is not sound ; as the fact put forward is not admitted by us ; you

* This 'peculiarity' of the preceding colour consists in its destruction. The succeeding colour is produced only when the preceding colour is destroyed ; and until it is destroyed, no new colour is produced, even though the fire-contact continues there. This shows that the several shades of colour do not proceed from a single cause, in the shape of the fire-contact ; in fact each colour has a distinct cause consisting of the fire-contact as qualified by the destruction of the particular colour that precedes it.

mean to say that a single action is the cause of both conjunction and disjunction; but we do not accept this as true; we do not admit that any action, independently by itself, is the cause of both conjunction and disjunction. "If then, it is only as aided by something else that action produces conjunction and disjunction, then the definition of 'action' falls to the ground: Action has been defined as that which, independently by itself, is the cause of conjunction and disjunction; and this definition fails; and the failure of the definition of Action leads to the failure (and rejection) of Action itself; * and this means that conjunction and disjunction are not preceded (and caused) by Action." This argument does not vitiate our position; when we say that 'action, independently by itself, is the cause of conjunction and disjunction,' we do not mean that it does not stand in need of the aid of anything else; all that is meant by its being 'independent' is that it does not stand in need of any such other positive cause as appears and functions subsequently (to the action) [as a matter of fact, in the bringing about of a new conjunction, it does stand in need of the *absence* or *cessation of the previous conjunction*; so that while independent of positive causes, it is not independent of a negative cause]. That is to say, in the case of Substances we find that one substance produces another only when aided by the subsequently appearing conjunction of other homogeneous substances; but such is not the case with Action, —which does not require the aid of a subsequently appearing Action; but being an Action, it brings about conjunction and disjunction [through the aid of other negative circumstances, such as the cessation of the previous conjunction and so forth]. Thus the definition of Action does not fail; nor are conjunction and disjunction brought about by a single cause.

* 'The failure of the definition implies the failure of the thing defined'—*Tātparya*.

The Material Substances.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 26, L. 10 to L. 12.]

What are the causes from which the Sense-organs proceed?

* *The Material Substances are Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Akāsha* (Sūṭra 13.)

Here we find the Material Substances mentioned by their respective names with the view that when they are thus clearly mentioned, it will be easy to point out which Sense-organ is the product of which substance.

[The *Vārṭika* does not deal with this Sūṭra separately.]

Arṭha—Things or Objects (the fourth Pramēya).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 26, L. 13 to P. 27, L. 2.]

Of the endless objects, the following are those 'objects' [which, when pondered upon as things apprehended by the sense-organs, lead to that dispassion which helps the attainment of Release; and which, when not rightly discerned, become the cause of endless births and rebirths]—

Sūṭra (13).

† *Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, which are the qualities of Earth [Water, Fire, Air and Ākāsha], are the Objects of the aforesaid [sense-organs].*

The qualities mentioned, belonging to Earth and the other elementary substances, are the 'objects' of the sense-organs respectively; in accordance with the actual functioning or operating of the sense-organs.

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* The *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* do not take any note of this Sūṭra; but the *Nyāyasūchīnibandha* has this as an independent Sūṭra. The *Bhāṣya* also speaks of this as containing the *upadēsha* of the *bhūṭas*; and this word could have been used only with reference to the word of the *Sūṭrakāra*.

†The translation here follows the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* however do not agree with the view that Odour and the other four qualities alone are 'perceptible'. Hence they interpret the *Sūṭra* and the *Bhāṣya* differently. The first difference lies in the following explanation suggested by the *Ṭāṭparya*—'*Ṭadarṭhāḥ*', the last word in the *Sūṭra*, means that which is sought

VĀRṬIKĀ ON SŪṬRA 13.
[P. 74, l. 7 to P. 82, l. 2.]

The compound word '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' (in the Sūṭra) is capable of several explanations. "How ?" Well, in the first place, it can be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa* compound; the meaning in this case being 'the qualities of Earth &c.';—secondly it can be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound ; the meaning being 'Earth &c. *and* Qualities';—lastly it can be taken as a *Bahuvṛīhi* compound ; the meaning being 'those things of which the Earth and the rest are Qualities'. Thus the compound being capable of being explained in several ways, there naturally arises a doubt as to what is the real meaning of the word.

And [our opinion is that] the real explanation is to take the word as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound. (A) The word cannot rightly be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa* compound; as, if that were the meaning, then, the Earth and the rest would cease to be 'objects of Sense-perception'. That is to say, if you explain the word as meaning 'the qualities of

after—i.e. acted upon,—by the sense-organs ; so that this word embodies the definition of the fourth 'object of cognition', '*arṭha*' ; and the rest of the *Sūṭra* is not a definition ; it only supplies certain details of information ; though not in a precise manner, as it is meant for a friendly listener, and not for a critical opponent.

The reason why the *Ṭāṭparya* had recourse to this explanation of the definition of *Arṭha* lay in the fact that according to the view of the *Vārṭika*, the *Sūṭra* could not be taken as supplying an accurate enumeration of the 'objects' of perception ; so the precise definition had to be found somewhere in the *Sūṭra* ; and this was found in the word '*ṭaḍarṭhāḥ*.'

The word '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' is taken, as we shall see, by the *Vārṭika* to mean *pṛiṭhivyāḍayaḥ*—i.e. '*pṛiṭhivī*', '*jala*' and '*agni*'—and *guṇāḥ* ; *ganḍha*, &c., being included in '*guṇāḥ*' ; their separate mention is regarded as another information supplied in a friendly spirit, with a view to indicate what is precisely apprehended by each sense-organ.

The great weakness in this explanation of the Sūṭra is that *Pṛiṭhivyāḍi* has to be taken as standing for only three out of five bhūṭas ;while the guṇas of the other two are as perceptible as those of the other three. It is not easy to see why the *Vārṭika* and the *Ṭāṭparya* fought shy of the *Bhāṣya's* explanation ; the only reason appears to be that this explanation precludes the 'perceptibility' of the other qualities of '*Pṛiṭhivyāḍi*'—viz : number, separateness &c.

Earth and the rest', then [the *Qualities* would be the principal factor of the compound, and] the *Earth and the rest* would be merely subordinate qualifications of the afore-mentioned Qualities, Odour, Taste &c.; and [being thus subordinated, the Earth &c. could have no syntactical connection with the predicate of the sentence; so that] Earth, Water &c. could not be regarded as 'objects of Sense-perception. And further, the qualification itself would be entirely superfluous; the first word itself of the Sūtra mentions by name Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound; and it is at once understood that these are 'the qualities of Earth &c.'; so that the further mention of these, 'Earth and the rest' (in the next word of the Sūṭra) becomes entirely superfluous. As a matter of fact, among Odour, Taste &c. there is no such division as that some of them are the 'qualities of Earth &c.' and some are the qualities of other entirely different things; and only in case there were such a division, would the specification of qualities '*of Earth and the rest*' have served some useful purpose. For these reasons we conclude that the word can not be taken as a *Genitive-Ṭaṭpuruṣa*. (B) Nor again will it be right to take the word as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; for this reason that we do not know of any such *things* 'of which Earth and the rest are qualities'; when taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound, the word can only mean 'those things of which the Earth and the rest are qualities'; now what are those *things* of which the Earth and the rest really *are* qualities? In fact, it is impossible to prove that Earth and the rest are *qualities* at all. And the *Bahuvrīhi* compound cannot be explained in any other way (to provide another meaning). Then again, except in certain specified cases, the *Bahuvrīhi* compound must denote something which is co-extensive with the denotation of the component words.*

*'And further, the thought that 'Earth and the rest are qualities of something' is not conducive to that disgust for things which is the purpose of the Shāsṭra.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

For instance, in the case of the compound '*chiṭraguḥ*', 'the man who possesses cows of variegated colour', we find that the compound (as denoting the man possessing the qualification mentioned) is possible only when it is already known that the man possesses cows, and also that the cows are of variegated colour; in the case in question, however, we do not know of any thing possessing the qualities mentioned; nor do we know that the Earth &c. are *Qualities*. "Because they appear (in the compound) as *qualification*, Earth and the rest could certainly be regarded as *Qualities*." Certainly not; for by this assumption everything would be *Quality* only: as there is nothing which cannot be the *qualification* or the *qualified* of something else; so that, by your reasoning every thing would be a *Quality*! For these reasons the word cannot be taken as a *Bahuvrīhi* compound. Thus both of these compounds being precluded, the word must be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound. That is to say, we have shown the impossibility of the word being taken as either a *Ṭaṭpuruṣa* or a *Bahuvrīhi* compound; no fourth compound is possible; and the only compound left is the third one, *Ḍvanḍva*; hence we conclude that the word "*priṭhviyāḍiguṇāḥ*' must taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound.

Vār: P. 75.

The Opponent raises an objection:—

"It is not right to take the word as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound; as there is neither any authority (*Shāsṭra*), nor any reason, in support of this view. If the word is to be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound, it is necessary for you to point out your authority and reasons in support of the view that Earth and the rest *are* 'objects of sense-perception'."

Your objection is not effective, we reply. As both are available: we have both authority and reasons in support of the view that Earth and the rest are 'objects of Sense-perception': As for 'authority', we have the Sūṭra—'Because of the apprehension of a single thing by means of the

Nyāya 246.

organs of vision and touch' (3-1-1).* And this same *Sūṭra* also shows the 'reason' as follows: As a matter of fact, we recognise the organs of both vision and touch as apprehending the same thing; as we have such a notion as '*I am touching* the thing that I had *seen*'; and this fact supplies the 'reason' as regards sight and touch (bearing upon Earth); and the Sūṭra quoted (which mentions this fact) supplies the 'authority'; and requisite 'authority' is also afforded by the fact that our (Nyāya) Shāsṭra declares that 'community' is perceptible by the senses [and 'community' belongs to Earth &c. also, and not only to Odour and the other qualities).

Thus it is proved that the word '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' should be taken as a Ḍvanḍva compound, signifying 'Earth &c. *and* Qualities.'

When the Sūṭra speaks of *pṛiṭhivyāḍi,*' 'Earth and the rest', what are meant are Earth, Water and Fire, which are perceptible by the *external* organs of perception; and by the word '*guṇāḥ* †' are meant (1) all that inheres in substances—*viz.* Number, Dimension, Separateness, Cognition, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Viscidity, Velocity, Motion, Community and Distinctive Individuality ‡,—as also (2) *Samavāya*, Inherence, which does not inhere in substances; and is yet

* The Sūṭra quoted represents both 'authority,' and 'reason'. It is only a material substance, an earthy substance for instance, that can be both seen and touched; so that the Sūṭra indicates the fact that material substances,—i. e. Earth, Water &c.—are amenable to perception by sight and touch; and it is not that it is only the qualities of the earthy substance that are perceived; as any single quality —out of the five mentioned in the Sūṭra, Odour, Taste &c.—is never perceived by sight and touch both.

† The word 'guṇa' here does not stand for only the qualities proper; it stands for the much wider conception of property, everything that qualifies a thing. So that Inherence also, which does not inhere in Substance, becomes included; and Motion, Community and Distinctive Individuality, though not qualities, are included as these also inhere in substances.

‡ The word 'vishēṣa' here is not used in the technical sense of *ultimate differentium*; as this latter is beyond the reach of the senses. It is used in the ordinary sense of distinctive individuality'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

'guṇa', inasmuch as it (along with Motion, Community and Distinctive Individuality) is a *ḍharmā*, property of things.

An objection is raised—"As according to what you say, Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Soundare all included under 'Guṇas', they should not be mentioned separately; and the Sūṭra should be in the form '*priṭhivyāḍiguṇāsṭaḍarṭhāḥ*' thus the *Sūṭra* would be much shorter; and yet the same end would be served."

It will not be right to shorten the *Sūṭra* in the way suggested. As the specific mention of the qualities of Odour Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound is for the purpose of showing the specific restricted action of the sense-organs: What is meant is that, as regards the qualities of Odour, Taste, Colour, Touch and Sound, the action of each Sense-organ is specifically restricted [Odour being apprehended by the Olfactory Organ only, and so forth]; while as regards other things, the action of the Sense-organs is not so restricted; for instance, Earth, Water and Fire are each apprehended by two sense-organs; as also the Guṇas (from Number down to Distinctive Individuality in those enumerated above); *Saṭṭā* (Being) and the genus '*guṇaṭva* are apprehended by all the sense-organs; so also are Inherence and Negation.

Vār. P. 76.

The Opponent [the *Bauḍḍha*, who does not admit of a *Substance* as distinct from an aggregate of qualities], objecting to the statement that 'a single thing is apprehended by the organs of vision and touch' [Sūṭra 3-1-1, put forward by the Logician above as the 'authority' for regarding Earth &c. as objects of Sense-perception], says:—"What is apprehended by the organ of Touch is only Touch, and what is apprehended by the organ of vision is only Colour [and no substance possessing the qualities of Touch or Colour]." Now to this Opponent we put the question—How do you know that Colour and Touch are apprehended by the Organs

of Vision and Touch respectively? "We know this", the Opponent will say, "for the simple reason that we actually find that the cognition brought about by means of the organ of vision is qualified by Colour, (i. e. in the form of cognition of Colour) and that brought about by the organ of Touch is qualified by Touch (i. e. in the form of cognition of touch).' In that case, we reply, your denial of the Substance (as the ubstratum of qualities) becomes baseless; as in regard to the jar and such other substance also, we have such cognitions as are qualified by that substance; that is, as a matter of fact, whenever a man perceives the jar by means of his Visual and Cutaneous Organs, the object that he cognises is the jar; and his cognition is qualified by the *jar*, is *of the jar* [just as the cognition of colour is qualified by colour]. Thus your denial (of the Substance) is not well-considered.

"The cognition *of the jar* proceeds only from the *qualities* appearing in that shape; when you say that by means of the Visual and Cutaneous organs the man cognises *the jar*, you say what is not true; because as a matter of fact what is cognised is only the qualities, Colour and the rest, which happen to be in a particular shape; and it is these *qualities* that the man actually perceives *in that shape*; and it is by reason of this that he has the cognition 'of the jar'; and there is no such substance as the 'jar', as distinct from Colour and the other qualities." *

This is not right, we reply; as, in the first place, you apparently do not understand the meaning of the word '*ākāra*', 'shape' [when you assert that 'Colour and the other qualities appear *in the shape* of the jar']. What is meant by a thing having a certain *shape is* that it ressembles something different from itself [so that the said assertion

* The Bauḍḍha view is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya*:—'The atoms of colour and the other qualities appear in diverse shapes; and when these qualities are found to be characterised by the action of water-fetching, they are called 'jar'; while when they are found characterised only by the action of imparting colour to what had no colour, they are called 'Colour'; and so on.

presupposes two distinct entities, the jar and the quality]; for instance, when we speak of the man having *the shape of the pillar*, we mean that the man has the shape of a thing, the pillar, which is *not man*; so that what the word 'shape' means in this connection is the *ressemblance of the pillar to the man*; and this 'ressemblance' is possible only when the man and the pillar are both well-known (distinct) entities. For you, however (who do not admit of the jar as a distinct entity), there is no basis for the conception of *the shape of the jar* belonging to Colour and the other qualities,—the conception that finds expression in your assertion that 'Colour and the other qualities appear in the shape of the jar and such other substances.' Thus then, the assertion that 'Colour &c. appear in the shape of the jar', coming from you, cannot be taken seriously. *Secondly*, as a matter of fact, there can be no such cognition as the 'cognition *of the jar*', if all that existed were only the qualities of Colour and the rest. For one who admits of nothing except the qualities of Colour and the rest, all things are equal [all being, for him a mere aggregate of qualities]; and hence for him there would be no possibility of any such cognitions as of the 'cow,' the 'horse' and the 'jar'— cognitions that are constantly found to appear in course of our experience; * as for him there is not available any such peculiarity in the qualities of Colour &c. (appearing in different substances) as would distinguish one cognition from another. "The difference in the cognitions is due to the difference in the configuration (or an arrangement, of the atoms of Colour and other qualities); that is to say, Colour and the other qualities appear in different substances in different configurations; and the difference in these configurations forms the basis of the difference in the cognitions of the several

Vār : P. 77.

*The reading of this sentence is defective; the meaning, which is clear, requires some such reading as - [illegible]

substances." This explanation is not tenable; for if the 'configuration' is something different from Colour and the other qualities, then there is a mere difference of names; and [if the 'configuration' is nothing different from Colour &c., then] the explanation offered becomes entirely futile. That is to say, if the 'configuration' is something different from Colour &c., then there is mere difference of names [what we call a 'substance' different from, and containing the qualities, you call 'Configuration']; if on the other hand, the 'Configuration' is not different from Colour &c., then your explanation, that 'the distinct cognitions of the jar &c. appear in accordance with the difference in the configuration of the qualities', becomes entirely futile [as in this case the 'configuration of the qualities' has no meaning].*

"The cognitions *of the jar* and such other substances are *wrong* cognitions. That is to say, we hold that the cognitions that people have *of substances*, such as the jar, are not *right* cognitions; they are *wrong* cognitions, brought about by the force of a beginningless tendency towards (material) fancy." †

This is not right; as all *wrong* cognitions have the ressemblance of *right* cognitions; whenever a wrong cognition appears in the world, it always bears the semblance of *right* cognition [so that when there is a *wrong* cognition of the jar, it implies the presence of a *right* cognition of the jar also]; but for you (who do not admit the existence of any such thing as the *jar*) there can be no basis for any cognitions of the jar and such other substances; *all* of which cognitions

*The *Parishuddhi* adds a few more objections: If the configuration is the same as Colour &c. then 'the configuration of Colour' would mean only the 'atoms of colour' and so on; and under the circumstances, how could you account for the perception of certain aggregates by means of two or more sense-organs?

† The word 'shabḍa' here stands for *vikalpa*,—says the *Ṭāṭparya*.

That the cognitions are wrong has to be admitted, as no satisfactory explanation is possible as to whether the substance, jar for instance, is one or more than one—*Ṭāṭparya*.

are regarded by you as wrong [so that there is no right cognition to which these wrong cognitions bear the semblance]; and these wrong cognitions can never appear without some such basis. From all this the conclusion follows that the cognitions in question are *not wrong*. Further, that the cognitions (*of the jar* and such other substances) are *wrong* can be proved only *after* it has been proved that the jar and such other substances are not something distinct from the qualities of Colour &c. And there is no proof in support of this latter view.

"It is not true that there is no proof in support of the view [that the jar is not something distinct from its qualities]. What proves the said view is the fact that there is no cognition of that (jar) while that (the quality) is not cognised. As a matter of fact, it is only when one thing is not-different from another that the cognition of the former is found to be impossible while the latter is not cognised; as we find in the case of Soup, and in that of a Row. [The Soup is not cognised until its constituent elements of meat and water have been cognised; and similarly the Row is not cognised until the objects constituting the row have been cognised; so that the Soup is nothing different from the meat and water, and the Row is nothing different from the objects constituting it]; and on the other hand, we have found that when one thing is different from another, one is cognised while the other is not cognised; for instance Time * is cognised while Colour &c. are not cognised."

The above reasoning is not right. (A) Firstly, because the premiss upon which the reasoning is based is not quite true. According to you† the object *jar* is made up of Earth,

*The text reads बाल; But the Bauḍḍha will not admit the independent existence of बाल or Hair apart from its Colour &c. It has therefore been presumed that बाल is a misreading for काल.

† The Opponent's theory is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya*:—The entire world consists of three *ḍhāṭus*—the *Rūpaḍhāṭu*, the *Arūpaḍhāṭu* and the *Kāmaḍhāṭu*. In connection with the last of these, every atom consists of eight constituents—Colour

(Water, Air, and Fire, Colour, Taste, Touch, Odour and Sound); so that when we perceive the jar, we should see Water &c. also (and not only the Earth); as a matter of fact, however, Water and the rest, being distinct substances, are not perceived; so that your premiss ['whenever it is found that while one thing is perceived, the other is not perceived, he things should be regarded as different'] cannot be true [as, we have the perception of Earth while Water is not perceived, and yet, according to you, Earth and Water are not distinct substances]. This difficulty may be sought to be avoided by saying that the constitution of the Atom described in the Bauḍḍha scriptures refers to the ordinary things of the world, and not to the four Elementary Substances [Earth, Water, Air and Fire]. But even so the view that Colour and the rest are identical with the Earth &c. will go against the assertion of the Bauḍḍha that '[every atom consists of] Colour and the four Elementary substances' [where Colour is mentioned as something distinct from Earth Water, Air and Fire.] You might argue that you do not regard Earth &c. to be anything different from Colour and other qualities. But, in that case your expression 'Colour and the four Elementary Substances' becomes equivalent to 'colour and colour'; and this expression (meaning that the Atom consists of *colour &c. only*) would be a direct contradiction of your scriptures, which declare that 'in the *Kāma-ḍhāṭu* section of the Universe, the Atom is constituted by *eight* things.' If you add the explanation that the name 'Colour &c.' is applied to the *aggregate of the Earth &c.* [and the notion of 'eight' declared in the scriptures is purely fictitious or imaginary; so that your view

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Taste, Odour, Touch, Sound, Earth, Water, Fire and Air. Thus every atom represents an aggregate of all these eight; so that neither of these eight has any distinct existence apart from the rest.

The *Ṭāṭparya* remarks that the view that Earth, Water, &c. are not distinct substances is a direct contradiction of the theory that 'every atom is made up of *eight* things.'

involves no contradiction];—then our reply will be that even with this explanation it will not follow that Earth &c. are only Colour. "How so?" Because your theory would mean that *Colour* is a composite of Earth &c., and *Earth &c.* are the composite of Colour &c.; so that both sets being *composites*, there are no *components* (in your philosophy); and as a matter of fact, in the absence of *components* there can be no *composites*; as every *composite* is found to be dependent upon its *components*.* Thus there is no escape for you from 'self-contradiction.'

(B) † *Secondly*, the reasoning that you have put forward —'Earth &c. are not different from Colour &c., *because there is no cognition of that while that is not-cognised*'——is open to another objection:—If we follow the real signification of the word 'that', in your statement, we find that it becomes absolutely incoherent. That is to say, when we take into consideration the meaning of the word 'ṭaṭ' (that occurs in your assertion), the meaning of your statement comes to be that 'there is no cognition *of that* when there is cognition *of that* same'; and this is certainly most incoherent. Then again, [the meaning that you intend to express by your statement is that 'the Earth is not different from Colour &c., because there is no cognition of Earth when Colour &c. are not cognised'; but this also is open to the following objection:] In your sentence—'the Earth is not different from Colour &c.'—if you intend 'colour &c.' to be the qualification of, and subordinate to, the 'Earth', then [as the pronoun '*ṭaṭ*,' 'that,' always refers to the principal factor] in the sentence, 'because there is no cognition of *that* when

* Even the bringing in of the '*samvṛiṭi*' or 'Fiction' will not help you; as the function of fiction lies in the hiding of the real forms of other things; and as in the case in question there are no components or composites, there is nothing that could be *hidden*,—*Ṭāṭparya* and *Parishuḍḍhi*.

† Having urged 'Self-contradiction' against the Opponent's reasoning, the Author next proceeds to show that the words in which the reasoning has been set forth make it absolutely incoherent and absurd.

that is not cognised,' the word 'that' in both places would refer to the *Earth* (which, *ex hypothesi*, is the principal factor, having Colour &c. subordinate to it); so that the meaning of your reason would come to be—'because there is no cognition of the Earth when the Earth is not cognised'; the reason for this lying in the fact that the word 'that' cannot refer to 'Colour &c.,' which are the qualifications of, and subordinate to, 'Earth'. This same argument will also apply to your view if you regard the 'Earth' as the qualification of, and subordinate to, 'Colour &c.;' as in this case also the meaning of your reason would be—'because there is no cognition of Colour &c. when Colour &c. are not cognised': as the word 'that' in both places would refer to the principal factor (which, in this case, would be Colour &c.). Similarly if you put forward your conclusion in the form—'The Earth is only Colour &c.,' or 'Colour &c. only are the Earth',—as this would mean that *Earth is only Colour &c.* or that *Colour &c. alone are the Earth*, your reasoning would be open to the same objections as before [*i. e.* as *ex hypothesi*, the *Earth* would be identical with *Colour &c.* the meaning of your reason would be 'because there is no cognition of the Earth when the Earth is not cognised', or 'because there is no cognition of Colour &c. when Colour &c. are not cognised'].

(C) *Thirdly*, your reasoning is open to the further objection that in whatever form you put forward your conclusion (asserting the non-difference of *Earth*, '*pṛiṭhivī*', from Colour &c., '*rūpāḍayaḥ*'), it always involves the incongruity that there can be no compatibility or co-ordination between the two words (subject and predicate) of your conclusion, because of the difference in their number; the word '*pṛiṭhivī*' is singular and '*rūpāḍayaḥ*' is plural; and difference in number always implies difference in the things denoted; as we find in the case of the two words '*nakṣaṭrāṇi*', 'stars', and '*shashī*', 'moon'; so that, inasmuch as we have the two

words '*pṛiṭhivī*,' 'Earth', and '*rūpādayaḥ*', 'Colour and the rest,' having different numbers, there must be some difference between the things denoted [*i. e.* between the *Earth* and *Colour* &c.]. "But we often find words denoting the same thing taking different numbers; as for instance, when we speak of the 'four life-stages', '*chaṭvāraḥ āshramāḥ*,' (plural) as '*chāṭurāshramyam*' (singular)." This is not right; as we do not admit of different numbers being used in connection with words denoting the same thing; as regards the word '*chāṭurāshramyam*' cited by you, what is denoted by this word is the fact that all the four life-stages are conducive to the performance of certain common duties (such as truthfulness and the like) [and as this *fact* is one only, it is only right that the word should take the singular number; and then again, the word, thus explained, does not denote the same thing as the word '*āshramāḥ*']. Other instances of the use of different numbers used in connection with words denoting the same thing that may be cited are—(a) the '*ṣad guṇāḥ*' (plural), constitute the *ṣādguṇyam*' (singular); and (b) the '*vishēṣāḥ*' (plural) constitute the '*vaishēṣikam*' (singular);—but both of these are amenable to the same explanation as above [the singular form in (a) '*ṣādguṇyam*' denotes, not the *six guṇas* or *methods of success*, but the fact of the six methods serving the common purpose of accomplishing success for the king; and the singular form in '*vaishēṣikam*' denotes, not the *many vishēṣas*, or *specific individualities*, but the fact of these individualities serving the common purpose of differentiating a thing from all other things].

(D) *Fourthly*, your reason—' because there is no cognition of the Earth when Colour &c. are not cognised,'—is not a true one. "In what way is it *not true*?" Well, as a matter of fact, we do cognise a substance, even when its Colour &c. are not cognised; for instance, when a piece of rock-crystal is placed near a black object, we do-not perceive

the colour of the crystal, which is *white*; and yet we do perceive the crystal itself [so that it is not true that there is no cognition of a thing when its Colour &c. are not cognised].

(E) *Fifthly*, in support of your reasoning you have cited the instances of the Soup and the Row; and this is not right; for apparently you do not understand what the 'soup' or the 'row' is. When a number of different substances (flesh, water &c.) are cooked together, they become mixed up with certain other substances brought into existence during the process of cooking; and at a certain time during this process there is a mixture of all the various ingredients; and to this mixture is given the name of 'Soup'; so that the *Soup* is not the same as its ingredients; it is something different from them; hence the case of *Soup* is not a right one to be cited as an instance where, on account of the non-difference of two things, the perception of one implies the perception of the other. This explanation disposes of the case of all such things as '*pāka*', '*kāñchika*' &c.* [which are the names of dishes made up of several ingredients]. Similarly, when a number of like and unlike things stand together towards one direction, in such a way that they are in contact with one another,—their limit or end being either definitely ascertained or not so ascertained,—we have a notion of *plurality* with regard to these things so placed; and it is this plurality of number to which the name 'Row' is given [and being a 'number', it is distinct from the things to which the number belongs]. So also when a number of elephants, horses, and chariots stand together, in different directions, in contact with one another,—their exact extent being, or not being, exactly determined,—the

* 'Pāka' is a name given to such preparations, chiefly medicinal, as consist of many substances cooked together; e. g. *Ḍhātrīpāka*. '*Kāñchika*' is a medicinal preparation where many medicinal substances are cooked along with very old gruel. We have not been able to ascertain what the 'vivēka' or 'virēka' is; but from what is said on p. 81, l. 8, it seems that this is a name for a preparation consisting of the mixture of equal quantities of Earth, Fire and Water—'Avakṣāra' is the name given to the mixture of the ash of several substances.

plurality of *number* subsisting in these is called 'army' Similarly when a number of a particular class of persons congregate together in definite bands, according to the diverse degrees of renunciation, the plurality of number subsisting in them comes to be called 'sect' or 'congregation.' Similarly with all collective names; such as 'heap', 'forest', 'herd,' 'Brahmāṇa-band' and the like. The name 'Circle' is given to that plurality of number which subsists in a number of things placed in diverse directions, in such a way that the central space enclosed by them is vacant. Thus we find that the case of 'Row' (or any similar collective name) does not afford the required instance of 'non-difference'.

[Having failed to convince the Logician of his own view that Substance is nothing different from an aggregate of qualities, the Opponent demands proof for the view of the Logician] —"What is the proof for difference (between the qualities and the substance to which they belong)?"

This proof, we reply, we have in the fact that when we perceive an object, we speak of this perception in terms of all that are perceived along with it; for instance, when the sandal is perceived, we speak of this perception as 'the colour of this is white', 'its taste is bitter', its odour is strong', 'its touch is cool'; and as a matter of fact, we know that whenever we speak of the perception of one thing in terms of the perception of another thing, the two things are different; as for instance, when we speak of the *vessel* as 'of the Brāhmaṇa;' and we never speak of the perception of the sandal in such terms as 'this white colour that I perceive belongs to the qualities of Taste, Odour and Touch, which (though not perceived) are inferred.' [And such should be the expression if the Sandal were nothing apart from its qualities]. "Your reasoning is not valid; as it is based on a premiss, the truth of which is vitiated by the case of such things as 'army', 'forest' and the like; in the case of these things we make use of such expressions as 'the elephant of the army', 'the

tree of the forest', where the things are not different [e.g. the Elephant is not something different from the Army, nor is the Tree different from the Forest; so that mere verbal expression, such as 'the odour of the Sandal', cannot justify the conclusion that the Sandal is something different from odour and other qualities]." This is not true, we reply; it is not true that the *army* and the *forest* are identical with the *elephant* and the *tree* respectively; we have already explained * how the *army* and the *forest* are entirely different from the elephants and the trees composing them respectively.

[The Opponent takes up the case of the *Row*, which the Logician has analysed into a phase of Number, and hence different from the things composing the *Row*.]——"There is no such thing as Number; how then can we accept the view that (in the form of the *Row*) it is something different from the things to which it belongs?"

Vā. P.

This is not right; as one who denies the existence of Number cannot account for either the affirmation of *oneness* (of Number, and that to which the number belongs, or of qualities and the substance to which the qualities belong), or the denial of diversity (between them) [as both *oneness* and *diversity* are only *numbers*]; and yet the said notions of *oneness* and *diversity* cannot be altogether denied (by the Bauddha Opponent, who actually makes the said affirmation and denial); and when you cannot deny the existence of the said notions, inasmuch as these are *qualified* notions, they would not be possible, if their very basis, in the shape of the Number, were altogether denied. "Why so?" Because of the following reasonings:—(a) 'The notion of *one* or *many* (with regard to the jar) must have a basis different from the basis of the notion of the *jar* itself,—because it is a notion different in character from the notion of the jar,—

* On this same page; as also under Sūtras 2, 1. 33 to 36, where it is proved that the *composite* is different from its *components*.

like the notion of *blue*;—and thus that which forms the basis of the notion of *one* or *many* is *Number*.'—(b) Then again, the qualified notion of *number* being different from the notion of that to which the number belongs,—differing, from it, as it does, in regard to its object, its cause and the notion itself, —it must require for its appearance, an entirely different basis; as a matter of fact, we find that whenever one notion differs from another, in regard to its object, its cause and the notion itself, it always requires a different basis; as for instance, in regard to such things as the cloth, the skin and the blanket, we have those same notions only of which the cloth the skin and the blanket respectively, in their unqualified form, are the basis; while in connection with those same things, the notion that we have of the colour *blue* is found to proceed from a basis entirely different from those things (the cloth &c.); in the same manner in connection with the jar, * the notions of 'one', 'two' &c. that we have are found to have their object and cause different (from those of the notion of the *jar* itself); and from this it follows that they must proceed from a different basis; and this basis is what is called 'Number'. [This same reasoning applies to the case of all the qualities, Colour and the rest].

[The Opponent brings forward another objection]—"We have such phrases as 'extensive army', and 'the forest in flowers',—where the *army* and the *forest* are spoken of as *extensive* and *in flowers*; so that either the *army* or the *forest* cannot be mere 'Number' (as the *Siddhānti* has tried to prove above, p. 79, ll. 6—7). If the *army* or the *forest* were mere *number*,† we could not have such expressions as 'extensive army' or the 'forest in flowers'; as *extensiveness* cannot belong to Number; nor can Number have *flowers*."

* The reading should be घटादिविषयविनिमित्तविवेकात्: घट घटादिप्रत्ययाः । as read by the Chaukhambha Series edition.

† A च is wanting in the text. It is found in the Chaukhambha Series edition.

This does not affect our position, we reply. For what is the meaning of the expression 'the extensive army'? *The same elephant &c. that constitute the army, having their precise number undetermined, and having other constituents (elephants, horses &c.) added to them, come to be spoken of as 'the extensive army'; so that what is called 'extensive' is only the plurality of *number*, arising from an † increase in the constituents of the army, which are spoken of as 'extensive.' Then as regards the expression 'the forest in flowers,' it is only the plurality of *number*, which inheres in the same substratum as the flowers; this substratum being the blossoming trees [and this co-substrateness forms the basis of the figurative application of the epithet 'in flowers' to the *Number*]; just as we have in such expressions as 'the bitter sugar'; though it is the *taste* that is 'sweet' [and the reason for the applying of the epithet 'bitter' to the sugar, and to the taste, is due to the fact that both *taste* and *bitterness* inhere in the same sugar.]

Vār. P. 81.

Similarly Number and other qualities must be regarded as different from the substance to which they belong, because they have different names. "The reason given is not sound, as we find many names of things that are mere non-entities; for instance, 'pit', and 'hole' [which are the names of mere void, which is a non-entity]." This argument is not right; as evidently you do not know (what a *pit* is). The *pit* is only the *ākāsha* as limited by a particular configuration of composite particles qualified by colour and other qualities,

* 'The word स्थान, etymologically meaning that which exists, here stands for number; and स्थानी is that to which the number belongs—*i. e.* elephants, horses and chariots. And when the army, originally consisting of elephants, has some more elephants added to it, it is said to have become *extensive*. This shows that extensiveness is nothing more than *number* in an undefined form; and it is varying; on account of the possibility of further additions to, and subtractions from, the army.'—*Tātparya*.

† 'उपचय', not 'अपचय', nor 'अपचयोपचय' as read by the Chaukhambha Series, edition, is the correct reading. The sense demands it and the *Tātparya* supports it.

—a configuration of which the central portion is empty. The same is the case with the *hole* also. [And thus being *Ākāsha*, neither the pit nor the hole can be regarded as a void or non-entity].

The Opponent raises a further objection :—"It is not right to regard a thing as different simply because we find it having a different name; (a) because as a matter of fact, we find different names applied to one and the same thing; for instance, we have such expressions as 'the post of *khaḍira* wood' [where, though the post is not different from the wood, yet they are spoken of by different names];—(b) secondly because we find a different name applied to a number of disjointed things;—as when we speak of a 'line of houses' [where the *line* is nothing different from the houses]; and also a different name applied to a number of heterogeneous things—as when we speak of the *virēka* consisting of the 'triune* combination of Earth, Water and Fire'. [all this proves that we are not justified in deducing any conclusion from mere names or expressions."

None of the above reasonings is convincing: (a) It has been urged that with regard to one and the same thing we find different names used. This is not right; as in the case cited by you what the word '*khaḍira*' denotes is a certain substance characterised by a particular class-character; the word 'post' also denotes a certain figure; and a 'figure' is only that particular form of conjunction which is called '*prachaya*', 'aggregate' or 'conglomeration'; and it is certainly something different† (from the *khaḍira*). The same reasoning applies to all similar expressions— such as 'the coil of the serpent', 'the body of the image', 'the ring of gold',

* The text here is hopelessly corrupt. Neither the *Ṭāṭparya* nor the *Parishuḍḍhi* helps us to trace the correct reading. The Chaukhambha Series edition reads 'virēkaḥ' for '*vivēkaḥ*'; '*vyūhaḥ*' is the word that gives some sense; and has been adopted in the translation. It may be that '*virēka*' is the name of a certain preparation consisting of the mixture of equal quantities of Earth Fire and Water.

† The Khaḍira wood and the post, both being material substances, could not inhere in any one part of the post.

'the body of the grinding stone,' and so forth,— in every one of which the two words denote different things. (b) The case of the expression 'the line of houses' is analogous to that of the word 'row', which we have explained above. (c) As regards the third case, where different names are applied to a number of things as forming a 'combination,' called 'virēka' it is clear that 'combination' is only a form of conjunction (which always implies difference among the members in conjunction).*

[A fresh objection is raised against the view that the Substance is something different from the qualities belonging to it]—"As a matter of fact, we have no cognition of any sub stance apart from the aggregate of its qualities". It seems you have the following reasoning in your mind—"If the substance were something different from the qualities, then it would be perceived apart from these qualities;—as a matter of fact however, it is never so perceived;—hence the conclusion is that there is no such thing as Substance (apart from qualities)." But this reasoning is not valid: In-as much as the non-perception can be due to two causes; and your premiss ['That which is not perceived does not exist'] is not true. With regard to every case of non-perception, there is a doubt as to whether there is no perception of a thing because it does not exist, (e. g. of the hare's horns), or because the means of perception are absent (e. g. of the roots of a tree buried under the ground). If then, the meaning of your premiss be that 'there is non-perception of the substance because it does not exist', then as this premiss would include the conclusion (that 'the substance does not exist'), it would not be a right premiss [as the conclusion being by its very nature open to doubt, the premiss that includes that conclusion also becomes of doubtful validity]. If then, the meaning of your

* The reading of this sentence is corrupt and curiously enough, the reading of the corresponding passage of the *Pūrvapakṣa* is also corrupt. We are unable to guess the correct reading and neither the *Tāṭparya* nor the *Parishuḍḍhi* affords an clue as to the reading. As in the *Pūrvapakṣa*, so here also, we have adopted the reading '*vivēkaḥ*', though perhaps '*vyūhaḥ*' may be a better reading.

premiss be that the non-perception of the substance is due to the absence of the means of its perception,—then also it cannot be accepted as leading to the desired conlcusion; for it is not right to deny the differenco (of the substance from the qualities) merely on the ground * that there are no means available for cognising that difference. [As it is only on the strength of the absence of such means of cognising a thing as would be possible in the case, that you could rightly conclude the absence of that thing. If, lastly, you assert that you do base your conclusion on the absence of such *possible* means of cognising the substance as apart from qualities, then] Your reasoning also becomes open to all the objections that we have shown against the former reasoning of yours, that 'the substance is not different from qualities, because there is no cognition of it when the qualities are not cognised.' (P. 77, L. 13).

Thus we find that the more we examine the arguments put forward in support of the theory of *non-difference* (of Substance from Qualities), the more do we find them supporting the theory of *difference*; as it is found that while all proofs tend towards one—the view of difference. —all of them tend against the other—the view of *non-difference*. Vār. P. 82.

Thus it is established that the word of the *Sūtra*, '*pṛiṭhivyāḍiguṇāḥ*' should be taken as a *Ḍvanḍva* compound.

*The reading of the printed text is defective. The *Ṭāṭparya* reads न प्रमाणाभाव-मात्राद्द्रव्यव्यतिरेकप्रतिषेधः ।

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CHAPTER IV.

Refutation of Objects of Cognition.

Section (1).

[Having dealt with the *Pramāṇas*, the Instruments of Cognition, the Author takes up the *Pramēyas*, the Objects of Cognition ; the character that is common to all *pramēyas* is that of *being an entity*. So before refuting the definitions of the individual entities, he proceeds to show that it is not possible to provide an adequate account of what constitutes an 'entity.' And with a view to keep up a connection with what has gone before, he turns the fresh discussion on to the subject of God who is one of the Logician's 'pramēyas'.]

(1) [Page 562] The Logician turns the discussion on the question of proofs for God's existence into a new channel:—" Notwithstanding all that you have said, as to the impossibility of putting a question as to the proofs of God's existence,—inasmuch as God is an entity, a positive being, it is incumbent on you to point out a *pramāṇa*, a proof, that affirms, or declares the existence of, that God." What do you mean by God 'being an entity' ?—we ask. " Well, it means that He is a positive being. " This will not be right ;for in thus answering my question, you simply supply me with a synonym (and you do not explain what constitutes an 'entity.') " *Being an entity* means existing in its own form." This also cannot be accepted ; as firstly, a negative entity also is something that exists in its own form ; and *secondly*, in presenting such a definition, each definition that you will put forward will apply to only individual entities,—serving to distinguish each one from the rest; and thus there would not be that comprehensiveness which is essential for all definitions. " A thing is called an 'entity' when with regard to it people have the notion that *it is* or *exists*. " This will not be right ; as it is possible for us to have such a notion as 'the negation or absence of jar *is* here' ; and as in this we have the notion of 'it is' with regard to a negation, this negation will have

Kh. II. 49.

to be regarded as an 'entity'; and further, even though with regard to the jar and such other substances, we often have the notion 'it does not exist', yet they do not cease to be 'entities' [and they would so cease if an entity were defined as proposed].

(2) [Page 563] Then again, when you speak of the notion of '*asti*' 'it exists' with regard to a thing,—do you mean that what is signified by the word '*asti*', 'exists', is capable of being predicated of the thing? or that the word '*asti*' is capable of being used in connection with the thing? It cannot be the former; as you do not explain what is signified by the words. "Why! the expression 'it exists' signifies *saṭṭā*, the generality of 'being', 'existence'." This is not right; as, according to the Logician, there is no '*saṭṭā*' in such things as Generality, Individuality, Inherence, &c; and so *saṭṭā*, signified by the phrase 'it exists' being incapable of being predicated of these, they could never be spoken of as 'it exists'; which would mean that they are mere negations, non-entities; specially as we have already rejected the idea of a thing 'existing in its own form.' Nor can the second alternative be accepted; as we have already pointed that there is such a notion as 'negation or absence exists' (where the word 'exists' is found to be used in connection with a negation); and further, if that alone were to be regarded as an *entity* in connection with which the word '*asti*' could be used, then all those things in connection with which we might use the word '*varṭaṭē*' (instead of '*asti*') will have to be regarded as non-entities! "But the word '*asti*' is synonymous with '*varṭaṭē*' (so it makes no difference whether you use the one or the other)". This is not right; it is not possible to show that the two words are synonymous except by pointing out the common denotation of the two words [and this is not possible, as

the word '*varṭaṭē*' does not signify exactly what is denoted by the word '*asṭi*'.]*

"That the two words are synonymous is comprehended, in a vague, general way, from the fact that one man is found to make use of the word '*varṭaṭē*' with regard to the same thing in connection with which another man makes use of the word '*asṭi*'". This is not right; as in the case of many words—such, e. g. as '*pramēya*', '*abhiḍhēya*' and the like—we find that though one man uses one word exactly in connection with a thing in regard to which another man uses the other word, yet the words not regarded as synonymous. "What is meant is that the denotation of the two words should be the same—that the words should be used in the same sense (and not that they should be made use of with regard to the same thing.)" But in that case, firstly, it remains as difficult as ever for you to explain what this 'same sense' is [we having shown that it is not possible for the words to mean 'existence in one's own form' and so forth]; and secondly, even if it were possible for you to point out this common denotation, you should explain your '*bhāvaṭva*', 'entity', 'character of being', by means of that same common denotation; and where would be the need for seeking after the proper expression for your definition?

(3) [Another definition of 'entity' is put forward]—"That is an *entity* which is not of the nature of the negation of another thing." This also cannot be accepted; as in the first place, the word '*para*', 'another thing', is entirely superfluous,—it does not serve the purpose of excluding

* This is the explanation given by the Shāṇkarī; the Viḍyāsāgarī and the Chiṭsukhī explain as follows:—'Entity' 'character of being' only can be this common denotation of the two words; and this forms the subject of our present enquiry; so that you are basing your definition of 'entity' upon the fact of the two words '*asṭi*' and '*varṭaṭē*' being synonymous, the comprehension of which is found to depend upon the due understanding of what 'Entity' is, thus involving an inextricable circle.

anything not excluded by the rest of the definition [as whatever is of the nature of negation, is always of the nature of the negation of another thing ; nothing can be of the nature of the negation of itself ; hence ' that which is not of the the nature of negation ' would provide all that is necessary] ; and secondly, the Logician recognises the fact that 'entity' and 'non-entity' are mutual contradictories—being of the nature of the negation of one another [so that 'entity' is just as much 'of the nature of the negation of another thing' in the shape of 'nonentity' as 'non-entity' is 'of the nature of the negation of entity'; so that the definition is an impossible one, not applying to what it is intended to define]. "As a matter of fact, we find that with regard to a 'non-entity' we always have the notion that it is *not an entity* (i. e. it is of the nature of the negation of entity) : in regard to an *entity* we do not always have the notion (that it is *not a non-entity* i. e. it is of the nature of the negation of non-entity) [so the definition cannot be regarded as impossible]." In spite of this fact, the definition does not become any clearer [it may be that we do not always think of an Entity as the *negation of non-entity*; but the fact remains that the Entity is as much the *negation of non-entity* as the Non-entity is the *negation of entity* ; and so long as this fact remains, the definition remains impossible]. "Then we shall define 'entity' as that which is not recognised, or thought of, as of the nature of the negation of another thing. [So that, even though Entity may be of the nature of the negation of another thing, yet, inasmuch as it is not always recognised as being so, the definition ceases to be impossible]." This definition also cannot be accepted ; as, in the first place, with such a definition, it would not be possible to apprehend an 'entity', or 'character of being', with the Eye and the other sense-organs ; as the fact of a certain thing being recognised, or thought of, cannot be known by the senses [and Entity has been defined as consisting

Kh. II. 52.

of a particular form of 'recognition']; —and secondly, the conception 'this is not a non-entity' would, in this case, be entirely objectless or baseless; as, according to you, the object of this conception could not be an Entity; as what is conceived of is conceived of as being of the nature of the negation of something else; nor could negation or non-entity be the object of the conception; as what it does is to deny the non-entity (which, therefore, cannot be its object). "There could be no such conception at all (as 'this is not a non-entity')." Certainly, there can be nothing to prevent the possibility of such a sentence bringing about at least a verbal cognition; as the words contained in the sentence being endowed with all such requisites of verbal denotation as mutual dependency, proximity and the like,—the sentence does actually signify a certain relationship among the several words [and this is all that is necessary for verbal cognition]; the possibility of such verbal cognition in regard to non-entities has been thus declared :—'Word brings about cognitions even with regard to what is an absolute non-entity.' (*Shlokavārṭika*, Sū. 2, Verse 6). "We shall regard that as 'entity' which is not cognised, *by perception*, to be of the nature of the negation of another thing; so that with this qualification the definition will not be open to the objections urged against it." Even this qualified definition cannot be accepted; as the Logician does not regard *all* 'entities' to be amenable to perception. "But according to the philosophy (like the Nyāya) which admits of God, every entity is certainly amenable to perception (by God)." But so far as God is concerned, there is nothing to prove that he perceives entities as 'not of the nature of the negation of another thing.' "But such things as are not perceived by God in this form, may yet be perceived by Him, as entities, in their positive form." Yes, but we are still in the dark as to the real character of 'entity' or 'positive form.'

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(4) "We do know for certain that 'positive form' is that which is expressed, by words also, as being not of the the nature of the negation of another thing [even though God may not perceive things in this form, yet His perception of such things may certainly be described, in words, to be of that form; so that these also become included]." In this definition also, the word 'another' would be superfluous (as shown in the case of the former definition); and thus even if the word 'another' were omitted (and 'entity' were defined as that which is cognised by means of words as being not of the nature of negation), then, the definition would become open to the objection that, as thus defined, the 'Entity' would be imperceptible by the Eye, and such other objections (as have already been urged above).* "On seeing a piece of sandalwood, the idea that we have is 'this is a fragrant piece of sandalwood', when, even though what is perceived is only the piece of wood, and not its sweet smell, yet fragrance enters into the perception as a factor that is merely presented to consciousness along with the wood; in the same manner, in the case in question, we can have the perception of 'entity'; and even though the factor of 'cognition' that enters into our conception of the 'entity' is not amenable to perception, yet it can form part of the perception, being presented to consciousness along with the entity." This cannot be; as this would mean—(1) either that the entity is the inseparable attribute of the cognition which is presented to consciousness as qualifying (entering into the conception of) the Entity;—and this would involve a vicious circle, so far as the Entity is concerned;—(2) or that the Entity is an adventitious adjunct of the cognition presented to consciousness, which latter also enters, only as an adventitious adjunct, into the conception of the 'entity'; and in this latter case, the character of 'entity

* A cognition is not perceptible; hence if cognition forms an integral factor in the definition of 'Entity', Entity also would not be perceptible; and so forth.

thus defined would become applicable to that *negation* which is cognised along with an entity! [For instance, when a certain place, an entity, is cognised along with the negation or absence of the jar,—in the cognition 'there is no jar here,'—this *negation* has for its adventitious adjunct the cognition of the *place*, which place is cognised as not being of the nature of negation; and hence this *negation*, fulfilling all the conditions of the definition of 'entity', will have to be regarded as an 'entity'; and this would be absurd].*

(5) Then again, when you put forward a definition in the form 'an entity is that which is so and so,' it becomes necessary for you to explain what 'entity' is, apart from what you put forward as the definition [as without knowing what the word 'entity' means, it is not possible to comprehend the definition containing that word]. If, with a view to escape from this difficulty, it be held that there is absolute non-difference (or identity) between the two (*i. e.* between the Entity and the character put forward in the definition) —then in that case, it would not be possible for you to put forward your definition in the form of the proposition that 'that which is endowed with such a *character* is *entity*' [in which the character is the qualification, and the Entity is what is qualified by it; and it is not possible for a thing to be qualified by what is non-different from it]. If, on the other hand, the character put forward is regarded (not as identical with the Entity, but) only as an adventitious adjunct of the Entity, then it behoves you to explain what is that which you seek to define (by means of this qualification). If then what is put forward as the definition be held to be what is

* This answer, along with the objection to which it is an answer,—*i. e.* the sentence beginning with '*surabhi chandanam*'—does not form part of the text, according to the *Chitsukhi* and the *Vidyāsagarī*; though the Chaukhamba Series edition contains the passages in the text, the Commentary takes no notice of them; it is not possible that they should have been omitted as too easy; for the *Vidyāsāgarī* never omits any passage; and the passage in question is not easy either. The *Shānkarī* alone accepts the reading, and provides a satisfactory explanation.

meant by 'Entity,' so that the two are identical, then there is yet another difficulty (over and above what we have already pointed out): *viz.*—When we cognise an Entity in the form—'the negation or absence of such and such a thing is not', the Entity will have to be regarded as *not* an 'entity' at all [as in this case the Entity is cognised as not absent, which means that it is of the nature of the negation of absence, and this is not 'cognised as being *not* of the nature of the negation of another thing']. If, then, 'entity' be defined as something entirely different from the definitions hitherto given, then, in that case, it will have to be regarded as something not included in any of the six 'categories' [that the Vaishēṣikas postulate.]*

(6) Lastly, we ask,—this character of 'entity', does it subsist in itself or not? If it does, then there is the absurdity of a thing subsisting in itself. If it does not, then it itself becomes a non-entity, though it may be cognised as not being of the nature of the negation of another thing [and thus fulfilling the conditions of your definition of 'entity'].

Section (2).

[Having refuted the conception of 'entity,' the author next takes up the idea of 'non-entity or' negation; and he turns this also on to the subject of God's existence.]

(7) [Page 568] [Having been baffled in his questionings in regard to proofs for God's existence] the Logician turns upon the Vēḍānṭin with the following threat:—"Inasmuch as you do not provide any proofs for God's existence, the inevitable conclusion is that God is a non-entity—there is no God." What do you mean by 'non-entity'?—we ask. "A *non-entity* is that whose nature is that of negation."

*The *Chiṭsukhī and* the *Viḍyāsāgarī* interpret this last sentence differently. According to them, the translation would run thus:—'Is Entity something different from the six categories or not? If it is different, then you admit a seventh category, and thus contradict your tenet of six categories [and if it is included in the six then, if it is any one of the six categories, the other categories become *non-entities*.]

If this means that which is of the nature of contradictiories, then this character belongs to the Entity also; as you yourself admit that Entity and Non-entity are mutual contradictories. " The nature or character of negation is just what constitutes a Non-entity." But you cannot thus escape from the objection by merely reversing the order of words: You started with defining 'non-entity' as that which is of the nature of negation, and now you define the 'nature of negation' as that which constitutes 'non-entity.' For the same reasons we cannot accept the definition of Non-entity as that which is cognised in the form of negation.

(8) " We shall define Non-entity as the contradictory of Entity." This also cannot be accepted. For, does this mean that it is the contradictory *of all* entities ? or of only some *particular* entities ? It cannot mean the former, for the simple reason that no such thing is possible; for instance, the negation of the jar, which is a non-entity, is not the contradictory of the earth's surface and such other things. Nor can it mean the latter, as there are many *entities* also which are 'contradictory to some particular entities'. " What is meant by contradiction is *incapability of association or co-existence*; and certainly there can be no such incapability between two *entities*." This is not right; as there certainly is such *incapability of co-existence* between the two entities *Goṭva*, (character of the cow) and *Ashvaṭva* (character of the horse). " When the two are so related that when on the affirmation of one there is denial of the other, then we have real contradiction." This also cannot be accepted; for if there is meant to be difference between the affirmation of one and the denial of the other, then, such a contradiction as is here described is found to exist between two particular *entities* also [*e.g.* when there is affirmation of the cow-character, there is denial of the horse-character]. " What we mean is that there is contradiction, when the affirmation of the one constitutes the denial of the

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other (so that the affirmation of one and the denial of another are identical) [and certainly the affirmation of the cow is not identical with the denial of the horse].' This also cannot be accepted, as this denial itself can be either an entity or a non-entity ; and in either case it would be an unknown quantity ; if it is a non-entity, then, it is unknown in so far as it is still to be explained what it is ; and if it is an entity then also it is unknown, in so far as denial in the form of an entity is something impossible.

(9) Another definition of Non-entity is put forward:—"A Non-entity is that in connection with which people have the notion 'it does not exist.'" This cannot be accepted, for people have such a notion as 'the absence of jar is not '; and as this is a notion in connection with the jar, the jar will have to be regarded as a non-entity. And in addition to this, this definition will be open to all those objections that have been urged against the definition of 'entity' as 'that in connection with which people have the notion *it exists* (see para. 1).

(10.) "A 'non-entity' or 'negation' is that the cognition of which is dependent upon the cognition of its counter-entity."

This also cannot be accepted ; for (1) if by 'counter-entity' you mean simply *something other* (than the non-entity), then the definition becomes much too wide [as there are many things whose cognition is dependent on the cognition of things other than themselves ; *e. g.* the cognition of the relation of conjunction is dependent on the cognition of the things thus related] ; (2) and if by 'counter-entity' you mean that which is contradictory, you have still to explain what is meant by 'contradictory ';—(3) if by 'counter-entity' is meant that which is non-existent, then, in the first place, the difficulty is that it is still not known what is the precise meaning of the negative element (in the word, 'non-existent ') [and what we are still discussing is precisely what is meant by

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negation]; and secondly, inasmuch as all cognitions of past and future things have their objects non-existent, the cognition of all these cognitions will be dependent on the cognition of what is existent [as without the cognition of the object we can have no cognition of the cognition of that object]; and these being thus included in the definition, it becomes too wide.

(11.) Whatever definition, or distinguishing feature, of 'non-entity' you may pointout, with regard to that we ask—is that distinguishing feature an (A) 'entity' or a (B) 'non-entity'? (A) It cannot be an entity; as in the first place, an entity, a positive feature, can not subsist in a non-entity; and secondly, even though it may be argued that entity, in the shape of a positive feature, does appear as a qualification in the cognition of non-entities [the cognition of the Non-entity being regarded as a positive entity], and as such it might, in a way, be said to subsist in the Non-entity, yet in that case it behoves you to explain under which of the well-known qualifications of 'cognition' this 'entity,' or positive feature, will be included. "This qualification of the cognition will be something totally different from the well-known ones, though similar in character to these." But even so your definition will not be free from objections; for instance, the non-entity that is qualified by this entity, or positive feature (which you put forward as its distinguishing feature),—is this qualified non-entity an 'entity' or a 'non-entity'?—we ask. If it is a non-entity, then this would mean that the non-entity subsists in itself—an absurdity; and if it is an 'entity' then there is self-contradiction [a 'non-entity' being an 'entity'.] (B.) Nor can the second alternative (mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph) be accepted—that is, the distinguishing feature of 'non-entity' cannot be a 'non-entity.' As if it subsists in itself, there is the absurdity of something subsisting in itself; and

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if it does not subsist in itself, the definition, consisting of that distinguishing feature, becomes too narrow (not subsisting in the very thing, 'non-entity', that it is meant to define).

(12) "A Non-entity or negation is that which always appears to consciousness as qualified by what is negatived or denied [*e. g.*, when we cognise the 'negation of the jar,' what appears to consciousness is the negation qualified by the *jar*, which latter is what is negatived or denied]." This definition also cannot be accepted; for in the first place so long as 'negation' itself has not been explained, we cannot understand what is meant by 'that which is *negatived*'; and secondly, it will be necessary to explain what is meant by the word '*vishiṣta*' in your definition.

(13.) Is this '*vishiṣta*' something different from the '*vishēṣaṇa*' (qualification), the '*vishēṣga*' (the object possessing that qualification) and the relation between those two? Or is it not different from these three? It cannot be something different from these three; for as matter of fact, whenever we conceive of the *man with the stick* (where the man is the *vishiṣta* and the stick the *vishēṣaṇa*), we do not think of it as anything entirely different from the *stick*, the *man* and the relation between these two; and further, if it were something totally different from these, then, when a person would be asked to bring forward the 'man with the stick,' he would not bring the man, (but something totally different). "That is called '*vishiṣta*' which is temporarily characterised by the relation between the *vishēṣaṇa* and the *vishēṣya* [so that the *man with the stick* is the person who is temporarily characterised by the relation, of possession, between the stick and the man]." This will not be right; for, in what form is the *vishiṣta* 'temporarily characterised'? Is it as something not bearing the relation that it is 'characterised'? Or is it as something bearing that relation? In the former case, the definition would become too wide [as when one is asked

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to bring the *man with the stick*, he would be justified in regarding the *man with the ear-ring* as the intended *vishiṣta*; as it is this latter which does not bear the relation between the man and the stick]. And in the latter case,—*i.e.*, if what is characterised is something that bears the relation, then,—that something must be different (from the *vishēṣaṇa* and the *vishēṣya* and the relation between the two) [so that the objection urged before remains in force;—*viz*, when asked to bring the *man with the stick*, one would bring something which is neither the man nor the stick, nor the relation between these].

"But the *relation* itself is the cause or basis of the 'charactorisation'; and certainly this relation is contained in, and possessed by, both members of the relation, the *vishiṣta* as well as the *vishēṣaṇa* [so that when the *man with the stick* is wanted, the man as well as the stick will be brought in, as the relation by which the man is 'characterised' is contained by both of these]." This is not right; as in this case, it will be necessary to regard the *relation contained by the vishiṣta and the vishēṣaṇa* as distinct from mere *relation in general*; and this will be far from right [as under the circumstances, there would be no bringing of the stick when *the man with the stick* is called in]. * "But the operation will certainly bear upon that which has that relation [so that, even though the *vishiṣta* is something distinct, yet it is only that which has the relation of the *vishēṣaṇa and vishēṣya*; hence any operation upon the *vishiṣta* will certain-

* Is mere *relation in general* the basis of 'characterisation'? Or is it that relation which is contained in the *vishiṣta* &c.? In the former case, when asked to bring in *the man with the stick*, one would be justified in bringing in a jar; as this also is 'characterised' by some sort of a 'relation.' In the latter case, that *relation which is contained by the vishiṣta and vishēṣaṇa* could not be regarded as subsisting in the *vishēṣaṇa*; as this would mean that a certain thing (in this case, the *vishēṣaṇa f. i.* which forms an integral factor of the relation) subsists in itself; which is aburd! And hence the *vishēṣaṇa* would not be included in any operation that bears upon the *vishiṣta*; so that the stick would not be brought when the *man with the stick* is brought in.

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ly bear upon the *vishēṣaṇa* and the *vishēṣya*; and when the *man with the stick* is brought in, both the man and the stick will be brought in]." This also we deny; you admit that the '*vishiṣṭa*' is something different from the '*vishēṣaṇa*' &c.; so that the '*vishiṣṭa*' in a particular case (*e. g.*, in the case of the man and the stick) will be a particular *vishiṣṭa*; that is a *vishiṣṭa* characterised by the relation of a particular *vishēṣaṇa* and *vishēṣya*; and thus this *vishiṣṭa* being, *ex-hypothesi*, different from what characterises or specialises it, you cannot point out any such particular circumstance in the case of the *vishiṣṭa* as would make the operations upon it bear upon the *vishēṣaṇa* [so that the absurdity of the stick being not brought in when the man with the stick is called remains in this case also]. And in order to escape from this, if you go on adding *vishiṣṭa* after *vishiṣṭa* (arguing that the *vishiṣṭa* includes the relation and the members related &c. &c.), you only land yourself on an endless series of assumptions; and yet you do not succeed in discovering anything peculiar in any case to justify the inclusion of the *vishēṣaṇa* in any operation bearing on the *vishiṣṭa*.

(14) [Nor can the second alternative, noted in the beginning of the last paragraph, be maintained: that is, the *vishiṣṭa* cannot be regarded as not different from the *vishēṣaṇa*, the *vishēṣya* and the relation between these; for] If the '*vishiṣṭa*' were not-different from the *vishēṣaṇa*, the *vishēṣya* and the relation of these, then each of these will be liable to be called '*vishiṣṭa*'; 'so that, in the case of the *man with the stick*, the man, the stick and their relation will each be capable of being regarded as 'the man-with-the-stick'; as each of these is equally non-different from the *vishiṣṭa*, 'the man with the stick', and there would be nothing in any one of these by which it could be singled out as *the* '*vishiṣṭa*'. "What is denoted by the word '*ḍaṇḍin*', 'the man with the stick', is, not each of the three factors

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singly, but all the three collectively." What do you mean by 'collectively'?—we ask. Does it mean the three factors, *and* also that which *collects* or combines them? or does it mean the last only, as something entirely different from the three factors? In the former case, the same objection that we had urged before remains—*viz.* each of the three factors will be regarded as *vishiṣta*; and there will now be a fourth also—*viz*, the connective factor, that which combines the three—which will be so regarded. The latter view—that the connective factor is something entirely different from the three factors,—is opposed to our experience, as also to actual usage, and should therefore be rejected in the same manner as before (we have rejected the view that the '*vishiṣta*' is something totally different from the '*vishēṣaṇa*' the '*vishēṣya*' and their relation).

(15) "What is meant by the word '*vishiṣta*' is that which, while comprising the relation, is multiform (or hetergeneous) in character and is comprehended either in a single conception or in several contiguous conceptions." * This cannot be, we reply. For in the single cognition or conception '*ghaṭapaṭau*', 'the jar and the cloth', are comprehended the jar, the cloth and certain relations; and by your definition the compound '*ghaṭapaṭau*', 'the jar and the cloth' would be a '*vishiṣta*'; it is admitted by you, the Logician, that the conception 'jar and cloth' includes the generic notion of 'jar' and the generic notion of 'cloth'; and when this is admitted, it must follow from this that the notion of 'relation' also is included in the said conception; or else, how could the said conception be held to denote 'the jar as related

* 'Comprising the relation' is added for excluding the *man* by himself;—"Multiform in character' means that it comprises not the *relation* only, but the relation as well as the *relatives*; 'comprehended by a single cognition' excludes such stray disconnected conceptions as 'the man', 'the dog', 'the relation of inherence' and so forth. And 'comprehended by several contiguous cognitions' serves to exclude such conceptions as appear after long intervals.

to, qualified by, the generic character of *jar* ', and ' the cloth as related to, or qualified by, the generic character of *cloth*'?* Nor will it be quite correct to regard ' *ghatapatau* ' as ' *vishiṣta* '. For in actual usage, the compound is applied to the *jar* and the *cloth*, each independently by itself and not as related to each other : we do not, for instance, speak of the ' *ghaṭī paṭaḥ* ' (the cloth having the jar) ') or of the '*paṭī ghaṭaḥ* ' (' the jar having the cloth '), as we do of the ' *daṇḍī puruṣaḥ* ' (' the man with stick '). It will not be right, on this account, to deny that the jar and the cloth are comprehended in the single conception of '*ghata-patau* ' ; for unless both were included in the conception, how could the compound give rise to the notion of duality ? And we shall, in this connection, recall all those arguments that we have urged above in connection with *Recognition* (which has been proved to include within itself the two notions of ' this ' and ' that ', [See Chapter I, para. 184, *et. seq.*]. For these same reasons, we cannot accept the second definition that you have proposed of

* Both the ' Pandit ' and the 'Chaukhambha S. S. ' editions read—' *ghaṭatva-paṭatvasambaddhānām* &c. ' But the question of the ' *sambandha* ' being included comes towards the end of the sentence ; in fact the exclusion of ' *sambandha* ' is made to follow from the previous inclusion. The mention, therefore, of the ' *sambandha* ' in the former clause has no meaning. The argument, as explained by the *Shāṅkarī*, the *Chitsukhī* and the *Vidyāsāgarī*, is as follows :—' It may be urged by the Logician that the compound *ghatapatau* does not signify any relation between the jar and the cloth, the compound denoting only *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* ; and thus the idea of ' *sambandha* ' not entering into the conception, the case of the compound cannot come under the definition. The answer to this is that when it is admitted that the generic notions of ' jar ' and ' cloth ' (*ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*) are included in the conception, you cannot but admit that some sort of relation also is included in it : even though it may not be a relation between the jar and the cloth, yet the compound must signify that relation which, according to the Logician, subsists between the generic character of ' jar ' and the individual jar, and also that between the generic character of ' cloth ' and the particular cloth. The Logician holds that all words denote *individuals as qualified by the generic character* '.

Such being the sense of the argument, the text should read as '**घटत्वपटत्वयोरुद्भूत-भासकयोरभ्युपगमेन.**'

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'*vishista*'—as 'that which is comprehended in several conceptions, [as by this definition also the jar and the cloth, each by itself, will have to be regarded as '*vishista*'].

(16) "We shall define the '*vishista*' as that which is heterogeneous in character, is comprehended in a single conception, and is one in which *absence of relation* does not appear at all;—and as in the compound '*ghatapatau*', the '*absence of relation*' is quite manifest, it does not fall within the definition; how then can the definition be open to the objections that have been urged against it?"
Your meaning then is that in the compound '*ghatapatau*' both the *ghata* and the *pata* appear by themselves, and have *no relation* manifested with regard to them; and if the *ghata* has *no relation* whatever of itself manifested,—and the *pata* also has no relation whatever manifested,—then this would imply the total absence of all kinds of relation that may be borne by the jar and the cloth,—including also that relation which the individual jar, or the individual cloth, bears to the class 'jar' or 'cloth'; and thus the notion of '*vishista*' with regard to the jar and the cloth, based upon this latter relation, will also be demolished; as the relation of the individual to the class is as much a relation as any other relation [so that when *relation* is declared to be absent, it must include *all* relations].

(17) "We shall then define the '*vishista*' as consisting of relations of *dharma* and *dharmin*—*i. e. those of character and that to which the character belongs*,—these relations being independent, and comprehended in a single conception. This definition could never apply to the *ghatapatau*, as the jar and the cloth do not stand in the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin*." This also is not right, we reply; as for this definition it will be necessary for you to point out a single comprehensive entity in the shape of the class '*dharmatva*', which would include,

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not only the stick, but all such subordinate and qualifying factors. "That is precisely what we desire."

You may desire it; but in reality (so long as you have not explained the precise character of '*vishiṣṭa*') you will have to regard all the endless *ḍharmas* as distinct entities, each by itself, just like so many grains of sand [as even with the comprehensive class '*ḍharmaṭva*,' which alone could include *all ḍharmas*, you cannot form any comprehensive notion of *all ḍharmas*, until you have explained what is meant by '*vishiṣṭa*'; for the only explanation of the comprehensive entity '*ḍharma*' that you can provide is that it is that which is '*vishiṣṭa*', characterised, by 'ḍharmaṭva']; and hence (the notion of '*ḍharma*' also involving the conception of the '*vishiṣṭa*', for the explaining of which you bring in 'relation between *ḍharma* and *ḍharmin*'), wherefore could you not regard *ḍharmin* itself as *ḍharma*? ['*Ḍharmin*' is *vishiṣṭa* by 'ḍharma', and 'ḍharma' also is *vishiṣṭa* by 'ḍharmaṭva'].

"We cannot regard the *ḍharmin* as *ḍharma*, simply because we do not know it as such [our experience being that the *ḍharmin* is the predominant factor, and *ḍharma* the subordinate factor]." This explanation is not satisfactory; the character of 'being comprehended in a single conception', which you put forward (as the necessary factor in the '*vishiṣṭa*'), is as present in the *ḍharmin* as in the *ḍharma*; and under the circumstances, why could not the *ḍharmin* be actually known as '*ḍharma*'?

(18) "Even if there is such a comprehensive homogeneous entity as *ḍharmaṭva*, including all *ḍharmas*; we can take *ḍharma* as consisting of the diverse and heterogeneous features of individual things (the peculiar feature of a thing being regarded as its '*ḍharma*'); and such a *ḍharma* along with the *ḍharmin* and the relation (between the two) would constitute what we call '*vishiṣṭa*'; which is nothing.

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apart from those three." This definition also cannot be accepted; as all those particular features being distinct from one another, under this definition, we could not have any such comprehensive notion as '*vishiṣta*', which would include all *vishiṣtas*; and secondly, you might as well do away with the relation (just as you do away with the comprehensive notion); and the notion of '*vishiṣta*' might, as reasonably, be accounted for through the disconnected (heterogeneous) features themselves (without the intervention of a third factor in the shape of 'relation') * ;—these latter being regarded as possessed of the character necessary for the bringing about of the requisite conception of '*vishiṣta*' in all cases, just as the diverse peculiarities have been regarded by you as possessed of the character necessary for the bringing about of the *vishiṣta* conception of 'ḍhārma']. "Why should not this be so?"—you will exclaim. But, in that case, you may do away with the poor '*ḍharmin*' also! And just as the conception of '*vishiṣta*' will be provided by the sheer force of the nature of the diverse features of colour and the other qualities, even without the intervention of the factor of 'relation',—in the same manner that conception may be possible even without the factor of the 'ḍharmin'! A great victory this for the *Bauḍḍhas* (who posit nothing besides the 'specific individuality' of things and they do not admit anything as the substratum of that individuality].

(19) "We might do away with the *ḍharmin* only if our notions consisted of the quality only;—we could do away with the 'white object' only if when we conceived of the

* Even without the intervention of a comprehensive notion of *ḍharmaṭva* the diverse disconnected features can account for the notion of '*ḍharma*', which is also a '*vishiṣta*'. Why then cannot these features themselves account for the further '*vishiṣta*' conception of the '*ḍharmin*', without the intervening agency of any relation? In both cases the 'nature of things' providing the adequate explanation the only necessary condition being that they should be comprehended in a single conception; and this is present in both cases.

object, the only idea that we had were of 'white' only; as a matter of fact, however, the notion that we have is in the form 'white conch-shell',—where the object 'conch-shell' appears as co-ordinated with the quality 'white'; and thus this notion presents before us the *ḍharmin* also, (which therefore we cannot reject)." This is not right; for the specific individuality, either of the class '*shaṅkhaṭva*' or of the qualifying adjuncts of colour and the rest, appearing (in a single conception) in close juxtaposition with it, may be installed by you in the position of the '*ḍharmin*' [and it is not necessary to posit an independent *ḍharmin* apart from the *class* and the *quality*]; so that even without a substratum (in the shape of the *ḍharmin*), there may be a possibility of speaking of the two (the class '*shaṅkhaṭva* and the quality '*shukla*') as co-ordinate (as is done in the expression 'the white conch-shell.')

(20) This (that you have to do away with the '*ḍharmin*') is not the only weak point in your position; it is also open to the following objections:—On the basis of the peculiar character of the conception that people form of the *vishiṣṭa*, you have been forced to give up the *ḍharmin*; and similarly, on the basis of the peculiar character of conceptions, there will be a rejection of all the diversities that might be conceived of in connection with the objects of those conceptions; and under the circumstances, you should accept the conception or Cognition alone; and this alone, through its diverse causal efficiency, would appear in various forms, and thereby make possible the several operations of speech and action (that are met with in ordinary experience);—and as all operations may be explained on the basis of Cognition alone, you should give up your longing for the '*object*'! Thus then,—

'**The only authority for the diversity in cognised objects consists in the words in which cognitions are expressed; and so**

***Kh. II.* 68.**

when the said verbal usage is explained on the basis of the peculiar character of the Cognitions themselves, and thereby the diversity is done away with,—that same authority gives the quietus to those philosophers (who accept the reality of the external object)'. (1) *

(21) Some philosophers have denied *Negation*, and have posited in place of it, '*tanmātradhīḥ*' 'the cognition of the substratum alone by itself' †; and this is quite in keeping with the character of these philosophers:

'It is only right that Guru (Prabhākara) has posited *cognition* in the place of *negation*; for *Prabhākara* (the sun) is well known as the 'friend of Buddha' ‡ (2)

(22) Then again, if you accept the definition of *Vishiṣta* as that which is manifold, is a relation and is comprehended in a single conception,—then that which, endowed with this distinctive feature, would be called '*vishiṣta*', would always be conceived of as distinct in character from that which is *non-vishiṣta*; and thus every conception of '*vishiṣta*' would include this latter cognition (of its being distinct in character from the *non-vishiṣta*). [And thus the cognition of one distinctive feature always including the notion of distinction from something not possessed of that distinctive feature] the latter cognition (of the *vishiṣta* being different from the *non-vishiṣta*] also would involve a further cognition (of the *vishiṣta* being

* The discussion on the character of the '*vishiṣta*' has, in due course, ended in the rejection of the reality of the entire external word—of all things except 'cognition' or 'consciousness', and thus the final result of the discussion is the defeat of the Logician on a much wider field.

† Those who do not accept Negation as a distinct *padārtha* hold that when we are supposed to perceive the negation or absence of the jar in a certain place, what we have is the *perception of the place by itself alone.*

‡ A play upon the name 'Prabhākara'; this was the name of the philosopher; and it is also one of the names of the 'sun'; among the names of Buḍḍha again we find 'Arkabanḍhu', the 'Friend of the Sun'. So that the philosopher Prabhākara being Buḍḍhas, friend, it is only fit that he should hold a view that is in keeping with the tenets of the Bauḍḍha philosophy.

different from those that are not different from the *non-vishiṣta*); and in this manner the cognitions involved in a single conception of '*vishiṣta*' would be infinite. And if, with a view to escape from this, at any stage, the cognition be not included, then all that would come next to that becoming '*non-vishiṣta*', the entire series, from top to bottom, would become '*non-vishiṣta*'! "We shall simply say that the conception of '*vishiṣta*' should be *capable* of involving the further cognition (and not that it should actually involve the further cognition; so that there can be no conception of cognitions *ad infinitum*)." Then this 'capability' is a further qualification of the '*vishiṣta*'; and as such would only lead to the further disintegration of the notion of '*vishiṣta*' into disconnected individual *vishiṣtas*—like so many grains of sand [and would not help you to form a comprehensive notion of all '*vishiṣtas*', to provide which should be the principal function of every definition]:—this we have already pointed out above. The same may also be said with regard to the other qualifications figuring in the definition—such as 'single', 'conception', 'comprehended', and so forth (every qualification tending to disintegrate instead of congregating or centralising the notion of '*vishiṣta*').

(23) Thus then,

'In case the idea of being different from *non-vishiṣta* enters into (or is involved in) the notion of '*vishiṣta*',—then either there is an unceasing (never-ending) series of ideas (involved in every such notion); or there is no notion of '*vishista*' at all, even at the bottom.' (3)

Section (3).

[Having demolished the notions of 'negation' and of '*vishiṣta*', the author takes up the definition of such special categories as Substance, Quality and the rest; as the definition of every one of these involves the notion of '*vishiṣta*', which is inseparable from all definitions. As the function of definition consists in the pointing of the peculiar qualifications of a thing; and when a qualification is pointed out, it means that the thing defined is 'qualified', '*vishiṣta*,' by that qualification.]

(24) The above refutation of the notion of '*vishiṣta*' implies the refutation of all definitions—such definitions, for instance, as that 'Substance is the substratum of qualities.' [For this involves the notion that substance is qualified, *vishiṣta*, by the character of being the substratum of Qualities].

(25) The definition of Substance as 'the substratum of Qualities' is untenable for the following reasons also :—How can we be sure of the fact that the definition applies to Substances *only*—when we find Colour and other qualities also being possessed of the quality of *Number*, and thus being 'the substratum of quality'. "This notion, of being the substratum of qualities, with regard to Colour and other Qualities, must be regarded as a mistake." You should, in that case, explain why the same notion should not be regarded as a mistake, in the case of Earth and other Substances also. "In the case of the latter we do not find any subsequent cognitions sublating the said notion; so we cannot regard it as a mistake." The same may be said with regard to Colour and the other qualities also. "We cannot but assert that the notion of qualities subsisting in Qualities is sublated; as it is our well-established tenet that Qualities are devoid of qualities." This will not help you; as it is impossible to determine that Colour &c., are 'qualities'.

(26) * "But it is a demonstrated truth with us that that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is Quality [and

* The refutation of the definition of Substance in the last paragraph is made to lead on to the definition of the Logician's second category, Quality.

this definition of Quality will enable us to determine that Colour &c., are qualities]." This definition of Quality will not help you; the *absence of qualities* forms an essential element in this definition, and what this *absence of qualities* means cannot yet be determined (so long as you have not provided an adequate definition of Quality); specially as even you attribute the quality of 'number' to qualities (regarding them as 24 in number); [and in the face of this conviction, it is difficult to conceive of Quality as being devoid of qualities]. "This conception of number with regard to Qualities must be regarded as erroneous." This is not right; as this leads you into the vicious circle of interdependence; you base your definition of Quality on the erroneousness of the notion that number belongs to Qualities,—and again you base your idea of the erroneousness of the notion upon a sublation which you base upon the aforesaid definition! Nor is it possible for you to determine, on the basis of some other reason, that Colour &c. are qualities,—and then to prove the sublation and erroneousness of the notion under discussion for the corroborrative instance that you will bring forward in support of your reason will always be in the form of a certain well-known quality; and as that also will be what is possessed of number, it will be a part of the object whose exact nature is under dispute; so that the fact that it is itself a quality will be far from definitely ascertained [hence any corroboration by such an instance would be absolutely futile]. "There is the quality of Number itself, which cannot be regarded as possessed of the quality of number; as to attribute number to Number would lead us into a *regressus ad infinitum*; thus having got a quality devoid of quality, we can cite this as the required corroborative instance." This also will not be possible; as number (even though without number) possesses the quality of Separateness; and thus not being 'devoid of qualities', Number also forms part of the object under dis-

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pute [and so cannot act as an efficient corroborative instance]. For the same reasons, *Separateness* also cannot serve as the required instance; as this also is endowed with Number.

(27) [*Page* 581] Nor will it be right for you to define Quality as 'that which is not the substratum of anything except Community and which is not of the nature of Action'; as this definition will include Community also (which is not the substratum of anything else except genus, i. e., it is the substratum of its own character) and it is also not of the nature of Action. "What is meant is that Quality is the substratum of Community *only* [which cannot apply to *Community* which is the substratum of various individuals also]." Such a definition will not apply to any Quality at all; as every quality is the substratum of the negation (of every other quality) [*Colour* contains the negation of *Touch*, and so forth, so that no quality is the substratum of *Community only*]. "What we mean is that Community is the only *positive entity* of which Quality is the substratum [and negation is not a positive entity.]" This also cannot be accepted; as Qualities are the substratum of many positive entities, in the shape of the *upāḍhis* or characters (in the form of *nameability*, *knowability* and the like, which subsist in all Qualities). "Colour and the other qualities are not exactly the substratum of Upāḍhis; they are in some way *related* to these; and it is on the basis of this general relationship (between Colour &c. and the Upāḍhis) that Inference and the rest proceed (in connection with Colour &c.)." This is not right; as a matter of fact, the relation of the characters must be taken to be that between the container and the contained;

* Inference proceeds on the basis of a certain character subsisting in the subject; if no character subsists in qualities, how can there be any inference with regard to them? The answer is that for the purposes of inference it is not necessary that qualities should be the *substratum* of the characters; it is enough if they are in some way related to the character; this some sort of relation would afford the basis necessary for all inferential processes.

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i. e. that to which the characters belong must be regarded as the *substratum* of these (and not only as related in some indefinite manner). Otherwise—i. e. if no positive character be held to subsist in qualities,—no universal or particular inferences could proceed in regard to them; as unless the characters (that form the basis of inferences) *subsist in the same substratum,* they do not prove anything with regard to the subject of the Inference.* Thus then (if you insist upon the view that no positive character can subsist in qualities), the definition that you have provided cannot be in the form of a positive generic entity (as all definitions ought to be, being intended to include a number of things) [for if the definition were a positive generic entity, it could not, under your theory, subsist in qualities]; and it would come to this, that if the definition (being a positive character) does not subsist in Colour and other qualities, then it subsists in them (*i.e.* then alone it is the true definition of these); and if it does subsist in them, then it does not subsist in them (i.e. then it is not a true definition);—this would be a wonderful riddle indeed! —exactly resembling such riddles as —*laga ityuktē na lagati mā lagētyuktē lagati* [This riddle has not been explained either by the *Shaṅkarī or* by the *Vidyāsāgarī*]

* For instance, in regard to colour, we have the inference.—" This that I perceive must be colour, because it is apprehended by only one external organ of the Eye,'; and here the positive character of being apprehended &c. must subsist in colour and in the object before the eyes; if the said character had not both of these as its substratum, and if it subsisted, not in colour, but in an entirely different thing, then it could not lead to the inference of colour; and so on with regard to all inferences in connection with qualities. This is an instance of a universal inference; in all inferences the probans and the probandum must subsist in the same substratum. As regards particular inferences, we infer the fact of a certain sound coming from a short distance from its loudness; now if the positive character of loudness subsisted in the Sound, no such inference could be possible. The translation adopts the explanation of the *Shaṅkarī.* The *Vidyāsāgarī* offers a somewhat different interpretation. If no positive character subsisted in qualities then there could be no inferences in regard to some qualities being *general* and others *special,* as these latter are positive characters; so if these be inferred to exist in qualities, the conclusion would be contrary to fact; an impossible one.'

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(28) [Page 582] Then again, when you define Substance as the 'substratum of Qualities,' what does the word 'substratum' signify? "It signifies *inherence*". This cannot be; as in that case the Community of *guṇatva* would also become a Substance; as the inherence of qualities subsists in that Community (the relation between the individual *guṇa* and the Community *guṇatva* being that of *inherence*). "What is meant by the word *guṇāshraya*, is *guṇasamavāyī*; which means *that in which quality inheres.*" This also will not be right; as what you have got to determine is precisely the real meaning of *āshraya*; and as this *āshraya* is what is expressed by the Locative in the expression 'in which', it is not right for you to explain the meaning of *āshraya* by means of such expressions as denote the same *āshraya*; as this involves the incongruity of explaining a thing by itself [an undesirable 'circle']. "What is meant by *āshraya* or *substratum* is that which forms the basis of the notion of 'in this'." We cannot accept this; as if this were the meaning of 'substratum,' then, in the case of the wrong notion 'there is yellowness *in this* conchshell', the conchshell will have to be accepted as the (real) substratum of the yellowness [while in reality it is not the substratum of yellowness; and yet as it forms the basis of the notion of 'in this', it must, under the definition, be regarded as the substratum of yellowness]. But the notion ('there is yellowness in this conchshell') is erroneous; and what is meant is that which forms the basis of the right notion of 'in this'." This will not be right; as we could never recognise the invalidity or erroneousness of the notion ('there is yellowness in this conchshell') until we had ascertained the fact of the object of that notion being non-existent; and as the precise signification of the notion of 'in this' is still to be determined, it will not be possible for you to ascertain the non-existence of the object *in that substratum* [and until this is done the erroneousness of the notion 'there is yellowness in this conchshell'

cannot be ascertained; and so long as this is not done, the conchshell will have to be accepted as the real substratum of the yellowness]. "As a matter of fact, it is yellowness that is the counter-entity of the non-existence,—i. e. whose non-existence is to be ascertained; and certainly this yellowness is known to be really existent somewhere (though not in the conchshell.)" That will not help you; as if the *existence* of yellowness is truly known, it will not be possible or right to assert its *non-existence.* "But even though its existence somewhere else may be quite real, yet as cognised in the conch-shell, its existence cannot be real [and it is in regard to the conchshell that the non-existence of yellowness is asserted]." This explanation will not serve your purpose; as you have still to define the precise meaning of the Locative—Substratum——that you make use of in your explanation, in the expression '*in the conchshell*'.

(29) The above reasonings also dispose of another definition of Substance, as 'that which is the material or constituent cause of things.' In the first place, how can it be ascertained what is, and what is not, a constituent cause. Secondly, we find that Colour and the other *qualities* are just as much the 'constituent cause' of Number, as the jar and the other *substances* are [and thus the definition is as applicable to Qualities as to Substances]. "But as a matter of fact, Number does not subsist in Colour and the other Qualities". How then does it subsist in the jar and the other Substances? If we appeal to actual experience and to popular ideas on the subject, we find that the idea of number belonging to Colour &c. is as common as that of its belonging to the jar &c.; and we may in this connection urge the same arguments that we made use on a previous occasion. "If we regard number as belonging to Substances only, we can explain the popular ideas of number belonging to Qualities as based upon the Substances in which these Qualities inhere

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(and not to the Qualities themselves); and this would be a much simpler method than to attribute Number to both Substances and Qualities: and under the circumstances, we should not accept the idea that Number subsists in Qualities." We cannot accept this view; why should we not accept the contrary to be the case? Why should we not attribute Number primarily to Qualities, and only through these to Substances? Then again, why should you accept the view that the Community of 'Being' and such other Communities subsist in Qualities? Certainly the popular conception of these subsisting in Qualities could also be explained as being based upon Substances in which the Qualities subsist [just as you have urged in regard to Number].

[The definition of the category of 'Community,' *Sāmānya*, is next taken up,—it becoming necessary in connection with the last argument, to determine the exact nature of the Sāmānya, which is held by the Logician to belong to Substance and Quality alike.

(30) What again is the meaning of 'Community'? It will not be correct to define it as *the cause of comprehensive conception;* as every effect is, in reality, produced by the entire causal apparatus (in general); consequently the definition will include not only the entire apparatus in general, but also the several parts of it. "We shall add to our definition the qualification 'peculiar' or 'special'; so that 'Community', being 'the special cause of comprehensive conception', would be that which does not produce any other kind of effect, (except comprehensive conception) [and this definition could not include the entire causal apparatus, which are productive of many kinds of effects]." This definition also cannot be accepted; for (even though with the further qualification, the definition will not apply to causal apparatus *in general,* yet) it will include the whole range of that causal apparatus (i. e. all the special circumstances) that produce that special effect [of comprehensive conception, which is brought about, not by 'Community' alone, but by the parti-

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cular means of cogniion by which the particular object is cognised, and many such factors besides]; and further as a matter of fact, we find that 'Community' also serves the purpose of bringing about several other cognitions besides the comprehensive cognition ; for instance, it also brings about the cognition of difference among things (e. g. when one animal is cognised as being different from another on the ground that they are found to be possessed of different Communities) [so that the definition, 'that which does not produce any other kind of effect,' cannot apply to such Communities as bring about the cognition of difference and such other effects].

(31) "Community may be defined as that whose authority, (or rational basis) consists in this conception (i. e. comprehensive conception) [it is this comprehensive conception which leads to the *inference* of 'Community'." This also cannot be maintained; as the comprehensive conception forms the authority, or basis, of the inference of its entire causal apparatus [which apparatus will thus be included in the definition]. "But Community is that for which the comprehensive conception is the *sole* authority or means of inferring [the rest of the causal apparatus being known or inferred on the basis of many other things also; e.g. the eye, which is one important factor in the cognising of the Community belonging to the animal that is seen, is capable of being inferred on the basis of the perception of colour; and so on for every other factor; but the community can be inferred or known on the basis of the *comprehensive conception* only : Where there is no notion of comprehension or inclusion of many things under one category, there is no 'community']." This also is not tenable, we reply; as there are many other things that provide a valid basis for the cognition of 'community'; o.g. the different kinds of effective action [when a number of things are found to have one uniform effective action, they come to be included under one category; that is known as belonging to one 'community'; so that the proposed definition becomes too narrow].

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(32) A third definition is proposed:—"Community is that of which the comprehensive conception is the only right cognition [this will not include the causal apparatus of the conception; as that apparatus is inferred from the said conception, which cannot be called the right cognition of the apparatus]." This also cannot be accepted; as this definition will apply to that (individual) which is qualified by that 'community."* "What is meant is that which has for its right cognition that portion of it which appertains to the generic factor [so that the individual becomes excluded]."† This also cannot be accepted; as this definition, involving as it does the conception of Community itself, cannot be established (and comprehended and accepted) until the Community itself has been established and defined.

(33) "We shall then define 'Community' as that without which no comprehensive conception is possible." This also cannot be maintained; as there are many other causes also without which no comprehensive conception is possible [e. g. the contact of the Soul and Mind, and such other causes without which no cognition is possible; all of which will thus be included in the definition].

(34) Nor can we accept the definition of 'Community' as *that which is comprehensive.* For what do you mean by this 'comprehensiveness'? "It means subsistence of more than one". This cannot be; as *the composite whole* and such relationships as *conjunction and the like* are those in which more than one factor subsist. [The *composite whole* consisting of

* Even though the individual cow by itself is not apprehended by a comprehensive conception, yet when we recognise the animal as a "cow"—*i. e.* as belonging to the category of 'cow', *i.e.* as qualified by the community 'cow'—this involves that *of which comprehensive conception is the only right cognition*.

† In the case of the cognition of the animal as 'cow', there are two factors—the *individual* pertaining to the particular animal cognised, and the *generic*, pertaining to the Community 'cow' to which the animal belongs. Now 'community' will be that whose right cognition consists of the latter of these two factors which, not pertaining to the individual factor, this latter becomes excluded from the definition.

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many component particles, and *conjunction* being the relation between *two* things]. "We shall add the further qualification of 'eternality'." Even so, the definition will apply to Inherence (which according to the Logician is an eternal relation, subsisting between more things than one). For the same reason 'comprehensiveness' cannot be defined as consisting in the *subsistence of many things.* "We can add the qualification, *that which is not of the nature of a relation* [so that Inherence will be excluded]." Even with this qualification, the definition will apply to atoms [which, according to the Logician, subsist in, i. e. in connection with, many points of space, with every one of which the atom is held to be in contact].

(35) "We shall then define 'Community' as that which is eternal and which inheres in many things [so that atoms will be excluded, which do not *inhere* in many things; their subsistence in regard to the points in space being in the form of *contact*, not *inherence*]." This also is untenable; as neither of the two alternatives possible with regard to it can be maintained: For instance, the definition can be either eternal or non-eternal. It cannot be eternal; as this will involve the incongruity of its operating by itself on itself [on the part of 'eternality', which forming an integral factor of the definition will be qualified by the eternality belonging to that definition]; even though in the definition 'eternality' appears only as a qualifying (and hence subdinate) factor, yet it is 'eternality' all the same. Nor will it be right to regard the definition as 'non-eternal'; as in that case, 'Community' itself, as well as 'Inherence' (which forms the essential factor of the definition), will both have to be regarded as *non-eternal* (which will not be in keeping with the Logician's tenets); and [even if, with a view to escape from the said difficulty, the non-eternality of the definition be attributed to the *individuals,* which also form

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a factor of the definition, and not to the *Communities*] then also as regards the Self and such other entities (of which the *individuals* also are held to be eternal) there will be no possibility of that 'non-eternality' which would be attributed to the definition by virtue of the 'non-eternality' of the individuals that form an essential factor in the definition. Then again, the definition cannot be said to be non-eternal unless it is admitted that at some time or the other it does not exist; and if this be admitted, it would imply that the cognition or notion of the definition is, at times, false (i. e., at the time that it does not exist); and thus what is false at one time will become liable to be regarded as false at all times; as the character of the thing remains the same; and this would make the definition an absolute non-entity, not existing at any time at all! As if it's existence at any one time be admitted, and the definition be regarded as real, not false,—then, that character remaining the same, it will have to be regarded as real and no non-existence (and consequent non-eternality) will be possible! "But when a certain thing happens to be related to, and hence characterised by, a certain definition, it should continue to be so characterised at other times also, the characterised thing remaining the same [so that even when the definition has ceased to exist, it can be regarded as characterising the thing defined, and it will be quite possible to regard the thing as characterised by that definition]." This cannot be; as in the case in question, no such (comprehensive) characterisation (by any definition) is possible; the number of individuals (and communities) being many and diverse. Thus we conclude that the definition cannot be regarded as *non-eternal*.

(36) The above reasonings serve to refute the notion of 'eternality' in regard to other things also. [So that we cannot accept any definition involving the idea of 'eternality']. *

* For instance, Ākāsha has been regarded as eternal; if this 'eternality' of Ākāsha is eternal, then there is a vicious circle; if it is not eternal, then the

Kh. II. 81.

[The definition of 'Community' is meant to exclude 'Individuality', hence the consideration of the former leads on to the consideration of the latter.]

(37) Then again, we ask—what is it that is excluded by the above definition of 'Community'? "Why, it excludes 'Specific Individuality' and the other categories (Substance, Quality &c.)." But what is it that you call 'Specific Individuality'? You will perhaps define it as 'that which necessarily subsists in Substances only, and of these also in those only that are eternal? But this definition cannot be accepted; as it is found to be too wide, being applicable to such entities as '*āṭmaṭva*' and the like ['*āṭmaṭva*' subsisting only in the eternal substance *Āṭman*]. "But *āṭmaṭva* does not subsist in any other eternal substance except the *Āṭman*; while the Specific Individualities must subsist in all eternal substances; and this is what we mean by the qualification 'which necessarily subsists'." In that case the definition becomes untenable, by reason of its not applying to any one Specific Individuality (as no single Individuality ever subsists in *all* eternal substances). "What is meant is that the definition applies to that Community to which all Individualities belong." But you do not admit of 'Community' in regard to Individualities [according to the Logician, Substance, Quality and, Action are the only categories that can have Community]. "What we mean by the Individualities belonging to the 'Community' is that they are all distinguished by a certain common character (from all other things)". We cannot accept this explanation; for if this common character serves to distinguish the Individualities from all other things, then there is no need for any further definition based upon that common

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Akāsha also becomes non-eternal. As the Vēḍānṭin himself accepts the Self to be eternal, the above condemnation of the very notion of eternality has been interpreted by the *Shāṅkari* to mean only the condemnation of those *definitions* which involve the notion of eternality.

character; as the only purpose for which a definition is required is the distinguishing of the thing defined from all other things; and this purpose is served by the said character itself; on the other hand, if the said common character does not serve to distinguish the Individualities from all other things, then the definition itself becomes incomprehensible; as it cannot be determined what belongs to the same class or community as 'Individualities' [and without this the definition cannot apply to any single Individuality, as shown above]. "All right; we may accept that 'common character' itself as a definition of Individuality [serving as it does to distinguish all individualities from everything else]." This will not be right; as you have not yet explained what you mean by 'common character' (*upāḍhi*).

(38) "We can define 'Specific Individuality' as that through which the Yogins have the cognition of eternal individual substances as distinct from the rest of the world." This definition also cannot be accepted; as it will apply to all those specific forms and specific qualities (through which Yogins have the cognition of many individual things as distinct from the rest of the world, which things are not always eternal). Otherwise [i. e. if in order to escape from this, it be held that the specific forms or qualities do not serve to distinguish individual things, and that Specific Individualities alone are capable of affording such distinctive cognition], how could there be any distinctive cognition with regard to such individual substances as are products (and hence not eternal), or to individual qualities and the rest (which are not Substance)? And [if it be urged that the distinctive cognition of these could be got at through other distinctive properties possessed by them] just as these are endowed with other distinctive properties, so also are the eternal substances [so that in the case of these latter also the required distinctive cognition could be got at through these other distinctive

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properties, and there would be no necessity for the postulating of 'Specific Individualities'.] Lastly 'Specific Individualities' themselves are not possessed of further such Individualities [and yet you are able to have distinctive cognition of the Specific Individualities,—so, in the same manner, even when the individual eternal Substances have no 'Specific Individuality', you could have distinctive cognition of those substances; which proves the utter futility of postulating any such thing as 'Specific Individuality']. Thus we find that everything that you wish to define comes to be wiped out of existence !

(39) Then again, in regard to all definitions of 'Specific Individuality' and other things, if the definition is different from the thing defined [as it must be], then, how is it possible that through such a definition, that thing alone, and nothing else, should be known by the particular name (occurring in the definition)? "It is the relation (borne by the definition to the particular thing) that would restrict the application of the name." That is not possible, we reply; firstly because the relationship between the relation and the things related will also need something whereby its connection could be restricted; and so on and on, there would be no end to the assumption of 'relations'; as without some such restrictive 'relation', there would be no restriction at all; and secondly because you have still got to define what 'relation' is.

[The refutation of the definitions of 'Relation' is next taken up].

(40) What, we ask, do you mean by the word '*sambandha*', 'relation'? "Inherence and the rest are what are meant by the word 'relation'." True; but what is meant by our question is—on what basis, for what reason, are Inherence and the rest known as 'relation'? That is to say, is it on the basis of '*samyogaṭva*', '*samavāyaṭva*' and the

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like—the specific character of each kind of 'Relation'—taken each exclusively by itself? Or is it on the basis of something else? If the former, then any comprehensive conception of all kinds of relations would be an impossibility; and yet [the possibility of such comprehensive conception cannot be denied as] there are such comprehensive notions involved in the assertions——(a) 'Perception is cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object' (Nyāya-Sū. 1. 1. 5) [where 'Contact' stands for both kinds of relation, Inherence and Conjunction, which shows that the Sūṭra involves a comprehensive notion of the two kinds of relation], —and (b) 'Inherence is constant association' [where also 'association' includes both Inherence and Conjunction; or else the qualification 'constant' would be superfluous]. Nor can Inherence &c. be known as 'relation' on the basis of something other than '*Samyogaṭva*' &c. As it is impossible to form the comprehensive idea of any such determinant (that will serve as the basis for all kinds of relation).

(41) "Certainly, the idea of '*niyāmakaṭva*', the generic notion of 'determinant' in the abstract, would serve as the necessary basis." This is not possible; as you regard the nature of things also as determinant of the thing; and this nature is certainly not a 'relation' [consequently, the 'determinant' in the abstract could not serve as the basis for the comprehensive notion of 'relation']. "But when the nature serves as a determining basis it must be regarded as a 'relation'." That cannot be; it is absolutely necessary for you to regard the nature of all things as determinants (as it is only by means of its nature that anything can ever be determined); and under the circumstances, when you come to define the character of 'determinant' as 'necessary existence before the determination' (the 'determinant' being defined as that which must exist before the determining),—it would be enough for you

to define it merely by 'existence' (the 'determinant' being 'that which exists'), and the rest of your definition would be absolutely meaningless. Then again [the determined and the determinant being regarded as identical], if what is sought to be determined is one that is never found to be unduly extensive (beyond its own well-defined limits), then the very name of the 'determinant' becomes a misnomer [as what by its very nature always keeps within well-defined limits does not need to be defined by any determining agency]. If, on the other hand, what is sought to be determined is one that is unduly extensive, then (the determined and the determinant being, *ex-hypothesi*, identical) the determinant also would be unduly extensive; and what is itself unduly extensive cannot serve the purpose of defining (or determining or keeping within well-defined limits) anything else.

(42) Then again [does the determinant do the determining after it has itself come into existence? or without coming into existence?]—if the defining is done after the determinant has come into existence, then what is determined will have to be regarded as undetermined, undefined, before the coming into existence of the particular determinant [and the determined and the determinant being identical, what is undefined before coming into existence, could not become well-defined after coming into existence].

(43) Similarly with all cases of such determining as is brought about by other causes [and in which case the *determined* and the *determinant* are not identical, but distinct]. For instance, when the jar is 'determined,' by its cause, if the cause, before the production of the jar, is itself not determined in the form of, as pertaining to, the jar, and yet it produces the jar, then that same cause would produce the cloth and such other effects also [as there is nothing to restrict the operation of the cause to the *jar* only]. "When we speak of the *determining* of the jar by its cause, we do not mean that the

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cause determines the jar; what we mean is that it determines its connection with the particular point of time." This cannot be, we reply. For [if what is determined by the cause is the connection of a particular point of time *with the jar*, then, as pointed out before, this determining will not be possible before the jar is produced; and] if what is determined is only the *connection of the point of time*, not necessarily *of the jar*,—then the same cause might as well determine the connection of time with the cloth and other things also! Thus then—

'If the cause were to determine, with reference to a particular time, a thing (the jar) which does not exist and which is not determined by any particular time,—then it could also similarly determine any other thing (the cloth also, which would be just as non-existent and as undetermined as the jar); or if it could not so determine it, then it would be entirely devoid of the determining power.' (4).

And further, if the cause be regarded as the determinant of the effect, on the basis of their existing at different points of time,—then, why could not there be a determining of what precedes (*i. e.*, the cause) by what follows, (*i. e.*, the effect) ? There would be nothing to determine which of the two (Cause or Effect) determines the other [as the only basis for the assuming of determining consists in the two appearing at different points of time, without any idea as to what comes first and what afterwards]. And thus,—

'If it be held that what follows is determined by what precedes it,—then, why could not there be the determining of what precedes by what follows? Nor again could sequence or precedence be ascertained when the series (of Cause and Effect) are beginningless and endless.' (5).

(44) [P. 592] If (in order to escape from the above difficulties) it be held that the determining is done by the determinant before it comes into existence,—then this would involve a contradiction in terms.

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(45) There is yet another objection to the view that 'the nature of a thing may be regarded as its relation':—As a matter of fact, the relative is the *container*, and the relation the *contained*; and so, if the nature of a thing itself were to constitute its relation, it would mean that the thing is its own container, which is absurd: even a well-trained dancing boy does not do the dancing by getting upon his own shoulders! Nor can the relation be held to be of something else (different from the relation itself); as you have yourself denied this (by declaring that relation consists in the nature of the thing related); for your position is that 'this (the relation) is based on the very nature of the thing'; and this view does not admit of any determining by the relation of anything different from itself; and under the circumstances, how could you, consistently with your view, regard the relative as something different from the relation?

(46) Then again, in whatsoever manner you may define the character of 'relation,' you must admit the presence of that character in Inherence (which is one form of relation postulated by you);—and [if this character is a positive entity, it must be included under one of the six categories, Substance and the rest, accepted by you; and under the circumstances that character could never subsist in Inherence; as] Inherence, always itself subsisting in substances can never be the substratum of any of the six categories [and the said character must be one of these categories]

"The character in question may be only of the nature of an *Upāḍhi* or adventitious attribute, for which it would be possible to subsist in Inherence."

This cannot be; as even this attribute could subsist in Inherence only by some sort of relation to it; but as a matter of fact, the relation between that attribute and Inherence could not be either one of Conjunction or Inherence; and the only third relation postulated by you

is the *natural relation*; and the possiblity of this has already been refuted. Nor, with a view to escape from these difficulties, will it be right to regard the character in question as an '*abhāva*,' a negative entity (and as such not included in any of the six categories). As in that case it will be necessary for you to provide an adequate explanation of the exact nature of that 'entity' which is negatived by the negative particle in the word '*abhāva*.' [And it will not be possible for you to provide this adequate explanation]. And according to you the entire world must be exhausted (contained) in the 'seven categories'; as six of these are 'entities' and the seventh 'non-entity'; and 'entity' and 'non-entity' being contradictory terms, must include all things. [And as the character in question cannot be an entity, or a non entity, it cannot be accepted].

[The notion of 'substratum' 'receptacle' or 'container' is next taken up].

(47) Then again, if the *determinant* is different from the *determined*, how is it that it determines only that, and nothing else? "Well, that is due to the fact that that alone is its *ādhāra* or substratum." What do you mean by 'substratum'?—we ask. "The substratum of a thing is that wherein it is located (or situated)." This is not right; as it still remains to be explained what is the signification of the Locative in the word 'wherein.'

(48) "We may define the substratum as that with regard to which we have the notion of 'here', 'herein', 'in this'." This also cannot be accepted; as, by this definition, that with regard to which we have the notion of 'there', 'therein', 'in that' would cease to be a 'substratum'. And further, this definition will involve a clear case of objectionable interdependence: we can have the notion of 'herein' only after we know of the thing as the 'substra-

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tum' of another thing [without which knowledge we cannot have any notion of the thing being situated 'herein']; and (by your definition) we can know what is a 'substratum' only when we have the notion of 'herein'.

(49) "The Substratum is that in which something inheres—subsists *by inherence*". This also cannot be accepted; as it will not apply to such notions of substratum as we meet with in the following conceptions—'there is absence of horns *in the hare*', 'the jujube fruit is *in the vessel*' [in which cases the subsistence is not by inherence, but by conjunction, and yet it cannot be denied that the Hare and the Vessel are the 'substratum' of the *absence of horn* and the *jujube fruit* respectively]. "In such cases as you have cited, in which the subsistence is not by inherence, the name of 'substratum' can be applied only figuratively." This is not enough; what you should add is that the very idea of such things being regarded as 'substratum' is wrong! "Well, yes! What then!" Why should it not be the other way? [That is, we may as well regard as *correct*, the application of the name 'substratum' to cases where the subsistence is by relations other than inherence; and regard as *wrong* its application to cases of subsistence by inherence]. And further, if the notion that 'the hare is the substratum of the absence of horns' were wrong (as you hold), then the hare would be a real substratum of the horn! As of two contradictories, the *horn* and the *horn's absence*,—the denial of one must imply the affirmation of the other.

(50) "The Substratum, then, may be defined as that which prevents falling." This also cannot be accepted; as this definition will not apply to the case of the *composite whole* (of which the component parts are the substratum), or to that of Qualities (of which Substances are the substratum); as in either of these cases the substratum does not serve the purpose of preventing falling. [If the component

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particles prevented the composite whole from falling, then there would be no falling at all for any composite whole].

(51) "The substratum of a thing may be defined as that which is situated immediately below that thing." This also is not tenable; as in the first place, there is nothing to prove that the substance to which certain qualities belong is situated *below* those qualities [and it cannot be denied that the substance is the substratum of the qualities];—*secondly*, (even admitting that the substance possessing the quality is below the quality),—inasmuch as the component particles of a composite substance would be as much below the qualities of the composite substance as the composite substance itself, the particles also will have to be regarded as the substratum of those qualities (which, in reality, belong to the substance as one composite whole, and not to its component particles);—*thirdly*, when of two objects in contact with one another, one is above the other, the upper object will be *above* (not *below*) the conjunction; and as such, could not by the present definition, be regarded as the substratum of that conjunction;—*fourthly*, the definition will not apply to many such cases as that of an object hanging by a thread [where even though the thread is *above* the object, it is regarded as its substratum, the thread being contained in the object].

(52) "If we do not find it possible to fix upon a single denotation of the word 'Locative' or 'Substratum', then we can attribute to it more than one denotation,—as we do in the case of such words as '*akṣa*' and the like (which have more than one meaning)." This is not possible; as if the '*āshraya*', 'substratum', had no one uniform character, then there would be no unformity of character in the fallacy of '*āshrayāsiḍḍhi*' and such other conceptions as involve the idea of '*āshraya*'. "We may accept the diversity of character in all these." That will not be

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right; as in that case, the exact enumeration of the fallacies of '*asiḍḍhi*' (as found in the standard Nyāya works), upon which all usage is based, would be wrong [as the number of '*āshrayāsiḍḍhi*' itself would be very much more than the number attributed to all the '*asiḍḍhis*' combined];—and further, it would be impossible to indicate any character that would afford the basis for a comprehensive idea of all those several kinds; for instance, in some cases the *āshraya* is that in which the thing inheres [e. g. when a substance is spoken of as the *āshraya* of a quality]; while this character can never belong either to that wherein a negation subsists [e. g. when we speak of a place as the *āshraya* of the jar's absence, in which case, the relation is not by *inherence*, but by the relation of simple qualification],—or to Inherence when it is put forward as a probans subsisting in the probandum [e. g. when we speak of the Earth as distinct from Water, &c., because it is the *āshraya* of the inherence of the community '*pṛiṭhivīṭva*', where, according to the Logician himself it will not be right to hold that the Inherence inheres in the Earth].

[PAGE 596] (53) In view of these indisputable facts, the Opponent says:—"We shall admit that the denotations of the word '*āshraya*' are diverse,—diverse also are the several kinds of *āshrāyasiḍḍhi* and the rest, taken each singly by itself; and as regards the exact number of '*asiḍḍhi*' laid down in our treatises, we must explain these enumerations differently, in view of the fact that the ordinarily accepted interpretation of these is found to be contrary to well-known facts (as you have shown above)." Even this admission well not help you very far; for even though all this may be possible, yet you have to explain what will be the exact sense of '*āḍhāra*' ('*āshraya*', 'substratum') in the case of the expression 'the jujube fruit in the vessel'. (*a*) It could not be explained as *that which prevents falling*; as it is quite possible for the fruit to fall along with the vessel containing

it,—in which case the vessel, which is its *āshraya*, does not prevent its falling. (b) Nor will it be right to explain it as *that with which the thing contained is in contact*; as both the things being equally in contact with each other, one would be as justified, by the definition, in regarding the fruit as the 'āḍhāra' of the vessel, as *vice versa* ! (c) Nor, with a view to avoid this difficulty, will it be right to define the 'āḍhāra' as that with which the other thing is in contact, and which lies below this other thing; as even though this definition may be applicable to the case of the fruit in the vessel, it will fail in other cases : *e. g.* when the soles of the feet are smeared with particles of dust, where the dust-particles [even though having the foot-sole in contact with them, and lying below the foot-sole] are not regarded as the '*āḍhāra*' of the foot; in fact, on the contrary, the foot-sole is regarded as containing the dust-particles, and as such, being their '*āḍhāra*'; and thus the definition being found failing in such other cases, cannot be accepted as correct, even with regard to the particular case that we have been considering (of the fruit contained in the vessel). "The last explanation of 'āḍhāra' is not intended to be applicable to all cases; it is meant to apply to only some cases (and this it does)—according to the view that the character of 'āḍhāra' is diverse (and not one only)." This does not help you at the present juncture: it may be possible for some other definition of '*āḍhāra*' to apply to some other cases; but what you now put forward as the definition is not possible, for the simple reason that it is found applicable to things (*e. g.*, the dust-particles on the foot-sole) that are never known as '*āḍhāra*,' as we have shown above. "With a view to avoid this difficulty, we shall add the further qualification that the *āḍhāra* has a size larger than that of what it contains." This will not be right; as this qualification will not apply to the case of a large mass of cotton held on the palm of the hand

[when the *āḍhāra*, the hand, is smaller in size than the mass of cotton it holds]; nor can the '*āḍhāra*' in this case, be explained as something else. Then again, your definition contains the word '*aḍhaḥ*,' 'below,' 'underneath,'—and you cannot determine the exact signification of this word.

(54.) "We regard that thing as 'below' which lies in the direction of falling." This will not be right; as 'falling' cannot be explained as anything other than 'going below or downwards'—which is only the idea of 'below' having the notion of 'going' added to it [and thus the definition of 'below' by 'falling' would involve a vicious circle]. It was for this reason that the Great Teacher of Aḍvaiṭa (Ribhu), knowing that it is impossible to define the exact meaning of the word 'below,' explained the refutation (of the use of such word as 'below' and 'above') to his pupil (Niḍāgha),—a refutation that has been thus summed up by the revered Parāshara :—'what is it that is called by the name *below*, and what which is called *above*?'

(55.) "We can explain the word 'below' as signifying the direction towards the Earth." This also cannot be accepted; as it is possible (in certain cases) for the word 'above' also to signify the direction towards the Earth (for instance, when the word 'above' is used by the inhabitants of Pāṭāla). "Whenever we speak of the 'direction towards the Earth' it is also in relation to something (*e. g.*, the Sun); and with reference to this something the 'direction towards the Earth' will be 'below.'"* This is not right. What do you mean by 'with reference to which'? (*a*) Do you mean that which is regarded as the limit or point from which the direction is judged? Or (*b*) that towards

* All notion of Direction is relative. When we take the Sun as the standard, all the points between the Sun and the Earth will be in the direction *towards the Earth* and all points on the other side of the Earth will be in the direction *away from the Earth*. Thus with reference to the Sun as the standard what is the 'direction towards the earth' is what is meant by the word 'below.'

which or facing which the Earth lies? [That is to say, is the standard only the limit from which the direction is judged? or is it that towards which the Earth's face is turned?] If it mean the former, then, taking as your standard or limit something that is above the Earth, what you call 'above' —*i. e.*, the direction above that standard something—will also be 'towards the Earth' in relation to something else (that may be higher); and so that direction also will have to be regarded as 'below.' For instance, above the Earth's surface, we have the mountain in relation to which mountain the Sun is 'above'; now the points of space between the Sun and the mountain will also be 'towards the Earth,' just as much as those below the mountain; and in this case also a 'limit' will be present, in the shape of the mountain, which is as much a limit for the points of space below it as for those above it; and thus fulfilling all the conditions of the definition of 'below,' the point of space between Sun and the mountain will also come to regarded as 'below']. For similar reasons [*i. e.*, because the character of 'being towards the Earth' is equally attributable to what is higher and what is lower than the standard limit] the second alternative also cannot be maintained [*i.e.*, it will not mend matters if by 'with reference to which' you mean 'that facing which the Earth lies'; as the Earth will face the points above the mountain, just as well as those below it].

(56). "That direction is 'below' by action towards which the Earth approaches nearer [so that 'falling' comes to be defined as that action by which the Earth approaches nearer, and that is 'below' which lies in the direction of that falling, defined above, in para. 54; against which the only objection urged was that of its involving a circle; and this circle becomes avoided by the definition of 'falling' provided here]." We cannot accept this definition; by this definition, the action of an object hanging by a rope in a well

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and swinging horizontally will have to be regarded as 'falling' [as each swing brings the object nearer to the 'Earth' in the form of the walls of the well]; and the space traversed by each swing will have to be regarded as 'below.'

(57). "Taking the Earth and some other object as the two limits, that space which, intervening between these two, is called the 'middle,'—when taken in relation to the limit other than the Earth,—is what is called below.' [For instance, the space between the Earth and the Sun is 'below' the Sun]". This also cannot be accepted; as in that case, the Earth itself could never be regarded as 'below' (the Sun); and further, without explaining what is meant by the word 'below,' you cannot provide any adequat explanation of what is meant by the' middle' or 'intervening space' between the Earth and the other object; —the only explanation possible of the 'middle' or 'intervening space' between the Earth and the other object being that it is 'above' the earth and 'below' the other object [so that the explanation of 'middle' involves the notion of 'below', and that of 'below' you seek to explain with the help of the notion of 'middle'; thus there is a mutual interdependence].' If you seek to provide any other explanation of the 'middle', (free from the notions of 'above' and 'below'), you will find that it applies to lateral space : For instance, such an explanation of the 'middle' would be in the form of 'that which is to the East of the Earth and to the West of the other limit;' as the word 'middle' or 'interval' is applied in usage to that space with regard to which two men standing in opposite directions have the notion of two contradictory directions [*i.e.* when one man is standing on the East and the other on the West, the intervening space is conceived by the former as 'West', and by the latter as 'East'] [and this explanation of 'middle' will apply to lateral space, which also, by the proposed definition of 'below', should have be regarded as 'below'].

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(58) "[If none of the above definitions of the 'Substratum' can be maintained] there must be something else that is signified by the word 'ādhāra'; as the notion (of 'herein)' is a well-recognised one; and it cannot be explained except by means of an explanation of what is meant by 'Substratum'." Even this is not admissible. Whatever may be signified by the word '*ādhāra*'—is it eternal or transient? It cannot be transient; as that would mean that the substratum ceases to exist, so that there may be times when the very notion of 'substratum' would be non-existent; and further, inasmuch as the case of the substratum is analogous to that of the Community 'cow' [which as signified by the word 'cow' is regarded as eternal, even though its constituent individuals are transient; from which analogy, even though the individual substratum may be transient, yet the genus 'substratum', as signified by the word 'substratum', should be eternal],—if, even so, it be regarded as transient, then (exactly on the same grounds) the Community 'cow' also will have to be regarded as transient. Nor will it be right to regard the signification of the word 'substratum' as eternal. As will this, that is signified by the word 'substratum', be either comprehensive (including all kinds of substratum) or not-comprehensive? If it be not-comprehensive, then there would be an impossibility of any comprehensive conception of the 'substratum'; and (in the absence of such comprehensive conception) it will be impossible also to comprehend any conventional denotation of the word 'substratum' [as this would, *ex-hypothesi*, have to be taken as separate with regard to each individual substratum; and the number of individuals being endless, any such convention would be beyond the grasp of our minds]. If, on the other hand, what is signified by the word 'substratum' be something comprehensive, then, is it one which, like Community, never renounces the individuals in which it subsists (*i.e.* the individuals that it comprehends, like Community, which has no

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existence apart from the individuals composing it) ? or is it one that does renounce these individuals ? In the former case, if one thing has been once recognised as the 'substratum' of another thing, then it will never again be possible for the latter to appear as the substratum of the former [and this is possible, as at one time a man may be seated on the bed, and at another time he may be carrying it on his head]. If then, it be held that it does renounce the individuals in which it subsists,—then, if there is no fixed law under which it renounces and embraces individuals, then, no restriction being possible, it will be possible for us to conceive of such renouncing and embracing as going on at all times (which would be absurd).

[Page 601] (59) "[In order to escape from this last absurdity, if you assert that] there is something that regulates the renouncing and embracing of the constituent individuals,—then you should point out what this regulating agency is [as a matter of fact, there is no such agency that you could point out]. "But we can certainly assume such an agency, seeing that, without some such agency, we cannot account for the well-known conception of 'substratum'." No such agency can be rightly assumed, we reply. For if we were to assume such a regulating agency, then that agency itself, which regulates the embracing of the constitutent individuals, might itself be regarded as the 'substratum,' and there would be no need for postulating any other 'substratum' [whose conception would be based upon the said regulating agency].* "Yes ; be that so." But this will not be quite right ; as that regulating agency also [which would constitute the character of the 'substratum'] will stand in need of some agency that will regulate its own renouncing and embracing of its substrates ; and for this latter

* That property which regulates the said embracing will be what indicates the character of 'substratum' ; and that which prevents the manifestation of the character of the substratum will be the property that regulates the renouncing.

agency again, another regulating agency will have to be assumed ; and [this latter agency itself serving the required purpose] the former would become futile [just as the assumption of another 'substratum' was found futile in the previous case] ;—and thus your position comes to this : If you do not assume an additional agency, there is nothing to regulate the renouncing and embracing of substrates ; if, on the other hand, you do assume the additional agency, the assumption of every such agency renders futile what has gone before it ;—truly a difficult position from which there is no escape! "But there could be an interchange of the work of regulating between the two [so that the renouncing and embracing of what follows will be regulated by what precedes it, and *vice versa* ; so that nothing would be futile, and there would be no endless assumption of regulating agencies]."
In that case there will be mutual interdependence between the two ; and we should feel called upon to answer this argument only after you have proved the fact that it is possible for two things to be so interdependently related that each would drag the other to where it is itself dragged ; [as a matter of fact to prove this is impossible ; as in that case mutual interdependence would cease to be an objectionable feature altogether.]

(60) "Well, the reasonings that you put forward against the comprehensive conception of 'substratum' apply with equal force to the case of such comprehensive conceptions as those of 'community' and the like ; so that these latter also become impossible". For heaven's sake, please do not utter these words too loud! If an enemy were to hear them, it would be a veritable calamity sprung upon us ! *

* The author holds all things to be inexplicable ; hence to him if it is pointed out that the conception of 'community' becomes inexplicable, it is only a contingency that he would desire ; and not anything to disconcert him. This is the sense of the jocular answer given.

(61) Then again, the character of 'substratum' that you postulate—has that itself a substratum of its own? or is it without a substratum? If it is without a substratum,—*i. e.* there is nothing that contains the character of the substratum—then with regard to what particular object could it bring about the cognition of being qualified by itself; as there being no objects that contains that character, all objects would be equally related to that character, [and there would be nothing that could be recognised as particularly endowed with that character, and hence as entitled to the name of 'substratum']. If, on the other hand, the character of the substratum has a substratum of its own (*i. e.* is contained in a particular object), then you have to point out this further substratum [and so on and on, you will have to postulate substratum after substratum *ad infinitum*]. "But the very nature of the character of 'substratum' is such that with regard to its own substratum (which contains that character) it forms the basis of the notion of 'substratum', without the intervention of any other substratum for itself;—just as '*saṭṭā*', the generic character of 'being' by itself forms the basis of the notion of 'being' (the existence of things) without the intervention of a further 'being' (that would establish the existence of this 'Being' itself)." This will not be right; as a notion, without an adequate substratum, would be wrong; just as the notion of silver, in the absence of the character of 'silver,' is wrong, so in the absence of the character of 'substratum', the notion of 'substratum' would be wrong. We shall explain this in detail, in course of our refutation of Diversity (p. 1141 *et seq.* Chaukhambha, s. s. Edition).

(62) "Even in the absence of the relation of the container and the contained (as held to subsist between the substratum and what subsists in it), the requisite agency

for the regulating of what is to be renounced, and what embraced, would be available in the shape of the intrinsic relation of things ; just as the connection between the object and its cognition is regulated by the relation known as '*Viṣayaviṣayibhāva*'." This also is not possible ; as in the first place, we have already refuted your 'intrinsic or 'natural relation' (in para. 41) ; and secondly, because you cannot provide an adequate explanation of the relation of '*Viṣayaviṣayibhāva*'—of 'subject' and 'object'—which you have cited as an example in support of your contention.

[The refutation of 'substratum' having turned on the exact nature of the 'Viṣayaviṣayibhāva' or the 'subject-object relation', the author proceeds to show the impossibility of explaining it.]

(63) What is the '*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*' of cognitions with the jar and other objects ? "Cognition being an entity of the form of illumination (or manifestation), the *viṣayaviṣayibhāva*, or relation of 'subject and object', with the jar is only that particular *svabhāva* (innate nature) of an entity of the form of illumination or manifestation which consists in its pertaining (or belonging) to that object." This definition cannot be accepted ; as it does not apply to the Objects of Desire (Aversion' Action) and the rest [Desire &c. also, according to the Logician bear , with objects, the 'subject-object' relation ; and ye not being of the form of illumination, which can apply to cognitions only, their relation becomes excluded from the definition]. "We shall then substitute the word '*viṣayiṇaḥ*', 'subjective' [in place of '*prakāshāsya*' ; so that the definition will include all such entities as Desire and the rest, which bear upon objects, and are, as such, capable of being regarded as 'subjective']." This will not be right ; as it is precisely this (the exact nature of the 'subjective') that you have got to determine.

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(64) Then again, what do you mean by the '*svabhāva*' of the cognition? Do you mean the cognition's own *ḍharma*' *character or property*? Or its own *self*?

(65) If it is the property, is it the character '*jñāna-ṭva*', 'being a cognition', which is common to all cognitions? Or is it a particular character peculiar to each ndividual cognition of the jar &c.? If it is the generic character of cognition', then, inasmuch as this is common to all cognitions, it is not possible for it to pertain to any particular individual object. If it is the peculiar character of each individual cognition, then the character of the cognition of each individual object would have to be regarded as distinct; and this would be only another way of asserting that the cognition is of the form of its object [a view which has been held by the Yogāchāra-Bauḍḍha- and stubbornly rejected by the Logician]. Then again, this property, this character of 'jñānaṭva',—[Is this an adventitious accessory of the cognition, like the *stick* of 'the man with the stick'?] Or is it a permanent attribute, n the form of 'Community', like '*puruṣatva*' of the man? If it is an adventitious accessory, (a) is what is imposed as such the object apprehended by the cognition? (b) Or is it something else?]—[A] it cannot be held to be dependent upon something else to be imposed upon; as in that case, for the cognition of the adventitious accessory, we would stand in need of something entirely different from the objects actually cognised, like the jar and the rest [*e. g.* in the case of the cognition of the man with the stick, the *stick* is what is imposed as the adventitious accessory; and this being something other than the real object of cognition, the man, for the cognition of the man, in this case, we are made dependent upon the stick; in the same manner, if '*ghaṭajñānaṭva*' as an *upāḍhi* of the '*ghaṭa-jñāna*' were an *upāḍhi* in which what is imposed as such

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is something different from the jar itself, then it would come to this that for the simple cognition of the jar, we would stand in need of something other than the jar, which is absurd]. (A) Nor again, can the jar itself be what is imposed as an adventitious accessory; as there is, so far, no connection between the jar and its cognition [the only relation possible is the *viṣayaviṣayibhāva*; and this is s still undetermined]; and if even so, it were to be imposed, hen great confusion would be the result [any object might be imposed upon any cognition, without any restriction] (B) Nor again can '*ghaṭajñānatva*' be regarded as a *āti*, (a class-character permanently inherent in the cognition of the jar); as in those ordinary cases where we cognise the jar by itself, and also the cloth by itself, the two class-characters, 'ghaṭatva' and 'paṭatva' having been recognised as distinct, if, at some time, we happen to have the composite cognition of the *jar and the cloth*,—so that we have a *ghaṭapaṭajñāna*,—if the property hereof, as '*ghaṭapaṭajñānatva*', were regarded as a class-character, or *āti*, this would be an instance of an admixture of two class-characters (*ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*; and such an admixture is not regarded as desirable by the Logician). If, in order to avoid this, it be held that the cognition of each individual object is distinct, [so that no such composite cognition as '*ghaṭapaṭajñāna*' would be possible], then it would never be possible to have the cognition of any qualified object [as this would involve the cognition of the object and also of its qualification, which, *ex hypothesi*, is not possible]. In order to meet these difficulties, it may be held that in the case of composite cognitions (*e. g. ghaṭapaṭajñāna*) there is a *composite* class-character (which is apart fromthe class-character of each individual cognition of individual objects; just as we have the class-charactor 'variegated colour' which is distinct from 'blue', 'red' &c.,); but in that case, we would ultimately be unable to speak of any class-character

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pertaining to the cognition of individual objects [as, according to the Logician, every cognition involves at least two cognitions, the *Savikalpaka* and the *Nirvikalpaka*, the former having for its object the concrete form of the object along with its distinctive features &c., while the latter apprehends only the object in its vague abstract form;—so that every cognition being composite in character, all cognitions would fall under the composite class-character]. If (thus reduced to a desperate position) you even admit the admixture of class-characters [and posit such class-characters as '*ghaṭajñānatva*', '*paṭajñānatva*' and the like], then these class-characters themselves being enough to distinguish each cognition, there would be no ground left for the assuming of the 'object' of cognitions (the Logician's position being that each cognition is distinguished from the other only through it object, in all other details, all cognitions having the same character). "Yet, inasmuch as in every cognition the relation to an object is manifest, we admit the *object* also." This explanation cannot be accepted; as it is this relation whose exact nature is under consideration now. "True, but this is its exact nature—that it is that relation which subsists between the cognition and its object." This is not right; as this 'subject-object' relation being one only, the cognition and the object would both be liable to be known as 'object'; just as in the case of the relation of Conjunction. * "But as a matter of fact, the cognition is the *viṣayi*, the 'subject' and the object is the *viṣaya*, which is different from the

* Conjunction is a relation subsisting between two objects in contact with one another; and of this relation both members are known as 'saṃyogi' 'conjunct', 'in conjunction'; similarly if 'viṣayaviṣayibhāva' is a *relation* it must be one subsisting over both members of the relation—the cognition and its object; and, hence as in the case of cognition, so here also, both would be known as either '*viṣaya*' or as '*viṣayi*' and there would be nothing to determine that one is to be called 'viṣaya' and the other 'viṣayi',—the analogy of the well-known relation of conjunction not providing any justification for this strict apportionment of the names

viṣayi. [That it to say, the relation is properly speaking '*viṣayitva*', 'being the subject'; and this belongs to the Cognition only, and not to both Cognition and Object; hence the case is not analogous to that of 'conjunction']". We cannot accept this; as this '*viṣayitva*' would only be another name for the *Bhāṭṭa* has called *jñātatā*', 'the character of being known' (as belonging to objects of cognition); and this we are going to refute later on.

(66) Then again, the '*svabhāva*' of a thing cannot be explained as the self of the object (the second alternative suggested in para. 64); as if the 'svabhāva' consisted of the self of the object, then,—just as the 'self' of the individual objects, jar, cloth &c., is each distinct from the other, so the 'self' of the individual cognitions of these objects also would each be distinct from the other; so that there would be an end to all such usage as is based upon the comprehensive conception of the cognitions of several objects [i. e. each cognition being entirely distinct from the other, no such comprehensive conception would be possible].

(67) Then again, your assertion, that "*the tadīyatā, belonging or pertaining to the object*, is the *svabhāva* or nature of the cognition," has to be looked into more minutely: The word '*tadīya*' (belonging to that) is formed of the pronoun '*tat*' (that) and the affix '*chha*', where '*tat*' refers to the *object*, and the affix denotes *relationship*; so that what your assertion means is that 'these two -the *object* and relationship—as qualified by each other, form the *svabhāva* of the cognition'; and what this means is that '*objects* form the *svabhāva* of the cognition'; and this would be an excellent refutation of the view of the Idealist by you (who make it your business to refute the Idealist standpoint, and yet reduce all objects to the form of mere cognition)! "What our assertion means is that what forms the *svabhāva* of the cognition is the *relation*, and *not* the object." This will not be right; as unless you add some specification, mere

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'relationship' in general would belong to all things (and not to cognitions only); as it cannot be held that Relation does not belong to any cognition; as in that case it would not be *relation* at all;—nor will it be right to hold that Relation belongs to a particular cognition only. As in that case, firstly, the relation would become identified with the cognition, as pointed out above; and, in the second place, there is nothing to show to what particular cognition it belongs. "The cause of the cognition will be the specifying factor [so that the fact of the relation of the jar pertaining to the cognition of the jar only is indicated by the contact of the jar with the perceiving organ, which contact is the cause of the cognition of jar]". That cannot be; for what does that specifying factor do? "It makes the relation pertain to the particular cognition". This will not be right; for is this 'ṭadīyaṭā,' 'belonging to that,' a part of that relation which forms the 'svabhāva' of the cognition? or is it a distinct property, outside, or apart from, it? If the former, then what is signified by the word 'that' is also a part of that same relation; so that there is the same identification of the object and the cognition, as pointed out above. If it is the latter, then, that distinct property (signified by the affix 'chha' in 'tadīya') would be the same as the *object* (as signified by the word 'tāṭ' in 'ṭaḍīya'); as by your own explanation, the object (jar) that is signified by the word 'ṭaṭ', which forms the qualifying factor in the composite conception denoted by 'ṭaḍīya', is nothing more than the same 'distinct property'. "That distinct property may be identical with the object [what is the harm in that?]" Then we ask—is this (distinct property—*i.e.* the object) related or not related, to the aforesaid 'svabhāva'-relation (*i. e.* the cognition)? If not, then the cognition would not be related to anything. If, on the other hand, it is related, then is it related to the relation in the shape of cognition by some other relation? or by the relation of *sva-*

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bhāva only? If by some other relation, then that would need another relation for being related, and so on and on, there would be that same infinite regress for avoiding which you posited the 'svabhāva' relation! If, on the other hand, it is related by the relation of 'svabhāva' only, then in the composite conception 'related to the relation in the shape of cognition', the cognition also enters as a qualifying factor; hence in accordance with the reasoning put forward above [*i. e.* if the cognition has the *svabhāva* of being related to the jar, then the jar and the cognition become identical], and in accordance with the argument just put forward [*i. e.* if 'taḍīyatā,' being a distinct property, is of the form of the object, and to that the relation that the Cognition bears is that of 'svabhāva'], both—*taḍīyatā* and *tat*—become the 'self' of the cognition;—and this would only be another way of accepting the identity between the Cognition and its object!

[Page 608] (68) The above reasoning serves to refute the 'svabhāva'-relation in other cases also.

[For the purpose of defining the relation of 'viṣayaviṣayibhāva', the Opponent proceeds to provide definitions of 'viṣaya' and 'viṣayi' and then base his conception of the said relation upon the correlation of these two definitions.]

(69) "The *viṣaya*, '*object* of cognition', is that which is the receptacle of the result of the cognition; and the *viṣayi*, *Subject*, is that which has (*i. e.* produces) that result". This also is open to objection. For what is the 'result of cognition'? Does it consist in *being known*? or in *being used*? If the former, then the definition will not apply to past and future things, or to things that are wrongly cognised, [as the past and future things do not exist at the present time, when the cognition appears, and when one has the wrong cognition of a thing, this thing is non-existent; so that in all those cases, the thing cognised being non-existent, it cannot be the receptacle of that

character of *being known*, which constitutes, *ex hypothesi*, the distinctive feature of the 'object'; so that neither the future thing, nor the past thing, nor the misconceived thing could ever be the 'object' of cognition]. Nor again is it possible for you to indicate any basis for the assumption, that a certain cognition (that of the jar, for instance) produces its result in that same object (the jar, and not in any other object, the cloth or the horse).—If there were some such basis, that basis itself might be regarded to be the distinctive feature of the 'object' [and there would be no justification for propounding a definition on the strength of that basis] If, on the other hand, the result of cognition consists in *being used*,—*i. e*, in being carried by the hands and so forth,—then, in the first place, as a matter of fact we find that such *usage* is not present in every case of cognition [*e. g.* when we cognise a quality, colour or smell, or when we cognise the self or the *ākāsha*; there is no *carrying by the hands*];—and secondly, even in the case of objects where such carrying is possible, along with the object will be caused many other things also that are inseparable from it (*e. g.* the qualities inherent in the thing, as the weight of the jar for instance); and even though these other things are not cognised, yet, by the definition, these also will have to be regarded as the 'object' of that cognition [that is when we cognise the jar and carry it, even though we do not cognise the weight of the jar, this weight will, by the definition, be the 'object' of that cognition of the jar]; and thus the said definition of 'object' becomes too wide. If again by *being used* is meant desire (aversion and indifference) [i. e. the result of cognition consists in its being desired or abandoned &c.], inasmuch as the Self is the only receptable of Desire &c, the definition of 'object' could not apply to any such thing as the jar and the like. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, it be held that the 'object' is not the '*receptacle* of desire',

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but the '*object* of desire' (i. e. the desired object);—then, for the purpose of ascertaining if a certain thing is an 'object of desire' you would need to know if it is object of cognition, [so that you will land yourself in a vicious circle]. Then again there are some philosophers who do not accept 'treating with, indifference' as a form of 'using' an object; what would be there to prevent these philosophers from rejecting (as *object-less*) that cognition which leads to the cognised thing being treated with indifference? [As such treatment not being 'usage,' the definition of 'object' will not apply to the thing apprehended by this cognition]. And further, who can you avoid the contingency that the cognition of such usages as *accepting* and *rejecting* would itself become objectless?* If, in order to avoid this, you hold that in every case, also in the cognition of usage, there is usage in the shape of *acceptance* and *rejection*,—then there would be no end to such cognitions and usages!

(70) There is another definition suggested on the basis of the object being related to the cognition;—that is, "when a cognition is found to have its nature in keeping with such usage as is inseparable from a certain thing, this thing is called the 'object' of that cognition; and the cognition having such an object is called the 'subject.'" This definition also does not escape from the arguments urged above [on the basis of difficulties attaching to the exact meaning of the words 'nature' and 'usage,' which are found in this definition also].

(71) It has been asserted† that "the 'object' apprehended by a cognition is only that thing which appears in that cognition; and it is nothing apart from it;—and this provides us with an adequate definition of what is 'apprehended' and what is 'not apprehended' [that which appears as a part and parcel of the cognition is its object 'appre-

* The cognition of usage should itself, by the definition, be dependent on a usage; if not, then, the definition of object, not applying to the usage, the cognition of usage would be without an 'object'!

† By Shālikanātha—says the *Vidyāsāgarī*.

hended,' and that which is apart from it is 'not apprehended' by it]." But as regards this definition we do not quite know what is meant by the thing appearing 'in the cognition': Does it mean—(a) that the cognition is the receptacle (or substratum) of the thing? (b) or that the cognition is the 'object'? (c) or that the cognition is merely related to the thing? (a) The first of these alternatives is not possible; as in the first place, such things as the jar and like (which are placed on the ground, and which have the ground for their substratum), when not resting upon a cognition, would be excluded from the definition [so that these things could not be regarded as 'object']! And secondly the definition would include the generic character of 'cognition'—*jñānatva*, which, even though its exact nature can be determined with difficulty will fall under the definition, as it has 'cognition' for its permanent substratum—the generic character of 'cognition' always residing in cognitions. (b) As regards the second alternative, you have not yet been able to determine what 'object' is; how then could it help to determine any other definition? Then again, by this definition the relation of subject and object, as between the cognition and its object—would be reversed [if cognition be regarded as the 'object' of the cognition, as intended by the second alternative] (c) The third alternative makes the definition too wide: the cause of the cognition is also 'related' to it [and would therefore, by the third alternative, have to be regarded as the 'object' of that cognition]; specially as this cause also is something that is manifested by (is apprehended by) another cognition. "But we shall add the qualification that it must be manifested by that same cognition [so that the cause of the cognition not being manifested by that same cognition, could not be regarded as its 'object']." This also will not be right; as what you are explaining is exactly this same character of 'being manifested' [and hence it is not right to put forward a definition of which this very conception

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forms the principal factor]; as it is only after we know what is meant by 'being manifested' that we can know if a certain cognition is 'related' to what is *manifested* by it.

(72) "We shall define 'Object' of a cognition as that which always necessarily appears on the appearance of that cognition." This also will not be right, we reply; as it is this 'appearance', the exact nature of which is still to be determined. "We all know in a general way what an 'object' is; and the definition here propounded is only that of particular objects [and as the generic entity 'object' cannot be gain-said, and as no generic entity is possible without specified individuals, no objection can be taken to a definition on the sole ground of its not applying to all objects]." This is not right; as when it is shown that no specific individual is in any case possible, the generic entity itself becomes impossible; and hence even the right conception that people may have of this generic entity becomes doubtful [and hence such a conception cannot form the basis of any specific definitions].

(73) [Another definition of 'object' is put forward*]—"The 'object of cognition' is only that cause of it which imparts its shape to that cognition." This cannot be accepted; as it cannot be ascertained by what the shape is imparted to the cognition. As a matter of fact this 'shape' is nothing other than the form taken by the cognition; under the circumstances, inasmuch as everyone of the causes (that bring about the cognition) would be capable (of imparting its shape to the cognition), how could you single out that particular cause (which you would regard as the 'object' of that cognition)? "Even though every cognition—of the jar, for instance—is accompanied, or led up to, by all those causes which are capable (of imparting a shape to it), yet it is the presence of the jar which is more explicit than the

* 'By the Bauddha' say the *Chitsukhī* and the *Vidyāsāgarī*; 'by those who hold that cognitions have shape'—says the *Shānkarī*.

rest; and on this ground it is the jar that is held to be what imparts its shape to the cognition." This is not right, we reply; for there is as much reason to believe in the presence of the jar as in that of all the other causes; what difference, then, could explicitness and non-explicitness make in the matter? "Why, we shall define the object on the basis of that whose presence is explicit." This will not be right; as rightly speaking, the presence of all causes is equally explicit. "[It is true that there is as much reason for believing in the presence of the jar as in that of the other causes] But the 'object', jar, is that whose presence is actually perceived." This we have already answered [*i.e.* if by 'perceived' you mean *known*, then it applies to all causes, everyone of which is known; if you mean *seen with the eye*, then it would be impossible for odour, taste, &c., to be the 'object' of any cognition; as the presence of these can never be seen with the Eye]; and further, until it has been explained what an 'object' is, it cannot be pointed out what is 'seen'.

(74) Nor can we accept the definition of the 'Object of Cognition' as "that which is the *karman*, or objective, of the Cognition. [*i.e.* on which the action of the cognition operates]." This cannot be accepted; as what you have got to explain is the relation of the cognition to this 'objective'; and the refutation of this explanation is to be found in my *Īshvarābhisandhi*, under the section dealing with '*jñātatā*', the character of *being known*.

(75) "There is a certain thing of which the cognition is a qualification by itself, and not through any other relationship (save that of *vishēṣaṇa* and *vishēṣya*; and it is this thing that is the 'object' of that cognition; so that we may define the 'object' of a cognition as that which is qualified by that cognition; and as a rule, of two things (*vishēṣya* and *vishēṣaṇa*) that is regarded as the '*vishēṣya*' or 'qualified'

whose qualification is assumed (or taken up) by something else, which is called 'composite conception' (of the *qualified* and the *qualification* together)."* In regard to this definition we make the following observation:—When it is said that the composite conception assumes the qualifications or character of the object, does it mean simply that it assumes this character [*i.e.* it assumes only some such nature]? or that it must assume this character? [*i.e.* it assumes all such natures]? If the former, then (in the case of the jar-cognition) the stick (of the potter) will also be a '*vishēṣya*',—as the jar-cognition assumes the character of *being an entity* which is one of the features of the stick. Nor can the second alternative be maintained; for in the case of that smoke which is not concomitant with fire for instance, the smoke that is seen issuing from the heated pot of the cowherd), we find that it is possessed of the character of issuing in an unbroken line; and there is 'something else' [in the form of the smoke that is concomitant with fire] which is qualified by that character; and yet this latter does not assume the character of *being not concomitant with fire* which is one of the features of the former '*vishēṣya*' [so that if the assuming of *all* features be made a necessary condition of the definition, *smoke* can never be regarded as a '*vishēṣya*']. "But as a matter of fact, the character of issuing in an unbroken line belongs (not to the *smoke* merely, but) to that which is endowed with unceasing upward motion; and certainly the character of failing to be concomitant with fire does not belong to such smoke, (the issue of smoke from the cow-herd's pot not being unceasing) [so that if this character is not assumed by smoke, it does not cease to be 'vishēṣya']." This cannot be; for that which is endowed with the first character (i. e., the smoke in the

* The composite conception 'the man with the stick' takes up the character of the 'man'—the stickholder being a *man*; hence it is the man that is the *qualified*, and the stick the *qualification*; in the composite conception 'the cognised jar' takes up the character of the *jar*; which makes the jar the *qualified* and the cognition the *qualification*.

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pot which issues in an unbroken line),—does, or does not, this possess the character of being not concomitant with fire? If it does, then the objection that we urged before remains in force [i. e. *non-concomitance*, a character of the pot-smoke, not belonging to, not being assumed by, the unceasing column of smoke, this latter cannot be a 'vishēṣya']. If it does not possess that character (of failing in its concomitance), then the addition of the further qualification (of *unceasing* &c.) is entirely superfluous; as it is only in *that which is qualified by the character of issuing in an unbroken line* that there is possibility of the discrepancy [of *failing in concomitance*, for the removal of which discrepancy further qualification would be needed; so that when such a qualification is not needed in connection with this, it cannot be required at all.]

"What is assumed is only that character qualified by which the thing takes that qualification; and all its characters are not assumed; nor do the qualifications belong to the smoke as qualified by the character of failing in concomitance [they belong to it only as qualified by the generic character of 'smoke'; hence it is this last character only that would be assumed, and not the failure of concomitance]." This cannot be, we reply; does this mean that the smoke *per se* never fails in its concomitance? [This cannot be, as in that case the qualification would be superfluous]. Thus then, if the smoke *per se* does fail in its concomitance, then the qualifications in question (that of issuing in an unbroken line, and that of unceasingly rising column) must be taken to belong to it as qualified by that failure of concomitance.

"The failure of concomitance may be the qualification of smoke; but it does not form a factor of the smoke being regarded as the '*vishēṣya*'." This is not right, we reply; as it is still unknown what the '*vishēṣya*' is.

(76.) Then again, you speak of the cognition as 'the qualification of the object';—does this mean that it is merely related *to* it? Or that it is related to it as its *qualification*?

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If it were the former, then much confusion would arise [even adventitious accessories falling under the category of 'qualification']. And if it is the latter, then there is the same 'mutual interdependence' and other absurdities (that we have pointed out above in connection with the definition of '*viṣayī*')*

(77). [Thus then it has been shown that no adequate definition can be provided of the '*vishēṣya*'; and as the definition of the 'object' has been made dependent, in the beginning of para 75, upon that of '*vishēṣya*', it follows that no adequate definition of the 'object' is available. Now a further objection is urged against the very conception of '*vishēṣya*']—Does, or does not, the *vishēṣya* assume that character which consists in its *vishēṣyatva, being the vishēṣya*? If it does, then the definition (of *vishēṣya*) becomes too wide (inasmuch as it includes the *vishiṣṭa* also).' If it does not, then your universal law, that the *vishēṣya* must assume *all* the features or characteristics, becomes violated.

(78) [A further objection is urged against the definition of 'Object' put forward in the beginning of para. 75]. Whenever there is a cognition, of the jar for instance, there is, according to the Logician, a corresponding *anuvyavasāya*, in the form 'I have this jar-cognition', which, in formal language, means 'there is inherence of the jar-cognition in my Self'; and in this the cognition appears as the qualification of the inherence, without the intervention of any relationship [as no relationship is held to subsist between

* That a certain thing is *related as qualification* we can understand only if we know what 'qualification' is; and for knowing what 'qualification' is we have to know what is meant by being 'related as qualification'; this is the 'interdependence.' The other 'absurdity' is referred to in the text :—(1) the *regressus ad infinitum* involved in the fact that for knowing what is 'related as qualification', we have to know what a 'qualification' is; and for knowing this we have to know what is 'related as qualification' and so on and on *ad infinitum* ;—and (2) the 'vicious circle' involved in the above, whereby the knowledge of 'qualification' is made to depend upon itself.

inherence and its substrate, for fear of infinite regress]; and yet the inherence is not the object of that jar-cognition (and under the definition it should be this object].

" The definition contains the qualifying phrase 'not through any other relation'; and this phrase is meant to exclude exactly that relation which forms the basis of the relation of 'qualification and qualified' as subsisting between a substance and its quality (or between an action and its instruments); and as it is the relation of inherence that forms the basis of these latter, how can it escape being excluded from the definition? [So that being thus excluded, inherence could never be regarded as the 'object' of the jar-cognition]". This cannot be right; as what the phrase excludes is only that relation which is other than the relation of 'qualification and qualified'; and this exclusion cannot apply to the *inherence* in question [as in the particular instance the *inherence* is only of the nature of the relation of 'qualification and qualified']. Thus then, when it is declared that the object is 'that of which the cognition is a qualification without the intervention of any other relationship',—we find that just as the cognition by itself, without the intervention of any other relation, is the qualification of the object, exactly in the same manner is it the qualification of the inherence also; and there is not the slightest difference between the two cases. Thus it was well said that when it is asserted that 'there is cognition in myself', the inherence becomes the 'object' of the Cognition.

(79) Further, the said definition of 'object' (as that of which the cognition is the qualification, without the intervention of another relationship) applies to the 'absence of cognition' also, [as in the phrase 'absence of cognition' the cognition is the qualification of the absence]. " But in this case there is the relation of inherence itself [which is other than the relation of 'qualification and qualified'; whose

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presence, therefore, precludes the possibility of the definition of 'object' applying to the *absence*]." This is not right; as the relation subsisting between the cognition and its absence is that of the qualification and the qualified (and not any other relation, so that the definition is quite applicable) [and thus, as in all cases the relation subsisting could be reduced to the relation of 'qualification and qualified', to speak of 'by some other relation' becomes an absurdity]. "But this relation of (qualification and qualified) is not something apart from the members related (the relation between the jar and its colour, for instance, is nothing apart from the coloured jar); and what is meant to be excluded by the phrase 'other relationship' is only such relation as is something apart from the members related [and thus there is no absurdity or impossibility involved in the definition]." This will not help you; as the same might be said, with equal cogency, with regard to the relation of inherence also [which also may be said to be nothing apart from the members related]. "The relations meant to be excluded by the phrase 'other relations' are those of inherence and conjunction [so that the definition could not apply to inherence]." This will not be right; as even so the definition will apply to the *absence of cognition* (even though it may not apply to inherence); as the relation between *absence* and *that which is absent* is not that of either conjunction or inherence. "But as a matter of fact, in the case of the *absence of cognition*, cognition is only an adventitious accessory of the absence, and not its permanent qualification [so that not having the cognition for its qualification, the *absence of a cognition* cannot be the object of that cognition]." Even so the definition cannot be accepted; as under the definition past and future objects would cease to be 'objects of cognition' [as the cognition that appears at the present time cannot be regarded as the qualification of the past and future things, which are not-existent at the

time ; and thus, not having the cognition for its qualification, neither the past nor the future thing will fulfill the conditions of the definition of the 'object of cognition '].

(80) [Finding it impossible to save the definition from applying to the *absence of cognition* the Opponent says]—" But we intend the definition only for positive objects ". This will not be right ; as in that case negations (or negative things) will never be 'objects of cognition ' (which is absurd); —and secondly, the definition would apply to everything apart from the cognition ; that is, to every one of those things that pertain to the cognition ; such as its cause, and other things connected with it. We desist from further prolixity. It may be right to assert (with the Idealist) that the object being of the same character as the cognition, there can be no difference between the cognition and its objects [so that there would be nothing 'apart from the cognition', and the last argument therefore becomes baseless, and loses its point]—But this will be contrary to our actual experience (in which the cognition is always known as distinct from its object) ;—and further if the difference between the two is not admitted by you, then it is not possible for you to deny such difference [as such denial would involve the absurdity of denying the unknown].

[This last discussion having led on to Difference, the author proceeds to demolish the conception of 'difference '.]

(81) It further behoves you to explain what is 'difference ' : It could only be either—(a) the specific form of the thing itself, or (b) mutual negation, or (c) some distinctive property (such, for instance, as separateness).

[*Page* 617] (82) (*a*) It will not be right to regard *Difference* as consisting in the specific form of the thing ; as if it consisted in this, then there would be no possibility of mistaking a different thing as non-different [*i. e.* we could never mistake the piece of shell as non-different

from silver]. For even the mistaken cognition apprehends the form of the thing [and *ex-hypothesi*, the cognition of the thing's form is the same as the cognition of its *difference*]; if, in order to escape from this difficulty, it be held that the mistaken cognition does not apprehend the form of the thing, then, we ask,—of what would it apprehend the non-difference [as according to you also, in the case of the mistaking of shell for silver, it is the shell that is apprehended, and apprehended as non-different from silver, which shows that there is apprehension of the form of the shell; and this, by the definition, means that its difference is apprehended; so that there is no chance for the apprehending of its non-difference, which is essential in the mistaken cognition]. "When a number of unconnected wooden slabs are heaped up, and we impose upon this heap, the character of—*i. e.* mistake it as—one composite whole inhering in (made up of) several component parts,—thus apprehending the non-difference of the slabs from the composite whole,—we find that in this conception of non-difference those (slabs) upon which the character is imposed do not appear at all; all that happens is that a number of disjointed things, which do not form a compact composite whole, are mistaken for a compact composite whole [so that in this case, the specific form of the thing miscognised, is not cognised at all; and this form not being cognised, its *difference* is not cognised; and if its *difference* is not cognised, it is not impossible to cognise its non-difference]."

This reasoning is not right; as when we urged our objection we did not have in view this particular instance of the disjointed wooden slabs; the instance (of mistaken cognition) that we had in view was the case of things that are recognised as being 'that same thing' which they are not [and certainly so far as this instance is concerned the explanations given by the opponent do not apply to it at all]. And if you were to assert that in this latter

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case also there is only an imposition of a different character [*i. e.* the character of non-difference ; so that it is analogous to the case of the slabs being mistaken for a compact whole]—then, in that case, every case of negation of identity would fall under the category of 'ordinary negation' [as in every case the negation would be only of a certain character imposed] ; and certainly this should not be acceptable to the Logician (who insists upon distinction between 'negation of identity' and 'ordinary negation of relation'). As a matter of fact, however, even if you were to admit this, when the specific form of the thing has been cognised,—which, *ex-hypothesi*, means that its *difference* is cognised,—there can be no possibility of any such character as 'non-difference' being imposed upon it. [So that our objection remains as it was].

(83.) (*b*) Nor will it be right to regard *difference* as meaning *mutual negation*; as in that case, the very conception of such difference would involve an objectionable interdependence [the cognition of mutual negation depending upon the cognition of the negatived thing as negatived, *i. e.* different,—and this latter cognition depending upon the cognition of mutual negation]* "But as a matter of fact, we have the cognition of the *substratum of the negation* (e. g. of the jar) even without actually recognising it as the *object negatived*; and conversely, the cognition of the thing (jar) as the *object-negatived* is brought about by the mere remembrance of the thing; and it is not necessary to remember it actually as the *substratum of negation*;—and thus, where is there any *interdependence*?" This is not right, we reply : In the case of such negation as 'the jar is not the cloth,' we find that what is

* We can cognise the jar as not-cloth—only when we know that it is different from the cloth ; and by the proposed definition of *difference* this will mean that for knowing the jar as not-cloth we must know that there is mutual negation between the two ; again for knowing that there is mutual between the two it will be necessary to know that the jar is not-cloth. Thus there is an interdependence involved in the conception of *difference*.

History of the Indian People: 'Life in Ancient India, in the Age of the Mantras'—by P. T. Srinivas Iyengar, M. A., Madras, 1912.

The field of Sanskrit Literature is fortunate in having enlisted the services of a competent writer in the person of Principal P. T. Srinivas Iyengar of Vizagapatam. Our readers are already familiar with him as the author of the scholarly translation of the *Shivasūtravimarshinī*. The work that he has now planned is at once stupendous and eminently interesting. He is engaged in writing a series of monographs on the different periods of Indian History from the earliest times to the present; and he is going to depend entirely upon original sources, dealt with by 'methods of critical investigation.' The task is a difficult one; but the sample that we have before us in the shape of the volume under notice is a guarantee that the work will be well done. This little volume of 138 pages gives us an authoritative account, supported by references to the original texts, of what the condition of the country was, in the ancient 'Vedic' times, as regards Agriculture, Medicine, Trade, Caste, Sea-voyages, Laws of Property, Position of Women, and fifty other important subjects. The treatment of each is full and scholarly; and what forms the unique feature of the work is that the writer has not had recourse to mere conjectures; he has taken each text and taken it in its most natural sense; he is apparently not wedded to any of the various 'theories' in regard to 'Vedic Civilisation' one way or the other; and certainly the only way to get at an idea as to what is contained in any body of ancient documents is to approach them with an absolutely unprejudiced mind; this is not what is always done.

Towards the end of the book the author speaks of the Indian people as having remained "unchangeable as their own Himalaya during the shocks of ages." We sincerely

trust that the study that he has inaugurated will help in the strengthening of this *unchangeability*. For has not the Indian ideal of life stood the test of time? Has it not secured for its votaries real happiness? These are questions that will have to remain long unanswered in regard to the modern ideals of life.

G. J.

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CHAPTER VII.

THE FOUR KINDS OF RIGHT COGNITION.

'Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word are the Pramāṇas'—says the Sūtra (1-1-3).

Before dealing in detail with every one of these, we shall review in brief the explanations given of these, and supplement this with a review of the controversy over the precise number of Pramāṇas recognised.

Perception, says the Bhāṣya, consists in the functioning of each sense-organ upon a particular object, this 'functioning' being in the form either of *contact* or of *cognition*; when it is in the form of contact, then the result is in the form of right cognition; and when it is in the form of cognition, the result is in the form of the idea of the thing being discarded or chosen or treated with indifference. This is the earliest instance that we have of the double meaning that is always given to the word '*Pramāṇa*'. It is defined as 'the instrument of right cognition', *i.e*, the instrument that brings about the cognition of a certain thing; *e.g.*, when the sense-contact of the thing brings about our perception of the jar. But the word is also used in the sense of 'form of cognition'; *e.g.*, in the case cited the perception itself is regarded as '*pramāṇa*'; and it fulfills the condition of being an 'instrument of cognition', in virtue of its giving rise to the further cognition of the thing perceived being fit for being acquired or discarded or disregarded.

Here is what the *Vārṭika* (P.30) says on this double use of the word '*Pramāṇa*':—

'In the case of all *pramāṇas*, when the word '*pramāṇa*' pertains to, or bears upon, itself, it denotes and accomplishes its own being; being, in this case, regarded as an abstract noun, it is synonymous with '*pramiṭi*' or cognition; when however it bears upon something else, the word

'*pramāṇa*' denotes *instrumentality*; being explained, in this case, as *pramīyaṭē anēna*, that by means of which a thing is cognised; when the word is regarded as an abstract noun, and its result consists in the ideas that the observer has of discarding or accepting the thing cognised; it is only when an object has been duly cognised that we can have such ideas as that 'this thing should be discarded' and so forth. The view that the *contact* of sense-organ alone should be regarded as *Praṭyakṣa-pramāṇa* is rejected on the ground that, inasmuch as both, Contact and Cognition, are productive of definitive cognition, there is no reason why only one of these should be regarded as '*praṭyakṣa-pramāṇa*'.

Inference, says the *Bhāṣya*, is that after-cognition of a thing which is obtained though the agency of an indicative feature which is duly recognised, and which belongs to that particular thing.

Analogy as a *pramāṇa* consists in the cognition of approximation—*i.e.*, of the presence of common properties—says the *Bhāṣya*. The *Vārṭika* offers the following explanation :—What happens in the case of all analogical cognitions is that the observer, who has seen the cow and is cognisant of its similarity to the unknown animal, happening to see that other animal, recalls to his mind the idea that had been afforded to him by means of words indicating the fact of the two animals being similar; and thereby coming to perceive directly the similarity in the animal before his eyes, he arrives at the cognition 'the name that I had heard mentioned belongs to this animal,' wherein he has the cognition of the connection of the thing with its name.

'Word is that by which objects are signified or denoted or made known'—*Bhāṣya*. That is, '*shabḍa*, as a *pramāṇa*, consists in the cognition of the denotation of words'—*Vārṭika*. The *Tāṭparya* affords the following explanation :—'When a sentence is uttered, there arises a cognition of things

denoted by the words composing the sentence; and it is this cognition that constitutes '*shabda*' or 'word' as the fourth *Pramāṇa*; when this cognition is the *pramāṇa*, the 'means,' then the result consists in the knowledge of the meaning of the whole sentence; and when the cognition of the meaning of the entire sentence is the *pramāṇa*, then the result is in the form of the thing being known as to be discarded and so forth.

The Sutra and the Bhāṣya have both enumerated the *pramāṇas* in a definite order; and various explanations have been given for this. Some people have offered the following explanation.

Perception has been mentioned first, as the most important of the four; after this comes Inference as it is always preceded by and based upon Perception; after Inference comes Analogy, as it is similar to Inference, both depending upon the remembrance of past cognitions; and Word comes last, because its scope is the vastest of all.

Some people have held that—there is no ulterior motive underlying the adoption of the particular order. When the author had to mention four things, he must have adopted some order; and he chose one at random, without regard to any special circumstances.

The explanation as suggested by the *Vārṭika* is somewhat different: Perception comes first, because it is the most important of all, supplying the foundation for all the other pramāṇas. Inference depends upon premisses which are afforded by Perception; Analogy also depends on the perception of common properties; and Word depends upon the perception—hearing—of the word-sound. Perception has also been regarded as the most important because of the fact that when a thing has been apprehended by Perception,—*i.e.*, has been directly perceived,—there is no further desire on the part of the observer to have any other cogni-

tion of it; it is not so in the case of other *pramāṇas*. When we are told that a certain thing that we want is to be found in a certain place, we are not satisfied with this verbal cognition; we go to the place, and are satisfied only when we have seen the thing there; after which there is no further search. Similarly when in search of fire a man sees smoke issuing from a certain spot, he infers the presence of fire; but is not satisfied until he has gone to the place and actually found and seen the fire.

The above explanation does not touch the precedence as among Inference, Analogy and Word. The real explanation appears to lie in the difference in the number of persons accepting the independent validity of the several Pramāṇas.

Perception is recognised by all men—the philosopher as well as the fool; Inference is recognised by the next largest number of persons—all philosophers accept it; Analogy comes next, as among philosophers there are many —*e.g.*, the Vaishēṣika and the Bauddha and the Jaina—who do not accept it as a distinct Pramāṇa; and Word comes last, as this is not accepted, not only by the Bauddha and the Vaishēṣika, but also by a party of Naiyāyikas also (says the *Nyāyakosha*); in regard to the exact nature of the validity attaching to verbal cognitions, there is a great difference of opinion among those who accept it as Pramāṇa; for instance, among the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmānsakas.

The diversity in the classification of Pramāṇas accepted by the various philosophers is of two kinds. There is the diversity between the Materialist-Atheist and the Logician; the latter admitting four pramaṇas, while the Materialist admits only Perception, and discards Inference and the rest as not necessarily leading to any right knowledge. On the other hand, there is the diversity between the Logician and the Vēḍānṭin; the Vēḍānṭin admits Presumption as a right

pramāṇa in addition to Perception, Inference, Analogy and Word admitted by the Logician; and the Vēḍānṭin admits this additional pramāṇa on the ground that the knowledge that it brings about is of a character entirely distinct from that obtained by the other four means; the Logician however does not admit Presumption; not indeed because Presumption does not lead to right knowledge; but because the right knowledge got by its means does not essentially differ from that got by means of Inference; so that as a means of knowledge, Presumption is only a form of Inference, and as such, not to be regarded as a distinct pramāṇa. Most of the diversity of opinion on this point is of this latter immaterial kind; we shall see this as we proceed. The *Nyāya-bhāṣya* distinctly declares (p. 101, under Sūṭra 2-2-2) that 'These (Tradition, Presumption, etc), are certainly Pramāṇa; what we mean is that these are not distinct from the other *Pramāṇas*.' In fact under sūṭra 2-2-3—6, we have a vigorous defence of Arṭhāpaṭṭi against *apramāṇya* and similarly of Negation under sūṭra 2-2-7—12.

We shall first take up those philosophers the number of whose pramāṇas is less than four, the number admitted by the Logician.

First of all comes the *Chārvāka*, the Materialist-Atheist; who is said to admit the validity of Perception only. It is interesting to note the arguments with which the Materialist rejects the validity of inferential cognition; the argument is logical and very subtle and aims at proving the impossibility of any cognition that could be expressed by a universal proposition.

"Those who maintain the authority of Inference", says the Chārvāka, "accept the middle term as the cause of knowledge, which middle term must be found in the Minor, and be itself invariably connected with the Major Term. Now, this invariable connection must be a relation destitute

of any (vitiating) condition, accepted or disputed; and this connection does not possess its power of causing inference by virtue of its *existence*, as the Eye, etc. are the cause of perception; but by virtue of its being *known*. What then is the means of this connection being known? We will first show that it is not Perception. Perception is held to be of two kinds, external and internal; that is as produced by the external senses, or by the inner-sense, mind. The former is not the required means, for although it is possible that the actual coutact of the senses and the object will produce the knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet as there can never be such contact in the case of the past or the future, the universal proposition which has to embrace the invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every case, becomes impossible to be known.

"Nor is the internal perception the means; since you cannot establish that the mind has any power to act independently towards an external object; since all allow that it is dependent on the external senses.......

"Nor can Inference be the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition; since in the case of this inference, we should also require another inference, to establish it and so on; and hence would arise the fallacy of an *ad infinitum* retrogression.

"Nor can Testimony be the means thereof. Since we may either allege in reply that it is included in Inference, in accordance with the Vaishēṣika doctrine of Kaṇāḍa; or else we may hold that this fresh proof of Testimony is unable to leap over the old barrier that stopped the progress of Inference; since it depends itself on the recognition of a sign, in the form of the language used in the child's presence by the old man; and moreover there is no reason for our believing another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected...... And again, if Testimony were to be accepted

as the only means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then, in the case of a man, to whom the fact of the invariable connection between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out by another person, there could be no inference of one thing on seeing another thing. Hence on your own showing the whole topic of inference for one's own benefit (where there is no assertion of propositions by another person) would have to end in mere idle words.

" Then again, Comparison (Analogy), etc., must be utterly rejected as the means of the knowledge of the universal proposition; since it is impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the unconditioned connection—*i.e.*, the universal proposition; the end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connection—*viz.*, the relation of a name to something named.

" Again, this same absence of condition, which has been given as the definition of an invariable connection, can itself never be known; since it is impossible to establish that conditions must be objects of perception; and therefore although the absence of perceptible things may be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things must be itself non-perceptible; and thus since here too we must have recourse to inference, etc., we cannot leap over the obstacle which has already been planted to bar these.........

" Since the knowledge of the condition must precede the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the universality of the proposition is possible; *i.e.*, a knowledge in the form of such a connection between the middle term and major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such condition; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection ['condition' having been defined as 'that which is equipollent in extension with, *i. e.*

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constantly accompanies, the major term, though not constantly accompanying the middle']. Thus we fasten on our opponents as with adamantine glue the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle. Hence by the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition it becomes impossible to establish Inference, &c. The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke to the knowledge of fire can be accounted for by its being based on a former perception, or by its being an error; and that in some cases this step is justified by the result, is accidental; just like the coincidence of effects observed in the employment of gems, charms, drugs, &c."

(*Sarvadarshanasaṅgraha*, Cowell and Gough, Ch. I).

Another reason put forward against the validity of Inference is that no reliance can be placed on the universal proposition—'All men are mortal' for instance; it is true that the man making the assertion has found all men to be mortal; but it is just possible that in the future an immortal human being might turn up. This likelihood of contravention is inseparable from all universal propositions; and again when an inference has been presented to us, we cannot accept it as true; as it is just possible that the next moment an inference to the contrary may be presented to us by a man who has better opportunities of observation and a keener intellect than the former man. And so on and on; no implicit faith can be reposed on any Inference; which therefore cannot be regarded as authoritative.

We shall see what answer the Logician has to give to this, when we come to deal with *Inference* in detail.

The above account of Chārvāka's creed we have learnt from the *Sarvadarshanasaṅgraha*. But the *Nyāyamañjarī* declares on p. 36 that the "well-trained Chārvāka holds that the exact number of *pramāṇas* cannot be determined"; and again on p. 64,—

"The astute Chārvāka, having declared his intention, in his first *Sūtra*, as 'I am going to explain truth', has, in his work, 'explained the truth' by asserting that it is absolutely impossible to determine either the exact number or the exact character of Pramāṇas and Pramēyas, and in support of this he proceeds to cite instances of many cognitions that cannot be included in Perception, Inference, &c."

From these quotations it would appear that the author of the *Mañjārī* had access to the original *Sūtras* of Chārvāka. And this shows that Chārvāka does not hold the view that Perception is the only Pramāṇa,—as declared in the *Sarva-ḍarshanasaṅgraha*. It appears that the author of this work had no access to any original work of the school, and, not without reason, came to the conclusion that as a rank materialist, a thoroughly worldly man, the Athiest could not deny the validity of Perception; and the author himself, being a skilled dialectician, thought, with justifiable pride perhaps, that every thinking man who accepted the validity of Inference, could not fail to be convinced of the existence of God; and thus the natural conclusion was that though the Atheist accepts the validity of Perception, he rejects that of Inference, and hence also of the other *pramāṇas*. But from the *Nyāyamañjarī* we learn the facts to be exactly the reverse. *Chārvāka* admits so many Pramāṇas that their enumeration is impossible. And as the *Mañjārī* actually quotes an original Chārvāka *sūtra*, we feel inclined to believe that its presentation of the system, obtained first-hand, is more reliable than that by the *Sarvaḍarshanasaṅgraha*.

Bauḍḍha view.

From Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuchchaya* and from Ḍharmakīrṭi's *Nyāyabinḍu* we learn that 'Valid Knowledge is of two kinds—Perception and Inference'. In Chapter IV of his *Pramāṇasamuchchaya* 'Diṅnāga rejects Comparison or Analogy as a separate source of knowledge; he says that when

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we recognise a thing through Perception of a similar thing, we really perform an act of Perception. Hence comparison or recognition of similarity is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception. In Chapter V he rejects Credible Word as a separate source of knowledge. He asks—' What is the significance of a credible word? Does it mean that the person who spoke the word is credible, or the fact he averred is credible? If the person is credible, it is a mere Inference. On the other hand, if the fact is credible, it is a case of Perception. Hence the conclusion is that Credible Word is not a separate source of knowledge, but is included in Perception and Inference.

(*Medieval Logic*—Satish Chandra Vidyabhūsana, p. 88.)

We thus see that the Bauḍḍha philosopher does not reject the authority of Analogy and Word; but only objects to these being regarded as separate sources of knowledge.

The earliest Logician's answer to this we find in the *Nyaya-Vārtika* under Sūṭra 1-1-7. And we shall explain this under 'Analogy' and 'Word' later on.

Jaina view.

As regards the Jaina view, we find the following in the *Nyāyā-vaṭāra* the earliest Jaina work on Pure Logic:

"Valid Knowledge is divided into 'Praṭyakṣa' (Direct Knowledge) and '*Parokṣa*', (Indirect Knowledge), including in the latter '*Anumāna*' (Inference) and '*Shabḍa*' (Verbal testimony). This division contravenes the conclusion of Chārvāka that there is only one pramāṇa, *viz.*, *praṭyakṣa*. Chārvāka's view is unreasonable; for *praṭyakṣa* cannot be established as *pramāṇa* except through the medium of *parokṣa* or indirect knowledge. It also sets aside the view of the Bauḍḍhas, who divide *pramāṇa* into *praṭyakṣa* and *Anumāna*, without any notice of *Shabḍa*" (p. 13 Trans).

The *Nyāyāvaṭāra* does not make any mention of either *Arṭhāpaṭṭi or Anupalabḍhi*; but from the above quotation it is clear that the Jainas do not accept any *pramāṇas* except the three therein described.

The *Bhāṣya* on the *Ṭaṭṭvārṭhāḍhigama sūṭra*, another authoritative Jaina work however, under sūṭra 1. 12 *et seq.*, speaks of *Anumāna* or Inference along with *Arṭhāpaṭṭi* and the rest;—and with regard to these it says—"Why are *Anumāna, Upamāna, Arṭhāpaṭṭi, Sambhava, and Abhāva,* which also are *pramāṇas*, not mentioned in the sūṭra?" The answer to this is that all these are included under the category of '*parokṣa*'; then again, these five, Inference and the rest, may not be regarded as *pramāṇa* at all, inasmuch as they consist of wrong knowledge also.

Thus with regard to Inference, the Jaina position does not appear to be quite clear. The '*praṭyakṣa*' also of the *Ṭaṭṭvārṭhāḍhigama sūṭra* is not the same as what other philosophers understand by the term. It is, according to the Bhāṣya on Sū ra 1-12, 'beyond the reach of the senses; and the cognitions usually included under '*Praṭyaksa*'—*e.g.*, the sensations of touch, colour, smell, sound, and taste—are classed (Bhāṣya on Sūṭra 1-14) under 'Parokṣa' or Indirect Knowledge. Under 'Indirect Knowledge' are also included Remembrance, Recognition, Ratiocination, Credible Word and Inference (as stated by a note on Verse 31 of the *Puruṣārṭhasiḍḍhyupāya*); all these, it appears, have been regarded as included under the '*māṭi*' or 'functionings of the Mind' of the *Ṭaṭṭvārṭhāḍhigama sūṭra.*

The *Nyāyakosha* is not very accurate when it attributes only *two pramāṇas* to the 'Ārhaṭas.'

Vaishēṣika view.

According to the *Vaishēṣikas*, there are four kinds of *Viḍyā*, Knowledge:—Perception, Inference, Remembrance and Intuitional or Spiritual. That which is produced by

sense-contact is Perception;—that got at by means of an indicative mark, which is related to the object inferred and is never found apart from it, is Inference;—the recalling of a previous cognition through certain causes is Remembrance; —that which is entirely due to a supernatural faculty due to virtue and penance is called intuitional or spiritual cognition. Verbal cognition, according to the Vaishēṣikas, is only a form of Inference (*Prashastapāḍa*, page 213); so also are Analogical Cognition (page 220), Presumptive Cognition (page 223), Probability (page 225), and Non-apprehension (page 225). It is not that these are not valid knowledge; they are as valid as Perception or Inference; but inasmuch as they can be reduced to the form of inference, there is no need for postulating them as distinct forms of valid knowledge.

With regard to Remembrance, the *Nyāyakanḍalī* (page 257) remarks that it is not '*Pramāṇa*', as it apprehends past objects, and therefore depends upon a previous cognition, and is not independent, as a pramāṇa should be.

But the *Bhāṣya* mentions Remembrance along with the other three, and does not imply any such distinction as that while the other three are *pramāṇa*, Remembrahce is not so. Nor is there any justification for the exclusion of Remembrance by the *Kanḍalī* itself; as the definition of '*Viḍyā*' that it has provided (on page 172) is meant apparently to be a definition of '*Pramāṇa*'; this definition is—'that well-defined cognition which is free from doubt, not liable to subsequent sublation'; and moreover on page 186, line 11, it calls all the three—Perception, Inference and Remembrance—'*laukika*' or human '*pramāṇa*', as distinguished from the *spiritual cognition*, which is superhuman. So it appears it was only an afterthought which made the *Kandalikārā* reject the *pramāṇaṭva* of Remembrance. Later *Vaishēṣika* writers have of course rejected its validity; but

as time wore on and originality began to lose ground, the Nyāya and Vaishēṣika writers began to bring about a coalition between the two systems; so that in later literature, we find their angularities worn off, and the two philosophies mingled up almost beyond recognition, in the later manuals.

Sāṅkhya view.

The Sāṅkhya view is thus put forth in the fourth Kārikā of Īshvarakriṣṇa—

'Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony are the three kinds of proof necessary; these include all kinds of proofs.'

On this the *Tattvakaumudī* remarks—

"Proof is that by which right knowledge is determined, it is the means of correct cognition; correct cognition being a mental condition free from all that is doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown....... Proof is distinguished from all that leads to wrong notion; viz., doubt, misconception, memory and the like.'

These three, Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony, include all proofs. Analogy, according to the Sāṅkhyas, is included in Valid Testimony; so that Analogical cognition is only a form of Verbal Cognition. Presumption and Probability are included in Inference; and Non-apprehension in Perception. (*Tattvakaumudī*, on *Kārikā* 5).

So that according to the Sāṅkhyas also Analogy and the rest are *pramāṇa*; but do not differ from the three mentioned in the *Kārikā*; and Remembrance is not *pramāṇa*.

The *Yogasūtra* also speaks of three forms of Right Knowledge:—Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony, (Sūtra 1-7). Neither the Sūtra nor the Bhāṣya nor any of the more authoritative commentaries say anything as to the other pramāṇas, Analogy, Presumption and the rest.

Perception, according to the Yoga-Bhāṣya, is that function of the internal organ which has the external thing

for its object, and which has as its principal concern the ascertainment of a certain specific aspect of the object,—such functioning of the inner organ arising when it is affected by the external object through the pathway of the sense-organs;—Inference is that functioning of the inner organ which has for its object the relation that associates the object with all homogeneous objects and dissociates it from all heterogeneous ones: and this functioning is concerned chiefly with the ascertainment of the generic character of things;—And lastly a certain object having been known by a trustworthy person, when that person expresses that cognition by words, for the purpose of conveying that knowledge to other persons, there comes about, by means of these Words, a functioning in the internal organ of the person addressed, which represents a form of knowledge that is called 'verbal.'

[The preceding Sūṭra, printed as (13) should be read throughout as Sūṭra (14).]

Buḍḍhi—Apprehension. The fifth Parmēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 27, L. 3 to P. 27, L. 8.]

* Some people (the Sāṅkhyas) have held the view that *Jñāna*, 'Cognition,' is the function of *Buḍḍhi*, 'Intellection,' which latter is a non-intelligent or unconscious instrument; while *Upalabḍhi*, 'Apprehension,' is the function of the intelligent (Soul), which latter is not-active. And our Author makes the following declaration, with a view, it would seem,† to set aside this view.

Sūṭra (15).

'INTELLECTION', 'APPREHENSION,' AND 'COGNITION' ARE SYNONYMOUS TERMS ‡ (SŪṬRA 15).

It is not possible for Cognition to belong to the unconscious instrument Buḍḍhi; as if it were, then Buḍḍhi could be a conscious entity; while there is a single conscious

* The Sāṅkhya theory is thus explained in the *Ṭāṭparya*:—Buḍḍhi is a product of the three guṇas, which are unconscious entities. Hence Buḍḍhi also is unconscious. Through the medium of the Sense-organs, the Buḍḍhi becomes modified into the form of the object. The faculty of consciousness on the other hand is unmodifiable, and is even conscious. When Buḍḍhi comes into close proximity to this conscious entity, it reflects within itself this consciousness; and thereby appears as itself conscious; and becoming modified into the form of the object, it cognises it; hence the modification of the Buḍḍhi into the form of the thing cognised completes the 'cognition' of that thing. While the connection of the conscious entity, through reflection, with the Buḍḍhi in the shape of the object cognised, constitutes a function of the conscious Soul, and is called the 'apprehension' of the object by the Soul. Just as the moon though without light of own, reflects the light of the Sun, and with this reflected light illumines objects, in the same manner Buḍḍhi, though itself unconscious, reflects the consciousness of the Soul and thereby cognises objects and makes them apprehended.

† "*It would seem*" -This qualifying clause is added with a view to indicate that this refutation is not the main purpose of the Sūṭra. The Sūṭra is for the purpose of providing a definition of Buḍḍhi; and the way in which the definition is put forward serves also the purpose of setting aside the Sāṅkhya view.

‡ Thus the definition of Buḍḍhi comes to be this—'That thing which is denoted by these synonymous words is Buḍḍhi.'

entity, apart from the aggregate of the body, and the sense-organs*.

Though the sentence composing the Sūtra is for the purpose of providing the definition of one of the *objects of cognition*, yet it is taken as implying the other fact (the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory) by the force of the argument (implied in the mention of the synonyms). †

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 15.

[Page 82, Line 3 to Line 22].

The Sūtra briefly indicates something else (*viz*: the the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory) while putting forward the definition of Buddhi, the turn of whose treatment has arrived ‡.

Intellection is that thing which is denoted by these synonymous words—'Intellection,' 'Apprehension,' 'Cognition.' "How can mere synonymous words constitute the definition of a thing §?" They can do so for the simple reason that they serve to differentiate the thing defined. The only purpose served by definitions is to differentiate things from one another; and as a matter of fact we find that no other thing

* This refutation is thus explained by the *Tātparya*:—Buddhi cannot reflect the conscious Soul, in the way that the moon reflects the light of the Sun. As consciousness being non-modifiable, there can be no reflection of it. Hence it would be necessary to attribute consciousness to the Buddhi itself. So that every cognition will have two conscious agents. (See *Vārṭika* below).

† Thus explained by the *Parishuddhi*.

‡ The Soul and other things that have been already defined are causes of Buddhi; so that after the definition of the causes, it is the turn of the definition of the Effect—says the *Tatparya*.

§ The sense of the objection is that mere words depend upon connection only; so that any word might, by convention, be applied to anything; so that no mere word can be a proper definition. The reply is that there are two kinds of words—Some have their denotation fixed by individual convention; as when the father gives a certain name to his child; while there are others whose denotation is fixed by a convention that is universally binding; as in the case of the word 'cow' denoting the cow. And there is nothing incongruous in regarding words of this latter class as proper differentiators of things—*Tātparya*.

(save Buḍḍhi) is denoted by the synonyms mentioned; so that being peculiar to the thing defined, they serve as its definition.

The *Bhaṣya* says [Page 27, Line 8.]—*The sentence of the Sūṭra is taken as implying the other fact* (*the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory*) *by the force of the argument.*

The meaning of this is that the function of Buḍḍhi as (postulated by Sāṅkhya) is set aside by means of the mention of the synonymous words. These people have held that Cognition is the function of Buḍḍhi, and Apprehension is a function of the Soul; and with a view to reject this view the Sūṭra declares that all these words—*Buḍḍhi* (Intellection), '*Jñāna* (Cognition) and *Upalabḍhi* ' (Apprehension) are synonymous; so that Cognition being the same as *Buḍḍhi*, cannot be regarded as a function of it, something different from itself.

" But what is the *argument* that implies all this?"

It is this:—When one asserts that 'the Soul *apprehends*' and 'Intellection *cognises*,' he admits that both Soul and Intellection are conscious entities. And if both were conscious entities, then there would be * no possibility of any inference of cognition having a single agent, which is deduced from the fact of every cognition belonging to only one individual. That is to say, if Intellection were a conscious entity, and the Soul also were a conscious entity, then the Soul could never apprehend things touched by the Intellection; for the simple reason that the apprehensions of one conscious entity are never cognised by another conscious entity; as a matter of fact, however we find that the Soul does apprehend things touched by Buḍḍhi; hence the conclusion is that there is a single

* The translation follows the interpretation of the *Tāṭparya*; but this makes the presence of 'च' necessary in the text. The text as it stands may be translated thus:—'The view that both are conscious entities would be met by the following reasoning based upon the fact of every cognition belonging to only one agent.'

conscious entity [and this is the same whose consciousness is admitted by all parties]. If (for the purpose of explaining the fact of a single cognitive agent) it be assumed that [there are functions of both, Soul and Buḍḍhi, and] the function of the Cognitive Soul is non-different from that of Buḍḍhi [*i.e.*, either that the function of both is one and the same, or, that though their functions are different, they cannot be distinguished],—then it becomes incumbent upon you to point out the exact nature of the Soul (as distinguished from Buḍḍhi).' "Well, Buḍḍhi determines things, and the Soul apprehends them; that is to say, the Soul is conscious of things in accordance with such time and place in connection with which Buḍḍhi determines them." But 'determines' and 'apprehends' are synonymous terms; and it is not proper to regard those things as different which are spoken of by means of synonymous terms; as we find in the case of the words '*ḍhvani*' and '*nāḍa*.' If it were not so [*i.e.*, if things spoken of by means of synonymous words were different], then in the case of the words '*ḍhvani*' and '*nāḍa*' also the things denoted by them would be diverse! It may be held that "while the Soul apprehends things, Buḍḍhi makes them known or apprehended." True; in that case the Soul of man cognises things by means of Buḍḍhi, and it is not Buḍḍhi that cognises things; when you say that Buḍḍhi makes known things, this Buḍḍhi becomes only an *instrument* of cognition.*

Manas,—Mind. The Sixth Prameya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 27, Line 9 to Page 28, Line 6.]

Remembrance, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Doubt, Intuition, Dream, Imagination, as also the Perception of Pleasure and the rest,—all these are indicative of the existence of the Mind; and in addition to all these, we have the following also—

* So that *Buḍḍhi* would be the same as *Manas*—says the *Tāṭparya*.

SŪTRA (16).—THE NON-APPEARANCE OF SIMULTANEOUS COGNITIONS IS INDICATIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OF MIND. (2).

Inasmuch as Remembrance and the rest (enumerated above) are not brought about by the instrumentality of the (external) * sense-organs, they must be due to some other organ. As a matter of fact, we find that even though at one and the same time several perceptible objects, odour and the rest, are in close proximity to the respectively perceptive sense-organs, the Olfactory organ and the rest, yet there is no simultaneous cognition of them; and from this we infer that there is some other cause, by whose proximity cognition appears, and on account of whose non-proximity cognition does not appear,—this other organ being in contact with the several sense-organs, and helping them, and being non-pervasive (limited) in its dimension. If the proximity of sense-organs to their objects, by themselves, independently of the contact of the Mind, were the sole cause of cognitions, then it would be quite possible for several cognitions to appear simultaneously.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 16.

[Page 83, Line 1, to Page 85, Line 4.]

Vārṭika, Page 83.

†The *Bhāṣya* (page 27, *l.* 9), says—*Remembrance, Inference, etc.*; this means that Remembrance and the rest are indicative of the presence of the Mind. "Are these the only indicatives?" No. "What then?" This also that follows (in the Sūṭra):—*i.e.* '*The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions.*' As a matter of fact, we find that at times, even though the contact of several sense-organs and their objects is present, yet the cognitions of all these objects do not appear simultaneously; and from this it follows that there is some other organ capable of being in contact with the sense-organs and helping them, and non-pervasive in its dimension, the presence and absence

* This qualification is added by the *Ṭāṭparya*.

† From here the translation has the advantage of the Chaukhambha Sanskrit series edition; but the page references continue in accordance with the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition.

of whose contact determine the appearance and non-appearance of cognitions. "How does this conclusion follow?' For the simple reason that the non-appearance of the effect (cognition) can only be due to some deficiency in the cause (the sense-contact; and this deficiency consists in the absence of mind-contact). This is the meaning of the *Sūtra*.

"How can Remembrance and the rest which subsist in something else (the Soul), be indicative of the existence of the Mind?"

We do not mean that Remembrance and the rest are indicative of the Mind, *because they subsist in it*; * what we mean is that they are due to some other instrument, because they are actions, and yet they are not the actions of odour-cognition and the rest. That is to say, in our experience we have found that an action other than Odour-cognition is due to an instrument other than the Odour-organ; and so forth; as for instance, the action of the chariot; and Remembrance and the rest are actions; so these must be due to the operation of instruments other than those of odour-cognition and the rest. Or, the reasoning may be put as follows:—Pleasure and the rest must be due to the operation of an organ other than the Visual and the rest, because while being different from odour (colour) and such other objects (operated upon by the Visual and other organs), they are objects of cognition,—just like chariots and such other objects (operated upon by agencies other than those of the ordinary sense-organs). As a matter of fact, we find that the chariot &c., are operated upon by such instruments as the axe and

* That is to say, Remembrance etc., are actions, and yet they are not brought about by the instrumentality of the Visual and other organs;—therefore they must be due to the instrumentality of some other organ. Because they are the specific qualities of the Soul; and all such qualities of the Soul must be due to the instrumentality of organs; as we find in the case of all perceptional cognitions. So that the appearance of Remembrance must be due to the operation of an *organ*, and not to any such agency as that of Impressions and the like. And to this organ we give the name 'Mind.'

the like, which are other than the Visual and other sense-organs; and pleasure, etc., also are objects (like the chariot); hence these also must be operated upon by instruments other than the visual and other organs.

An objection is raised:—

"The *non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions* is a property belonging to *cognitions*; how then can it be indicative of the *Mind*? Even when a property is not related to a thing, if it were regarded as indicative of it, then everything would be indicative of everything; and we could in that case have such reasonings as—'the Soul exists because the crow is black.' Such reasonings however are impossible; so that a property that is not related to a thing can never be regarded as its indicative."

To this objection some people make the following reply:—Even though a property be not related to a thing, it can be indicative of it. For instance, when we see a fresh earthenware cup, even though this *seeing of the cup*, does not subsist in the potter, yet it rightly indicates his existence. Similarly also the * sight of the revolving potter's wheel [which also indicates the presence of the potter].

Vārṭika, Page 84.

This explanation however is not right. What is indicated by the fact (of seeing of the fresh cup) is, not the presence of the potter, but only the spot, the point in space, as qualified by the presence of the potter; and certainly *the presence of the cup* also is a qualification of that same spot. Similarly when the spot is found qualified by the revolving wheel, it proves the fact of that same spot being qualified also by the presence of the potter. Thus we find that in no case is there an Inference of a thing from a character not related to it.

* Both editions read '*chakramaḍarshanam*', which gives no sense. '*Chakraḍarshanam*' gives better sense.

"In that case *the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions* not being related to the *Mind*, how can it be indicative of this latter?"

* The said *non-appearance* is not absolutely unrelated to the Mind, when we take the *appearance of simultaneous cognitions* as the Subject, or Minor Term, of our inference "How so?" The apprehensions of Colour, etc., must be regarded as standing in need of other instruments, because they are never found to appear simultaneously; for instance, in the case of a man well-versed in several handicrafts, we find that even though several instruments, in the shape of the axe and the rest, are before him at one and the same time, yet, they do not bring about, at the same time, any large number of objects, in the shape of the chariot and the like; and this because all those instruments stand in need of the operation of his hands: in the same manner, inasmuch as the Eye and the other organs also are never found to bring about simultaneous cognitions, it is concluded that these also stand in need of the operation of some other instrument. Or again, we may meet the objection by putting forward an inference in which the *sense-organs* are the 'Subject' or Minor Term. "How?" In the following form:—'The Eye and the other organs, in all their operations, stand in need of another instrument, because they are never found to operate simultaneously; just like the axe and other instruments.

A fresh objection is raised:—"If then, the Eye and the other organs are incapable of apprehending their several

* The only inference relevant to the present context, of which *the appearance of simultaneous cognitions* could be the subject, may be thus stated:—'*The appearance of simultaneous cognitions* is not possible because the perception of colours, etc., stands in need of an instrument other than the Eye, etc.'; and then we can construe the next sentence as proving the fact of the perceptions standing in need of other instruments; the reasoning contained in this latter sentence having the *apprehensions* for its 'Subject,' and not *the appearance of simultaneous cognitions.*

objects simultaneously, because they stand in need of another instrument,—then, why should there be no simultaneous cognition in the case of such objects as are *all* perceptible by the same sense-organ? Certainly the contact of the mind is not absent in the *one* organ! It will perhaps be urged that the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions in this case will be due to the diversity of the objects related (to the organ). But then, how would you account for it in a case where several objects are actually related to the organ at one and the same time? In the case of such several objects as the blue colour, and the like, where these objects come into contact with the organ one after the other, the diversity of the objects may account for the non-appearance of their simultaneons cognition. But in a case where several objects are actually in contact with the organ, how would the said non-appearance be accounted for? For example, [when you see the white cow walking, and the white colour, the animal's body and the motion are all in contact with the eye at one and the same time] why cannot we have the cognition 'the white cow is walking' [where the three cognitions of the three objects would be simultaneous]?"

To the above some people make the following reply:—The non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions is due to the diversity in the *desire for cognition* (in the mind of the cogniser). The sense of this explanation offered by some people is that, even though a certain object may be related (to the perceiving organ), yet it is not cognised, if there is no desire (on the part of the cognitive agent) to cognise it. [So that when a number of things are not cognised at one and the same time, it is due to the fact that the desire for cognising all of them is not present at one and the same time].

This explanation is not right: as this would lead to the rejection of Mind; if the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions were due only to the diversity in the desire for the

several cognitions, then, Mind should be rejected altogether. [If, in the case of one set of cognitions, the non-appearance be held to be due to the diversity in the desire for cognitions, then] in other cases also there would be no bar prohibiting the postulating of the same diversity in the desire for cognitions ; so that there being no use for the Mind, it should be rejected.* But there are cases where even though the desire for cognising many things is present, simultaneous cognitions do not appear; and for this some other explanation than diversity of desire for cognising should be found. Hence the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions must be regarded as due to some other cause (than the diversity of desire for cognising). "What is that cause ?" The cause lies in the very nature of instruments. That is to say, it is in the very nature of Instruments that they never act unless they are operated upon (by an intelligent agent); and in the same manner it is also in their very nature that even though related (to objects),

Vārṭika, Page 85.

they do not have more than one action at a time; that is to say, even though it may be related to several objects, an instrument can never have more than one action at a time; and †even though the Soul may be the supervisor or operator of the instrument, yet, inasmuch as the fact of the Soul being related to more than one organ at one and the same time cannot be denied, some other cause (than the supervision of the Soul) should be found for the non-appearance of simultaneous cognitions. And this cause is no other than the Mind. Thus is the existence of Mind established.

* As Apparent Inconsistency of the non-simultaneous cognitions is the only basis for the postulating of Mind ; so that when another explanation, in the shape of diversity in the desire for cognitions, is found for the non-simultaneous cognitions, the inconsistency ceases ; hence there remains no basis for the assuming of Mind.

† 'The supervision of the Soul cannot account for the non-simultaneity of cognitions ; as when several causes are present, the Soul does bring about several effects. For instance, one and the same boy accompanies his teacher, carries his water-pot, and repeats his lessons—all at one and the same time'—*Tātparya*.

Pravritti, Activity—Seventh Pramēya.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 28, Line 7 to Page 28, Line 11.]

After Mind comes the turn* of Activity; and

ACTIVITY CONSISTS IN THE OPERATING OF SPEECH, OF MIND AND OF BODY. (SŪṬRA 17.)

By the word '*buddhi*' in the Sūṭra the Mind is meant,—the word being taken in the sense of *that by means of which things are cognised* (*buddhyatē anayā*)†.

‡ The various 'operatings' by the body, by Speech and by the Mind are virtuous and sinful; and are of ten kinds. And this we have already explained above under Sūṭra 2.

VĀRṬIKA.

[Page 85, Line 5 to Page 85, Line 13.]

Activity consists of the operating of Speech, of Mind, and of Body—says the Sūṭra—*i.e.*, of operations *by* Speech, *by* Mind and *by* Body.

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* As Activity belongs to the Mind (see Sūṭra), Activity has to be defined after Mind has been described.

† The word '*buddhi*', when explained as '*buddhyaṭē iti*,' that which is apprehended, denotes cognition; and when explained as '*buddhyat anayā*', it denotes the instrument of cognition, Mind.

‡ Says the *Tāṭparya*:—Operations are of two kinds—some give rise to cognitions; others give rise to action. For instance, the operation of Speech becomes the cause of virtue or sin according to the nature of the cognition that it produces (in the mind of the person spoken to). So that 'Speech' must be taken here to stand for *all* those operations that bring about cognitions; and thus the operations of the Eye and other organs, which consists in the perceiving of agreeable or disagreeable things, become included. Operations leading to Action are of two kinds—*that having the Body for its cause, and that caused by the Mind.*

These two expressions are explained by the *Parishuddhi* to mean—'that of which the body is the *object*' and 'that of which the Mind is the *object*'. For instance, the operation or effort involved in the actions of giving, stealing and the like, have all got the Body for their object; as it is the Body that is active; similarly, sympathy, jealousy and the like are operations having the Mind for their object; as it is the Mind that is active. This explanation of the two expressions—'*Kayanimiṭṭā*' and '*Manonimiṭṭā*'—are necessitated by the fact that otherwise all operations could be called both *Kayanimiṭṭā* and *Manonimiṭṭā*; as there is not a single action of man in which *both* Mind and Body are not the cause.

This Activity is both virtuous and sinful; and is of *ten* kinds. *Virtuous* activity consists in—(1) giving shelter, (2) serving and (3) giving—these by the Body;—(4) telling the truth, (5) telling what is salutary, (6) saying what is agreeable, and (7) reading—these by Speech;—and (8) mercy, (9) aspiration, and (10) faith—these by the Mind. The contraries of these ten constitute the *sinful activity*.

*An objection is raised:—"All Activity being momentary,—it is impossible that it should be the cause of birth (as has been held). That is to say, in view of the fact that every operation exists for a moment only, it is not right to regard it as the cause of birth; and the fact of Activity not being the cause of Birth goes against what has been declared in Sūtra 2 above (where it has been stated that Birth is due to Activity)."

The answer to the above objection is that there is nothing in the present Sūtra which goes against what has been declared in Sūtra 2; as in Sūtra 2, the word 'Activity', '*Pravṛitti*', stands for the *results* of Activity; *Virtue and Vice* (Dharma and Adharma) are the direct results of all Activity; and it is these that have been spoken of by the word 'Activity, in Sūtra 2; and the justification for this figurative use of the word lies in the fact that *Activity* is the cause of Virtue and Vice; and such usage is common; for instance, we have such assertions as 'food is the *life* of living beings' [where *food*, which is the *cause*, the *means* of living, is spoken of as *life* itself.]

Doṣa—Defect.—The Eighth Pramēya.

Sūtra (18).

(SŪTRA 18).—DEFECTS HAVE URGING OR INCITING FOR THEIR DISTINGUISHING FEATURE.

* 'Birth occurs in the next life, hence it cannot be due to the activity of the present life; as all such activity vanishes in a moment, and cannot be present when the effect—next birth—appears.'

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 28, L. 13 to P. 29, L. 4.]

*'Inciting' means *causing activity*. Attachment and the rest incite, or cause the activity of, man towards virtuous or sinful deeds; and whenever there is ignorance, there are attachment and aversion.†

Objection—"Everyone knows what these *Defects* are; why are they described by means of a definition?"

As a matter of fact, persons qualified by attachment, aversion and ignorance (which are the inciters to activity) are distinguished (or characterised) by their action: the man who has attachments does that action whereby he experiences pleasure or pain; similarly the man who has aversion, or one who has ignorance. [And it was necessary to bring out this fact of Attachment &c. being the cause of activity, in order to produce disgust against them; which fact could not have been brought out by the mere mention of Attachment and the other *Defects*; for] when the words 'attachment,' 'aversion' and 'ignorance' are used by themselves, not much is expressed by them.‡

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*The action of the *inciter* can be understood only after that of the *incited* has been understood, hence after the definition of Activity comes the turn of its excitant, Defects.—*Tāṭparya*.

†Both Attachment and Aversion arise from ignorance; and urge the man to activity; so that 'inciting' is a peculiarity of Attachment and Aversion; and this peculiarity subsists in the same substrate as the ignorance.—*Tāṭparya*.

In explaining this, the *Parishuddhi* draws a distinction between *pravartaka* that which incites) and *pravartanā*, (the action of inciting). What incites men to activity are ignorance and the consequent Attachment and Aversion towards the object on which the activity turns; and the *inciting* is towards this activity, which is the means leading to that object, and with regard to which also there are ignorance and consequent Attachment and Aversion.

‡The *Tāṭparya* explains—All that the words express are the mere forms of the defects; and they give no idea of their being excitants of activity; and until this fact is brought out, there would be no disgust against Defects; as there is nothing wrong in Attachment or Aversion *per se*; it is only when they give rise to activity bringing pleasure and pain, that they come to be recognised as something to be shunned.

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 85, L. 15 *to* 86, L. 2].

Defects have inciting for their distinguishing feature—says the Sūtra. The question is asked—"What is this *inciting*?" The answer is that *inciting* is that by reason of which man is forced, helplessly, to act; when a man acts, he is incited by the *defects*, Attachment and the rest; and thus this inciting being the cause of activity, is called '*pravarṭanā*', *the means of activity* (*pravarṭayaṭi iti.*); just as we have the words '*kāraṇā*' (which means the *means of doing*), *hāraṇā* (the means of taking away) and the like. 'But how is this inciting known?"* The fact that there is *inciting* (done by the Defects) is known by each person directly by Perception so far as his own activity is concerned; and in the case of the activity of other persons, the fact is known by Inference; just as the fact of the Soul being the object of the notion of 'I' (self-consciousness) is known by each man directly by Perception; and this self-consciousness is not got at either by means of Inference or by means of Word. "Why is it not known by Inference?" For the simple reason that there is no *probans* available (whereby the inferential cognition could be obtained). "And why cannot it be got at by means of Word (Trustworthy Assertion)?" Because it involves a conception that cannot be obtained by any teaching or instruction.† From all this it follows that like Colour &c., the Soul of each man is perceptible to himself, while the Soul in another man's body is inferred from his activity and cessation from activity.

*What is known is the *defect*, and not the fact of the defect being the excitant to activity'—*Ṭāṭparya*.

†That my activity has been due to a certain attachment or aversion in myself can be known by myself alone; and cannot be taught to me.

Prēṭyabhāva, *Rebirth.*—*The Ninth Prameya.*
Sūṭra (19).

*REBIRTH CONSISTS IN BEING BORN AGAIN.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 29, L. 6 to, p. 29, L. 11.]

Having died, when [the Soul] is born again in an animate body, this *being born again* constitutes the *Rebirth* of that [Soul], which is born,—*i.e.*, becomes connected with the body, the sense-organs, the mind, apprehension, and experience; and *being born again* consists in repeated connection with the body etc.;—the word 'repeated' denotes *recurrence.*† The literal meaning of the word '*Prēṭyabhāva*' may be thus explained:—When the Soul, subsisting in a particular animate body, abandons the body etc., previously occupied, then it *dies* (*praiṭi*); and when it takes possession in another body, of another body and sense-organs etc., it is *born* (*bhavaṭi*); so that '*prēṭyabhāva*' is *birth* (*bhāva*) after *having died* (*prēṭya*). The recurrence of this process of birth and death should be regarded as without beginning, and ending only with Final Release.

VĀRṬIKA ON SŪṬRA 19.

[Page 86, Line 4 to *Line* 17.]

Rebirth consists in being born again—says the *Sūṭra*; that is to say, Rebirth is transference into another body after the abandoning of the previously occupied body etc. The mention of the word 'repeated' (in the *Bhāṣya*) is with a view to indicate the beginninglessness of metempsychosis; the meaning being that birth and death recur again and again; which shows that metempsychosis is without beginning.

"What is this *Metempsychosis*?"

Metempsychosis consists in the unceasing process of effective causal activity among Pain, Birth, Activity, Defect and Wrong Cognition (mentioned in Sūṭra 2). And this process is without beginning; as there is no restriction as to

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*The *Ṭāṭparya* omits to mention the ground for the treatment of Rebirth after Defect. The *Parishuḍḍhi* says—Rebirth is the acquisition of the Body etc., down to Defects, after the abandonment of the same; so that it is only natural that Rebirth should be dealt with after these.

†'Recurrence' of connections with body etc., implies also the abandoning of these.—*Parishuḍḍhi.*

any particular order of sequence among the said 'Pain' and the rest. For instance, if it were held that Pain comes first, then this could not be right; as there is no Pain without Birth;—If Birth were held to come first, this also would not be right; as there can be no Birth without Merit and Demerit;—if Merit and Demerit be held to come first, this also would not be right; as these are not possible without Attachment and Aversion;—lastly, if it be held that Attachment and Aversion come first, this also will not be right; as Attachment and Aversion never appear without Ignorance.

"Then, Ignorance may be taken as the beginning of the series." This also will not be right; as there is no Ignorance without Body and the rest.

This causal activity among Pain and the rest, down to Ignorance, being unceasing, constitutes 'Metempsychosis', '*samsāra*',—also called (in the scriptures) '*Ājarañjarībhāva*.'

"This Birth and Death (*samsāra*),—does it belong to the Soul or to the Mind?" If by '*samsāra*' you mean *the action* (of entering and moving off from the Bodies), then it belongs to the Mind; as it is the Mind that actually *moves*, '*samsarati*'; on the other hand, if by '*samsāra*' you mean *experiencing* (of pleasure and pain) [as it really is], then it belongs to the Soul; as it is the Soul that experiences pleasure and pain.

Fruition, Phala.—Tenth Prameya.

Sūtra 20.

* FRUITION IS A THING PRODUCED BY ACTIVITY AND DEFECT.

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 29, L. 13 to P. 30, L. 2].

Fruition consists in the experiencing of pleasure and pain, as every action leads to pleasure and pain. And as

* Fruition is the direct result of man's *activity* alone; but the Sūtra adds *Defects* also with a view to show—(1) that defects are the cause of Activity and (2) that Pleasure and Pain (which constitute Fruition) are the result of Defects also. It is only when the soil of the Soul is irrigated with the water of Defect that the seeds of Merit and Demerit produce the fruits of Pleasure and Pain'—*Tātparya*.

pleasure and pain appear only when the Body, the Sense-organs, the Objects and Apprehension are present, what are meant to be included under the name 'Fruition' are pleasure and pain along with Body and the rest; so that all these (Pleasure and Pain along with Body &c.) constitute the Fruition, which is *a thing produced by Activity and Defect.* Each time this Fruition is received by man, it is relinquished by him; and each time it is relinquished, it is again received; and there is no end * or absolute cessation of these receivings and relinquishings; and it is by this unceasing current of receivings and relinquishings that the entire worldly process is carried on.

This same (Body and the rest) [constitute *Pain*, defined in the next Sūṭra].

VĀRṬIKA.

[Page 86, L. 19 to P. 87, L. 3.]

Everything that is produced, *e.g.*, the Body and the rest, is a 'fruit' or 'fruition'; as every one of such things is brought about by the agency of Merit and Demerit. If we regard the primary or principal fruit alone as constituting *Fruition*, then the experiencing of pleasure and pain is the only *Fruition*; as this is what it ultimately leads to. But inasmuch as the experiencing of pleasure and pain is the

Vār. P. 87

final result of Merit and Demerit,—and there is no possibility of this experiencing without the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest,—with a view to this fact, it has been held that Merit and Demerit bring about the experience of pleasure and pain only after having brought about the Body &c.; so that the word 'fruiion' is applied, primarily, to the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and secondarily to the Body (and the rest).

The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds that the author of the Sūṭra will himself describe in Adh. VI how Defects help Activity in the bringing about of Fruition.

On the word '*Arṭhaḥ*', 'thing,' in the Sūṭra, the *Tāṭparya* remarks—'The word is put in for including all kinds of Fruition, primary as well as secondary; the primary fruition consisting in Pleasure and Pain, and the secondary in the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest—says the *Parishuḍḍhi*.

* '*Niṣṭhā*' is mere end; and as there is some sort of an *end* to Pleasure and Pain &c at each Dissolution, the *Bhāṣya* corrects itself and adds the word '*Paryavasānam*' *absolute* (*pari*) *cessation* (*avasāna*).—*Tāṭparya.*

Pain, Duḥkha.—Eleventh Pramēya.

Sūṭra (21).

PAIN IS THAT WHICH IS CONNECTED WITH ANNOYANCE.

BHĀṢYA.

[P. 30, L. 4 to L. 7.]

By 'Annoyance *' here is meant *suffering*, *injury*. Every thing, (*i. e.* Body &c. and also Pleasure and Pain), being intermingled with *i. e.* invariably accompanied by, never existing apart from—pain, is inseparable from Pain; and as such is regarded as *Pain* itself. Finding everything to be intermingled with Pain, when one wishes to get rid of Pain, he finds that birth (or life) itself is nothing but pain; and thus becomes disgusted (with life); and being disgusted, he loses all attachment; and being free from attachment, he is released.

VĀRṬIKA.

[P. 87, L. 5 to Line 22.]

This same—*i. e.* the Body &c.—being connected with annoyance, is called 'Pain'. Primarily, it is pain alone that can be called '*Duḥkha*'. The word '*lakṣaṇa*' (in the Sūṭra) means *connection*. All these—Body and the rest—are connected with pain: The body is the cause of pain; so that in this case the 'connection' consists in the *causal relation*;—the Sense-organs, the Objects and Apprehension are the instruments of pain; so that in the case of these, the 'connection' consists in *instrumentality*;—Pleasure never exists apart from Pain; so that in this case the 'connection' consists in *invariable concomitance*. Primarily, however, Pain itself alone can be regarded as *Pain* [everything else being so regarded only on account of being connected with Pain].

Some people have held that everything is Pain, primarily by itself. But this is not right; as this is against

* 'Annoyance' here stands for the *feeling* of annoyance; so that it refers primarily to Pain; but secondarily to the Body and the rest also;—all of which are necessary factors in the feeling of pain.—*Taṭparya.*

well-known facts of perception : Pleasure is something that is distinctly perceived; so that its existence cannot be entirely ignored. "But Pleasure is only a form of Pain. That is to say, Pleasure is only a particular phase of Pain; and it is nothing independently by itself." This also is not right; as the negative particle is not added to what is only a particular phase of a thing; in no case do we find the negative particle added to what is only a particular form of a thing; for instance, a particular Brāhmaṇa is never called a 'non-Brāhmaṇa'; similarly if Pleasure were only a particular form of Pain, it could not be spoken of as 'not Pain' (as it is actually called). Then again, if there were no Pleasure, Ḍharma or Merit would be entirely useless. "Why so?" Because Merit has been regarded as the means of Pleasure; so that if there is no Pleasure, there is no use for Merit. Nor will it be right to regard the mere *negation of Pain* as the result of Merit; as in that case Merit will come to have a negative result; that is to say, the result of Merit will become a merely negative entity; and [this would not be right; as] in ordinary experience we find a two-fold activity among men : One man acts with a view to obtain something desirable (when the result aimed at is positive), while another acts with a view to *avoid* an undesirable thing (where the result aimed at is negative); and if there were nothing *desirable* (*i.e.*, affording pleasure), then this two-fold activity would not be possible [every action being, in that case, undertaken for the purpose of *avoiding* that which is undesirable, *i. e.*, pain]. Then again (if there were no Pleasure) there could be no such advice as that 'Pleasure should be looked upon as Pain'; as there could, in that case, be no counter-entity (of Pain, in the shape of Pleasure, which could be looked upon *as Pain*). Lastly, (if there were no Pleasure) there could be no attachment; as no one is ever attached to Pain. For all these reasons we conclude that all things cannot be regarded as 'Pain' in

themselves; and the fact is that all things are regarded as 'Pain' because of the teaching that they should be so regarded [and in reality Pain is not the only entity].

Apavarga—Final Release—Twelfth Pramēya.

Sūtra (22).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 30, Line 8.]

When there is an end, an absolute cessation [of the series of receivings and relinguishings of Fruition], this is what constitutes Final Release, (which is thus defined) :—

ABSOLUTE FREEDOM FROM THE AFORESAID (PAIN &c.) IS FINAL RELEASE (SU. 22).

BHĀṢYA.

[Page 30, Line 10 *to* Page 34, Line 2.]

Release is absolute freedom from that—from the aforesaid Pain, *i.e.*, from birth.* "How is this ?" When there is a relinquishing of the birth that has been taken, and the non-resumption of another,—this condition, which is without end (or limit) is known as 'Final Release' by those who know what Final Release is. This condition of immortality, free from fear,† imperishable (unchanging), consisting in the attainment of bliss, is called 'Brahma.'

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* The word '*ṭaṭ*' in the Sūṭra stands, not only for Pain proper, but also for all such products as the Body, the Sense-organs &c. to everyone of which the name 'Pain' is applied in its secondary sense.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The 'fear' meant here is the fear of being born into the world ; the epithet 'unchanging' is added with a view to deny the view that Brahma evolves itself into diverse names and forms ; the phrase 'condition of immortality' is meant to exclude the Bauḍḍha theory that Release consists in the absolute cessation of the mind, ressembling the extinguishing of the lamp.—*Ṭāṭparya.* The *Parishuḍḍhi* adds——Evolution is of two kinds—(1) the material object itself ceases and another bject takes place, which idea of evolution is favoured by the *Bauḍḍha* ; and (2) the object remaining intact, there is a change of its qualities ; this form of Evolution being held by the *Sāṅkhya*. Neither of these two is possible in the case of Brahma ; as in either case it would be transient.

Some people hold the view that —"in Final Release what is manifested is the eternal pleasure of the Soul, just like its vastness; and when that happiness is manifested, the Soul is absolutely free, and becomes happy." *

Bhāṣya, Page 31.

This position is untenable; as there is no proof for what is here asserted; that is to say, there is neither Perception, nor Inference, nor Word of Scripture to prove that 'like its vastness, the eternal pleasure of the Soul is manifested in Final Release.'

Then again, the above view of the *Vēdāntin* meaning that (in Final Release) there is manifestation—*i.e.*, feeling or experience—of the eternal (pleasure),—it behoves him to point out the cause of this 'manifestation' In other words, when it is asserted that there is experienced a feeling or knowledge of eternal (pleasure), it is necessary to explain what is the cause of this manifestation—*i.e.*, the cause whereby it is produced. (*a*) If it be held that the manifestation, or experiencing or feeling, of pleasure is eternal, like the pleasure itself [so that there can be no production of it by any cause, which, therefore, need not be pointed out],—then there would be no difference between the Soul released and the Soul still in the meshes of birth and rebirth. That is to say, just as the released Soul is endowed with the eternal pleasure and its eternal experience, so also would be the Soul that is still involved in birth and rebirth; as both these Souls are eternal [and would therefore be equally endowed with the pleasure, which also is eternal, and as such cannot be absent at any time, even before Final Release]. And if this be admitted, then people would be cognisant of the concomitance and simultaneity (of Final Release) with the result of of Merit and Demerit. In other words, we would be cognisant of the concomitance and simultaneity of the eternal feeling of eternal pleasure with that pleasure and pain which, brought about by Merit and Demerit in the substrates (viz., the souls) wherein they are produced, are experienced by turns! And there would never be any substrate (soul) where either pleasure or its experience would be absent; both of these

* We have the text '*vijñānam ānandam brahma*,' where all the three appear as synonymous; so that Brahma is of the nature of happiness; and as Brahma is eternal, the happiness also must be eternal. Hence in the phrase 'happiness of the Soul,' the preposition 'of' has the sense of apposition.—*Tātparya.*

being *ex-hypothesi*, eternal! (*b*) If, on the other hand, it be held that the feeling of pleasure is not eternal, then it becomes necessary to point out its cause; *i.e.*, if it be held that the manifestation in Final Release, of the eternal pleasure, is not eternal,—then it becomes necessary to point out the cause from which that manifestation proceeds. As regards the Mind-Soul contact it can be such a cause only when aided by other causes; *i.e.*, if it be held that the Mind-Soul contact is the cause of the said manifestation of pleasure, then it would be necessary to point out some other cause which aids the said contact (in bringing about that manifestation of pleasure).* If Merit be held to be that auxilliary cause, then the cause of this has to be pointed out; *i.e.*, if Merit be held to be that other accessory cause, then it becomes necessary to point out the cause from which that Merit proceeds [which, through the Mind-Soul contact, brings about the manifestation of eternal pleasure].

Bhāṣya, Page 32.

The merit that is produced by Yogic contemplation, being a product, must have an end; so that if the product of this ephemeral Merit (in the shape of the said manifestation) were held to be eternal, this would involve an incongruity (the continuance of the product in the absence of the cause); consequently it is necessary to regard the said manifestation also as coming to an end on the cessation of the Merit. That is to say, if the Merit brought about by Yogic contemplation be the cause of the Merit that brings about the manifestation of pleasure, then, inasmuch as the continuance of the product after the cessation of the cause would involve an incongruity, it would be necessary to admit that, when the Merit ceases,—as it must cease, being itself a product,—there must follow the entire cessation of the feeling of pleasure. And when the *feeling* of pleasure is absent, the *pleasure* itself is as good as non-existent. In other words, if there is a cessation of the feeling of pleasure, on account of the disappearance of Merit, then it can not be true that *eternal* pleasure is felt; as there is nothing to determine whether the feeling is absent, because the pleasure itself is absent, or that the feeling is absent even though the pleasure is present. [Nor will it be right, with a view to escape from these difficulties, to hold that the Merit is eternal, as] there is nothing to prove that the Merit is imperishable; for the simple reason that it is something that

* Alone by itself, the Mind-Soul contact can bring about nothing.

is produced. That is to say, there can be no arguments to prove that the Merit produced by Yogic contemplation does not perish; on the other hand, there is a clear argument to the contrary—viz., 'a thing that is produced is non-eternal [and Merit being *produced*, must be ephemeral].' In case there were a person whose feeling of pleasure never ceased, he alone would be justified in arguing that the cause of that feeling (Merit) is eternal. But if Merit were eternal, there would be no difference between the man that has been *released* and one who is still in the meshes of birth and re-birth, —as we have already pointed out above (page 31, line 6). What we mean is that, just as in the case of the released man, the pleasure as well as the cause of the feeling of that pleasure are both eternal,—and there is no cessation of the feeling itself, for the simple reason that the Merit, which causes the feeling, is eternal,—so in the case of the worldly man also [as his Merit also would be eternal, its effects, in the shape of the feeling of pleasure, would also be eternal]. And this would mean that Final Release is co-existent with the feelings of pleasure and pain brought about by Merit and Demerit*. It might be argued that (in the case of the worldly man) the presence of the Body, and the Sense-organs is the cause of obstruction (of pleasure-experience); but this cannot be right; as the Body etc. are for the very purpose of experience; and there is no reason to prove the contrary. In other words, our Opponent might put forward the explanation that in the case of the man who is still in the meshes of worldliness, the presence of the Body etc., obstructs the operation of the cause that leads to the feeling of eternal pleasure; so that there is a clear difference between the worldly man and the released man (in whose case, the Body etc., having fallen off, there is no obstruction). This however is not right; as the only purpose for which the Body, the Sense-organs and the rest exist is to bring about experiences; so that it is not possible that they should obstruct or hinder the experiencing (of eternal pleasure), specially as there is nothing to prove that there is any sort of experience for the Soul deprived of the Body and the rest.

[On p. 31. l. 2, the Author has said that there is no proof in support of the view that final Release consists

* As it is such feelings that abound in worldly existence; and both worldly Existence and Release have been shown to be co-eternal.

in pleasure. In order to meet this, the Vēḍāntin puts forward proofs in support of his view | (1) "The activity of of man is always for the purpose of obtaining what is desired".——If this be urged as a proof in support of the Vēḍānṭa view, then we deny this ; as activity is (also) for the purpose of removing the undesirable. That is to say, the Vēḍānṭin might put forward thefollowing argument.—*" The instructions in regard to Final Release, as also the activity of men desiring Final Release, are both for the purposeof obtaining what is desirable ; and neither of the two can beabsolutely useless." But this reasoning will not be right; as the instruction relating to Final Release as well as the activity of men desiring Final Release, may both be also for the sake of avoiding or removing what is undesirable. That the said activity is for the purpose of removing something undesirable (and not always for obtainting what is desirable) is also proved by the fact that there is nothing that is absolutely desirable, and not mixed up with an undesirable element ; so that what is *desirable* also becomes *undesirable*; and thus when one is active towards the removing of something undesirable, he comes to remove or renounce also what is desirable ; as removing by discrimination is not possible, *i. e.* it is not possible to remove the one without also removing the other.

Bhāṣya, Page 33.

2. As regards the renouncing of what is desirable, this applies with equal force to the case of the Body etc. That is to say, the Vēḍāntin might put forth the following argument—"We see, as a matter of fact, that people renounce the ordinary transitory pleasure and seek for the more lasting pleasure (which proves the presence of a pleasure that is ever-lasting; and this is Final Release)." But on the analogy of this argument, you might also argue that, because in ordinary life people are found to renounce their ephemeral Body, Sense-organs and the rest, this indicates the presence of an eternal set of Body etc., for the released man; and in this manner you will have really established the singularity or aloofness and self sufficiency of the released man | † If it

* The real sense of this argument it thus explained by the *Tātparya*—"The scriptures urge men to activity towards the obtaining of Final Release ; and in ordinary experience we find that it is only when a man desires something that he acts towards its accomplishment ; and as pleasure is the only thing desirable it follows that Final Release must consist in pleasure."

† In seeking to prove that the man becomes free, isolated, you come to prove that it is eternally beset with the entire set of Body, sense-organs and all the rest of it

be urged that this would be against all proof, that would apply with equal force to both parties. In other words, it might be urged that the eternality of Body etc., being contrary to all evidence, it would not be right to assume such body etc. for the released man. But this could be said with equal force with regard to Pleasure also: that the eternality of Pleasure being contrary to all evidence, it is not right to assume such pleasure for the released Soul.

(3) Inasmuch as the absolute cessation of metempsychic pain could be spoken of as 'Pleasure,' there would be no incongruity (in the view that Pleasure consists in the cessation of Pain), even though there be scriptural texts describing Release as 'Pleasure.' That is to say, even though there be certain scripture-texts to the effect that 'absolute pleasure belongs to the released man,'—yet, such texts could very well be taken as using the word 'pleasure' in the sense of 'absolute cessation of pain;' in fact in ordinary parlance, we often find the word 'pleasure' used to denote the cessation or absence of pain. [So that the view that Final Release consists in the cessation of pain is quite in keeping with the said texts].

(4) Further, * until there is a renunciation of the desire for eternal pleasure, there can be no attaining of Final Release; for the simple reason that all desire or attachment has been held to be a *bondage*. That is to say, if it be held that in Final Release eternal pleasure is manifested, then, in accordance with this view, whenever a man would put forth activity for the attaining of Final Release, he would do so only under the influence of a desire for the eternal pleasure; and being so influenced, he could never attain Final Release; nor would be deserve the attainment of Final Release; as desire of all kinds has been held to be a bondage; and it is not possible that a man should be *released* while he is under *bondage*!

† On the other hand, when a man is free from desire for pleasure, there is no longer any feeling of aversion or

* The reading '*syaprahāṇe*' gives no sense; the 'Pandit' edition, as also all the manuscripts consulted, read '*syāprahāṇe*.'

† This is added in anticipation of the following objection:—"If Final Release consists of the removal of pain, then man's activity towards it could be due only to aversion to pain; and aversion is as much a bondage as desire." The sense of the reply is that there is real aversion only so long as there is no desire for something,—the aversion being against that which obstructs the fulfilment of the desire.

undesirability (with regard to anything). In other words, when the man's desire for eternal pleasure has disappeared, the desire for eternal pleasure being not there to obstruct (his path towards Final Release), [and the activity towards Release thus emanating from one who has renounced desire],—whether the man does, or does not, really obtain eternal pleasure, in either case, there is no doubt as to his attaining Final Release.*

VĀRṬIKA.

[Page 88, Line 2 *to* Page 91, Line 5.]

Absolute freedom from the aforesaid is Final Release—says the *Sūṭra*. This means that Final Release consists in † absolute separation from pain, consisting in Body, the Sense-organs, &c.

Some philosophers ‡ have held that Final Release consists in the absolute manifestation of pleasure; they declare that Final Release is only the consummate manifestation or feeling of pleasure. But it cannot be so; as there is no proof; there is no evidence to show that the released Soul experiences eternal pleasure. "It is not right to say that there is no evidence; as there is restriction; § that is to say, the congregation, in the Soul, of pleasure brought about by several causes, is not possible unless there is a restrictive or determining agency (restricting a particular pleasure to a particular Soul); this (fact of congregation) proves that there

* Being free from all desire, when the man betakes himself to activity towards the attaining of Release, he does not care whether the eternal pleasure comes to him or not. As in any case, the activity being of a man who is purified of all desire, there can be no uncertainty as to his attaining Final Release.—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† This epithet is necessary with a view to exclude the separation from Body &c., that occurs at the time of universal dissolution,—this separation not being absolute; the Soul being again saddled with these during the next creation.

‡ The Vedānṭins who follow Chiṭsukhāchāryā hold with him, that the Release, that forms the highest end of man, consists in 'unlimited bliss.'

§ The reasoning here put forward is thus explained in the *Parishuḍḍhi*:—Eternal pleasure, must be accepted as subsisting in the Soul—because there subsist in it pleasures which are of the same generic kind as the eternal pleasure.

is, in the Soul, an eternal pleasure, being determined or restricted by which the said pleasure brought about by several causes comes to inhere in that particular Soul." This however is not right; firstly, because this reasoning would apply, with equal force, to all those qualities of the Soul that are brought about by several causes; so that like eternal pleasure, eternal pain also, as well as eternal desire and the rest, will have to be assumed for the Soul;—secondly [in case eternal pain is not assumed] the reasoning becomes inconclusive [as pain subsists in the Soul, and yet it is not eternal, so that the basic premiss itself of the reasoning becomes false];—lastly, the precise signification of the word 'manifestation' has not yet been pointed out: in the assertion 'eternal pleasure is manifested', what is the precise signification of 'manifestation'? If* 'manifestation' means cognition or feeling, then it is not possible to determine whether this cognition (of pleasure) is eternal or non-eternal.

If it be held that the cognition (of pleasure) is *not* eternal, then it becomes necessary to point out the cause (whereby the cognition is produced). If Mind-Soul contact be held to be the cause, then it should be pointed out what is the accessory cause of that contact. That is, if you hold that the Mind--Soul contact is the cause of the Cognition, then you should point out its accessory cause; because, as a matter of fact, we find that whenever such products as substances,

* 'Pleasure is only a *quality*, not the very constituent, of the Soul, and as such the pleasure must be something distinct from the Soul. Similarly, cognition also is a quality of the Soul; and it is not possible for the Soul, which is without beginning or end, to be identical with cognition, which has both beginning and end; nor can the Soul be regarded as of the nature of cognition itself; as in every act of cognition, all the three factors of cognition, cogniser and cognised object are apprehended as distinct from one another; and even though the factors of cognition and cognised vary with each particular cognition, the cogniser remains the common factor in all; all which goes to show that the *cogniser*, *i.e.*, the Soul, cannot be the same as the *cognition*. Then again, we have proved in the section on 'Perception' that Pleasure is *not* of the nature of *cognition*; and we shall prove in Aḍhyāya IV that there is nothing that can be self-illumined or self-manifested—*Ṭāṭparya*.

qualities or actions are brought about by contact, this contact never operates independently by itself. It might be urged that the Mind-Soul contact is dependent upon, and is helped by, Pleasure; but this will not be right; as this would be incompatible with the idea of 'Kaivalya' or Final Release. That is to say, if you hold that the Mind-Soul contact becomes the cause of cognition when it is aided by the eternal pleasure subsisting in the Soul,—this will not be right; as this would go against all idea of Final Release. *For, just as this Mind-Soul contact of yours brings about the cognition of pleasure, with the help of its object alone (*i.e.*, of this pleasure), independently of all other agencies,—so, in the same manner, a similar contact could bring about the cognitions of such objects as Colour and the rest, †with the help of these objects alone, (independently of all such other agencies as the Sense-organs and the rest); and this would do away with Final Release altogether; and the Soul would be beset with all sorts of difficulties; as cognitions could be constantly crowding upon it (if they came independently of auxilliary agencies) [With a view to escape from these difficulties] it might be held that ‡the Mind-Soul contact brings about the cognition of (eternal)

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* As a matter of fact, in ordinary worldly experience the Mind-Soul contact brings about the cognition of pleasure, with the help of the agency of Merit; if in Final Release, the contact bring about the pleasure independently of Merit, then in the cognition of colour etc., also the auxillary agency of the sense-organs would not be necessary !—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† The Chaukhambha edition reads '*Viṣayānnapēkṣamāṇaḥ*'; but from what has gone before, as also from the explanation supplied by the *Ṭāṭparya*, it is clear that the sense demands the reading with a single '*na*'.

‡ "We do not", says the Vedānṭin, "mean that the contact depends upon the object alone; what we mean is that it requires exactly the same aid that it does during ordinary worldly existence; *i.e.*, during Final Release also it is aided by Merit; but with this difference that the Merit that brings about the cognition of eternal pleasure is that which is born of Yogic contemplation; while the cognitions of ordinary ephemeral pleasures are bought by ordinary merit."—*Ṭāṭparya.*

pleasure, when aided by the merit born of Yogic contemplation. But this also will not be right; as in that case the cognition of pleasure (*i.e.*, Final Release) would cease on the cessation of the said merit. That is to say, after the Merit born of Yogic contemplation will have become exhausted, what would be there to aid the contact,—this has to be pointed out It will not b right to assert that the merit born of Yogic contemplation is never exhausted; as all that is produced is bound to be transient (perishable). As a matter of fact, everything that has the character of a product is found to be transient; so that if it be held that the merit born of Yogic contemplation is eternal,—our answer would be that to say that it is *born* of Yogic contemplation and is yet eternal would be a contradiction in terms.

If, on the other hand, the cognition (of eternal pleasure) be held to be eternal,—this also will not be right. For the eternality of cognition (of pleasure) stands on the same footing as the eternality of pleasure itself; inasmuch as for the former also there is no proof, and there arises the same incongruity of there being no difference between the released man and the man who is still in the meshes of worldliness; and further (if the cognition of pleasure were eternal) there would be no experiencing of pleasure and pain by turns—(as is actually found to be the case);—then again, if a man were to experience pleasure eternally, then, there would be absolutely no use in making any efforts to obtain Final Release; as no one ever wishes to get rid of, or be *released* from, pleasurable experience (and such experience is eternal, *ex hypothesi*); and [if the effort put forth were held to be for the purpose of obtaining *release* from *pain*], as it would not be possible to differentiate pain from pleasure (as the latter would be eternal), and to regulate his renunciation accordingly, when a man would renounce pain, he would

renounce pleasure* ; and further as the man would never experience any pain (his experiencing of pleasure being eternal), for getting rid of what experience would be put forth his effort (for Release)? "As there would be the †obstruction caused by the Body and the rest [which has to be got rid of], the said objection does not hold good ; that is to say, the objection, that the man would *for ever* be experiencing everlasting pleasure, does not hold; as the Body and the rest are there to obstruct the experiencing of the everlasting pleasure." This is not right, we reply. For without the Body, the sense-organs etc., no experience is possible ; so that [for the experiencing of the everlasting pleasure] an everlasting set of Body etc. will have to be postulated ! That is to say, just as for the *released* man you postulate an everlasting pleasure, so you will have to postulate for him an everlasting set of Body and the rest. And a nice release indeed would this be for him ! "The eternality of the Body, etc., would be contrary to well-ascertained facts of ordinary perception; and as such no such eternality could be reasonably postulated." This does not help you, we reply ; for in the case of Pleasure also, the eternality of any such pleasure as belongs to us (mortal men) would be contrary to well-ascertained facts of perception ; so that no such eternality could be reasonably postulated.

There is no proof [*in support of the assertion that in Final Release there is manifestation of eternal pleasure*]—says the *Bhāṣya* (p. 31, l. 2) ;—against this the following objection

* 'Under our theory, pleasure becomes an object to be got rid of, as it is accompanied by pain. But if pleasure is eternal, it cannot be accompanied by pain ; so that it could never be an object to be got rid of'—*Tātparya* ; and if an ordinary worldly pleasure is not got rid of, there is no Final Release.

† From what follows, '*pratibandha*' appears to be the proper reading in place of '*prabandha*'.

is raised :—*"What the *Bhāṣya* says is not true; as all activity is for the purpose of acquiring something desirable. As a matter of fact, we find that in this world whenever a man acts, he does so for the purpose of acquiring something desired by him; and people who desire to be *released* are found to act; this action also must be for the obtaining of something desired by them, and such an activity could be useful only if there were such a thing as *eternal pleasure* to be obtained. [And this is a sure proof for the existence of eternal pleasure]."

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† This is not right; as activity is of two kinds: In ordinary experience we find that there are two kinds of activity: One is for the obtaining of something desirable, and another for the getting rid of something undesirable; so that it is doubtful whether renunciate mendicancy (which according to the Vēdāntin, is a means to Final Release) is for the obtaining of something desirable, or for the getting rid of something undesirable [and so long as this is doubtful, the mere activity of man cannot prove that *Release* consists in *pleasure*, and not in mere *freedom from pain*.]

" But we learn this from the Scriptures: We learn from the Scriptures that for the released Soul there is eternal pleasure; we are distinctly told that the released Soul becomes happy." This Scripture also has to be carefully pondered over: Does it assert the connection (of the Soul) with eternal pleasure, or the final and absolute separation from pain? As a matter of fact, in ordinary experience we find people, who have got rid of fever and other diseases, saying—' we are well

* The Scriptures urge man to activity towards the undertaking of measures for the obtaining of Final Release,—a man undertakes an activity only when he wishes to obtain something he desires;—pleasure is certainly a desired thing; -this proves that Release consists in pleasure.—*Tātparya.*

† The reasoning adduced by the Opponent is by no means conclusive; as it is one-sided: all that it proves is that Release *may* consist of *pleasure*; it is equally possible that it *may* consist in mere *cessation of pain.*—*Tātparya.*

and and happy.' * Further, if the contemplative renunciate were urged to activity towards the attaining of Final Release by a desire for pleasure, under the impression that the pleasure is eternal,—then it would be impossible for him to obtain that release at all. "Why so?" † For the simple reason that all desire and attachment have been declared to be bonds; desire is a source of *bondage* [so that one who has desire can never be *free*] "Even if the man were urged to activity towards the attaining of Release by aversion,—*i.e.*, with a view to get rid of pain,—even so he could not obtain the Release; as Aversion also is a bond; as both attachment and Aversion are sources of bondage."‡ It is not so we reply; because of

* This further reasoning is put forward to meet the following argument of the Opponent:—"In all our verbal construction we accept the secondary or figurative meaning only if the Direct or Primary meaning is found incompatible. In the text 'the released Soul is happy', we find no incongruity in the word 'happy' signifying *pleasure*; so that there is no justification for taking it in the secondary sense of *freedom from pain*". Finding this reasoning to be sound, the Author puts forward another argument against the idea of Release consisting in pleasure.

† 'Merit and demerit are real, and not the products of mere illusion; and these can be set aside only by a man who has got rid of all desire. So long as a man is beset with desires, he has to set himself to obtaining the things desired and discarding them after they have been enjoyed; and this process going on without ceasing, the man has no chance for release; the desire is a *bondage*; so that the man seeking for Release should avoid all activity due to desire. Otherwise, even though the desire be only for the lasting pleasure attainable in Release, yet when it has once obtained a footing, the devil of desire will eventually make the man dance attendance on all the several objects of ordinary enjoyment; and would throw him off further from Final Release. For this reason no man should allow any footing to desire in any form. In view of this, in all the scriptural texts that speak of Final Release as 'eternal bliss,' we cannot take the word 'bliss' in the direct sense, of *pleasure*; it must mean *absence from pain*.'—*Tātparya*.

‡ "So that the Nyāya view of Release being *freedom from pain* is open to the same objections as the Vedānta view that it consists in *pleasure*." The sense of the reply to this, given in the next sentence, is as follows—The *obtaining of pleasure* is detrimental to Final Release on account of its being inextricably mixed up with desire and attachment, which are the direct opposite of that *Vairāgya*, *Freedom from Passion*, which is essential for the man seeking release; the *Discarding of*

its being not detrimental: the discarding of pain is by no means detrimental; as a matter of fact, the man (seeking to get rid of pain) is not moved by aversion; and as he is not moved by aversion, he obtains the freedom from pain, which is not detrimental (to Final Release).

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* [The Author next takes up the conception of 'Final Release' propounded by the *Bauḍḍhas*].

Other philosophers have held that it is the Mind that is *released*; as Desire and the rest (which are the source of bondage) have power over the Mind only; as a matter of fact, it is the Mind which, under the influence of desire &c., comes to be produced under various conditions and in diverse substrata; and so far as the Soul is concerned, Desire and the rest have no influence over it.

This view of Final Release however is not right; as if this were true, then Final Release would be accomplished without any effort; that is to say, those people who hold that Final Release consists in either the non-production or the destruction of the Mind,—for them Final Release would be accomplished without any effort. "Why so?" For the

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pain, on the other hand, is not necessarily mixed up with aversion: a man suffering from pain is not necessarily angry; and anger is the baneful factor in aversion; so that in this latter case there is nothing that is detrimental to the obtaining of Final Release.—*Ṭāṭparya*.

* This is thus explained by the *Ṭāṭparya*:—It is only that which is beset with worldliness that can be *released*; Desire, Aversion &c. are the sources of worldliness; these cannot subsist in the Soul, which is eternal; nor can they beset the Soul with worldliness; as that which is eternal can never have its character modified in any way: there can be no addition to, or subtraction from, its essence. To this effect we have the following saying:—"Rain and heat have no effect upon the ākāsha; they effect only the skin; if then the Soul is like the skin, then it is transient; if, on the other hand, it is like ākāsha, then it cannot be effected by any pleasure or pain." The Mind, however, is a product, and as such, capable of being beset with worldliness, by desire and the rest; so that it is the Mind which, on being freed from desire &c., becomes *released*.

simple reason that the birth or production of a thing is only for being destroyed (under the theory that everything lasts only for one moment); so that the destruction of that which is born or produced would come about without any effort. "But Final Release consists (not in the destruction of the Mind, but) in the non-production of the series (of momentary minds)."* This also cannot be accepted; as such non-production is not possible; it is not possible to bring about the non-production of the Series; as the Series consists only in the unceasing flow of causes and effects [and this can never come to an end; as so long as the cause is a *cause*, it cannot but bring about its effect]†. "What is brought about is the non-production of what has not yet been produced." But the non-production of what is not produced is already present; so that what is it that is brought about? Thus then, we find that under no circumstances is it possible for Final Release to belong to the Mind.

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"To whom then does Final Release belong?" It belongs to one who is released. "Who is it that is released?" It is the Soul? "What is *Final Release*?" It consists in separation or freedom from Pain and the rest.

* The series of Minds, wherein each individual is the cause of that which follows it, is usually without beginning or end; but it can come to an end only in the case of a man all whose weaknesses of ignorance and tendencies of past acts have been destroyed by the direct realisation of the Self; and this *destruction* consists in the fact that there is no production of a Mind-unit in the never-ending series; so that the series comes to an end; and this is 'Final Release.'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

† 'There can be no non-production of that which has been produced; nor can the series be brought to an end; as in the case of no series is it possible to have the *last moment*. For does this *last moment* produce something or not? If it does, then there is no cessation in the line of cause and effect. If it does not, then being unproductive and thus having no effective action, it is as good as non-existent (as according to the Bauḍḍha, *existence* consists only in effective activity); and when that moment is non-existent, the moment preceding it, which is said to be its cause, is not effective; so that also is a non-entity; so on and on carrying the same process backwards, the entire series becomes a non-entity. Under the circumstances, whose cessation would constitute Final Release?'—*Ṭāṭparya.*

negatived is the *cloth* as well as the *jar*; and [the only difference being that it is only the *cloth* that forms the *object of negation* with reference to the *jar*; so that if the recognition as the *object of negation* be not regarded as essential in the cognition of mutual negation] the mutual negation 'the jar is not the cloth' would imply the negation of the jar also (with reference to itself), just as it implies the negation of the cloth [because so far as mere negation is concerned, without any reference to being cognised as the *object of negation*, both the jar and cloth stand on the same footing].

(84) The Opponent offers the following explanation:—"It is true that the mutual negation [of the jar and cloth] involves the negation of the jar also; but at the time that we deny the *cloth-character* with reference to the jar (by the words 'the jar is not the cloth), what is meant by this denial is not that the jar is the object negatived, but only that the jar is the substratum (of the negation of cloth); and so the said mutual negation does not necessarily imply the negativing of the jar;—as regards the cloth, on the other hand, what is required is that it is the negatived object, and not that it is the substratum of the negation; and so the said mutual negation does not involve (or imply) the inclusion, (*i.e.*, affirmation) of the cloth, as it does that of the jar. Though it is quite true that both the jar and the cloth are the objects of the mutual negation (involving as it does the denial of each with regard to the other), yet that which has the jar for its substratum is different from that which has the cloth for its substratum, and that which negatives the jar is different from that which negatives the cloth; and so even though the mutual negation has both for its objective and both for its substratum, yet there is no possibility of any incongruity in the shape of either the denial of both, or the affirmation of both.* It will not be

* The denial and affirmation of one or the other being regulated by the principle that of the two—Jar and Cloth—that which is directly cognised at the time,

right to urge against this the argument that if the character of the '*pratiyogin*' (*i.e.*, the negatived object, *e.g.*, the cloth) depends upon its being different from the '*anuyogin*' (*i.e.*, the object with regard to which the other thing is negatived, *e.g*, the jar), then there is interdependence;[*] and if it is not dependent upon that difference—*i.e.*, if it is not necessary that there should be difference between the two objects,—then it would be possible for the object (the Cloth) to be different from itself [just as it is different from, is the *pratiyogin* of, the negation with reference to, the other object, which, *ex hypothesi*, may be non-different from it]. It will not, we say, be right to argue thus, as the regulating principle being that 'that which is remembered is the *pratiyogin* of the negation and that which is perceived is the *substratum* of the negation',—there is no possibility of any object being cognised as different from itself. It may be argued that when we recognise a certain thing as 'this is the same thing that I had seen before' [when the same thing is *perceived* as well as *remembered*], we should be cognisant of the thing being different from itself, (in accordance with the said principle). But this will not be right; as the actual presence or absence of difference will always serve as the determining factor [so that one thing is cognised as different from another when, *while being different*, the latter is remembered as the *pratiyogin* of the negation]."

(85) The above explanation cannot be accepted. For what do you mean by 'the cognition of the substratum' which you hold to be the cause of the apprehension of difference? (a) Does it mean that that which is the substratum is actually cognised *as substratum*? or (b) only that

is the substratum of the negation; while that which is only remembered, is the object of the negation; hence when we see the jar and deny, with reference to it, the cloth—when we say 'this jar is not the cloth'—the former is the substratum and the latter the object of the mutual negation; and it is not possible for both to be both at one and the same time.

that which is the substratum is cognised in its real form (without any idea of its being the substratum)? (a) If the former, then, what is that of which the jar would be the substratum, the cognition of which would be the cause of the apprehension of the difference of the jar? The cognition could not be of the jar as the substratum of the mutual negation; because until it is known what 'mutual negation' is, there can be no cognition of its substratum; just as unless we know what the stick is, we can have no idea of that which contains it; specially as it is a well-recognised principle that the cognition of the qualified (*e.g.*, the *substratum of a thing*) necessarily implies the cognition of the *qualification* (*e.g.*, that thing itself); and this for the simple reason that the *qualification* forms an essential factor in the composition of the *qualified.* Nor again can the cognition of the jar as the substratum of anything be the cause of the cognition of difference; because when between two objects which are really different, we have the mistaken notion of non-difference, [*i.e*, when we mistake two different things as identical],—even though the thing is cognised as the substratum of *existence* and such other properties, yet this latter cognition does not, and cannot, bring about the cognition of the difference of the thing. "[But the non-production of the cognition of difference in this case is only due to the fact that] the cognition of difference cannot arise merely from the cognition of the thing as the substratum of one thing; but from this latter cognition as accompanied by the remembrance of that which is negatived (or denied with reference to that thing); and as in the case cited (when no difference is cognised, this remembrance is not present, it is only natural that the cognition of difference does not appear." This explanation is not satisfactory; for what is meant by 'the remembrance of the negatived thing'? Does it mean that there is remembrance of the thing *as the*

negatived object? Or that there is remembrance of the thing itself (without any idea of its being the negatived object)? If the former, then, is the thing remembered as the *pratiyogin of* the object negatived by mutual negation? Or as the *prati-yogin* of anything? It cannot be the former, as until it is known what mutual negation is, there can be no remembrance of anything as the negatived object of that negation, as already pointed out above. Nor can it be the latter; as when an object, which is really different, is mistaken as non-different, and is cognised as non-existent, in a place other than its own,——even though this object is cognised as the *pratiyogin*, the negatived object, of its own negation, yet (even though all the conditions laid down by you are present) the conception of mutual negation does not arise. "But in this case the thing is directly cognised as the negatived object, and there is no remembrance of it [and it is the remembrance that we make a necessary condition]." This is not right; as it cannot be essential that there should be *remembrance* only [as you must admit the actual perception also of the *pratiyogin* to be the cause of the cognition of difference or mutual negation]; otherwise, if you insist upon its being *remembrance* only, then it would not be possible to have any conception of mutual negation between two things, both of which are directly perceived (and neither is remembered). The assumption of the agency of an intervening remembrance is further rendered absurd by the fact that in every conception of mutual negation,—which appears in the form 'these two things are not identical with each other'—we have a direct apprehension (and no remembrance). Even if it were essential that the intervening agency should be of the nature of remembrance, we find that in the case of such conceptions as 'this is that thing which did not exist there',—even though the thing is negatived by a remembered negation, there does not appear any idea

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of 'mutual negation'; because the thing, though really different (from that which did not exist at the previous time), is mistaken as non-different. "[In the cognition of difference or mutual negation] the absence of discrepancies also is a necessary factor in the cause; and in the instance cited of mistaken cognition, this condition is not present (a discrepancy being present in the form of the mistaken cognition). [And hence it is only natural that the cognition of difference does not appear]." This explanation is not right; for when one remembers the jar seen at some previous time, and sees, at the present time, another jar, even if he fails to apprehend the difference between the jars,—he would by your definition, cognise the 'mutual negation' of the two jars! [As the only two conditions that you lay down are—(1) absence of discrepancy in the shape of mistaken cognition, and (2) the remembrance of the negatived object; and both these conditions are present in the case cited]. "Even under the circumstances stated the mutual negation is actually cognised." It is not so; as we find that the perception of the jar is followed by a doubt (as to its being the same as, or different from, the previously perceived jar; and there could be no such doubt if the mutual negation were definitely cognised). "But the specific cognition (of the peculiar features of the thing concerned) is also an essential factor in the cause of the cognition of difference [so that there are three factors in this cause: (1) the specific cognition of the thing, (2) the absence of discrepancies, and (3) the remembrance of the negatived object; and so, in the case cited, the specific cognition of the jar being wanting, so long as there is an uncertainty as to its being or not being the same as the former jar, the cognition of mutual negation does not arise]." This is not right, we reply; as the peculiar features of a thing cannot be known until its mutual negation is duly determined [to know the peculiarities of a thing, it is necessary to know what things it resembles and

what it differs from; so that a recognition of its differences is essential for the due recognition of its peculiar features]. This same reasoning serves to set aside the view that the cognition of difference is aided by the remembrance of the actual form of the thing itself; * and also the view that it is aided by the cognition of the actual form of the substratum †; as (under both these views) it will be possible for us to cognise the mutual negation of a tree which, though actually different from the other tree, is mistaken as non-different from it.

(86) Nor is the third alternative (noted in para. 81) admissible—that is to say, Difference cannot be defined as presence of *distinctive property*. As, if Negation be held to be devoid of all properties, then it could not be 'different' from any thing; so that it would have to be regarded as non-different from the entire Universe; and thus being non-different from negation, the Universe itself would become a negation, and thereby, *ex-hypothesi*, devoid of all properties; and thus being devoid of all 'difference' which, *ex-hypothesi*, consists in the presence of distinctive properties, the entire Universe would have to be regarded as of one uniform form; for the simple reason that Negation has no properties. "In this case the 'difference' will consist of the actual form of the negation itself (and not in the presence of any distinctive properties)." That is not possible; as this 'actual form' of negation which you describe as its 'difference'—is this a 'difference' from something else? Or is it a difference without a counter-entity (*from* which the negation is different)?

(87) The difference cannot be without a counter-entity; as there being no proof for such a difference, it will have to be rejected as non-existing: As a matter of fact, whenever

* The second alternative put forward in the text, Pandit Edition, p. 620, *fourth* line from the bottom.

† The second alternative proposed in the opening lines of para. 85.

we talk of 'difference', it is always difference *from something*; and it is never without a counter-entity, as the use of the concept 'blue' is. Nor is it ever possible for the 'difference' to be without a counter-entity. Under the circumstances, if, even though without a counter-entity, it could form the basis of a usage referring to a counter-entity,—then there would be no restriction as to the exact counter-entity of a 'difference'; and it might be possible for the difference to be conceived and spoken of as different from itself. If it be asked—'how can there be any difference from itself?'—our answer is (if there is no difference from itself) is the difference from something different? *In that case* there would be an infinite regress of differences—each difference implying a 'different' thing!

(88) Nor can the first alternative be accepted—that is, we cannot accept the view that the 'difference' consisting in the form of the negation is a difference from something else, a counter-entity of that difference. As it should be explained, in that case, what is that counter-entity from which there is the 'difference'. The 'difference' cannot be from *all things*; as that would involve difference from itself. Nor can it be 'difference' from such things as the jar and the like; for when we talk of one thing as 'different' *from another*, the latter (taking the Ablative ending) is the *limit or boundary*, and the former the *limited or bounded*; now is this relation of the 'limit and limited' something different (from the things)? Or is it included in the things themselves? If the former, then as that also will be the limit of a 'difference', a similar question being raised with regard to a further relation of the 'limit and limited' that would be involved, if the same answer were given—*i. e.*, if this further relation were held to be something different again—then there would be an infinite regress of 'differences'. If, on the other hand, the relation be held to be included in the things themselves,

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at the second stage, then why should there be an aversion to admitting this at the outset? In fact at the very first stage the difference should be admitted to be in the form of the things themselves. But as a matter of fact, even this will not be right; for if the 'limit and limited' relation of the difference of 'difference' with the jar &c. were to be included in the actual form of the 'difference', then the same form could not include the relation of 'negative and negatived' that subsists between the negation and the object negatived by it; as the 'form' of a thing is one only, while the two relations are entirely different from one another; as the *difference* (of the jar) from the counter-entity (the cloth) can never be the same as its *negation*; as 'difference from the jar' pertains also to things that are not meant to be negatived [as the difference can be expressed as 'the cloth is other than the jar', in which no idea of negation or denial is involved]; whereas the relation of 'negative' and 'negatived' pertains only to certain well-defined things [so that when 'the negation of the jar' is regarded as a mere *negation* or *denial*, it pertains to the jar only; while if it is regarded as *difference* it pertains to the cloth and all those things from which the jar differs].

(89) The same objections can, with equal force, be urged against all natural relationship '*svarūpasambandha*'—such as that between the cause and its effect and so on. And the same objection can also be applied to all cases where difference between things is be held to consist in their own forms.

(90) Then again, when you assert that 'difference' consists in the presence of distinctive peculiarities, what is your meaning? Is it that the generic character '*ghaṭatva*' (which is the principal distinctive feature of the jar) constitutes the 'difference' (of the jar)? Or that it is some other distinctive property that constitutes the 'difference'?

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(91) If it be the former—that is, if the 'difference' of the jar consists in the generic character '*ghaṭatva*',—then this would imply the absurdity of the generic character of '*ghaṭatva*' having for its *pratiyogin*, counter-entity, something negatived by it; as every 'Difference' must have a counter-entity; as a matter of fact however the generic character of '*ghaṭatva*' has no counter-entity at all; as it is cognised without the corresponding cognition of any counter-entity in the shape of the cloth or any other thing. "But there are occasions when the said generic character is cognised with reference to, and along with, such other things as the cloth and the like; and it is only on such occasions that it forms the basis of the conception of 'Difference' [*i. e.*, it is only when the jar is cognised along with the cloth that it is recognised as possessed of the generic characters of *ghaṭatva* which makes it 'different' from the cloth]." This is not right; as it behoves you to explain the cognition of what is with reference to, or dependent upon, the cloth; is it the cognition of the generic character of '*ghaṭatva*' that is so dependent? or the cognition of some property of it? If the former, then it would never be possible to have any cognition of '*ghaṭatva*' except with reference to the cloth! As if a certain thing appears without another thing, this latter cannot be regarded as its cause. In the case of fire, which is producible by various causes (such as dry grass, friction of two dry pieces of wood and the lens), it is possible to restrict the causal efficiency of one kind of cause to particular fires, and to reject it in the case of other fires,—this being made possible by reason of the possibility of dividing fire into several sub-classes in accordance with the particular kind of cause that produces it, so that in this case it does not matter if any particular cause is not found to produce some other kind of fire;—no such explanation or discrimination however is possible in the case in question [where

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no sub-classes of the cognition of '*ghaṭaṭva*' being possible, it could not be held that the *cloth* is necessary for the production of the cognition of one kind of '*ghaṭaṭva*'; and so it does not matter if every cognition of *ghaṭaṭva* is not produced by, and is dependent upon, the cloth]; specially as it is not possible to have larger and smaller (more and less extensive) classes (in connection with the ' cognition of *ghaṭaṭva*') in the shape of 'direct apprehension' and the like.* Even though there may be people who (on the basis of the fact that there *is* no 'larger' and 'smaller' class among 'Qualities', and cognition is a quality) would be willing to accept the cross-divisions of classes (that such sub-divisions of 'cognition of *ghaṭaṭva*' would give rise to), yet, even according to those people—what would the idea of *limit*, denoted by the ablative ending (in the word *paṭāṭ* as occurring in the sentence *ghaṭaḥ paṭāṭ bhinnāḥ*, 'the jar is different *from the cloth*') be construed? If the idea of 'limit' were connected with '*ghaṭaṭva*' [as this connection could only be in the form of something inherent in the form of the '*ghaṭaṭva*' itself, *i. e.* its '*svarūpa-sambandha*'], the '*ghaṭaṭva*' would ever, subsequently, be cognised as that 'limit' [and there would be no conception of '*ghaṭaṭva*', except as a 'limit'] which is absurd. "What is related to the 'limit' is a certain pro-

* This anticipates the following objections :—" Why should sub-classes be impossible in regard to 'the cognition of ghaṭaṭva', when there is such a class as 'right cognition', which is more extensive than, and includes, the class 'the cognition of ghaṭaṭva'?" The sense of the reply is that as regards the case in question, the only such-class of 'cognition of ghaṭaṭva' that can be postulated is some such as 'the cognition of ghaṭaṭva as having a counter-entity'; and if this is not more extensive than the class of 'direct apprehension' —*i. e.*, if it does not include cognitions other than Direct apprehensions—then *remembrance* of *ghaṭaṭva as having a counter-entity* would be an impossibility; as Remembrance is beyond the pale of 'direct apprehension'. On the other hand, if the class 'the cognition of ghaṭaṭva as having a counter-entity' is more extensive than 'direct apprehension', then, when the ghaṭaṭva would be cognised without any idea of its counter-entity, this cognition could not be regarded as 'Direct apprehension'; so that this gives rise to objectionable 'cross-divisions'.—Vidyāsāgarī.

perty of the *ghaṭaṭva* (and not the *ghaṭaṭva* itself.) This however is not a fact; and this is precisely the second of the two alternatives propounded above [viz: it is the cognition of a property of the 'ghatatva' that is with reference to, and dependent upon, the cloth];—and this is not admissible; as in that case, that property itself (cognised as 'limit', and hence) having its cognition dependent (upon something else, for instance, the cloth), would constitute the 'difference' (of the jar) [and not any such thing as '*ghaṭaṭva*' which is what you really regard as constituting the 'difference' of the jar]; and further, as the property would be of the '*ghaṭaṭva*', the 'difference' also would be of the same (and not of the *ghaṭa*; and the mention of it in answer to the question regarding the 'difference' of *ghaṭa* will, on that account, be wholly illogical. Lastly, if 'difference' consisted of '*ghaṭaṭva*', '*paṭaṭva*', and the individual properties of each,—taken severally,—how could there be any such comprehensive notion of 'difference' at all? If you hold that even so the distinct individuals (properties in the present case) afford the requisite comprehensive notions, then, you may as well base all comprehensive notions upon the distinct individuals themselves [and there would, in that case, be no justification for the postulating of 'communities', which are assumed entirely for the purpose of affording the basis for comprehensivenotion].

[Page 627] (92). Nor can we accept the second alternative (noted in para 90);—that is, it will not be right to hold that the 'difference' of the jar consists in some distinctive property other than '*ghaṭaṭva*'; for the Logician himself cannot consistently accept this view; as, in the first place, a 'difference' like this cannot be included in any of the seven categories accepted by him; and secondly it will not be logical to regard this difference either as present or as not present in itself [as if this 'difference' differs from its substrate by that same difference, then there is the absurdity of the

difference resting in itself; if, on the other hand, the difference between the 'difference' and its substrate is other than itself, there would be an endless assumption of differences].

If, then, the above difficulties be sought to be met by asserting that 'difference' is only a class or community (and hence nothing apart from the *seven* categories),—then our answer is that if such diverse individuals, differing from one another in regard to their distinct specific properties, were to constitute a 'Community', then all those diverse things that differ from one another in their distinctive properties might, with equal reasonableness, be regarded as forming a 'Community' [and there would no such thing as distinctive features at all].*

(93) "As a matter of fact 'difference' consists of *ghaṭatva*' and such generic charaters; and even though in all cases of the difference of the jar, there would, *ex-hypothesi*, be the cognition of *ghaṭatva*, yet it becomes possible for each case to be spoken of (and cognised) as distinct, by reason of the aid that is accorded (in each case) by the cognition of the counter-entity or negatived object."† This is not right; as in order to establish the real character of usage (as regards the 'difference' of the jar being diverse), it becomes necessary to admit that the conception (of diversity with regard to the 'difference') is a true one; so that the same objection that has been urged before becomes applicable [that is to say,—is the difference of the jar from the cloth different from that of the horse by that same difference or by some other difference? If the former, there is the absurdity of the difference subsisting in itself; and in the latter case, there is

* 'And if 'difference' be a *Community*, a Jāṭi, then there could be no difference among Communities; as the Logician denies the possibility of one 'Community' residing in another.

† So that the difference of the jar from the cloth, and that from the horse, through cognised as 'ghaṭatva' in both cases, comes to be distinguished from each other by the cognition of the cloth in the former, and that of the horse, in the latter case.

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an endless assumption of 'differences']. If an endless series of differences is postulated,—if each one of the series could be held to be known gradually, one after the other, then in connection with the cognition of any single difference, there could be no end to the cognitions of differences which could go on *ad infinitum*! If, on the other hand, the entire series is cognisable simultaneously, then as all these endless differences would be alike, there will always be a chance of the difference from one thing being mistaken for the difference from another thing; and thus with regard to the cognition of no difference could there be any confidence in our mind as to its being a true cognition of a real difference (and not a wrong cognition of some other difference). If, in order to escape from these difficulties it be held that it is not necessary that every one of the endless series of differences should be cognised [and that it is enough for the cognition of difference if three or four differences in the series are cognised], then there would be no proof for the existence of that difference which is not cognised [so that retracing our steps backwards from that point in the series, we would be forced to deny all the differences, even up to the very first of the series]. It may be that in the case of all things we cognise only that which we intend to cognise, so that even though a certain difference in the series of differences may not be cognised at any particular time, it will be cognised, whenever there is a desire on our part to cognise it, and the mere non-cognition of any difference at any one time need not lead us to deny it altogether;—but even so, as all these cognitions would be 'cognitions of difference,' it would be impossible to form a comprehensive conception of these cognitions unless we admitted of a community including all of them; and when once we admit of such a Community, the 'difference' of that Community also should have to be included in that Community; and thus between the 'Community' and

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'difference' each would be the 'container' as well as the 'contained' of the other, each subsisting in the other (which is absurd). This same objection is also applicable to the view under which anything—*e.g*, 'Being'—is regarded as endless.

(94) Then again, if 'difference' consisted in such generic characters as '*ghatatva*' and the rest,—and the due cognition of this depended upon such limits (counter-entities) as '*patatva*' and the like,—then, inasmuch as like '*ghatatva*,' '*patatva*' also (being a generic character) would constitute 'difference,' the cognition of this also would depend upon certain 'limits;' and these limits would be in the form of '*ghatatva*' and such other generic characters; and thus the cognition of '*patatva*' (as 'difference') would be dependent upon that of '*ghatatva*'; so that there is a most objectionable interdependence. "As a matter of fact, when we have to recognise the '*ghatatva*' or the '*patatva*' only, in its own form as a genuine character, we do not need to have the idea of any 'limit' or 'counter-entity'; the idea of this latter being necessary only when we have to recognise the '*ghatatva*' or the '*patatva*' as constituting the 'difference' (of the *ghata* or the *pata*); and when '*ghatatva*' or '*patatva*' is recognised as a 'limit' or 'counter-entity', it is so recognised only in its own form; so that where is there any inter-dependence at all?" This reasoning is not right; as [when the '*ghatatva*' is regarded as constituting 'difference', it can be so regarded either in its own form, or in the form of some other character or quality] if the form of the '*ghatatva*' itself constituted the 'difference', then the assertion that 'when we recognise the *ghatatva* in its own form we do not need to have the idea of any *limit* or *counter-entity*' can have no meaning. If, on the other hand the 'difference' consisted of *ghatatva* in the form of some other character,—then, in that case, the same character

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may be regarded as constituting the 'difference'; and there is no necessity for the assumption of the complicated dictum that the 'difference' consists of the '*ghaṭatva*' as qualified by the said character! "All right, we may regard 'difference' as consisting of that same character." This will not be right for you; as this view is open to many objections [such, for instance, as that this would mean the postulating of an additional category over and above the six or seven postulated by you.]

(95) Then again, how can you justify the assertion that 'Difference' consists of all the three factors—the form of the thing, mutual negation and diversity of character (as held by the Logician)? The form in which difference is spoken of in ordinary usage is, as a matter of fact, of only one kind; and if, even though this is so, the basis of that one uniform difference be held to be threefold, then what proof could there be in support of the view that for the comprehensive notion that we have of the 'cow,' there should be a single basis (in the shape of the community 'cow')? As the said case of difference would falsify the idea that the comprehensive notion of a number of things must have its basis in a single entity, [as the comprehensive notion of 'difference' has, *ex-hypothesi*, a threefold basis.] And under the circumstances, as all usage with regard to the large community ('cow') could be explained on the basis of the manifold sub-classes (the 'hornless cow', the 'red cow' and so forth), there would be no ground for the assuming of the wider community at all.

(96) Then again, [as regards the view that 'difference' consists of *mutual negation* and *diversity of character*, we ask] —in the Difference itself, is there any further difference or not? If there is, then there is a *regressus ad infinitum*—an endless series of differences. On the other hand, if there is no difference in the difference itself, then that would mean

the entire negation of all difference; as difference (according to you) consisting of the form of the 'different' thing itself, the assertion that there is no difference in this form, would mean that this thing itself is not existent. "Inasmuch as the form of the thing itself constitutes the 'difference,' it could quite reasonably form the basis of the ordinary conception of difference with regard to itself; exactly in the same manner as *saṭṭā, Being*, forms the basis of our conceptions of existence with regard to itself." This cannot be; as this would mean that 'difference' of a certain thing is *non-different from itself* (consisting in its own form), and at the same time it is also *different from itself*; so that in regard to difference *from itself* the thing is the '*avaḍhi*' *limit*, and in regard to its difference from something else it would the '*avaḍhēya*', *that to which the limit pertains*; and this would mean that the *difference* has the same thing for its counter-entity as well as for its substratum;—and if you do not feel any incongruity in this, then wherefore should you not accept the thing to be different from itself? Certainly there could be no incongruity in this, if there is none in what you already admit! "We could accept this only either if such a contingency were actually cognised, or if in our ordinary practice and usage we had such a conception (as that a thing is 'different' from itself)." This does not extricate you from the difficulty; for if you have both these conditions fulfilled in the case in question,—for instance, when one makes the assertion 'the jar is different from itself',—even though this assertion is wrong and untrustworthy, yet the fact asserted is certainly cognised; and as the speaker has made the assertion, we have the said conception (of the jar being different from itself) occurring in actual usage. "But it is only *right* cognition and *correct* usage that can afford sufficient ground for admitting a fact; and certainly there can be no right cognition and correct usage with regard to

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any thing being different from itself." Even so, your position is not improved; for in the same manner, no right cognition and correct usage is possible with regard to the thing itself being its own substratum as well as its own limit; and under the circumstances, how is it that you admit this latter fact?

(97) "We do not hold that any thing is either its own substratum or its own limit; all that we mean is that when we accept a distinct character or quality to be either the substratum or the counter-entity of the difference, on the basis of this acceptance a definite conception and usage are found to proceed;—and in seeking for an explanation of these, if we postulate another distinct character, we find ourselves landed on a *regressus ad infinitum*; and with a view to avoid this we hold that what gives rise to the said conception and usage is the nature of the 'difference' itself, without the intervention of a further distinct character." This also cannot be maintained; as such a conception of distinct character, in the absence of any such character, would not in any way differ from any ordinary conception of such character appearing where the character is entirely absent; and as this latter is universally regarded as wrong, the similar conception (on which you base your idea of 'difference') would also have to be regarded as wrong; and that 'nature of the thing,' on the basis of which such a wrong conception would proceed, would have to be regarded as a *defect* [as it is only a defect in the cognitive agency that gives rise to wrong conceptions];—exactly as in the case of silver, when we have the conception of silver appearing in regard to what is really silver, it arises from '*rajaṭaṭva*,' the 'nature' of the silver,—and when there is no silver, if '*rajaṭaṭva*,' the conception of silver, appears, it is always, regarded as wrong,—and that on the basis of which such a conception proceeds is called 'defect.' "In the case of the silver cited, the silver cognised is not

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there at all; while in the case in question what is cognised—and forms the basis of the cognition—is the *Difference*, which is actually present, even though only in the form of the thing concerned. [So that the two cases not being analogous, the conception of difference cannot be regarded as wrong]." This is not right; for in one case [*i.e.*, in the case of the conception 'the jar is different from the cloth'] you have admitted the truth and validity of the composite cognition apprehending the difference as well as its substratum (jar); and now if with regard to another cognition, [of the conception 'the Difference is different'] which does not, in the slightest degree, differ from the former cognition,—if you deny that it apprehends both things [the 'difference' as well as its difference], then the conception would be most decidedly a wrong one, and even Indra himself could not prevent it from being wrong! On the other hand, if you admit that it does apprehend both, then there is a *regressus ad infinitum* [the assumption of endless series of differences being necessary]. If, on the other hand, this latter conception not apprehending both things, were held to be true and valid,—then, in that case, all other conceptions that do apprehend the two things would have to be regarded as false and invalid. We desist from further straining of this point.

(98) Then again, the case of *Saṭṭā*, *Being*, has been cited (in para 95) as a corroborative instance;—but this citation resembles the case of the proverbial 'bull in the camp;'* as *Being* itself will be rejected by us by means of the arguments that we have just put forward.

[The author now reproduces those arguments in support of the notion of *Difference* which have been propounded by Uḍayanāchārya in his *Āṭmaṭaṭṭva-vivēka*. The expounding of this stand-point of the Logician continues up to para. 105, *i. e.* line 6, page 637 of the 'Pandit' edition, and up to page 1176 the of Chaukhambha Series Edition].

* There are three explanations given of this :—(1) 'a wicked bull, wherever it goes, it is beaten' (Viḍyā.) (2) 'In a camp when horses run about, the cow also breaks its tether and runs along with the horses; so when the notion of Difference

(99) The following explanation has been provided by the Logician.

"What is really meant by those philosophers who reject *Difference*? (1) Do they mean that the idea or conception of Difference does not exist at all? (2) Or that even though existing, it is eternal? (3) Or that though non-eternal, it is without any cause (to bring it about)? (4) Or that though having a cause, it is objectless? (5) Or that though having an object, its object is discarded or sublated? (1) The first of these alternatives is opposed to the experience of all men and so does not need to be answered [even the Vēḍānṭin could not proceed with its refutation if he had no *idea of Difference.*] (2) As regards the second alternative, it has to be discarded, in view of deep sleep [during which, according to the Vēḍānṭin himself, all conceptions cease, so that having no existence at that time, the idea of Difference can not be eternal]. (3) The third alternative also has to be rejected, as it involves a self-contradiction [what is not eternal cannot be without a cause]. (4) We must reject the fourth also; for the simple reason that Difference is actually spoken of [by the Vēḍānṭin himself, which proves that the *idea of Difference* has an object in the shape of the *Difference* that is spoken of]. (5) The fifth alternative we are going to discuss in detail.

(100) "[The fifth alternative is that the Idea of Difference, though with an object, has this object sublated; now with regard to this, we ask]—what is the object of the conception of difference? Is it one of the three already mentioned [the *form of the thing, mutual negation, diversity of character*]? Or is it something other than these? If

is running away from our arguments, *Being* also will run away along with it;'—or (3) 'a bull even though beaten away, returns again and again to the camp, so even though often rejected, the case of *Being* is cited again and again by the Logician.' These two explanations are given by the Shāṅkarī.

it is the latter, then inasmuch as all the arguments that you have propounded in subversion of the idea of difference are only against the said three forms of difference, these arguments would not be applicable to that something else (apart from these three forms) which you assert to be the object of the conception of difference; and under the circumstances do the said arguments sublate or subvert the object of the conception of difference? If they do, then this would be analogous to the case where for the crime of the thief the punishment inflicted was upon Ṛiṣi Māṇḍavya (an entirely different person)!

(101) "If, on the other hand, one of the three forms be held to be the object of the conception of difference,—then (A) firstly, if it be held that of the three, it is the *diversity of character* that Difference consists in,—then all that you will be justified in rejecting, for fear of the *regressus ad infinitum* (that you have urged against this view), would be those subsequent *diversities* that would be assumed in addition to the first *diversity*; and there would be no justification for the rejecting of the original Difference itself. [So that the *regressus ad infinitum* cannot lead us to reject the whole idea of Difference]; for a *regressus ad infinitum* never sets aside a thing that is actually perceived (*appears* to consciousness); it only serves to bar the way to the further stream of presumptions; *e. g.*, in the case of *odour*, the presumption of a further odour in the odour that we perceive is precluded by the infinite regress that such presumption leads to [and it does not tend to reject the perceived odour itself].

(102) "(B) Secondly, if the difference consists in mutual negation (the second of the three alternatives suggested),—and the *conception of difference* has that negation for its basis or object,—then also, wherein could there be any 'ātmāshraya' or 'Vicious Circle'? If there were any such vicious

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circle, there would be no idea of difference at all; *—so that if (as a matter of fact) there is the idea of difference, it must point to a cause different from itself (the postulating of which leads to the 'vicious circle'); and certainly the fact of a thing not being its own cause does not prove the non-existence of the thing itself! The Vedāntin may attribute the idea of the difference to *Avīḍyā*, Nescience; but what difference would that make? The mere mention of 'nescience' cannot do away with the 'vicious circle'. And further (if mere Nescience could explain the idea of difference, independently of the causes, then) even such things as the jar and the like could come into existence by themselves, independently of the potter and other causes! 'As regards the idea of Difference, we find that if it is regarded as its own cause, then there is a vicious circle; so that its appearance must be due to something else; but we cannot determine what this something else is; hence it is that we attribute it to *Nescience*.' Well, if this is all that the Veḍāntin means, then there is no quarrel between us! [As the statement of the Vēḍānṭin is tantamount to the assertion that the idea of Difference has Difference for its object as well as for its cause]. As a matter of fact however, it is not difficult to determine the cause of the Idea of Difference; as it is easily determined that when (of the two things, the jar and the cloth, the mutual negation between which is cognised), we perceive the one as being the substratum (of the negation), without, at the same time, recognising the counter-entity, and also when we remember the counter-entity, without, at the same time, remembering the substratum,—it is then that we have the

* There is 'vicious circle' if the idea of difference is held to be due to the idea of its substratum as qualified by mutual negation; and it was on this basis that the Veḍāntin had urged the 'vicious circle' against the Idea of Difference. As a matter of fact, however, the Logician argues, the Idea of Difference is not due to the said idea of the substratum, but to something else. If no such cause is postulated, no idea of difference is possible; and yet the presence of this idea is not disputed by the Vēḍānṭin.

cognition of difference [so that the cause of the cognition of difference consists in the cognition of the substratum independently of the cognition of the counter-entity, and also the remembrance of the counter-entity, independently of any idea of the substratum].

(103) "[C] Lastly, if the truth be that Difference consists in the form of the thing itself,—and this form is the object of the Idea of Difference;—then what you would be justified in rejecting would be only the incongruous juxtaposition of the two words 'Jar' and 'Different' [in the assertion 'the jar is different', which would be purely tautological]; and what fault will have been committed by the *Difference* itself (that you should reject it)? It may be urged that the said juxtaposition is actually met with in usage (and so we do not reject it; but we reject the difference). It is quite true that we meet with the juxtaposition of synonymous words; but such use is always due to special causes (in the shape of a definite purpose to be served by such usage); as for instance, we meet with the expression '*ghataḥ kumbhaḥ*' (where two synonymous words are in juxtaposition) only when what is intended by the speaker is the explanation to an ignorant person of what is meant by the word '*ghataḥ*'; and such usage cannot be regarded as inseparable from (in the very nature of) the words; for instance, when making use of the word '*ghata*' and '*paṭa*' in such expressions as '*ghaṭamānaya*' (bring the jar), or '*paṭam avalokaya*' (see the cloth), no intelligent man ever uses the word '*bhēda*' (Difference) along with the words in question (which should be the case if the juxtaposition of synonymous words were essential in the very nature of the use of words);—hence the juxtaposition of synonymous words can be accepted as correct only in special cases, under special circumstances and for special reasons.

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(104) "The Opponent might ask—'what is the real truth with regard to the meaning of Difference?" Our answer is that Difference means all the three (*the form of the thing, mutual negation* and *diversity of character*); and in each individual case it is taken as meaning the one or the other, in accordance with the peculiar conditions of each case. For instance, it is a well-known fact that the jar is known in three forms: (1) it is known in the form of the jar itself, (2) it is known as not-cloth, and (3) it is known as possessed of a character distinct from that of the cloth. Now as regards Negation or Non-existence, it is always known in the first form; a negation having no further negation, nor any other character [so that the second and third forms would not be possible in this case] [and thus the difference of negation would always consist in its own form]. As regards the categories of Community, Individuality and Inherence, as these have no other character, their difference would consist in the first two forms;—while as regards Substance, Quality and Action, inasmuch as they have their own form as well as their own distinctive characters, all the three forms of difference are possible. For instance, in regard to the Substance *cloth* we have all three notions as —(1) 'this is cloth' (when the form of the cloth is known), (2) 'it is not the jar' (where the mutual negation of the jar and the cloth is known), and 'it is made up of yarns' (when its distinctive character is noticed);—similarly with the Quality of *odour*, we have the three notions, '(1) 'this is odour', (2) 'it is not colour', and (3) 'it is sweet';—and with regard to the Action of *going* we have the three notions—(1) 'it is *going*', (2) 'it is not *throwing up*', and (2 'it is horizontal'.

(105) "When we come to the actual definition of Difference, we find that—(*i*) in the case of the first kind of Difference, that consisting in the form of the thing, we recognise the thing as *different* in its form from another, when

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we find that the other thing is actually cognised, though not cognised as having the same form as (being identical with) the former thing;—(b) the second kind of Difference, Mutual Negation, consists of that negation which is cognised without subsequent denial, as co-substrate (with its counter-entity);—(c) and in the case of the third kind of Difference, we know one thing as of diverse character from another, when we find that there is an incompatibility in the characters of the two things,—this incompatibility consisting in the fact that they are never found co-existing in any one substance. Such is the position."

[Against the above account of *Difference* as provided by Udayanāchārya the Author offers the following objections.]

(106) Against the above view we make the following observations:—You have put the question—'Does the object of the Idea of Difference consist of any one of the three (the form of the thing, mutual negation, and diverse character)? Or in something apart from these?'—Now this question would shine at its best (would be effective) when put against one who undertakes to explain things, and not against us (who do not profess to explain anything at all); as what we assert is that the difference that appears in usage is absolutely inexplicable, no adequate explanation of it is available; in view of the fact, that whether we consider the question as to its inclusion or non-inclusion in any of the three aforesaid forms,—or as to any other property with regard to it—whether we regard it as a positive entity (in the shape of an effect) with regard to which something can be affirmed, or as a negative entity (as not having the character of the effect etc.), with regard to which only denials could be made,— in every case we find it liable to rejection [every one of the possible alternative views with regard to it being found beset with objections]. In fact

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this applies, not to Difference only, but to the entire world and what this *Anirvachaṇīyavāda*, Philosophy of the Inexplicable is, we have already explained before.

(107) What has been asserted (by Uḍayana) in para. 101 above—is not right; as that same reasoning which justifies the presumption of one will make unimpeachable the presumption of a series of such things also;* and if this reasoning be regarded as too weak to justify the presumption of the series of Differences, then it would be equally weak to justify the presumption of a single Difference also; as the one is precisely of the same character as the entire series. For similar reasons it will not be right to assert that the one Difference is accepted on the ground of its directly appearing to consciousness [and not on the strength of any reasonings];—as, in the first place, this argument from mere appearance to consciousness would apply to (and thereby justify the acceptance of) all that we may be conscious of (rightly and wrongly alike; so that we would have to accept as true the objects of wrong cognitions also); and secondly, there is no reasoning in support of the view that only that fact of consciousness is to be regarded as authoritative which appears directly through perception; and not that which appears through inference and the other means of cognition; nor does this form one of your tenets. Then again, the argument that propounds a *regressus ad infinitum* does not differ from the Inferential and other reasonings; as Hypothetical Reasoning (which is the form of reasoning in which the infinite regress is urged) also is based upon invariable concomitance; and, in fact, you have yourself declared that every objection that is urged (against any theory) partakes of the character of inferential reasoning.

* The first Difference is presumed on the ground of the common idea of difference that everyone of us has. As with regard to Difference also we have ideas of further difference; on the ground of these we shall be justified in presuming a series of differences also.

Thus then (the conditions for accepting the first Difference being exactly the same as those for the whole series) it becomes incumbent on you either to indicate some defect in the reasoning propounding the *regressus ad infinitum* (involved in the whole Idea of Difference),—or to renounce your doctrine (regarding the Idea of Difference).

(108) "But as a matter of fact, there is no infinite regress involved in the accepting of a single item of Difference, as there is in that of a series of Differences." Do you then hold the view that what proves the first Difference is the reasoning that you propound (in support of it) *as qualified by the absence of infinite regressus* [so that while the reasoning proves the first Difference, which does not involve infinite regress, yet it does not prove the series of Differences, which latter involves infinite regress]? If you do, then, inasmuch as there would be no infinite regress involved in the *second* Difference [the regress being involved only when we come to the *series* of Differences], you will have to admit the *second* Difference also. "Well, yes [we shall admit the second Difference]." In that case, what would be there to prevent the acceptance of one difference after the other,—this series extending up to the highest conceivable number? "But you cannot rest content with this alone: You may go on still further and say why we do not accept a further series of Differences—first, second, third and so on—beyond the highest conceivable number;—and thus there will be that same infinite regress [which we regard as barring the acceptance of more than one Difference]." True; let us carefully ponder over the question as to what we shall really accept, in order to avoid the infinite regress. "Well, what we have got to do is to reject the second and all that comes after it (accepting only the first difference)." But the first Difference is just as much included in the infinite series (of Differences) as the

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second and the rest;—under the circumstances, why then this favouritism towards the *first*, whereby you accept that and discard all the rest? "But as a matter of fact, the infinite regress begins with the second only." If you were disposed to extend to the *second* the same favour that you now extend towards the *first*, then you would be equally prepared to keep the *second* also, declaring that the infinite regress begins with the *third*. And we do not think that this arbitrary favour and disfavour of yours, besetting the mind of the man who is trying for his highest good, will conduce to his welfare! There remains one more reason that you put forward in support of your discarding of the series of Differences. That is, the series is to be rejected just as we reject a further odour to Odour (end of para 101). But as a matter of fact there is no reason for attributing a further odour to Odour (as there is in the presuming of the series of Differences); and if there were a reason for it, what harm would that do to us—who have got to refute (among other things) that reason also?

(109) What has been urged by Udayana (in para 102, above)—beginning with '*aṭhēṭara, etc.*' and ending with '*nirūpaṇāṭ*'—is also not right; as nothing that is urged therein affects the position of one who (like us) asserts that —"the position of the person who regards the cognition of mutual negation to be the cause of all usage bearing upon Difference is untenable, as it involves a vicious circle." Then as regards the answer given by Udayana beginning with word '*praṭiyogirūpaṭvēna* [towards the end of para. 102, where it is urged that *it is not difficult to determine the cause of the idea of difference*],——this has been already refuted before.

(110) The arguments put forward by Udayana—begining with the words '*aṭha svarūpam*' and ending with '*na doṣaḥ*' [para. 103]—of that we take no notice; as it seeks to answer an objection that has never been put forward by us.

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(111) As regards what Uḍayana has urged [in para. 104]—beginning with '*ṭaṭhā pi kaḥ*' and ending with '*ṭiryak cha*'—this smacks of ressemblance to the case of partitioning the flesh of the iguana whilst it is still in its hole; * —as each of the three alternatives being already covered by the arguments shown before they cannot be shown out as tenable [and thus they resemble the iguana hidden in its hole]; so that any division or adjustment of these is to be rejected on the simple ground that it is absolutely inopportune (and impossible) to adjust things that are entirely invisible!

(112) Uḍayana has (in para 105 above) put forward the definition of the first kind of difference—i. e., that difference which consists in the form of the thing—as 'that in which one thing is actually cognised, though not cognised as having the same form as ṭhe other thing'. This definition also is defective: as it applies to the case where one and the same thing is mistaken for something different; [*e. g.*, when we mistake the single moon for two different moons] as in this case also the one thing is not recognised as having the same form as itself, and yet it is cognised; though as a matter of fact this is not a case of *difference*; so that as applying to this case, the definition becomes too wide; specially as the qualifying word '*ṭādrūpyēṇa*', 'in the same form', has been added only with a view to show that the case in question does not fall within any other form of difference (in the form of Mutual Negation and Diversity of Character). [So that neither of these two forms being present in the case of the single moon being mistaken for two, if the qualification has to have any meaning it must include the case of the two moons; and thus the definition becomes too wide]. "But what is meant is that the cognition of the thing should be one that is not wrong or mistaken [so thaṭ the definition could not apply to the case cited]." That does not help you; as

* Jacob: *Handful of Popular Maxims*, II 24.

the cognition of the thing itself is not wrong. [*E. g.* Even when we mistake a single moon for two, one cognition of the moon itself is not wrong]. And further this definition of *Svarupa-Bhēḍa* also applies to that case where a certain thing, which is really one only, is cognised simply as itself, neither as 'of the same form' nor as 'of diverse form' [as in this case also, the thing, though *cognised, is not cognised as of the same form*] [and this is absurd; that whenever anything is cognised by itself it is a case of difference!]. "In actual practice there is no such case as has been just cited; as in every case an object must be recognised as being either of the same form, or of a different form". This is not right; as in a matter of common experience there is no room for quarrelling over facts: As a matter of fact it often happens that when a man is asked—'that which you saw, was it one or many?'—he answers—'as regards the particular fact no suspicions arose in my mind, nor did I feel any curiosity to seek for this information; I saw and cognised the thing by itself, and thereupon became indifferent to all other details in connection with it.' "Well this form of the thing by itself also—does constitute its difference from something else; so that how can the definition be stigmatised as 'too wide', by being found applicable to that case?" This is not right; as in case, the qualifying term 'not cognised as of the same form' would be entirely superfluous; and it would be sufficient to define difference as consisting in *mere cognition*; as whatever is *known* is certainly *different* from something. You will perhaps say that the qualification of 'being not cognised as of the same form' has been added with a view to preclude the possibility of a thing being recognised as *different* from itself. But this has been answered [by the citing of the case where the man who sees a thing not having any doubts as to its being one or many]. "What is meant by *ṭāḍrūpya* is not being *of the same from*, but being *of another from* [the pronoun '*ṭaṭ*' in the compound *ṭāḍrūpya* denoting

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another, 'that'] [so that the definition cannot apply to the difference of a thing from itself]." This cannot be; as in the first place, the pronoun '*taț*' would in that case, stand for something entirely different from the thing concerned [which would make the definition totally absurd];—and further if this *being another* consisted of *svarūpa-bhēḍa* of a thing, then there would be 'self-dependence', as what you want to define is all '*svarūpa*' [*i. e.*, it is not yet known what Svarūpa' is; so that for understanding what 'svarūpa' is you bring in the word *another*; and your explanation of this *another* again contains the word '*svarūpa*', thus the explanation of *svarūpa* is made dependent upon itself];—if, on the other hand, the *being another* consisted of *mutual negation*, then there is mutual interdependence [*i. e.* we know what is *mutual negation* when we know what is *svarūpa-bhēḍa*; and for comprehending this latter, we need to understand the meaning of *being another*, which again is only mutual negation];—lastly if *being another* consist of *diversity of character*, then there arises a vicious circle [*i. e.* unless we know what *svarūpa-bhēḍa* is we cannot know what *mutual negation* is;—unless we know what mutual negation is we do not make out what is contradictory to what;—without knowing this latter, we cannot know what 'diversity of character' is;—and it is upon our knowing what this last is that our comprehension of *svarūpabhēḍa* depends].

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(113) Uḍayana (as shown in para 105, above) has defined *Mutual Negation* as *abāḍhiṭaḥsamānāḍhikaraṇo niṣēḍhapratyayaḥ*; and this definition is not acceptable; as when we come to examine the real meaning of the expression '*samānāḍhikaraṇo niṣedhaḥ*' 'cosubstrate negation, &c.,' we find that what the definition means is that *Mutual Negation is that negation which is cognised as co-substrate.* And with regard to this we ask—what is the meaning of the negation being *co-substrate*? (A) Does it mean

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that it has a similar (*samāna*) substrate? (B) or that it has one substrate? (C) or that it has identity for its counter-entity (i. e., it denies identity)? (D) or that which is denoted by that word (i. e., the negative particle) which stands in the relation of the *qualification and qualified* to the word denoting the thing which is the substrate (*f. i.*, the 'jar' denoting the jar which is the substrate of the negation)? (E) or does it mean something different from all these?

(113) (A) It cannot mean the first of those—i. e., it cannot mean that the negation has a similar substrate; as we meet with such conceptions as 'in the face of my beloved, as in the moon, there is no possibility of the slightest blemish' [where the *negation of blemish* has similar substrates, and would thus become included in the definition]. "Mutual negation actually subsists between the Face and the Moon [so that it is only right that the said negation should fall under the definition]." This contention is not right; as even though it is true that there is *mutual negation* between the Face and the Moon, it is not true that the conception cited by us has that negation for its object. [The conception does not mean that the Face is different from the Moon]. "The conception may not have the negation for its object; but so long as the definition we have propounded applies to it (and serves to distinguish it from everything else), it does not matter if the conception cited by you does not have the negation for its object." This is not right; as in that case, what does the definition come to? (*a*) It could not mean that *mutual negation* is that which is the object of the conception or cognition of that denial which has similar substrates [as this definition would apply to the instance of the Face and Moon cited above];—(*b*) nor could it mean that 'mutual negation consists in the conception or cognition of the denial with similar substrates' [as this definition would be

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an impossible one, not applying to what is sought to be defined, mutual negation not being a *conception*].* (*c*) nor lastly, could the definition mean that 'mutual negation is that which is present where there is cognition of such difference as has similar substrates (i. e., it is that negation which is co-substrate with the said cognition'; because with this definition, all the properties that subsist in the things (between which the *mutual negation* subsists) would have to be regarded as so many *mutual negations*! And this would make the qualification '*samānādhikaraṇaḥ*' entirely superfluous [as *all* properties subsisting in the things being included, the qualification fails to exclude anything, and as such becomes superfluous.]

[Page 645] (115) (B) Similarly the second alternative—that '*samānādhikaraṇa*' is that which has one substrate—also becomes rejected, if we take for our example any one of the two things cited above (viz: Face and the Moon) [so that the ordinary negation, that appears in the conception, 'there is no blemish in the face of my beloved,' would have to be regarded as 'mutual negation,' as it has *one substrate*, and this is all that '*samānādhikaraṇa*' means].

(116)(C) Nor can the third alternative—that what is meant by the mutual negation being *samānādhikaraṇa* is that it has identity for its counter-entity—be maintained. For until we understand what *identity* is, we can have no idea of its being a *counter-entity*; hence it becomes necessary to define *identity*; and it is not possible to provide an adequate explanation of identity:—Identity could only be explained either as (*a*) *oneness*, (*b*) or as '*absence* of difference'. It is not possible to explain it as the 'svarūpa,' or 'specific form' of a thing; as

* The *Shānkarī* suggests another explanation of (*b*); by this, the text would stand thus—"mutual negation cannot be defined as that which is *always* the object of the conception of a denial which has similar substrates"; the addition of *always* serving to exclude the ordinary negation, which has dissimilar and different substrates also. The objection to this argument would, according to the *Shānkarī*, be that the phrase "similar substrates" has still to be explained.

in the first place, the Logician regards the 'specific form' of a thing as constituting its *difference* from all other things [and what constitutes *difference* cannot be regarded as *Identity*]; and secondly (if the specific form of the thing constituted its *Identity*), on seeing the thing, there could be no possibility of the arising of any doubt as to its being, or not being, identical [as the perception of its *form* would mean the perception of its *identity*]. (*a*) If then *identity* be explained as *one-ness*, is this *one-ness* a particular number? or an entirely different property? It cannot be the former; firstly because in that case, there could be no *identity* among Qualities (Actions, Communities, Individualities, Inherences) [as a quality can, according to the Logician, subsist in Substances only];—secondly, at the first moment of the existence of a product, even though it is one only, it would have to be regarded as non-identical with itself [as, according to the Logician, at the moment that an object is brought into existence, it is without any quality; and Identity, being a number, which is a quality, could not, therefore, subsist in that object at that moment];—and if you urge that you do not accept the Vaishēṣika tenet (of the product being without qualities at the moment of its production), even then, the same objection would lie against you, with reference to *one-ness* itself, which could never have any Identity at all [as Identity being one-ness, if Identity belonged to it, that would mean that One-ness rests in itself, which is absurd];—if, with a view to escape from this, it be held that the *Identity* (that rests in One-ness) is that which is connected with certain concomitant circumstances or limitations (and not that which consists in pure One-ness,—so that there is no *resting in itself*),—then, we ask, how could this *Identity*, which is related to the circumstances, be ever regarded to be one and the same as *Identity* in its pure unalloyed form?—when, as a matter of fact, the ideas that we have of them are wholly divergent (our Conception of *pure* Identity being different

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from that of Identity as limited by circumstances). Nor will it be right to regard *one-ness* as an entirely different property; as if so regarded, that other property would require another different property, and so on there would be an infinite regress;—and if there were no 'different property' after the first one, then a thing would cease to be identical with itself. (*b*) Nor again will it be right to explain *Identity* as *absence of difference*; as the *absence of difference* would only be absence of *mutual negation*; as *Mutual Negation* consists in the denial of Identity (and Identity is absence of difference); then again, for the same reason Identity also will consist in the denial of mutual negation; as it is a well-established fact that the *negative* and the *negatived* consist of the denial of each other;—under the circumstances, it will be impossible to comprehend *Identity* without knowing what *mutual negation* is; as the cognition of the *negative* is always dependent upon the cognition of the *negatived*;—and thus you are landed in a 'vicious circle' [for explaining *Mutual Negation* it is necessary to understand *Identity*, and *vice-versa*].

(117) [D] Nor is the fourth alternative—viz. what is meant by the negation being *co-substrate* is that it is denoted by that word which stands in the relation of the *qualification and the qualified* to the word denoting the thing which is the substrate—tenable; as in that case the definition of '*Mutual Negation*' would apply to the ordinary negation expressed in such conceptions as '*nirghatam bhūtalam*', 'this place is jar-less'. [As here also the words '*nirghatam*' and '*bhūtalam*' stand to each other in the relation of the qualification and the qualified].

(118) [E] Nor lastly can we accept the fifth alternative —that what is meant by the Negation being co-substrate is something different from these. When you speak of the negation being co-substrate, it must mean co-substrate with

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its counter-entity; so that the negation that is so co-substrate with its counter-entity would (according to you) be the *Mutual Negation*; and such being the case, it would not be right to define *mutual negation* as consisting in the '*pratyaya*' or cognition of the co-substrate negation [as has been proposed above in para. 113]. And further, if *mutual negation* were held to be co-substrate with its counter-entity, then the negation that is involved in the conception 'the *Kumbha* is not *paṭatva*' would not be 'mutual negation' [as '*paṭatva*', which is the counter-entity of the negation does not subsist in the *Kumbha*, which is the substrate of the negation; so that the negation is not 'co-substrate with its counter-entity'] It might be held that, even though in the particular case of mutual negation cited the desired 'co-substrateness with the counter-entity' is not present, yet it remains true that 'mutual negation' *in general* (as a generic entity) is so 'co-substrate'. But in that case you will admit a certain peculiarity of character as the basis for the generic conception of 'mutual negation',—the presence of which character (in the particular instance cited by us) will justify its inclusion under the generic entity 'mutual negation'; and under the circumstances, this character itself would be perfectly capable of forming the definition (distinctive feature) of *mutual negation*; and would, on that account, interdict the putting forward of any other definition (such as you propose), which after all, is (as you have admitted) dependent upon the said character. As a matter of fact however, even this will not be possible [that is, it will not be right to accept this other *character* as the definition of *mutual negation*]; as this has already been refuted by us in connection with the refutation of the distinction that you draw between *Mutual Negation* and *Ordinary Negation*; and it is not possible for you to discover any other method (of defining) than the one there refuted. "The *mutual negation* involved in the conception '*ghaṭaḥ paṭatvam na bhavati*' (which has been cited by you against

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us, as not being 'co-substrate with its counter-entity') is the same as that which is involved in the conception *'paṭaḥ paṭaṭvam na bhavaṭi'*; and the negation being the same, its counter-entity can be one (*i. e., paṭaṭva*) only; and as the negation is actually found, in some cases, [as in the conception *'paṭaḥ paṭaṭvam na bhavaṭi'*,] to be co-substrate with this counter-entity (*paṭaṭva* being actually present in the *paṭa*, as well as in the *negation*), we are not wrong in asserting that '*mutual negation* is co-substrate with its counter-entity.'" This reasoning is not right, we reply; as by the same reasoning the *mutual negation* of a thing would become the same as its *absolute negation*,—the same thing being the counter-entity of both! And further, just as *Identity* rests in two substrates, so also does Conjunction; so that even on this ground the definition would become applicable to the Ordinary Negation of Mutual Negation of Conjunction *. Lastly, if by 'co-substrateness with the counter-entity' be meant subsistence in the same substrate at different points of time, then the definition would apply to *Prior Negation* and *Destruction* also; as these also subsist in the same substrate in which their counter-entity may subsist at any other time [E.g. before the jar is produced out of the clay, there subsists in the Clay, the *Prior Negation* of the jar, and after its production the jar also subsists in the same clay, so that there is 'co-substrateness.'] If, with a view to avoid this, it be held that the subsistence (of the negation and its counter-entity) in the same substrate should be at one and the same time, then the definition would not apply to the *mutual negation* of time [as by the definition it would be necessary for the *negation of time* to subsist in its substratum *at the same time that Time* does; which would imply the subsistence of Time

* This anticipates the explanation that there can be no sameness between mutual and absolute negations as the counter-entity of the former rests in two things, while that of the latter rests on a single thing.

in and at a time; and this is impossible; as by the Logician's theory, Time cannot pertain to Time.]

(119) Lastly Udayana has defined (as mentioned above, in para. 105) the third kind of *Difference*, ' Diversity of Properties', as consisting in *incompatiblity*, which has been explained as the impossiblity of the two properties co-existing in any one object. This also is an assertion made by one whose mind is confounded. For, we ask—Is there, or is there not, a difference between *Pramāṇa* (Instrument of Cognition) and *Pramēya* (Object of Cognition)? If there is not, then the two words, '*pramāṇa*' and '*prameyā*' would be, synonymous! and the result would be that, when asked to indicate the *pramāṇa* for a certain cognition, one would simply mention, in answer, the *object* (*pramēya*) of that cognition!

Nor can the former alternative be maintained—that. there is a difference between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*; as, in the first place, the *difference* between these cannot consist in their very nature; as one and the same thing is often found to partake of the character of both; as for instance in the case of the balance (which is a *pramāṇa* in regard to the weight of other things, and a *prameya* when it is itself perceived, says Vāṭsyāyana in his Bhāṣya II 1-16) [and this would not be possible if there were something in the very nature of *pramāṇa* and *pramēya* that made them different].

Secondly, for the same reason the difference between the two could not be in the form of *mutual negation*.

The only form of *difference* that remains is of the third kind which consists in the *diversity of character*; this alone might be possible in the case of *pramāṇa* and *pramēya*, as one and the same thing is *Pramāṇa* when endowed with one character, and '*pramēya*' when endowed with another. But, in that case, the definition of this kind of *difference*— as consisting in the impossibility of the two characters consisting in any single object—would fail

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to apply to this case [the character of both '*Pramāṇa*' and '*Pramēya*' subsisting in one and the same thing.] And thus it turns out that when Uḍayana propounded the said definition, he forgot the instructions of the great sage (Gautama) imparted in the sūtra '*pramēyā cha ṭulāprāmāṇyavaṭ*' (II. i. 16) [where it is mentioned that one and the same thing' e.g. the Balance, is both *Pramāṇa* and *Pramēya*]. We desist from further prolonging of the discussion.

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(120) "It cannot be denied that our notion of Difference is obtained by means of Sense-perception; and hence the cause of this cognition must be held to be *contact of the sense-organ with the object* (which is the cause of all sense-perception); and in this contact, as bringing about the cognition of difference, there are two factors, one of which is the sense-organ, and the other that with which the sense-organ is in contact; and it is this second factor of the contact that we call 'difference' [so that Difference may be defined as the object of the *notion of difference*."] This cannot be accepted; as we have already rejected, by means of several arguments, the very notion of 'difference'; so that we cannot accept the assertion that the said notion is brought about by 'the contact of the sense-organ with the object.'

[The discussion on Difference leads on to the subject of 'Cause'; as the last argument of the Logician has been to the effect that the *Sense-object Contact* is the 'Cause' of the *notion of difference*. So the author next proceeds to discuss the nature of the *Cause*].

(121) What too do you understand by *Cause*? It cannot be defined as that which goes before—i.e. the antecedent. As in that case, things that have long been utterly destroyed (and ceased to exist) would have to be regarded as 'Cause'. "We shall define *Cause* as the *immediate* antecedent—that which goes immediately before the effect." This also will not be right; as in that case, what would be regarded as the

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cause would be the *operation* (that brings about the effect, and not that to which the operation belongs). "But the *operation* of the ṭhing cannot be regarded as intervening between that thing and its effect (on the law that what belongs to a thing cannot interrupt it). [So that if the effect is immediately preceded by the operation of a thing, it is to be taken as immediately preceded by this latter thing itself]." This is not right; as in that case the cause of the cause of an effect will have to be regarded as the 'Cause' of that effect [as the Cause also belongs to the Cause]. "But the Cause of the Cause is not the *operation* of the cause; so that it could not be regarded as the Cause of the Effect." Unless you add some specification, it is not possible to determine what *is* 'operation' and what is not. "When, in the absence of something, a cause does not produce the effect, that something is to be regarded as its 'operation' towards that effect." This is not right; as by this definition the auxilliaries of the cause will have to be regarded as its 'operation.' "But we shall add the qualification 'that which is produced' [so that the 'operation' of the cause is that which, being produced by that cause, leads to the production of the effect of that cause]." This cannot help you out of your difficulty; as in the first place, until it is ascertained what the 'cause' is, it cannot be determined what is 'produced' by what; and secondly, even if this be somehow determined, by the definition that you have provided, the *Ākāsha* and such other permanent entities would have to be regarded as the 'cause' of everything [as these things are the immediate antecedents of everything that is produced].

[Page 652] (122) "We can define the *Cause* as that antecedent which is not *anyaṭhāsiḍḍha*." This definition cannot be accepted; as it behoves you to explain what is meant by '*anyaṭhāsiḍḍha*'—*i.e.*, what is meant by the cause being '*siḍḍha*', and in comparison to what it should not be

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anyathā. If by the cause being not *anyathāsiddha* it be meant that it is *not produced by a method different from the effect,* then the definition becomes an impossible one; as the cause is never produced by the effect. Nor can the meaning be that it is not *known* by a means different from the effect; as *causes* are very often *known* by such means as Sense-perception and the rest (which latter are not their *effects*); and all cognition of the *Cause* is not always derived from its effect. Nor will it be right to explain '*na anyathāsiddha*' as that it is not *produced,* or *known,* as other than the Cause; as in the first place, in this manner the cognition (and also the production) of the Cause would be dependent upon itself which is an absurdity; and secondly, as a matter of fact, the Cause is often found to be cognised by other means also.

(123) "What we mean by '*anyathā*', 'different', is that which is *not-cause* [so that when we speak of the Cause as *not anyathāsiddha* what is meant is that it is *siddha* in a form other than that of the not-cause]." This also is not right; as it does not remove the objectionable feature that has been urged [*i. e., other than the not-cause* is synonymous with *Cause*; hence if the conception of the cause depends upon that of what is *other than the not-cause,* you have the self-dependence as before]; and further, the philosopher who, like the Logician, does not accept the momentary character of all things, holds that the production and cognition of a thing is present even before it acquires the character of the 'Cause' [as the causal character is acquired by a thing that already exists, and thus there are production and cognition of the thing, in a form other than that of the 'Cause' *i. e.,* in a form of the *non-cause*; and thus the definition proposed becomes too narrow, being not applicable to the causes just mentioned]. "But even in such cases, (even though its production and cognition are present from before) the Cause does exist immediately before the effect; and having the char-

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acter of the 'cause' at that time, it is poss'ble that even before that time, its production and cognition may be regarded as being only in the form not different from that of the 'Cause' [so that the definition remains quite applicable to all these cases also]. It is true that there may be some particular cases, where the cause does not fulfil these conditions exactly [*e. g.*, when the cause is such that it is destroyed the very moment at which it is produced, and is not actually present immediately before the effect]; but even these cases belong to the same category as the regular 'Cause'; and as such these also being included in the generic conception of the 'Cause', no such individual case can be regarded as vitiating the correctness of the general principle involved in the definition". Even so, the definition cannot be accepted; as this causal character could not be denied to such eternal substances as the *Ākāsha* and the rest, even with regard to effects other than those produced by themselves [as all permanent substances exist immediately before all effects, and they exist in the forms of 'Cause', as they do produce their own Effects]. "But all these permanent substances are *anyathāsiddha*—existing in a manner different from the Cause; inasmuch they exist before the production of effects, (not *as causes*, but) only as omnipresent and eternal substances. [So that the definition cannot apply to such Substances]." This reasoning is not right; as by this *Ākāsha* (never being a *Cause*) would cease to be the cause of Sound also (which, according to the Logician, is the product of Ākāsha).

(124) The reasons just set forth (against the idea of '*ananyathāsiddha*') also dispose of the definition of *Cause* as that which is not *anyathāsiddha*, and whose presence and absence are in keeping with the presence and absence of the effect;—and this definition is open to the further objection that, as no *absence* is possible in the case of *Ākāsha* and such other permanent substances, these could never be a *Cause*.

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[Page 654] (125) "We shall define the *Cause* as that which is operative." This also is not tenable; as does *being operative* mean that the operation inheres in it? Or that it is the producer of the operation? It cannot be the former; as in that case a sacrificial performance could never be a 'cause' [as the operation, in this case, inheres in the performer, and not in the performance]. Nor can it mean the latter; as it is the exact nature of the 'producer' (which is the same as 'cause') that you are seeking to explain [so that it is not right to introduce the same in the explanation].

(126) Another definition of Cause is proposed:—"The Cause of an effect is that which is the precluder of the possibility of the effect being either eternally existent or absolutely non-existent." This also cannot be accepted; as, in the first place, until you have explained what a 'cause' is, you cannot determine the exact signification of the verbal affix in the word '*nivāraka*' ('*precluder*') [the affix in the word signifying *cause*, we cannot understand what is meant by 'precluder', unless we know what a 'Cause' is; so that the proposed definition is futile, as it does not help us to understand what the 'Cause' is]. Secondly, you cannot provide an adequate explanation of the conception of 'either this or that' (involved in your definition).*

(127) Another definition is put forward—"One thing is regarded as the *Cause* of another when it is found that in case the former is not admitted, there would arise the possibility of the latter coming into existence before it is actually found to do so; and this character constitutes the definition, or distinctive feature, of the Cause." We cannot accept this definition either; for as a matter of fact we find that in case we do not admit the *destruction* of an entity, there is a possibility of its existing before it actually comes into existence

* If the phrase 'either this or that' implies uncertainty, then the definition becomes doubtful and hence indefinite, vague. If it implies the notion of *mutual negation*, this has already been refuted.

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[as that which has no destruction must be eternal, ever-existent]; so that, by your definition, the *destruction* will have to be regarded as the *cause* of the entity! If, with a view to avoid this difficulty, you add the qualification that it should exist before the effect (which will exclude *destruction*, which never exists before the thing is destroyed),—even then the definition would apply to the negation of co-existent things [for instance, according to the Logician, when the jar is baked, colour, taste and odour are produced in it simultaneously; and in this case, if the *prior negation* of the *colour*, which does exist before the colour comes into existence, be not admitted, there arises the possibility of the appearance, not only of colour, but also of taste and odour; so that, by the definition, the *prior negation* of *colour* will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of Taste and Odour, and *vice versa*!] If this be admitted [*i. e.* if the prior negation of Colour be admitted to be the *Cause* of Taste], then, by the same reasoning, the attendant accessories also (of Colour) will have to be regarded as the *cause* (of Taste). If this also be admitted, then this would mean an absolute identity between the two effects (Colour and Taste)! The definition is open to the further objection that it is non-comprehensive [applying to only specific causes; as the word '*yat*' in the compound '*yadabhyupagamē*' must refer to specific things only]. In answer to this it might be urged that it is true that the definition applies to specific causes only, but it applies to *all* specific causes (all which thus becoming included, the definition becomes quite comprehensive). But (if the definition applies to all individual causes), then in that case, the definition becomes too wide [the cause of the jar's colour having to be regarded as the cause of its Taste]: And if, in answer to this, it be urged that the definition does not refer to any individual causes in particular [but generally to *those things whose non-acceptance makes possible the existence of the effect before its time*], then, that makes room for

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the objections that we are going to put forth later on, on the basis of the unacceptability of all possible alternatives with regard to the meaning of the word '*pūrva*', 'before' [and in the absence of an adequate explanation of the word '*pūrva*', no sense can attach to the definition now under review].

(128) "We can define *Cause* as the invariable antecedent." This also is not tenable; as if *invariability* means *necessity* [the meaning being that that is the *cause* which must always exist before the effect], then the objection remains that *Ākāsha* and such other eternal substances would, in that case, be the *Cause* of all Effects; and further, the component parts of a thing would have to be regarded as the cause of that thing, as also of the colour and other qualities of the thing. If, on the other hand, *invariability* means *unadventitiousness*, then the meaning of the definition would be that that which is the unconditional or natural precursor of the effect,—whose antecedence is not due to any adventitious circumstance,—is the *Cause*; and by this definition, the issuing (out of the hole) of ants (which is a precursor of rain) will have to regarded as the *Cause* of rain! Then again, of two co-existent things (Colour and Taste of the jar being baked e. g.) the causal accessories of one will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of the other [*e. g.* the accessories producing Taste will be the Cause of Colour; as the antecedence of these two latter will not be due to any adventitious circumstances]. "In the case of the appearance of ants and rainfall, the invariability does not pertain to the former, [as there is rainfall even when ants do not appear]; it pertains only to the sequence of the latter [there is sure to be rain when ants appear] [so that our definition cannot make the appearance of ants the *cause* of rain]." This explanation does not help the definition; [even though this reasoning might apply to the case of the ants and rain, yet there

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is another case which makes the definition too wide; *e. g.*] in the case of the premonitory symptoms of diseases, it is found that the said 'invariability' pertains to the antecedence of these symptoms [which, by the definition, will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of the disease]. "True; these are certainly the *Cause* of the disease." Not so, we reply; as, in that case, there would be no distinction between 'premonitory symptoms' and the '*nidāna*' (Cause) of diseases [a distinction that has been insisted upon by all standard writers on Medicine].

(129) Further, you have to explain what you mean by 'antecedent' [when you say that the *Cause* in the 'antecedent' of the Effect]. "That is the 'antecedent' which is connected with previous time." This is not right; as with this definition, Time could never be the *Cause* of anything [as according to the Logician, Time cannot be connected with time]; and further, we have to consider what is meant by the *previousness* of time [in the phrase 'previous time' that appears in your definition of *Antecedence*]. "*Previousness* is that which is determined by past circumstances [such as the movements of the sun, whereby Time is determined and measured]." This is not right; as you have still to explain what is meant by the past participial word '*atīta*', 'past,' which itself denotes *previous time* [and as such cannot rightly be introduced into a definition of 'previousness']. "There are two qualities, *Paratva* (Priority) and *Aparatva* (Posteriority); and of these it is the former that constitutes *previousness*". This cannot be maintained; as the Logician does not admit the presence of any such quality in Time and other immaterial substances, or in Quality, Action and other Categories [as according to the Logician, Priority and Posteriority are qualities belonging to material Substances only; and hence Time being an immaterial substance, and Quality &c., not being Substances, *previousness* could not

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belong to any of these; so that they could never be the *Cause* of anything!]; nor could the said quality of *paraṭva* belong to *Paraṭva* itself; so that *Paraṭva* also could never be a *Cause* of its own direct apprehension [though as a matter of fact, in every direct apprehension the object apprehended is regarded as its Cause].

[Page 658] (130) Nor will it be right to define the *Cause* as a part of the *Sāmāgrī*, *i. e.* the circumstances or accessories attendant (upon the appearance of the effect). As, in the first place, it cannot be determined what 'a part' in this connection is; for it is not possible for the 'Circumstances' to have any *avayava* (component parts) or *pradēsha* (particular place in the entire extent), or any other form of 'part;'—and secondly, the word '*Sāmāgrī*' is only a collective name applied to all the causes that operate in the producing of an effect; so that in defining the *Cause* by means of that word you are defining the *Cause* by itself (thus landing yourself in a circle). "But we give the name *Sāmāgrī* to that whereafter the effect necessarily appears [so that our definition does not involve the absurdity of defining the *Cause* by itself]." This is not right; as in the case of Disjunction we find that as soon as there is disjunction, the destruction of Conjunction necessarily follows; so that, by your definition, the Disjunction would have to be regarded as the *Sāmāgrī* of the destruction of Conjunction, [while, as a matter of fact it is the sole *Cause* of it];—similarly, the action or motion (that brings about Disjunction, and as such is its *Cause*) would have to be regarded as '*Sāmāgrī*';—and lastly, the final contact of the yarns (which is the Cause of the cloth) would have to be regarded as the '*Sāmāgrī*.'

(131) "There is a distinct relationship known under the name of '*Kāryakāraṇa-bhāva*', the Cause-Effect-Relation' [and that in which this relation subsists is the *Cause*]." In that case, so far as the said relation is concerned, there

being no difference between the Cause and the Effect (in both of which the Cause-Effect-Relation subsists), it would be impossible to determine which is the *Cause* and which the *Effect.* And, if you seek to avoid this confusion by making a distinction between the two by qualifying their relation by 'Cause' and 'Effect' respectively [so that the 'Cause' is *that which is related to the Effect,* and the 'Effect' is *that which is related to the Cause*],—then it becomes necessary for you to provide separate definitions of each of them.

(132) "*Kāraṇatva,* the *causal character,* is a definite property [and that which possesses this property is the *Cause*]." This cannot be accepted; as it behoves you to explain what proof you have for the existence of such a character. "The proof of it lies, in some cases [*e. g.* in the case of the stick as producing the jar], in direct Perception, and in others, [*e. g.* in the case of the atom being the cause of all composite substances] in Inference based upon Perception." This is not right; what is that with regard to which (as the effect) the 'Causality' (of the *Cause*) would be indicated by Perception? [That is to say, when you *perceive* the stick as the *cause,* do you perceive it—as the *cause of the jar*? Or simply as a *cause in general*?] The *cause* cannot be held to be perceived merely as a *cause* in general, without any reference to a particular effect; for, as a matter of fact, no cause is ever perceived as such; and this for the simple reason that all positive and negative cognitions with regard to any cause—as also every property that is recognised as indicative of the causal character—can pertain only to particular effects. Nor will it be right to hold that when you recognise a cause (the stick for instance) you know it as the cause of *jar in general* (without reference to any particular individual jar). For in that case there could be no production of *individual jars* at all (the 'causes of the jar' being recognised as productive of the *jar in general*

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only). If, in answer to this, it be held that the cause productive of the *jar in general* would naturally produce the individual jar also [as the *jar in general* is inseparable from the *individual* jars],—then there would be this difficulty that you could not ascertain which particular *cause* would produce which particular effect. On the other hand, if it be held that when the *cause* is perceived it is recognised as productive of each individual effect, then, inasmuch as before it is produced the effect is not in existence, it cannot come into contact with the sense-organs; and as such it will not be possible for the *cause*, in this case, to be cognised by Perception;—and as for the time during which the effect is actually in existence (*i.e.*, after it has been produced), at that time all the circumstances that constitute the '*sāmagrī*' necessary for the production of that particular effect are not present,—so that that is not the time *at* which the effect is produced; and under the circumstances, how could there be at that time, any *perception* of the cause *as qualified by the production* (*i.e., as productive*) *of that effect*? [The *production* not being present at the time]. And as such a qualified cause would never have been perceived before (the production of the effect), there would be no possibility of the help of any *impression* [that could remind the perceiver of the cause previously perceived and thereby lead to his subsequent *recognition* of it]. Similarly, how could there be any Inference with regard to such a *cause*?—No such cause having ever been perceived, on the basis of what *probans* could there be any premiss (expressing invariable concomitance) from which such an Inference could proceed? As for the Retaliatory Argument that might be put forward by the Logician [to the effect that if no cognition of the cause is possible how does the Vēdāntin proceed with arguments? Or how does he proceed to drink water when he feels thirsty?], —no such argument can be rightly urged against one who regards everything as inexplicable. "The cognition of

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the *Cause* would proceed from Inference based upon the premiss that without a Cause the occasional character of the effect (*i.e.*, the fact that the effect is produced only at a particular time) cannot be accounted for". This inference, we reply, will not be sound; as the two characters (the character of 'cause' and the said 'occasional character') subsist in different substrates [the former in the *Cause* and the latter in the *effect*; thus affecting the 'fallacy of four terms']. Even if the two characters were, somehow, shown to be co-substrate, [by putting the inference in the form that the effect, which is *occasional*, must *have a cause*']—there will arise a further difficulty: the character of *having a cause*, which is put forward as accounting for the *occasional character*, would itself need something else to account for itself; and so on and on, there would be an *infinite regress*; nor will it be possible to justify this regress on the ground of the said series having no beginning in time [on the analogy of the regress involved in the case of the seed and the tree] [for if the series were regarded as beginningless, there would be an end to the very conception of *cause and effect*]. Then again, if the two characters belonged to different substrates, if there were no relation between the character that is accounted for (*i.e.*, the occasional character) and that which accounts for it (*i.e.*, the character of *having a cause*), then there would be no restriction (as to what proves what);—if, on the other hand, there be some relation between the two, then there arises an *infinite regress* [the relation belonging to the relatives by some sort of relation, etc., so on and on].

[Page 662] (133) The arguments just urged (in the preceding paragraph) also dispose of the definition of *Cause* (propounded by the *Mīmāṃsaka*) as that which has '*shakṭi*', *power* or *efficiency*.

(134) Then again, as regards the view that the nature of the *Cause* is something actually perceptible, it is a well-

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known fact that in every Perceptional Cognition, the *object* also is a 'Cause' operating towards the cognition through the 'contact' (of the sense-organ with the object, which is the essential cause of every perception); and thus in the perception of *cause*, you will have the undesirable contingency of the *cause* [as the *object*, and also as such the *Cause* of that perception] operating upon itself. If, in order to avoid this contingency, you deny the causal character of the 'Object' (of Perception), then you will have to deny such character of the 'Sense-organ' also; which also operates only through the *contact*, in which the 'object' is as essential as the 'sense-organ'. Specially as, if the contact of the *sense-organ* only, independently of the *object*, were held to be the *cause* of Perception, then a great confusion would result [the presence of the Eye alone without any object before it, would in that case, bring about the perception of all objects]. Lastly [if the nature of the *cause* were directly perceptible] as regards the question as to whether a certain thing is the *cause* or not [no difference of opinion would be possible, just as no one quarrels as to whether or not fire is hot; and if a difference of opinion could ever arise, there would be no chance of ever settling the question one way or the other] as while one person will perceive the *cause*, the other will not perceive it [and this state of things could not be altered]; And if, in order to determine the question, you were to call in the aid of the definitions that have been propounded—such, *e.g.*, as 'that which is a necessary precursor' and the like,—you become open to *all* the several objections that have been urged against every one of those definitions. And yet without some such distinctive feature, by the perception of what could you set aside your misconception and doubt (with regard to a certain thing being the cause of another thing)? Then again, it may happen that though the thing, which is the *cause*, is itself perceived by the senses, its *causal character* is not perceived; and in this case you will have to postulate something by the

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help of which the sense-organs would be enabled to apprehend the casual character; and such being the case, this latter something, which is a real entity, will provide the necessary basis for your notion of 'Cause'; and so, what would be there to justify the unnecessary complications involved in the assuming of another basis for the same notion? "[If the said 'something' which, being perceived, manifests the causal character to the sense-organs, be held to be the sole basis of the notion of 'Cause']—any such perceptible basis would be entirely absent in the case of such causes as *ākāsha* and the like whose casual character is always *inferred* (and never *perceived*); so that in view of such *causes*] we have to postulate a basis (for the notion of '*cause*') different from that manifestive 'something".' This is not right, we reply; as this would involve an objectionable interdependence: If Perception had for its object a 'causal character' different from that which manifests that character, then alone could the analogy of this lead to the inference that in the case of *Ākāsha* and such other things, the causal character is different from the said manifester;—and conversely, the fact of the causal character apprehended by Perception being different from that which makes that character apprehended is made to depend upon the facts of the causal character of *Ākāsha*, etc., being *inferred* (and not *perceived*).

(135) Further [is the *causal character* of such causes as the Stick and the like adventitious, something transient? or unadventitious, eternal?]—if the causal character is eternal, then, even before the cause produced its effect, we would have the notion that *it produces*, just as we would have the notion that *it exists*; and both these notions would be equally valid [which is absurd];—if, on the other hand, the casual character were transitory, then prior to the production and appearance of this *causal character* [which being an abstract generic entity, is only one], there would be no *casual character*

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anywhere at all [and there being no *causal character*, there would be no *cause* to produce that character]; and if, even though transitory, it were never *produced*, then why could not the same be the case with all such transitory objects as the jar and the like?

(136) Lastly if, there be such a single entity as '*Kāraṇatva*,' *causal character*,—and it subsists in each and every one of the diverse things that are regarded as 'cause,'—then everything would be the cause of every other thing! "But the '*casual character*' pertaining to each individual effect is distinct." This will not help you, we reply; as even so, there will be some character common to all *causes*; and this character being the basis of the simple comprehensive notion of 'cause', if this generic entity of the 'cause' were conceived of only as consisting of the causes of all such things as the jar and the like, you could not avoid the contingency of the 'cause of the jar' being regarded as the 'cause of the pillar.'! "But the comprehensive notion that we have is only in the generic form 'cause' and not in the form 'cause of the jar,' 'cause of the pillar,' 'cause of the cloth' and so forth." This is not right; as there is no proof for the existence of any such vague generic entity as 'cause', independently of all particularisation by reference to the jar and other particular effects,—a *cause*, that is, with regard to which it cannot be determined *of what effect* it is the 'cause.' On the other hand, if the generic character of one *unspecified* 'cause' were to subsist in that which is the 'cause' *of a particular effect*, then—as that same particular cause would not be the *cause* of some other particular effect, the character of the 'non-cause' also would subsist in it; so that one and the same object, being possessed of such mutually independent and contradictory characters as the 'cause' and the 'non-cause', would have to be regarded as 'different'; and

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thus your theory having led to the absurdity that every 'cause' is different from itself, you discard every chance of even a single 'cause' being established!

[Page 665] (137) Further, we ask—Has a particular effect a *cause* or not? If it has not, then it would either never exist at all, or be ever existent. If, on the other hand, it has a *cause*, then what is that *cause*? If you say simply that it is a particular individual, [i. e., a particular individual stick is the *cause* of a particular individual jar],—this cannot be accepted; as if this particular individual be held to be simply that which exists before the effect—the jar—is produced, even such adventitious accessories as the ass (on which the clay has been brought, and which is there before the jar is moulded) and the like would also have to be regarded as the *cause*; hence it behoves you to provide a further explanation as to what is it in the particular individual—stick—that makes it the *cause* of the particular effect—jar? (A) "Well, it is the form of the particular individual that makes it the *cause*." This will not be right; as in the first place such form is distinct with each individual object; so that if the *cause* of the particular effect (jar) were to consist in the specific form of any one particular individual (*stick*), then anything else not having that form could never be the cause of that particular effect! [i. e., if the *stick* is the cause of the jar, because it has the stick-form, then the potter's wheel and such other things, which do not have that form, could never be regarded as the *cause* of the jar;—and yet the name 'cause of the jar' is actually given (by the Logician, not to the stick only, but) to several particular individual things that produce the jar—viz: the constituent (clay), the non-constituent (stick, wheel, &c.,) and the active or efficient (potter); and if several distinct individuals (in the shape of the several kinds of *cause*) could form the basis of the use of the single comprehensive name ('cause of the jar'), then there

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would be no ground for the postulating of such comprehensive entities as '*Goṭva*,' the class 'cow' and the like [which are postulated only with a view to provide an adequate basis for the use of such comprehensive names as 'cow' &c., which could rest on the basis of the distinct individual cows], as we have already pointed out before. (B) "What makes the stick the *cause* of the jar is the fact that it is its necessary antecedent [which the ass and such other accessories are not]."* This also cannot be accepted; as what constitutes the *necessary* character (of the *antecedence*) is the fact that the two are *invariably concomitant*;—and as a matter of fact, there can be no such invariable concomitance between any particular individual cause and all particular individual effects [*e.g*, all particular jars can never be concomitant with any particular stick]; and if the qualification 'necessary' be removed, and mere 'antecedence' were made the condition, then many other things become included under the category of 'Cause,' which are not a cause at all. (C) "[In order to escape from the difficulty just pointed out] we explain that what makes a particular thing (the stick) the *cause* of another (the jar) is the fact that the former belongs to that *class or category* of things which is concomitant with things belonging to another class [so that the particular stick belongs to that *class* 'Stick' which is always found concomitant with every individual thing that belongs to the class 'jar']." This also is untenable; as this definition will apply to other individuals of the class also [*i.e.* it will include every stick that belongs to the category of 'stick,' and not only to that which is productive of the jar]. (D) "We may state the definition in the form that that which is the *cause*, while belonging to the category which is concomitant with things of the other category, *is the antecedent* of the particular individual of the latter category." This also cannot be accepted; as it will apply to hundreds of

* As a definition of 'Cause this has already been refuted above in para. 128.

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those particular things that may be productive of hundreds of particular effects appearing at the same time as the effect in question [so that if one hundred jars are produced at the same time, the cause of one would, under the definition, have to be regarded as the *cause* of all]; and if you accept this as desirable, then the destruction of the cause of one of these particular effects would imply the destruction of all those effects [*i.e.*, the destruction of the component particles of one jar will mean the destruction of all jars] ! And further it may be held that all these particular things, belonging to the category concomitant with things of the other category,—which are produced at any one time—are produced by *all* those causal accessories belonging to the category with which the other is concomitant, that exist at the time ;—but in that case, as difference of the effects can be due to difference in the causal accessories only, if you regard all accessories as jointly producing the several effects, this would mean that all the effects are identical [every one of them being produced conjointly by the same set of causes]; and if each effect be held to be produced by a distinct set of causal accessories, then each particular effect would have to be regarded as diverse [being the product of the diverse accessories]!

(138) [We next proceed to demolish the Logician's conception of the '*Samavāyikāraṇa*,' 'Constituent or Material Cause']. As regards the Constituent Cause, if you make the *similarity of properties* the determining factor [which indicates what is the *constituent* of what, so that the yarn is the *constituent* of cloth because there is a certain similarity between the two], then the definition becomes too wide [all the yarns in the world having to be regarded as the *constituent* of any particular piece of cloth];—and if you take each yarn by itself, then it would be impossible for you to get at any idea of *concomitance* (between *cloth and yarn*). "But we can define the *Constituent Cause* as that which, while belonging

Kh. II. 175.

to a category of things which are the invariable concomitants of the particular effect, is one that is co-situate (*sadēsha,*) with the effect [so that of any particular piece of cloth only those yarns would be the constituent cause which are co-situate with it, which occupy the space occupied by the piece of cloth]." This will not be right; for if by the two being 'co-situate' you mean that both are co-inherent, inhering in a common substratum, then this will not apply to the case in question at all; as you do not hold the view that the cause and its effect inhere in the same substratum;—if, on the other hand, by the two being 'co-situate' you mean that both are in conjunction or contact with the same points in space, then the definition will not apply to qualities and other such categories [which according to the Logician, cannot have any *conjunction,* which is possible for Substances only];—lastly if some indefinite sort of *co-situateness* be meant [so that even though in the case of Qualities and the Substances to which they belong, there is no conjunction, yet there is no doubt that there is some sort of *co-situateness* between them], then the definition becomes too wide [some sort of *co-situateness* being found in the case of many things that do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; for instance, when fire and water are contained *in the same room*]. Then again, inasmuch as you admit, as *Cause,* many such things as the unseen force and the like, which never occupy the same points in space as their effects, everything—whether co-situate or not—might be regarded as the *Cause* of everything else!—specially as mere antecedence remains the same in both cases [i. e. in the case of the co-situate *Cause* like the yarn, as also in the case of of the non-co-situate Cause like the Unseen Force].* Further, whenever we conceive of invariable concomitance, it is always as between two communities (*e. f.* between 'fire' in general and 'smoke' in general, and never as between particular individuals); so that [*if invariable concomitance* be the

* So that the stick at Benares would be the cause of the jar at Pātaliputra.

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